



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Maurice de Wulf

History of Mediæval Philosophy

by

Maurice de Wulf

*Professor at the University of Louvain
Professor Emeritus of Harvard University
Member of the Academie Royale de Belgique*

Translated by

Ernest C. Messenger, Ph.D. (Louvain)

*Sometime Lecturer in Philosophy at St. Edmund's College, Ware
Member of the Royal Institute of Philosophy*

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE SIXTH FRENCH EDITION

The sixth edition of our *History of Mediæval Philosophy* remains faithful to the general plan of preceding editions. It sets forth the general movements and rhythms involved in the succession of philosophic systems, the characteristic features of which are first of all outlined. The analytic or monographic method is thus combined here with the synthetic or comparative method, and we shall endeavour to justify the use of both.

Various modifications have been introduced into this sixth edition which must be mentioned here. The most important is a new interpretation of the resemblances between the philosophies of the Middle Ages. Struck by the extent and depth of these resemblances, in previous editions we treated the body of common doctrines as an attempt to set forth an ideal which exercised its attraction upon all. We advanced the idea that certain dominant doctrines, the powerful influence of which on the philosophers of the thirteenth century is so very manifest, form a coherent system ; that they emanated from a characteristic mental attitude ; that there existed a "scholastic" mentality ; that these "scholastic" doctrines were a decisive factor in civilisation ; and that it is allowable to explain the labour of the ninth to the twelfth century, and afterwards from the fourteenth to the fifteenth, in terms of this ideal. The great scholastic "synthesis" would thus appear as the culminating conception, which the preceding centuries prepared, which reached its zenith in the thirteenth century, and which declined in the following centuries. It would be the end or terminus towards which all tended, consciously or unconsciously, and those who opposed it could, because of their opposition to this dominant conception, be called "anti-scholastics."

Numerous criticisms have been made against this way of interpreting Scholasticism. The critics all agree in urging

that such a method does not get sufficiently close to the reality of the individual systems, the originality of which it is the duty of the historian to set out in relief.

We willingly admit that an attempt such as that we have described belongs less to history than to the philosophy of history, and that it is dependent upon the personal ideas which the individual historian possesses as to the theoretical value of particular systems. But we are still convinced that it is legitimate in itself, and that it offers much promise for future study and research.

First as to its legitimacy. The late Cardinal Ehrle justly remarked that one cannot deny to a historian the right to ascend to a philosophy of history, and to explain the systems of the Middle Ages by means of their relations to a philosophy-type, taken as a standard of value, provided its existence rests on real data and not on imaginary views. And he adds that such a manner of understanding the Philosophy of the Middle Ages "e la metà dei nostri voti e sforzi"; when we shall have gathered together the indispensable materials, after we have ransacked the mass of unpublished documents, we shall be able, without too great risk, to undertake "una filosofia della storia della scolastica."¹

We are glad to subscribe to this opinion, set forth by a master of mediæval history. When all the productions of the Middle Ages have become known, explained, and classified, and documentary research will be concerned only with details—as is the case with classical antiquity—it will, in our opinion, then be seen that, despite the infinite variety of mediæval philosophies, a common doctrinal patrimony was slowly built up in the course of centuries, which thus witnessed the progressive realisation of an intellectual unity, an ideal which exercised its influence upon all men's minds.

But leaving aside this point of view in the present edition, we here stress the strictly historical character of the synthetic views and approximations which we outline, at the same time confining them to the systems allowing of a detailed exposition in the present state of our knowledge. Understood in this way, a synthesis follows upon the facts, and never anticipates them.

¹ F. Ehrle, *L'Agostinismo e l'aristotelismo nella scolastica del secolo XIII*. Ulteriori discussioni e materiali, in *Xenia Thomistica*, Vol. III, p. 530, Rome, 1925.

Its extension is the same as that of the elements which it endeavours to unify. In consequence, such a synthesis remains always subject to revision. Every discovery of a new philosophy, every study which changes the appearance of a philosopher already known, may modify the contours of these syntheses, enlarge them, or contract them. Again, these synthetic views deal with a closed collection of systems, for the series of mediæval philosophers open to study forms a fixed number (even if all are not yet known). In scholastic terminology, we should say that the notions which are derived from these comparisons have a "collective," but not an "abstract" value. Their field of application is necessarily limited to the cases observed ; we may not extend it indefinitely.

Confined within these limits, the synthetic method is in no way arbitrary or imaginary ; it simply arranges the researches already carried out, and its results are valuable. It can even, by way of hypotheses, direct further researches. The analogies between the philosophical systems of the Middle Ages, and the fundamental community of possession of philosophical conceptions, realised at that time more than at any other period of history, are facts just as much as the originality of each thinker, and the doctrinal divergences of particular systems. This intellectual unity, which we previously regarded as an end to be attained, or an ideal to be aimed at, thus appears now as a result, or an effect. It is due above all, as we shall show, to the identity of influences affecting the thinkers of the Middle Ages, in varying proportions.

A second general innovation has been introduced into the present edition. This one is concerned with a question of terminology. Conforming ourselves to the general usage, we now identify "scholastic philosophy" and "mediæval philosophy." The expression "scholastic" thus has once more a chronological meaning, designating any philosophy of the Middle Ages, and the antinomy between "scholastic" and "antischolastic" loses the doctrinal significance which we gave to it in preceding editions. The modification is verbal rather than real, and this will not be surprising if we remember that most of the discussions concerning the expression "scholastic" can be reduced to quarrels concerning words. The equivalence between "scholastic" and "mediæval" does not modify the bearing of certain fundamental facts

which we shall establish, notably the formidable opposition between the "communiter loquentes" and certain other philosophers who attacked such or such a doctrine of the scholastic patrimony.

In drawing up the general bibliography which forms the second part of the Introduction, and the special bibliographies which terminate each individual section, we have been guided by the following principles.

It has appeared to us unnecessary to repeat the bibliographical material drawn up by B. Geyer in the latest edition of Ueberweg's *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, Vol. II (1928), a work well known to all specialists in mediæval philosophy. Accordingly, in the case of publications previous to 1928, we shall mention only the principal editions of texts and the most important works, so as to constitute a "select bibliography" on mediæval philosophy. On the other hand, we think it will be of service to students if we give them a more complete bibliography of publications which have appeared since the last edition of the *Grundriss*, and which have some scientific value.

The general bibliography and the special bibliographies have been drawn up by our friend and colleague Professor F. Van Steenberghen, to whom we here express our great gratitude.

As a rule, the complete description of a work will be found in the bibliography which concludes each section, and not in the footnotes. These will indicate the paragraph number which contains this bibliography.

At the end of the volume will be found a list of the abbreviations employed.

Mgr. Pelzer, the Scrittore of the Vatican Library, a great authority in the realm of Mediæval Philosophy, has very kindly brought up to date the sections which deal with the works possessed by the scholastics, and the translations of which they made use (Vol. I, No. 28 ; Vol. II, Ch. I, § I). In the preceding edition he had already rendered this same service to our readers. We beg him to accept our most sincere thanks.

MAURICE DE WULF.

Louvain,

15th May, 1934.

TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION

While this new edition of De Wulf's *History of Mediæval Philosophy* was in preparation, the sad news arrived of his death in Belgium on December 23rd 1947. Fortunately the Professor was able to complete his great work, for the third volume appeared in French in the autumn of 1947, a few weeks before his demise.

The work is now issued in three volumes. The first deals with Mediæval Philosophy from its beginnings down to the end of the twelfth century, the second deals with the thirteenth century, and the third with the fourteenth and part of the fifteenth century.

In the previous edition, published in two volumes (French edn. in 1924, English edn. in 1926), De Wulf gave a full exposition of what he held to be the "common patrimony or doctrinal inheritance" possessed by all mediæval Scholastics, and only then did he pass on to deal with mediæval philosophers individually. This treatment met with criticism from various writers, some of whom even went so far as to question whether we can rightly speak of a mediæval-Scholastic Philosophy common to all schools. In his Preface to the present edition De Wulf defends his viewpoint, but at the same time, in deference to his critics, he inverts the order of his treatment. He first deals with the individual philosophers, and only in the second place does he give a series of "Synthetic Studies." This method certainly has the advantage of enabling the reader first to study the facts, and thus to see the solid foundation for the inferences the author himself draws.

An English translation of the first two volumes of this new edition appeared in 1935 and 1937. It was, however, completely destroyed by enemy action during the late world war. It has now been revised, and the bibliographies have been brought down to the end of 1947. In addition, a long section in Vol. II, revised by Mgr. A. Pelzer, the well-known Vatican scholar, dealing with the thirteenth-century Latin translations of Greek and other works, which was omitted from the previous English

edition, is now included.¹ The third volume of the work appeared in 1947 in French only, and it is now translated into English for the first time.

An Index will be found at the end of each volume.

As a tribute to the author's memory I append a brief biographical note.

E. C. MESSENGER

MAURICE DE WULF

A Biographical Note

Maurice de Wulf was born in 1867, and was the son of a Belgian doctor. He received a solid classical education, first at Poperinghe, and then at the Jesuit College at Alost. He entered the University of Louvain in 1885, and obtained the degrees of Doctor of Laws and Doctor of Philosophy and Letters. The philosophical teaching at Louvain in those days was largely Cartesian in spirit, but De Wulf supplemented the normal lectures by attending the optional course on Thomistic Philosophy which had recently been introduced in the University by the young Professor Mercier, under whom he decided to devote his life to the study of the history of mediæval philosophy. He now began to travel, and attended the lectures given at Berlin by Zeller, Paulsen and Ebbinghaus, and also the lectures at Paris on historical criticism, given by Langlois. De Wulf's first work was a *History of Scholastic Philosophy in the Low Countries*, and this was crowned by the Royal Academy of Belgium. It appeared in 1893. About the same time, De Wulf began an intensive study of Henry of Ghent, and his essay on this interesting personality won him the degree of Doctor in Thomistic Philosophy at Louvain. De Wulf now began to plan a comprehensive History of Mediæval Philosophy, which had hitherto received no general or satisfactory treatment. The first edition of his work, in one volume, appeared in French in 1900, and it is a tribute to its excellence that, while in the course of time it has

¹ Mgr. Pelzer has also revised the long section in Vol. I, entitled *Philosophical Library* .. p. 58-73).

had to be enlarged from one volume to three, its general framework and main ideas are still sound. Following its publication, scholars throughout the world began their researches : libraries everywhere were ransacked for manuscripts of the works of mediæval philosophers, and the results were made known to the learned world. To realize the great progress made since De Wulf first wrote in 1900, one has only to compare the scanty bibliographies in the first edition of his *History* with the extensive ones found in subsequent issues and, above all, in the present final edition.

Throughout, De Wulf has defended the following views. First, he holds that in the Middle Ages there was a Scholastic *Philosophy*, distinct from Scholastic *Theology*. No-one questions that to-day, but it was a new idea when De Wulf first put it forward. The second point is that, in the Scholastic Philosophy of the Middle Ages, we can trace a common doctrine, which he calls the *Scholastic Patrimony*, and of which Thomism was only one form. This idea has met with more criticism than the other, but De Wulf has, in our opinion, successfully vindicated it. Thirdly, in the later editions of his work, De Wulf has brought out the close relations existing between Scholastic Philosophy and the development of civilization and art in mediæval times. He has set forth these ideas in greater detail in a separate work, based on lectures he gave at the University of Princeton, and published there under the title *Philosophy and Civilisation in the Middle Ages*.

De Wulf has written several other works. A French *Introduction à la Philosophie néo-Scholastique* appeared in 1904, and was translated into English by Dr. Coffey of Maynooth under the title *Scholasticism Old and New* (London 1907). In 1922 De Wulf published a useful survey of Thomism under the title *Medieval Philosophy illustrated from the system of Thomas Aquinas*, representing a series of lectures given at Harvard University. But scholars are more particularly indebted to him for the series of *Philosophes Belges*, which he planned and began in 1901, and which is still being enriched with original texts and monographs. De Wulf edited some of these texts himself, notably works by Giles of Lessines and Godfrey of Fontaines, and he entrusted others to well-known scholars such as Pelzer, Mandonnet, Van Steenberghe, Wallerand, De Poorter, Longpré, and Birkenmajer.

Besides these, De Wulf wrote many articles on mediæval philosophy in the *Revue néo-Scholastique*, the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, etc., besides some interesting articles on Art and Aesthetics. A complete list of his works down to 1933 was given in the *Revue néo-Scholastique* for 1934. In that year a special volume of this review was published to celebrate the completion of forty years of lecturing by Professor De Wulf, and an international Committee was organized for the event, consisting of members of many universities and learned bodies throughout the world. I had the honour to be a member of the Executive Committee. Under its auspices, scholars from many nations, all of world-wide reputation, contributed to a special volume in honour of this great Belgian philosopher.

De Wulf became widely known as a lecturer, and he gave courses at Harvard, Princeton, and Durham Universities. His lectures were models of clear exposition. His health, however, deteriorated in recent years. Fortunately he was able to prepare and see through the press this final edition of his greatest work. There can be no doubt that it will live after him. And it is equally clear that Professor De Wulf blazed a trail which will always be followed in the future by students of the Middle Ages.

E. C. MESSENGER

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INTRODUCTION

§ I—General Notions

After showing that mediæval philosophy, which was once treated with contempt (1), has now become a favourite subject (2), thanks to the manifold reasons which make it worthy of study (3), we shall proceed to explain the subject of this study: it will be confined to rational explanations of reality, i.e., to philosophies worthy of the name which were elaborated in the Middle Ages. The majority of the current definitions of mediæval philosophy are defective in the degree in which they fail to recognise this subject-matter (4-13). Once this has been defined, it will be easy to fix the methods to be followed (14), and the divisions of mediæval philosophy (15-16).

1. Contempt for mediæval philosophy.—The humanists of the fifteenth century treated the Middle Ages with contempt. Fascinated as they were by classical antiquity, they despised the centuries dividing them from the Greeks and Romans as a period of barbarism. The very term "Middle" Ages, that is, the mean or intermediate period between antiquity and their own time, had a belittling significance.¹ All the features of mediæval civilisation were depreciated: its architecture was condemned as *Gothic*, a term which for the Italian classicists of the sixteenth century was synonymous with barbarous.² It was repeatedly said that the Middle Ages knew nothing of the love of Nature, and never felt its beauty—indeed, long afterwards the glory of revealing these to the world was attributed to Jean Jacques Rousseau. Others said

¹ G. Kurth, *Qu'est-ce que le Moyen Age?* 2nd edn., 1905. The expression "media tempestas" is found in 1469, "media ætas" in 1518. "Medium ævum" does not appear before 1604. Cf. G. Gordon, *Medium Ævum and the Middle Ages* (Society for Pure English, tract 19, Oxford, 1925).

² André Michel, *Histoire de l'Art*, I, p. 934 (Paris, 1905).

that the Middle Ages had no cognizance of freedom of thought or respect for personality.

Mediæval philosophy did not escape the sarcasms of the Humanists. Erasmus, Vivès, and Cornelius Agrippa ridiculed it.¹ The Reformers of the sixteenth century encouraged these ideas, and the epithet "scholastic" became one of contempt. According to Thomasius, for instance, Scholasticism was a philosophy which was taught in bad Latin, abused the syllogism, and busied itself with subtleties or foolish trifles. Or, again, it was described as a philosophy which pretended to follow Aristotle but did not understand him. And since all systems of philosophy after the sixteenth century boasted of their independence of dogma, Scholasticism was dismissed as a system used in defence of the Catholic religion or of the theology of Popery: *eam esse philosophiam in servitutem theologiæ Papæ (sic) redactam*.² "A Scholastic," wrote Ch. Binder, "is a man who spends his life in studying Aristotle and the barbarous commentaries of Albert, Thomas, Holcot, Pricot, Mammatrektus, Maffretus, and other obscure persons, concerning whom one might sometimes wonder whether they are using Latin or the language of the Scythians."³ The scholastics known to this author are the Thomists, Scotists, and the followers of Occam or of Durandus, all of them later than the thirteenth century. In the same way, Tribbechovius (1641-1687) means by "Scholastics" the Terminists, Scotists and Thomists of the end of the Middle Ages, and to these he adds the name of Anselm, Abelard, Roscelin, Thomas Aquinas, Albertus Magnus (*Hercules Albertus ille magnus*), Duns Scotus (*tenebrarum magister*) and a few others.⁴ He adds

¹ See Vol. II.

² Preface of Heymannus to the treatise of Tribbechovius, Jena, 1719, p. xxii.

³ "Ab eo tempore nullus fuit ad scholasticum professionem admissus . . . qui non maximam ætatis suæ partem tribuisset in Aristotelis litteris, et post hunc in barbaris commentariis super Aristotelem, Alberti, Thomæ, Holcot Pricot, Mammatrekti, Maffreti et aliorum tenebriorum de quibus interdum dubites an Scythe vel latine loquantur" (p. 15). He continues: "Si Thomas aliquid affirmat, nititur ejus argumenta infirmare Scotus; quæ labefactare conatur Occam ut sua figat; at ista quoque Petrus Aliacensis luxat" (p. 17). The Jesuits are described as "loquacissimæ ranæ" (p. 22).—*Scholastica Theologia, in qua disseritur de ejus causis, origine, progressu ac methodo legendi scholasticos*, auctore Christ. Bindero, Tubing, 1614.

⁴ Adam Tribbechovius, *De doctoribus scholasticis et corrupta per eos divinarum humanarumque rerum scientia*, Giessæ, 1665, and Jena, 1719, pp. 58, 46, et passim. This curious and rare little book devoted entirely to Scholasticism constitutes a history of Scholastic Philosophy written a century before the work of Brucker.

that all the knowledge which the Scholastics possessed came from the Arabs: "Quidquid enim sapuere scholastici, illud omne Arabibus acceptum tulere."¹ It is, however, worthy of note that about the same time Busse distinguished philosophers from theologians, preferring to give the name of "scholastics" to the latter. He describes them as "Christian doctors who subjected philosophical and theological science to Aristotle."²

This contempt for Scholasticism went hand in hand with ignorance of its teaching, and the word finally came to stand for vague and childish speculations, "dealing with such questions as that of matter and form, powers and faculties, essence and existence."

The same contempt and the same ignorance are found in the opinions concerning Scholasticism held by Rabelais, Francis Bacon, Locke, Descartes and other philosophers of the 17th century. Their cheap sneers were repeated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Thus arose the idea of the "night of a thousand years" during which philosophy was unknown.

2. Beginning of historical study of mediæval philosophy.—Nowadays the Middle Ages are no longer looked upon with contempt. The labours of those who have studied the mediæval period have brought us face to face with a distinct civilization, which in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries reached a very remarkable and high degree of perfection. The romances of chivalry, the feudal system, the art of illumination and frescoes, the symbolic poetry, Romanesque churches and Gothic cathedrals, political and social institutions, scientific, philosophical and theological works are not the product of a barbarous age, but of the human race in a mature state and capable of great things. We may apply to mediæval civilization as a whole that which Goethe said of Strasburg Cathedral: "Brought up as I was to look upon Gothic architecture with contempt, I despised it, but when I went inside I was struck with wonder, and I felt the attraction of its beauty."³

¹ p. 126.

² "Cum vero duplicem eorum differentiam animadvertamus theologos alios, alios philosophos, quamquam illis hoc nomen potius tributum sit."—Busse, *De Doctoribus Scholasticis*, Dissert., 1676, Leipzig, a 2 verso.

³ Goethe, *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, IX, 2.

The first *historical* studies of mediæval philosophy are not anterior to the middle of the nineteenth century. Victor Cousin was faithful to his eclectic tendencies when in 1836 he examined the twelfth century. Rousselot and De Remusat studied the problem of universals.¹ Prantl wrote a history of mediæval logic. Stöckl (1864-1866), Hauréau (1850), and Werner (1881-1884) wrote the first general histories.

But the real development dates from the time when scholars undertook the thorough examination of the philosophical manuscripts with which the libraries were filled, also the critical revision of the literary ascriptions and of existing texts, the publishing of a multitude of works previously unknown, and monographs on philosophers—the whole in conformity with the exigencies of historical criticism and philology, the developments of which go back to about the same time. That was about 1880, to which period belong the remarkable works of Denifle, Ehrle and Baeumker, whom we may call the forerunners. Amongst the best scholars of the present day, we may mention Ehrle, Grabmann, Baumgartner, Pelster, Endres, Geyer and Koch in Germany; Mandonnet, Gilson, and Théry in France; C. Webb, Little, and Carlyle in England; Miguel Asin y Palacios and Xiberta in Spain; Haskins, Lacombe, and Paetow in America; Pelzer, Lottin, and De Ghellinck in Belgium; Birkenmajer and Michalski in Poland; Longpré and the Quaracchi group, Masnovo and the Milan school in Italy. We shall have occasion to mention their principal writings in the course of the present work.

We may add that in addition to this group of specialists, and under their influence, historians of philosophy and philosophers of every school and of all countries tend more and more to give to mediæval philosophy the attention it deserves.

3. Advantages of the study of mediæval philosophy.—Its advisability is evident :

(i) From the point of view of the history of philosophy. Quite a number of powerful systems of philosophy made their appearance from the ninth to the fifteenth centuries, so that there was no break of continuity between the close of the

¹ V. Cousin, *Introduction aux ouvrages inédits d'Abélard*, 1836.—Rousselot *Etudes sur la philosophie dans le moyen âge*, Paris, 1840-1842.—Ch. de Rémusat *Abélard*, 2 vol., Paris, 1845.

period of antiquity and the beginnings of modern philosophy. Mediæval philosophy arose out of Greek philosophy, just as in turn it prepared the way for modern philosophy. The development of human thought was not arrested during the Middle Ages. Is it likely, *a priori*, that during a thousand years the human race in the West should have ceased to philosophize ?

(ii) From the point of view of philosophy proper. Some of these systems, as for instance those of St. Anselm of Canterbury, Thomas Aquinas, and Duns Scotus, have an admitted value.

(iii) From the point of view of mediæval history. It would be impossible to understand the civilization of the Middle Ages without examining its philosophy. For at no period has philosophy modified more profoundly the general mental outlook upon art, economic, political and social life, and literature.

(iv) From the point of view of modern history. The twelfth and thirteenth centuries have moulded the philosophic temperament of the Anglo-Celts, the neo-Latins, and the Germans ; and the scholastic philosophy of the thirteenth century has bequeathed to modern philosophy much of its teaching, and to the nations of to-day many of their distinctive characteristics.

If these remarks are justified, the study of the philosophical systems of the Middle Ages has an educational value ; it constitutes an indispensable element in the philosophic training of all those who wish to enter into the thought of the Western Mind. Just as the study of the classics of Greece and Rome is an essential part of literary culture, and mediæval architecture and Renaissance art are valuable for the formation of our sculptors, architects, and painters, so also the study of philosophy ought to include the mediæval conceptions of the world and of life.

4. Subject of this study. Insufficient definitions of Scholastic Philosophy.—The identification of *mediæval philosophy* with *scholastic philosophy* goes back to the Renaissance, and is commonly accepted to-day. We ourselves now bow to custom in the matter, provided this identification is accompanied by certain necessary explanations, and especially

provided that by "scholastic or mediæval philosophies" are meant real philosophies.

A philosophy is the product of a rational mind, an attempt at a co-ordinated and more or less perfect explanation of the Real in its totality, a synthetic view of the universe. If this object could not be found in the speculations of the Middle Ages, these would be anything but philosophies.¹ We hope to show plainly in the present work that the true philosophic spirit was apparent from the beginning of the Middle Ages, and that it inspired in the thirteenth century doctrinal systems which are in no way inferior to the most remarkable philosophic creations of history.

For this reason we regard as insufficient (although not necessarily false) numerous definitions of scholastic philosophy which neglect or minimise its philosophical value, and which see in it only a vague philosophico-religious syncretism. As these definitions continue to be put forth almost everywhere, after the manner of the "prejudices" or "fallacies of simple inspection" spoken of by J. S. Mill, it will be opportune to show exactly why they are superficial, deficient, or inexact, and at the same time to indicate the measure of truth which they contain.

Among these definitions, some are purely *extrinsic*, for instead of explaining mediæval philosophies by *what they are in themselves*, that is to say, by their doctrinal content, they deal solely with their relative aspects, by relating philosophical doctrines to *elements which are themselves foreign to these doctrines*; others are *incomplete*, inasmuch as they define the philosophic thought of the Middle Ages by only one of its characteristics.

To the first category belong the definitions which are content to stress the relations of scholastic philosophy :

- (i) with the schools in which it was taught : that is the *etymological* definition :
- (ii) with its methods of systematization and of teaching ;
- (iii) with religion and theology : the *religious* definition ;
- (iv) with other factors of mediæval civilisation ;
- (v) with ancient and patristic philosophy.

¹ E.g. Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik*, denies the existence of philosophy properly so called in the Middle Ages, and says there were then only discussions on logic and theology.

To the second category belongs the definition, so long in vogue, which reduced scholasticism to a discussion several centuries old on the problem of universals.

5. Scholasticism and the Schools.—The word “scholastic” had not the same meaning in the Middle Ages and at the time of the Renaissance. In the Middle Ages the *scholasticus* (from *schola*, school) was the master who directed a school, or a man of culture versed in the *trivium* and *quadrivium*. In a wider sense the name was applied to any learned man or professor¹ and the title came to have an honorific sense.²

The writers of the Renaissance and Reformation periods abandoned this *professional* sense of the word (implying teaching) and adopted instead an *ideological* sense, according to which it stood for the theologians (“scholastic theology”) or philosophers (“scholastic philosophy”) of the Middle Ages. The adjective came to indicate contempt. “Scholastic” was synonymous with “sophist.”³

Because “scholastic” is derived from *schola*, Hauréau writes that it is “philosophy as taught in the schools of the Middle Ages,”⁴ and Picavet calls it “the offspring of the schools.”⁵

This merely *etymological* and *verbal* definition is useless from our point of view. In the later Middle Ages, musicians and astronomers are called “scholastics” as well as philosophers and theologians. Even if we admit that *schola* was used to signify the highest teaching, namely, philosophy and

¹ Concerning the historic meaning of the word “scholastic” as used by the Greeks, the Latins, and in the Middle Ages, see Tribbechovius, *op. cit.* and Manser, *Ueber Umfang und Charakter d. mitt. Scholastik*, Hist. polit., Blätter, 1907, pp. 320 sqq.

² Abbot Hilduin, about 835, describes a certain Fortunatus as *scholasticissimus*. *Monum. Germ. Hist. Epp.* T.V., 333, 28.

³ Tribbechovius, *op. cit.*, pp. 39, 66. Here are some examples, taken at random: “Qui litterarum regnum media in barbarie tenuerunt Scholastici” (p. 37); “Scholastici omne punctum tum demum se tulisse arbitrantur, si quando tribus syllogismis instructi de quavis materia litem movere possent” (*ibid.*); “Abyssos potentionalitatis et aptitudinalitatis” (p. 46). He recalls the judgment of Bullinger: “utuntur interpretibus sive expositioribus putidissimis” (p. 49); the diatribes of Erasmus: “cum nil nisi meram barbariem evomuerint” (p. 336); also those of Vivès and Aventinus. Speaking of the last period he says: “Habesque post Scotum, Holcot, Tricot, Bricot, Boquinquum et plures alios. . . . Et quis singillatim omnes enumerare, deque operibus eorum commentari posset, cum numerus eorum ad XIII M. excreverit” (p. 333).

⁴ *Hist. philos. scolastique*, I, 36; *Dictionn. sciences philosoph.*, by Franck, sub voce *scolastique*.

⁵ *Revue Philos.*, 1902, p. 185; *Grande Encycl. s.v. scolastique*.

theology, the two sciences which complete the edifice of knowledge, still this does not put before us the doctrine which was taught. Moreover, if Scholasticism is "the offspring of the schools," the term could be applied to our own time just as much as to the Middle Ages, for the printing press has not put an end to oral teaching. As a matter of fact, some authors speak of the scholastics "of the time of Kant, Hegel, and Cousin."¹ It is hardly necessary to point out that this wide use of the term is its own condemnation.

6. Scholastic methods.—To understand the meaning of a second group of definitions of Scholasticism, those which deal with its educational apparatus and its processes of systematization, it is necessary to explain what is meant by "scholastic method." This expression designates different things which are often confounded.

When the reference is to philosophy, the phrase can signify :

(1) A method of scientific construction. The Middle Ages subjected the various branches of philosophy to a rigorous process of systematization in conformity with the exigencies of methodology ; the practice of the syllogism, the emphasis on logical principles, and the application of deductive and inductive methods resulted in the constitution of organized sciences, in which the formal object of each was the *ratio ordinis*. From the point of view of internal arrangement and of clearness, the philosophies of the thirteenth century are models of their kind.

(2) In particular, the phrase may signify certain more or less uniform methods which assist the understanding of these systematizations : definitions, distinctions, objections, the reduction of the reasoning to the syllogistic form, the accumulation of the arguments for and against a thesis.

(3) A didactic or teaching method : such as the use of the commentary (*lectio*), or the methods of debate (*disputatio*).

When the reference is to theology, the expression "scholastic method" similarly designates :

(1) the systematization of materials, by contrast with the compilation of juxtaposed "sentences," with which people

¹ Picavet in *Le Moyen Age*, 1902, p. 34. In this matter he is more logical than Hauréau, according to whom the end of scholasticism coincided with the discovery of printing.

were at the beginning contented. The theological Summæ of the thirteenth century all aimed at giving an organic synthesis of the questions studied ;

(2) certain methods in more general use for the realization of this systematization ;

(3) the methods of teaching in theology, methods similar to those in use for philosophy ;

(4) lastly, and above all, the use of philosophy as a " hand-maid," for theological purposes.

We shall meet with these different types of scholastic method in the course of the present work.

7. Scholasticism defined as a method.—Many historians define Scholasticism, then, as the use of certain didactic methods. Scholasticism, they say, signifies any pedagogical systemization, the adaptation of knowledge of any kind to the use of a school (*Schulwissenschaft*). They then go on to contrast the disordered state of the scientific material as used by the Fathers of the Church with the cut-and-dried framework which enshrines the teaching of the Middle Ages.¹ Or again, it is identified with a particular form of systemization : thus the scholastic method is said to be the syllogistic method " deducing consequences *ad infinitum* " ² ; or again, it is " thought subjected to the constraint of dialectics. " ³

All these ideas are open to criticism on the ground that they stop short at the formal arrangement of doctrines and do not penetrate to the doctrines themselves. Pedagogical systemization, and the use of a particular kind of method, may characterize any system of philosophy, and may apply to that of Kant just as much as to that of Thomas Aquinas. Furthermore, the laws of methodology are not peculiar to philosophy, but govern every branch of knowledge.

As for the syllogism, we may add that it is not the only process employed by mediæval philosophers.

It is scarcely necessary to say anything about the ideas—true but superficial—of those who define Scholasticism by means of the " peripatetic " phraseology which it employed

¹ For this idea see Willmann, *Gesch. d. Idealismus*, II, 67, nos. 2 and 4.

² Fouillée, *Hist. de la Philos.*, p. 198 (Paris, 1883). Cf. Diderot : " Scholasticism is not so much a philosophy as a dry and narrow method of reasoning. " (*Œuvres complètes*, t. XIX, p. 362.)

³ Draeseke, in *Revue de philosophie*, 1909, p. 641.

or else the technical formulæ which it adopted. One might just as well say that Greek philosophy is philosophy taught in Greek, or define Kant's system as one which calls for a special vocabulary in order to understand it. The possession of a technical terminology is common to all philosophies.

8. Scholasticism and Religious Civilization.—The most widespread definitions of Scholasticism confine themselves to its relations with Christianity, with the Christian civilization in which it appeared, or again, with Christian doctrine (9).

Some insist, and rightly, on the central place which Christianity occupied in the civilization of the Middle Ages, and on the religious character of philosophy which results from this (Manser, Picavet). The fact is not to be denied. Philosophy was affected in its external aspect by the religious spirit of the period, and there follow from this certain particular features to which the historian must call attention (Ch. III, § 3).

But while these extrinsic characteristics of a philosophy denote its value as an element of a religious civilization, they cannot distinguish Scholasticism either from art, or politics, or morals, which are all placed in the same religious atmosphere. Accordingly they do not suffice to define it. Moreover, to content oneself with such characteristics is to pass over the philosophical *teaching*, that is, the thing to be defined: and this is the chief defect of a definition which concerns itself solely with external relations.

No less defective would be definitions of Scholasticism which are content to indicate certain aspects of resemblance which it presents with other factors of civilization: to stress, for instance, its unitive tendencies, its intellectualism, its optimism, its impersonality.

Similarly, those who merely see in Western Scholasticism a stage of civilization which they also find in India and in the East, with analogous characteristics, are saying what is correct, but what is not adequate. To say that Scholasticism is a doctrine poured into a formal mould, encyclopædic in its beginnings, studying above all the problem of the categories of beings, and making an effort at adaptation and at unification¹—is to tell us nothing of the *philosophical doctrine* of scholasticism.

¹ Masson-Oursel, *La scolastique, Etude de philosophie comparée*, in *Revue philos.*, 1920, pp. 123-41.

9. Scholastic Philosophy and Christian Theology.—But is not this doctrine itself essentially religious? Many think so. Some say it is a servant or slave (Cousin, Freudenthal, Windelband, Dilthey, Paulsen, Bréhier, etc.); others, that it is a collaborator (Gonzalez, Erdmann, Willmann, Picavet, Geyer, Gilson), but in each case, Scholasticism is a philosophy placed under the domination or direction of Catholic theology.

The *scholasticity* of mediæval philosophy would in this view consist entirely in its subordinate rôle (*philosophia ancilla theologiæ*) in respect to Christian doctrine, and Theology which examines it. On the one hand Scholasticism would be a philosophy which flourishes within a certain Faith and has ultimately no other function except to “explain” rationally the content of this Faith. On the other hand, as a humble servant—*ancilla*—philosophy ought to take care, at every moment, not to go contrary to theology, to which it is subordinate.

If Scholasticism were but that, it would not be a *philosophy*, but a department of theology. Christian philosophy understood in that sense is a contradiction on terms. For there is a *philosophy* only if there is a search for rational solutions by rational methods. The explanation and justification of *religious doctrines* is not the function of philosophy as such. Just as the use of mathematics in astronomy belongs to astronomy, so also the use of philosophy in theology belongs to theology (Chap. III, § 4).

But Scholasticism is something different, as we shall see later. We find therein isolated theories, groups of theories, and complete systematizations which constitute purely rational explanations of the universe. From the point of view which occupies us here, we can divide these explanations into two groups:

(1) Some coincide, in point of fact, with theological truths, or are utilized by theology, as for instance the existence of God, or the immortality of the soul. But independently of this coincidence or of this utilization, these doctrines have their own philosophical significance.

(2) A number of doctrines have *no direct connection with Christianity*. For instance, nothing from the side of theology obliged the Scholastics to explain the constitution of bodies

and their changes by means of prime matter and substantial form. Aristotle, the originator of this doctrine, had no cause—evidently—to harmonize his cosmology with Christianity, or with any other religion; several philosophers of the Middle Ages preferred the atomic theory, *in spite of* their Catholicism. Now the doctrine of matter and form is fundamental in Aristotelianism and in the majority of Scholastic philosophies.

If many scholastic doctrines—and not the least important ones—are free from direct control by theology, this is because the common ground between mediæval philosophy and theology is less extensive than are this philosophy and this theology. To serve someone or to collaborate with him one must meet him in some way. But outside this common ground, a subordination of one with respect to the other would have no meaning. Hence this subordination is insufficient to characterize a philosophy as such.

Moreover, if Scholasticism were *only* “philosophy in harmony with dogma,” we should arrive at this strange result, that one and the same Scholasticism—Catholic Scholasticism for instance—would present multiple and contradictory types. The pantheists, thanks to the principle of the allegorical and symbolical interpretation of the Scriptures, and the Averrhoists of the fourteenth century, by means of the doctrine of the two truths, safeguarded their orthodoxy, or thought they did so, no less than the pluralists who combated them. All boasted that they had the true spirit of the Gospel. At the threshold of the Renaissance, Nicholas of Cusa found ingenious connections between his doctrine of the *coincidentia oppositorum* and Catholicism. The accommodation is disputable, but the fault arises from the weakness of his philosophy, and in any case does not affect our argument. Descartes and Malebranche were surely no less Catholics than Thomas Aquinas? Ought we to call them Scholastics?

An equally defective definition has been given of Gothic Architecture, by stating that it is the architecture appropriate to Catholicism. As if every other form of art were not capable of inspiring the construction of Catholic churches, and as if Gothic had not given rise to masterpieces of civil architecture! With how much greater justice has Viollet le Duc defined Gothic

in itself according to its forms, and according to the solutions it provides for the problems of gravitation !¹

From these considerations we may conclude that mediæval philosophies ought to be studied above all in themselves and for themselves ; and only secondarily in their relations with religious civilization and with Christian theology.

10. Scholasticism and other religions.—Certain historians widen the sense of the formulæ we have just been discussing. Just as some have called “scholastic” every product of the schools, so also the name has been applied to every philosophy harmonized with a system of dogma. The *scholasticity* of a philosophy would consist in this submission or dependence, and the diversity of the regulating dogma would serve to distinguish between Hindu Scholastics (Masson-Oursel), Jewish (Zeller), Arabian (Carra de Vaux), and Mohammedan Scholastics (L. Gauthier). The autonomy of philosophy would be all the more compromised according to the extent in which the dogmatic system is less flexible and better defined : rigid and objective in Catholicism, it is abandoned, in Mahommedanism and in Protestantism, to individual inspirations.²

If by “Scholasticism” is meant “a philosophy subordinated to any system of dogma,” the same difficulties arise as before, but in a more general form. The Jewish, Arabian, Protestant, and Catholic Scholasticisms become *species* of one and the same genus. The element specifying these various Scholasticisms is religious and dogmatic, i.e., an *extra-philosophic* element, and we should thus be obliged to continue to characterize a *philosophy* by something which is not itself philosophic. Moreover, whatever may be the regulating system of dogma, the philosophical theories subordinated to it have none the less a meaning of their own from the philosophical point of view, and in addition each one of these Scholasticisms comprises a number of solutions upon which the system of dogma exercises no control, for the simple reason that it is not interested in the questions which give rise to them.

¹ We shall show later on (Ch. III, § 4) the meaning and implication of the doctrinal primacy of theology. At the present moment we discuss it only from this special point of view : does it suffice for a definition of Scholasticism ?

² L. Gauthier, *Scholastique musulmane et scol. chrétienne*, in *Revue d'hist. de la philos.*, 1928, pp. 221-53, and 333-65. As Islam has no dogmas strictly so called, in contrast to Christianity, it would follow that Mahommedan Scholasticism possesses greater independence. In this system, it is reason which decides upon the meaning to be given to the Mahommedan texts.

II. Scholastic philosophies and ancient philosophies.—Scholastic philosophers borrowed from the philosophic systems of Greece, Rome, and the Fathers, but one would not formulate an adequate definition by saying that Scholasticism is a duplicate copy of former philosophies.

(i) *Aristotle*. It has often been said—and is still said to-day—that mediæval philosophy plagiarizes the Peripatetic system. This prejudice dates back to the Renaissance, and it was strengthened by the fact that the scholastics of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries called themselves “Aristotelians.”

It cannot be denied that the scholastics held Aristotle in high esteem. He is commonly called *the* “philosopher,” just as Rome was the *urbs κατ’ ἐξοχήν*.¹ For Albert the Great Aristotle is *archi-doctor philosophiæ*.² He was the great authority, and philosophical works are full of quotations from his writings. The thirteenth century, the most brilliant in this period, was also that which was most influenced by Aristotle, but already in the eleventh and twelfth centuries this influence was manifest.

It presented at once a didactic and a doctrinal character. The didactic influence of Aristotle, which could be seen in all the Western thinkers, taught them to put order into their expositions, and clearness in their vocabulary. It is noteworthy that this influence, so strongly formative, was felt in the same way by the Jews, and by the Arabians of Bagdad and of Cordova, just as it had previously been felt by the Greeks. It was one of the most beneficent activities of Peripateticism.

We may also say that the scholastics took from Aristotle many of his theories, and that they possessed an understanding of his philosophy that many moderns might envy.

But the Aristotelianism of the scholastics was far from being servile or plagiaristic. Apart from the fact that they looked upon the argument from authority as only of feeble force, they rejected many of the Aristotelian theories. Important groups of scholastics regarded Aristotle with persistent mistrust because of his errors. As for the theories which they did borrow, some of these they completed and widened, others they corrected; and all were co-ordinated, subjected to an

¹ John of Salisbury, *Polycraticus*, vii. 6.

² *De propriet. element.* Lib. I, tr. I, c. 1.

intrinsic control, and introduced into a synthesis much more extensive and more coherent than that of Aristotle himself, and in which other influences play a great part.

(ii) *Plato* aroused an enthusiastic admiration. The Middle Ages adopted many of his theories. But it never reproduced pure Platonism as such: it tempered the elements borrowed by adding other doctrines. Moreover, Plato was introduced to the Middle Ages much more through the instrumentality of his disciple St. Augustine and the neo-Platonists than by his own Dialogues. Thus Plato theory of idea-types as the stable element in things was modified and completed by St. Augustine's Exemplarism, which links up these idea-types with the Divine Essence.

(iii) *Neo-Platonism*. By the intermediary of the Fathers of the Church, of Pseudo-Dionysius, Chalcidius, Macrobius, Boethius, and, especially in the thirteenth century, of the *Liber de Causis*, also through the writings of Proclus, and the philosophic systems of Avicenna and other Arabians, many neo-Platonist ideas penetrated into mediæval philosophy.

Scholasticism accepted several special theories, for example, those of the good, light, the degrees of being and their hierarchical subordination, also the division of the virtues, and we shall see later on that we can distinguish various stages in the history of this infiltration. But Scholasticism rejected the idea of the becoming of one unique Being, and the procession of beings founded upon this becoming, and resisted the emanative and monistic tendencies which constitute the very nucleus of the neo-Platonic system of Proclus and the *Liber de Causis*. Indeed, the neo-Platonic elements borrowed were incorporated into a pluralistic conception, and lived with a new spirit, constituting so many developments and precisions of a doctrine which was not at all neo-Platonist. Hence it is incorrect to lay down as a principle that Plotinus was "the veritable master of Scholasticism."¹

¹ Picavet, *Esquisse d'une histoire générale et comparée des philosophies médiévales*, 1907, Ch. V. The principal argument of M. Picavet amounts to this: the union of philosophy and religion is found for the first time in Plotinus, and lasts from thence throughout the Middle Ages. This is confusing civilization with a religious basis, and philosophy as such. Cf. 8. We already pointed this out in 1905 (*Revue d'histoire et de littérature religieuse*, p. 74). We may add that the Middle Ages were not acquainted with the *Enneads* of Plotinus.

The philosophies which tended towards Monism in some form or other were exceptional, and even these modified the emanative significance of the principles of Proclus.

(iv) *St. Augustine* exercised upon the Middle Ages a fascination which tended to rival that of Aristotle. All knew him, and scarcely any ventured to contradict him. But here again, Augustinism did not exist in a pure state. The philosophies of the thirteenth century which have been called by this name incorporated their Augustinian elements into Aristotelian structures. (Vol. II.)

Hence we cannot speak of plagiarism, even in those who followed St. Augustine very closely. The reason is that they took from St. Augustine only certain doctrines, in order to combine them with others, and also because the Middle Ages to a certain extent separated these doctrines from their theological surroundings. Apart from the fact that the philosophy of Augustine was not elaborated scientifically, it was not in the school of Augustine that the Middle Ages learnt to systematize its thought.

Other philosophies besides those we have just mentioned acted upon Scholasticism, namely, those of the Pythagoreans, Democritus, Epicurus, the Stoics, and pseudo-Dionysius and his commentators. From all these previous philosophies Scholasticism sought light, but it followed none of them in a servile manner. The elements borrowed were re-thought and adapted to a new mentality. If they had been slavishly adopted, their heterogenous origin would have been a source of dissonance. But on the contrary, they were harmonized into systematizations the order and coherence of which have not been equalled. The scholastics surpassed the previous philosophers whom they utilized.

12. Conclusion.—It is correct, but insufficient, to say that the scholastic philosophy was taught in the schools of the Middle Ages ; that it practised typical methods of systematization ; that it was religious, and was subordinate to dogma ; that it had relations with other factors of mediæval civilization ; that it borrowed from the past. To understand it we must grasp it, not only in its relations with things other than itself, but in its doctrines, and in the systems which constitute it.

13. Insufficient intrinsic definitions.—M. Hauréau, and others following him, reduce Scholasticism to a dispute concerning universals. This notion has, compared with the preceding ones, the merit of being based on philosophical elements, but nevertheless it is defective. It is easy to show that the Middle Ages dealt with a crowd of questions which do not come within the framework of universals, such as the relations between the intellect and the will, freedom, the existence of God, act and potency, etc. The same inadequacy applies to those who seek for the dominant characteristic of Scholasticism "in the conciliation of Idealism and Realism by the immanence of the intelligible in the sensible,"¹ or in a predilection for the "problem of the ontological constitution of being."² These formulæ mention only certain doctrines of psychology and metaphysics, and neglect others.

The truth is that the great scholastic philosophies are syntheses which deal with all the *questions* which philosophy asks, and in which all the *replies* are harmonized, hold together, and control each other. It is these syntheses which must be studied if we wish to find out the characteristics of Scholasticism, and these appear in all their brilliance in the thirteenth century.

14. Historic methods.—The study of the philosophical doctrines of the Middle Ages forms the proper subject-matter of a history of Scholasticism. The methods which govern such a study do not differ from the general historic methods. At the same time, their application presents certain special features to which we must draw attention. When the materials of historic construction have been assembled by the application of the rules of criticism, two methods of grouping are open to the historian, which mutually complete each other: the analytic or monographic method, and the synthetic or comparative method.

(1) *The analytic or monographic method is the necessary one to begin with.* It is concerned with placing the philosophers in their chronological succession and in their filiation. It brings out the personality and originality of each thinker, determines his biography, his works, and his ideas; and

¹ Willmann, *Geschichte des Idealismus*, Brunswick, 1908, II, p. 322.

² Morin, *Dict. de philos. et. de théol. scolast.*, 1856, p. 23.

endeavours in this way to revive in all its complexity the historical reality constituted by concrete events.

We can never devote too much care in drawing out the philosophical temperament of each personality, determining the books which furnished his library and were the tools he daily employed, discovering the *élan vital* which explains the origin of his system, showing how he is related to his predecessors and contemporaries, illuminating his system from within, and grasping its exact meaning and its internal coherence (always bearing in mind what he himself tells us about his philosophical education), and showing how the scientific, religious or social surrounding acted upon him.

Among these factors which explain the psychology of a philosopher, we must evidently allot a large place to his intentions. At the same time—and this is especially true for the Middle Ages—the historian must carefully distinguish between these two things which are so different, the *intentions* of a philosopher and his *doctrines*.

The *intentions* and the objects which a man has in view are revelations of his personality ; they are variable to infinity ; they depend upon his conscious personality ; he who wishes to understand the secret springs of a life must look for them. They have their place in a monograph on a philosopher.

The *doctrine* of a man is independent of his intentions ; it possesses an impersonal objectivity ; it obeys the laws of an inexorable dialectic, and sooner or later, it leads to all its consequences. The deduction of these consequences lays bare the *finis operis* of the system, while the intentions reveal the *finis operantis*.

The mediæval philosophies show by excellent examples that good intentions are not of themselves guarantees of truth, and that doctrines may end in results different from those which their authors desired. It suffices to recall the intentions of heretics, of whom not one wanted to run counter to revelation, much less to destroy it, but who all wanted to interpret it in the best possible way ; or again, the example of the monists, of whom not one wanted to compromise the distinction between beings, and who all claim to safeguard the real co-existence of the One and the Many.

(2) *The monographic method ought to be combined with the comparative method*, which unravels the more or less profound

similarities between the different systems. After the quest of detail, a series of synthetic considerations will serve as a complement and a crown to the work. It is a new way of studying the same materials. In order to penetrate the complexity of the philosophies of which the analytic method determines the individual features, we must be attentive, not only to the differences, but also the resemblances. To deny the *reality* of these resemblances would be to reduce relations, of whatever kind, to subjective views created by dreamers of dreams, and this is not the place to show that such an idealism is unacceptable.

Historic synthesis raises history in general, and also the history of philosophy, above pure erudition; it confers upon it its scientific character, and converts it into a "higher empiricism."

This comparison of doctrines will lead the observer to interesting discoveries.

Throughout the variety of systems there circulate doctrinal currents, sometimes homogeneous, sometimes opposed. Moreover, at all times we find points of contact in the manner of setting forth problems, in the privileged place which many of these problems occupy, and in certain elements of solution and of argumentation. These similarities attained their culminating point in the thirteenth century, which manifested homogeneous conceptions in all the domains of intellectual and social activity, and had the same criteria of value. We may say in general that the philosophies of the Middle Ages manifested a closer intellectual relationship than can be discovered in ancient, modern, or contemporary systems.

It will not be out of place to recall here a principle which has its application in all historical construction: the methods which we have just described must be practised within the period which they serve to interpret, and hence:

(3) *The historian of mediæval philosophy must think directly in the philosophical mentality of the Middle Ages and of the various periods.* The philosophy, no less than the civilization of the Middle Ages, has a meaning of its own. Hence, to understand it, we must think ourselves directly into its mentality, and give up the idea of establishing continual parallels with our own time. Do we not advise one who wishes to speak a foreign language to think in that language,

and not simply to translate the words and phrases of his own mother tongue? To interpret the philosophies of the Middle Ages, not in terms of the metaphysics which forms the centre of their perspective, but in function of the critical problem of knowledge as it is considered by the moderns, is to falsify their meaning and to disfigure them. And yet how many contemporary historians of Scholasticism err in this way!

If the philosophy and civilization of the Middle Ages are other than those of our own time, it follows that they are not necessarily either inferior or superior. This tells us how, and according to what criterion, we ought to judge them, after we have compared them. Just as a civilization is great when it confers an intense, original, and well-ordered expression upon the fundamental aspirations of individual and social life, so also a philosophy is noteworthy when it sets forth and answers in a satisfactory way the problems arising from a comprehensive explanation of reality. From this point of view, we shall see that the Middle Ages witnessed two great centuries of civilization and of philosophy: the twelfth and the thirteenth. The centuries which led up to these, and those which followed them, were manifestly inferior.

15. Chronological limits of mediæval philosophy.—According to a long received chronology, the Middle Ages began with the death of Theodosius in 395 and ended with the taking of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453.

As for the *terminus a quo*, historians tend more and more to prolong antiquity after the fourth century. They call attention to the fact that civilization remained Roman until the epoch of the Carolingians. The history of philosophy confirms this judgment in a certain measure,¹ for it is only very late—not before the ninth century—that we recognize the activity of the new races.

At the same time, it is only right to find a place for writers previous to the ninth century who, while continuing the ancient latinity, led the way for the strictly mediæval mentality. On the other hand, the great importance of Christianity in

¹ Willmann (*op. cit.* II, 342) makes Scholasticism begin in the eighth century with the *πηγὴ γνώσεως* of John Damascene (Ch. IV). because the parts of this work are preceded by *κεφάλαια φιλοσοφικά*. Taylor (*The Mediæval Mind*, I, 6) similarly considers that the civilization proper to the Middle Ages did not commence before Gregory the Great (died 604), Boethius (died 523), or Cassiodorus (died 575).

the formation of this mentality, and the characteristic common to the philosophies anterior to the thirteenth century, which all move in the stream of Christianity, authorizes us to place at the very threshold of the Middle Ages the great figure of St. Augustine. It was he who gave a speculative form to the ideas and aspirations of Christianity. In virtue of this, he was the forerunner and the first author of the speculative outlook which was to govern mediæval philosophy ; moreover before the progressive increase in the influence of Aristotle, St. Augustine was in the early centuries the dominant authority. We thus arrive back at a date sufficiently close to the death of Theodosius, or the end of the fourth century.

As to the *terminus ad quem*, there was a fairly long period in which mediæval and modern philosophy compenetrated each other. The Middle Ages were not separated from the modern age by violent facts, and the influence of mediæval philosophy extended beyond 1453.

The evolution of thought is the fundamental criterion which governs our delimitation. To this criterion we may add another, based on the development of the civilization itself in which the philosophy evolves.

If other criteria were chosen, we should arrive at surprising results.¹ Thus, those for whom mediæval philosophy means *any philosophy combined with religion*, find themselves obliged to make mediæval philosophy begin with a group of neo-Platonists, eclectic Platonists, and neo-Pythagoreans " at the end of the first century *before* the Christian era," and to extend it to our own days.²

16. Divisions and plan.—We shall employ the same *doctrinal* and *social* criteria in fixing the divisions of mediæval philosophy.

Western mediæval civilization did not remain uniform throughout the Middle Ages. During the first centuries (fifth and ninth), the dominating feature was a passive recep-

¹ Brucker fixes on the twelfth century as the commencement of mediæval philosophy. (*Historia critica philos.*, III, 709.) But he wrote in the eighteenth century, when practically nothing was known about the early Middle Ages, Tribbechovius (*op. cit.*, p. 312 *et seq.*) begins with the Commentaries of Peter Lombard.

² Picavet, *Le moyen âge, caractéristique théologique et philosophico-scientifique. Limites chronologiques*, in *Entre Camarades* (Paris, 1901), pp. 71 and 74. As for a " *terminus ad quem*," M. Picavet goes so far as to say that mediæval and modern civilization exist side by side even to-day.

tivity. The mediæval temperament became clearly manifest in the twelfth century; and it produced its characteristic effects in the thirteenth, so that we may look upon these two centuries as the centre of the mediæval age. With the close of the fourteenth century mediæval civilization began to crumble, and the formation of the nations announced the dawn of a new world.

Western philosophies followed fairly closely the same rhythm. Their evolution was slow, progressive and complex. In this respect mediæval Scholasticism resembles the architecture of the period, which underwent a gradual transformation by continuous differentiation.

From this point of view, the events which led up to the scientific renaissance in the thirteenth century were epoch-making. The preceding period was one of a long doctrinal elaboration. In the thirteenth century Scholasticism displayed all the wealth of its systematic genius, but its splendour did not last long. The period of decadence began already in the fourteenth century and was accentuated in the fifteenth. More and more Scholasticism fell into a state of decline, especially as it was attacked on all sides by new systems which were the forerunners of modern philosophy. It was in vain that a few distinguished men attempted in the sixteenth century to restore the prestige of the dethroned sovereign: when compared to the glorious past, the reaction which they called forth was only a local and a temporary one. Thus we may distinguish three periods in mediæval philosophy:

- (i) The period of formation (from the fifth to the end of the twelfth century).
- (ii) The period of full development (thirteenth century).
- (iii) The period of decline (fourteenth and first half of fifteenth century. With the second half of the fifteenth century begins the transition from mediæval to modern philosophy.¹

In each of these periods, the materials will be elaborated in turn according to the twofold analytic and comparative

¹ Tribbechovius, whose work is one of the earliest histories of Scholasticism, if not the earliest of all, adopts a division into three periods: (1) from Peter Lombard to Albert the Great; (2) from Albert the Great to Durandus; (3) from Durandus to Luther. He does not deal with Byzantine philosophy, and he knows the Arabians only as inspirers of Scholasticism.

method. A first series of studies will be devoted to the various masters, who will be treated according to their chronological sequence. A second series will comprise synthetic expositions: we shall therein endeavour to bring out the doctrinal currents which can be traced through particular systems, also the analogies and intellectual relationships, the significance of conflicts and disagreements, and the relations between the various philosophies and civilization.

There will be no need to adopt any principle of geographical classification. Mediæval philosophy was European, like its civilization. At the same time there existed some privileged centres and foci of culture: the court of Charlemagne and that of the Ottos in the ninth and tenth centuries, the French and English schools, and the episcopal school of Toledo in the twelfth century. We may say that the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, as well as the first half of the fourteenth—in brief, the centre of the Middle Ages—were the centuries of French and English thought.

The central part played by France diminished after the Hundred Years War. In the fifteenth century, the spiritual leadership passed to Italy.

What we have to say of the Oriental philosophies, the study of which is not the proper object of this work, but which nevertheless cannot be passed over altogether, will, in the case of the first period, form the subject of an appendix. From the fifth to the twelfth centuries, the Byzantine and Arabian philosophies constituted parallel and independent currents with regard to Western thought: Paris, Byzantium, Bagdad were three centres of studies which did not know each other. On the contrary, from the thirteenth century, the various currents joined together: Western philosophy derived from its contact with Arabian and Byzantine ideas a new and lasting vitality; by contrast, the Arabo-Jewish philosophy rapidly disappeared, and Byzantine philosophy languished. For these reasons, in the two last periods we shall treat only incidentally of the Byzantine, Arabian and Jewish philosophies, and not devote special sections to them.

§ 2.—*General Bibliography.*

SUMMARY.

17. *Research: its organization and method.*

18. Auxiliary Sciences : I. Bibliographies, Libraries, and Catalogues.—II. Palæography.—III. Chronology and Historical Geography.—IV. Philology.—V. General History.—VI. History of the Church.—VII. History of Literature.—VIII. Archæology and History of the Arts.—IX. History of Civilization.

19. Sources.

20. Works. I. Organization of Teaching.—II. General Expositions.—III. Principal Sources and Currents.—IV. Nature of Scholasticism.—V. History of Branches, and Monographs on Particular Problems.—VI. History of the Sciences.—VII. History of Theology.

21. Principal Collections. I.—Dictionaries and Encyclopædias.—II. Collections of Texts and Studies.—III. Periodicals.

17. Research : its organization and method.—The Philosophical manuscripts of the Middle Ages constitute the primordial sources for a history of philosophy. They are scattered in the various European libraries. Many are unpublished, and even unknown. The history of philosophy will benefit greatly by the publication, which is taking place practically everywhere, of catalogues of manuscripts and unpublished texts, by the new critical editions, and by the researches in literary criticism, which are particularly difficult.

Besides the philosophical works, the student must also consult the general sources of history, which are numerous and of unequal value. Such are, for instance, the works of the early annalists, the continuators of the *De viris illustribus* of St. Jerome (St. Isidore of Seville, Sigebert of Gembloux, Honorius of Autun, etc.); their information was utilized and completed by Trithemius in the fifteenth, Miræus in the seventeenth, and Fabricius in the eighteenth centuries. Then again there are the historical biographies of the writers of religious orders: each order has had its annalists; very often these are tempted to magnify the past, but several of these compilations have great historic value.

On all sides, people are realizing the need of co-ordinating research works, and of organizing them in a more systematic manner. The *Mediæval Academy of America* centralizes researches relating to the Middle Ages in general. The *Union Académique Internationale* has promoted various publications which are in process of realization, notably the Catalogue of Alchemic Manuscripts, the Dictionary of Mediæval Latin, the *Corpus philosophorum mediævi*, and in particular, the publication of the mediæval Latin translations of Aristotle. The *Société thomiste* has instituted an office for the co-ordination of historical and doctrinal studies relating to St. Thomas; the *Bulletin thomiste*, the organ of the Society, publishes information, notes and suggestions which are calculated to promote Thomistic studies. There ought to be an international repertory of the *Incipits* of the mediæval scientific manuscripts. There should also be, by a closer collaboration of research workers, some means of preventing the dissipating of efforts, and of assuring a better division of labour.

On the method, the organization, and the actual state of researches and of critical works relative to the philosophy of the Middle Ages, consult : F. Ehrle, *Das Studium der Handschriften der mittelalterlichen Scholastik*, in *Zeit. f. kath. Theol.*, 1883, pp. 1-51 ; *Nuove proposte per lo studio dei manoscritti della scolastica medievale*, in *Gregorianum*, 1922, pp. 198-218 ; *Die Scholastik und ihre Aufgaben in unserer Zeit*, 2nd edition, by F. Pelster, Freiburg in B., 1933. M. Grabmann, *Ueber Wert und Methode des Studiums scholast. Handschriften*, in *Zeit. f. kath. Theol.*, 1915, pp. 699-704 ; *De Methodo historica in studiis scholasticis adhibenda*, in *Ciencia tomista*, 1923, pp. 194-209 ; *Forschungsziele und Forschungswege auf dem Gebiete der mittelalterl. Scholastik und Mystik*, in *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben*, Munich, 1926, pp. 1-49. A. Landgraf, *Gesetze der scholastischen Problementwicklung*, in *Theolog. Quartalschrift*, 1929, pp. 262-78. M.-D. Chenu, *Pour l'histoire de la philosophie médiévale*, in *The New Scholasticism*, 1929, pp. 65-74. J. Koch, *Zum augenblicklichen Stande der scholastischen Forschungen und ihrer Organisation*, in *Hist. J.*, 1930, pp. 357-66.

18. Auxilliary Sciences.—The utilization of the sources of mediæval thought require a constant recourse to the disciplines auxiliary to the history of philosophy. *Bibliographies, Libraries. and Catalogues* will provide information as to materials (printed and unprinted). *Palæography* will provide the key to manuscript literature. *Chronology* and *Historical Geography* are likewise indispensable for researches into literary criticism. The *philological study* of mediæval Latin is constantly necessary for the interpreting of texts. Finally, general history, the history of the Church, of literature, of the arts and of civilization constitute so many buttresses which help to support the edifice of the history of philosophy. As for the history of the sciences, and in particular, of theology, its relations with the history of philosophy are so close that it seems preferable to treat it separately instead of as an auxiliary science, We therefore deal with it later on (20, VI-VII).

I. Bibliographies, Libraries, and Catalogues.—The historical sources and works relating to the philosophy of the Middle Ages are catalogued or described in bibliographical collections of various kinds.

One should first consult the bibliographical part of general publications, which will be discussed later on in various connections, and are merely mentioned here : 1. *dictionaries and encyclopædias*, which give at least a short bibliography at the end of each article ; especially the biographical dictionaries (21, I) ; 2. *general works* on the history of philosophy and on mediæval philosophy (20, II) ; 3. *literary histories of the Middle Ages* (18, VII) ; 4. *historical or philosophical reviews*, which contain details of current bibliographies (21, III).

Among the bibliographical collections, we may mention :

(A) *Catalogues of books and manuscripts*. The annual publications of the learned world, *Minerva*, and the *Index generalis*, give useful,

though incomplete information, on the principal libraries and on catalogues. One should also consult, for manuscript departments : Haenel, *Catalogi librorum manuscriptorum qui in bibliothecis Galliae Helvetiae, Belgii, Britanniae Magnae, Hispaniae, Lusitaniae asservantur*, Lipsiae, 1830 ; F. Blume, *Iter italicum*, 4 vols., Berlin-Stettin, 1824-36 ; *Bibliotheca librorum manuscriptorum italica*, Gottingae, 1834 (completes the preceding) ; Migne, *Dictionnaire des manuscrits*, 2 vols., Paris, 1853 ; W. Weinberger, *Catalogus catalogorum*, Vienna, 1902, Supplement in 1907 ; *Bibliographie der Handschriftensammlungen*, in *Beiträge zur Handschriftenkunde*, II, Sitz. V, Vol. 161, IV (1909) ; Ch. Samaran, *La recherche des mss. d'auteurs du moyen âge et de la Renaissance*, in *R. du xvi siècle*, 1928, pp. 344-55. And above all : *Bibliothèque nationale, Catalogue alphabétique des livres imprimés mis à la disposition des lecteurs dans la salle de travail, suivi de la liste des catalogues usuels du département des manuscrits*, Paris, 1895, 3rd edition, 1924 (contains an important list of catalogues of manuscripts).—For the incunabulae see : *Gesamtkatalog de Wiegendrucke*, 5 vols. published so far, Leipzig, 1925-32. We must mention here, because of its exceptional importance, the work of Mgr. A. Pelzer : *Bibliotheca apostolica vaticanae codices manu scripti recensiti, Codices vaticani latini . . . 679-1134*, Rome, two vols., 1931-33 (a mine of unpublished information on the sources of mediæval thought, with excellent tables).

The older repertories of manuscripts will give information on the composition of the libraries of the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, or the centuries which immediately preceded the French Revolution, and the destruction of a great number of monastic libraries. Cf. Sanderus, *Bibliotheca belgica manuscripta*, Lille, 2 vols., 1641-43 ; [Bernard and Wanley], *Catalogi librorum manuscriptorum Angliae et Hiberniae*, Oxford, 1697 ; Montfaucon, *Bibliotheca bibliothecarum manuscriptorum nova*, Paris, 2 vols., 1739 ; Hirsching, *Versuch einer Beschreibung sehenswürdiger Bibliotheken Deutschlands*, 4 vols., 1786-91.

On the libraries of the Middle Ages, see : G. Becker, *Catalogi bibliothecarum antiqui*, Bonn, 1885 ; Th. Gottlieb, *Ueber mittelalterliche Bibliotheken*, Leipzig, 1890 ; P. Lehmann, *Quellen zur Feststellung und Geschichte mittelalterlicher Bibliotheken, Handschriften und Schriftsteller*, in *Hist. Jahrb.*, 1920, pp. 44-105 ; J. de Ghellinck, *En marge des catalogues des bibliothèques médiévales*, in *Miscellanea Ehrle*, 1924, Vol. V, pp. 331-63 ; J. Stuart Beddie, *Libraries in the Thirteenth Century, their Catalogues and Contents*, in *Anniversary Essays in Mediæval History*, by Students of Ch. H. Haskins, edited by C. H. Taylor, Boston and New York, 1920, pp. 1-24 ; J. Montebaur, *Studien zur Geschichte der Bibliothek der Abtei St. Eucharis-Mathias zu Trier*, Freiburg in B., 1931 ; F. Milkau, *Handbuch der Bibliothekswissenschaft. I. Schrift und Buch*, Leipzig, 1931 (especially chapter iv) ; F. M. Powicke, *The Mediæval Books of Merton College*, Oxford, 1931 ; J. Gessler, *Les catalogues des bibliothèques monastiques de Lobbes et de Stavelot*, in *Revue Hist. Ecc.*, 1933, pp. 82-96 ;

A. de Poorter, *Manuscripts de philosophie aristotélicienne à la Bibliothèque de Bruges*, in *Revue Néo-Scholastique*, 1933, pp. 56-95. Etc.

Lastly, a great deal of information on the manuscript sources of mediæval thought will be found in: C. D. Bulaeus, *Historia universitatis parisiensis*, 6 vols., Paris, 1665-73; *Notices et extraits de quelques mss. latins de la Bibliothèque nationale*, Paris, 1861 (in 4°); B. Hauréau, *Notices et extraits de quelques mss. latins de la Bibliothèque nationale*, 6 vols., Paris, 1890-93 (in 8°); H. Deniflé and A. Chatelain, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, 4 vols., Paris, 1889-97; *Auctuarium Chartularii*, 2 vols., Paris, 1894-97.

(B) *Bibliographical works properly so called*.—On archives: H. Oesterley, *Wegweiser durch die Litteratur de Urkundensammlungen*, 2 vols., Berlin, 1885-86 (too big to be complete); Jaffé and Potthast, *Regesta pontificum romanorum*, 2 vols., Berlin, 1874-5.

On literary documents in general: J. A. Fabricius, *Bibliotheca latina mediæ et infimæ ætatis*, edited by Mansi, 6 vols., Patavii, 1754, republished at Florence in 1858; U. Chevalier, *Répertoire des sources historiques du moyen âge*, I. *Bio-bibliographie*, 2nd edn., 2 vols., Paris, 1905-7. II. *Topo-bibliographie*, 2 vols., Montbeliard, 1894-1903.—Historical documents: A. Potthast, *Bibliotheca historica mediæ ævi*. *Wegweiser durch die Geschichtswerke des europ. Mittelalters bis 1500*, 2nd edn., 2 vols., Berlin, 1895-6.—Historical documents relating to a particular country: W. Wattenbach, *Deutschlands Geschichtsquellen im Mittelalter bis zur Mitte des 13. Jahrh.*, Vol. I, 7th edn., Berlin, 1904, Vol. II, 6th edn., 1894; O. Lorenz, *Deutschlands Geschichtsquellen im Mittelalter seit der Mitte des 13. Jahrh.*, 3rd edn., 2 vols., Berlin, 1886-7; Dahlmann-Waitz, *Quellenkunde der deutschen Geschichte*, 9th edn. (H. Haering), 2 vols., Leipzig, 1931-32; A. Molinier, *Les sources de l'histoire de France*, Paris, 1901; C. Gross, *The Sources and Literature of English History*, 2nd edn., New York and London, 1915.—Theological documents: H. Hurter, *Nomenclator litterarius theologiæ catholicæ*, 3rd edn., 5 vols., Innsbruck, 1903-II.—Literary documents emanating from authors of a particular society, order, or group. Among the numerous Bibliographies of ecclesiastical writers, we may mention: G. Cave, *Scriptorum ecclesiasticorum historia litteraria*, 2 vols., Oxford, 1740-43; L. Ellies du Pin, *Nouvelle bibliothèque des auteurs ecclésiastiques, contenant l'histoire de leur vie, le catalogue, la critique et la chronologie de leurs ouvrages*... 19 vols., Paris, 1693-1715; C. Oudin, *Commentarius de scriptoribus ecclesiæ*... 3 vols., Lipsiæ, 1722. (These works are literary histories rather than mere bibliographical collections.)—For authors belonging to particular religious orders: J. F. Ossinger, *Bibliotheca augustiniana*, Ingolstadt, 1768, 2nd edn., 1785 (= *Biographia literatorum ex ordine augustiniano*); [Jean-François], *Bibliothèque générale des écrivains de l'ordre de saint-Benoit*, 4 vols., Bouillon, 1777-8; C. de Visch, *Bibliotheca scriptorum sacri ordinis cisterciensis*, Duaci, 1649, Colonia, 1656; C. de Villiers, *Bibliotheca carmelitana*, 2 vols., Aurelianis, 1752, 2nd edn., Rome, 1927; J. Quétif and J. Echard, *Scriptores ordinis prædicatorum*, 2 vols., Lut. Paris, 1719-21,

2nd edn. revised and completed by R. Coulon, 8 fasc., appeared between 1910 and 1914; L. Wadding, *Scriptores ordinis minorum*, Rome, 1650; G. Sbaralea, *Supplementum* (to Wadding), Rome, 1806 (Wadding was republished in 1906, and Sbaraglia in 1908, unfinished); L. Goovaerts, *Ecrivains, artistes et savants de l'ordre de Prémontré*, 4 vols., Brussels, 1899-1917. Etc.

Lists of incipits: K. Halm, *Initia librorum patrum latinorum*, Vienna, 1865; A. T. Little, *Initia operum quæ sæculis xiii, xiv, xv attribuuntur*, Manchester, 1904; M. Vatasso, *Initia patrum aliorumque scriptorum ecclesiast. latin.*, 2 vols., Rome, 1906-8; R. Lane, *John Bale's Index of British and other Writers*, Oxford, 1902.

For more complete information on the many bibliographical collections to which the historian of mediæval thought can refer, national and local bibliographies, etc., see the general works on bibliography: J. Peterholdt, *Bibliotheca bibliographica*, Leipzig, 1866; H. Stein, *Manuel de bibliographie générale*, Paris, 1898; G. Schneider, *Handbuch der Bibliographie*, 4th edn., Leipzig, 1930.

II. *Palæography*.—E. Reusens, *Eléments de paléographie*, 2nd edn., Louvain, 1899; M. Prou, *Manuel de paléographie latine et française*, 4th edn., Paris, 1924; F. Ehrle and P. Liebart, *Specimina codicum latinorum vaticanorum*, Berlin, 1927, 2nd edn., 1932; B. Katterbach, A. Pelzer, C. Silva-Tarouca, *Codices latini sæculi xiii (Exempla scripturarum, fasc. I)*, Rome, 1929.

A. Cappelli, *Dizionario di abbreviature latine ed italiane*, 3rd edn., Milan, 1929, 2nd German edn., Leipzig, 1928; O. Gradenwitz, *Laterculi vocum latinorum*, Leipzig, 1904 (very useful for understanding abbreviations and incomplete words).

J. Destrez, *La 'Pecia' dans les mss du moyen âge*, in *Revue Sc. Phil. Theol.*, 1924, pp. 182-97; P. Lehmann, *Autographe und Originale namhafter lateinischen Schriftsteller des Mittelalters*, in *Zeitschr. des deut. Vereins für Buchwesen und Schrifttum*, 1920, pp. 6-16.

III. *Chronology and Historical Geography*.—L. de Mas-Latrie, *Trésor de chronologie d'histoire et de géographie pour l'étude et l'emploi des documents du moyen âge*, Paris, 1889; A. Giry, *Manuel de diplomatique*, Paris, 1894, reprinted 1925; A. Cappelli, *Cronologia e calendario perpetuo*, Milan, 1906; J. Creusen and F. Van Eyen, *Tabulæ fontium traditionis christianæ ad annum*, 1926, Louvain, 1926; P. Gams, *Series episcoporum ecclesiæ catholicæ*, Ratisbon, 1873; C. Eubel, *Hierarchia catholica mediæ ævi (1198-1600)*, 3 vols., Monasterii, 1898-1910, 2nd edn., 1923; J. C. Th. Graesse, *Orbis latinus oder Verzeichnis der wichtigsten lateinischen Orts- und Ländernamen*, 2nd edn., by F. Benedict, Berlin, 1909; W. R. Shepherd, *Historical Atlas*, 7th edn., New York, 1929; K. Heussi and H. Mulert, *Atlas zur Kirchengeschichte*, Tübingen, 1905; H. Singer, *Geographische Grundlagen der Geschichte*, Freiburg in B., 1931.

IV. *Philology*.—L. Traube, *Quellen und Untersuchungen zur lateinischen Philologie des Mittelalters*, Munich, 1905, sqq.; *Vorlesungen und Abhandlungen*, II. *Einleitung in die lateinische Philo-*

logie des Mittelalters (herausg. von P. Lehmann), Munich, 1911 (a work of fundamental importance); J. E. Sandys, *A History of Classical Scholarship, I. From the Sixth Century B.C. to the End of the Middle Ages*, 3rd edn., Cambridge, 1921; Ch. du Cange, *Glossarium mediæ et infimæ latinitatis*, 7 vols., Paris, 1840-50; L. Diefenbach, *Glossarium latino-germanicum mediæ et infimæ ætatis*, Frankfort, 1857 (Supplement to Du Cange); *Novum glossarium latino-germanicum mediæ et infimæ ætatis*, Frankfort, 1867 (summary of the preceding); G. Reeb, *Thesaurus philosophorum seu distinctiones et axiomata philosophica*, Brixen, 1871; N. Signoriello, *Lexicon peripateticum philosophico-theologicum in quo scholasticorum distinctiones et effata præcipua explicantur*, 5th edn., Rome, 1931; Antonius M. a Vicetia and Joannes a Rubino, *Lexicon Bonaventurianum philosophico-theologicum*, Venice, 1880; L. Schutz, *Thomas Lexicon*, 2nd edn., Paderborn, 1895; M. Fernandez Garcia, *Lexicon scholasticum philosophico-theologicum . . . Quaracchi*, 1910 (dealing with Duns Scotus).—These special lexicons also lend themselves to a more general use.

Periodicals: *Münchener Archiv für Philologie des Mittelalters und der Renaissance*, Munich, 1913, sqq.; *Historische Vierteljahrschrift, Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft und für lateinische Philologie des Mittelalters*, Leipzig, 1898 sqq. (from 1889 to 1897: *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*).—The *Historische Vierteljahrschrift* has since 1931 the sub-title just mentioned, and has since then dealt specially with mediæval Latin philology.

V. *General History*.—Introductions, and works on historical methodology: Ch. de Smedt, *Principes de la critique historique*, Liege, 1883; E. Bernheim, *Lehrbuch der historischen Methode*, 6th edn., Leipzig, 1908; C. Langlois and C. Seignobos, *Introduction aux études historiques*, 4th edn., Paris, 1909; E. Becher, *Geisteswissenschaften und Naturwissenschaften*, Munich, 1921; H. Pirenne, *De la méthode comparative en histoire*, Brussels, 1923 (Address at the 5th International Congress of Historical Sciences); *What are Historians trying to do?* Chicago, 1931 (in *Methods in Social Science*); H. Rickert, *Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft*, 7th edn. Tübingen, 1926; E. Baudin, *Introd. générale à la philosophie*, I, Paris, 1927 (see ch. iv.); E. Keyser, *Die Geschichtswissenschaft. Aufbau und Aufgaben*, Munich, 1931; L. J. Paetow, *A Guide to the Study of Mediæval History*, 2nd edn., by D. C. Munro and G. C. Boyce, London, 1931 (a mine of bibliographical information); P. Harsin, *Comment on écrit l'histoire*, Liege, 1933.

History of the Middle Ages: E. Lavissee and A. Rambaud, *Histoire générale du iv s. à nos jours*, 12 vols., Paris, 1893-1901, 2nd edn., 1927; *The Cambridge Mediæval History*, 7 vols., London, 1922-32; L. Halphen and P. Sagnac, *Peuples et civilisations. Histoire générale*, 19 vols., so far (Paris, 1926-32) (of unequal value).

For national and regional histories, and for the different branches of special history, see the bibliographies in the general works mentioned above.

VI. Church History.—C. Baronius, *Annales ecclesiastici*, ed. Mansi, 35 vols., Lucca, 1738-59, new edn., 37 vols., Bar-le-Duc and Paris, 1864-83; F. Mourret, *Histoire générale de l'Eglise*, 9 vols., Paris, 1909-20; J. von Hergenrother, *Handbuch der allgemeinen Kirchengeschichte*, 4 vols., 6th edn., by J. P. Kirsch, Freiburg in B., 1924 *sqq.* (French translation by Belet); A. du Fourcq, *L'Avenir du Christianisme, I. Histoire ancienne de l'Eglise*, Vols. V-VI, 6th edn., Paris, 1931; J. de Jong, *Handboek der Kerkgeschiedenis*, 2nd edn., 3 vols., Utrecht-Brussels, 1932.

Bibliographies concerning the history of the Popes, Councils, Canon Law, national and local churches, the clergy and religious orders, etc., will be found in the general works mentioned above; for instance, Mourret, Vol. I, *Notice bibliographique*, pp. 9-19; de Jong, Vol. I, *Algemeene werken en bronnenuitgaven*, pp. 3-6; *Literatuur over onderdeelen en hulpwetenschappen der Kerkgeschiedenis*, pp. 6-9. Cf. also Paetow, *op. cit.* (V.).

VII. History of literature.—For the philology of mediæval Latin, cf. 18, IV.—Literary histories of the Middle Ages: M. Manitius, *Geschichte der lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters*, 3 vols., so far, Munich, 1911-23-31 (excellent work, the third volume, published in collaboration with P. Lehmann, reaches the end of the twelfth century); F. A. Wright and T. A. Sinclair, *History of Later Latin Literature from the Middle of the Fourth to the End of the Seventeenth Century*, London, 1931; O. Bardenhewer, *Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur*, Vol. 5, Freiburg in B., 1932 (this volume contains a history of Latin literature from the fifth to the seventh century); *Histoire littéraire de la France*, 36 vols., 1733-1927 (in progress; the 36th volume reaches the middle of the fourteenth century, the earlier volumes are out of date). See also the histories of the various natural literatures: Paetow, *op. cit.*, pp. 108-110.

VIII. Archæology and History of the Arts.—V. Gay, *Glossaire archéologique du moyen âge et de la Renaissance*, 2 vols., Paris, 1887-1928; C. Enlart, *Manuel d'archéologie française depuis les temps mérovingiens jusqu'à la Renaissance*, 3 vols., Paris, 1902-16; 2nd edn. of Vol I (1 and 2), 1919-23; H. Leclercq, *Manuel d'archéologie chrétienne*, 2 vols., Paris, 1907.—A. Michel, *Histoire de l'art depuis les premiers temps chrétiens*, 8 vols., Paris, 1905-26; L. Brehier, *L'art chrétien*, Paris, 1918; M. Aubert, *Nouvelle histoire universelle de l'art*, 2 vols., Paris, 1932.—E. Male, *L'art religieux du xii s. en France*, Paris, 1923; *L'art religieux du xiii s. en France*, 5th edn., Paris, 1923; *L'art religieux de la fin du moyen âge en France*, 2nd edn., 3 vols., Paris, 1922; *L'art allemand et l'art français du moyen âge*, Paris, 1917.—A. K. Porter, *Mediaeval Architecture, its Origins and Development*, 2 vols., 2nd edn., New York, 1912; *Lombard Architecture*, 4 vols., 1915-17 (excellent work); T. G. Jackson, *Gothic Architecture in France, England and Italy*, 2 vols., Cambridge, 1915.—J. Abert, *Die Musikanschauungen des Mittelalters und ihre Grundlagen*, Halle, 1905.

IX. History of Civilization.—*Beiträge zur Kulturgeschichte des*

Mittelalters und der Renaissance, edited by W. Goetz, Leipzig, 1908 sqq.; *Vom Mittelalter zur Reformation, Forschungen zur Geschichte der deutschen Bildung*, edited by K. Burdach, Berlin, 1912 sqq.—M. de Wulf, *Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages*, Princeton, 1922; G. Grupp, *Kulturgeschichte des Mittelalters*, 5 vols., various editions, Paderborn, 1923-5; G. Kurth, *Les origines de la civilisation moderne*, 2 vols., 7th edn., Brussels, 1923 (for the early Middle Ages); G. Schnürer, *Kirche und Kultur im Mittelalter*, 3 vols., Paderborn, 1924-26-29; French translation, Vol. I, Paris, 1933; H. O. Taylor, *The Mediæval Mind*, 2 vols., 4th edn., New York, 1925; M. Manitius, *Bildung, Wissenschaft und Literatur im Abendland vom 800-1100*, Crimmitschau, 1925; H. Schmalenbach, *Das Mittelalter, Sein Begriff und Wesen*, Leipzig, 1926; E. K. Rand, *Mediæval Gloom and Mediæval Uniformity*, in *Speculum*, 1926, pp. 253-68; *Founders of the Middle Ages*, Cambridge, 1928; C. H. Haskins, *The Spread of Ideas in the Middle Ages*, in *Speculum*, 1926, pp. 19-30; *Studies in Mediæval Culture*, Oxford, 1929; A. Fliche, *La chrétienté médiévale (Histoire du monde, vol. 7)*, Paris, 1929; F. Vernet, *La spiritualité médiévale*, Paris, 1929; A. Dempf, *Sacrum Imperium*, Munich, 1929; R. McKeon, *Utility and Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, in *Speculum*, 1933, pp. 431-6; H. Pirenne, G. Cohen, H. Focillon, *La Civilization occidentale du xi au milieu du xv siècle*, Paris, 1933 (Vol. VIII of the *Histoire Générale*, published under the direction of G. Klotz).

On mediæval civilization in particular countries: G. Steinhausen, *Kulturgeschichte der Deutschen im Mittelalter*, Leipzig, 1910; *Geschichte der deutschen Kultur*, 2 vols., 2nd edn., Leipzig, 1913; E. Michael, *Geschichte des deutschen Volkes vom dreizehnten Jahrh. bis zum Ausgang des Mittelalters*, 6 vols., 1897-1915 (German civilization in the thirteenth century).—A. Rambaud, *Histoire de la civilisation française*, 7th edn., 2 vols., Paris, 1898; Ch. Langlois, *La vie en France au moyen âge de la fin du xii au milieu du xiv s.*, 4 vols., Paris, 1924-8 (tendencious).—R. Altamira, *Historia de Espana y de la civilizacion espana*, 4 vols., 3rd edn., Barcelona, 1913-4.—*Social England*, edited by H. D. Traill, 6 vols., 2nd edn., London, 1901-4 (various collaborators).

19. Sources.—The majority of philosophical texts so far published are in "Collections" of texts which are also collections of studies. They are mentioned later on (21, II).

The sources which have been published separately are indicated in the course of the work, in the corresponding paragraphs.

As for the general sources of history, cf. 18, I and V.

20. General works:—Side by side with the critical examination of sources, historical research requires the utilization of previous works. Monographs on particular subjects will be indicated in the course of this work. Here we mention some works concerning mediæval philosophy in general, and cognate subjects.

I. Organization of teaching.—Schools and mediæval universities. H. Deniflé, *Die Universitäten des Mittelalters*, Berlin, 1885; H.

Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, Oxford, 1895; A. Clerval, *Les écoles de Chartres au moyen âge, du ve au xvi s.*, Paris, 1895; M. Grabmann, *Geschichte der scholastischen Methode*, 2 vols., Freiburg in B., 1909-11; R. S. Rait, *Life in the Mediæval University*, Cambridge, 1912; G. Hort, *Theological Schools in Mediæval England*, in *Church Quarterly Review*, 1933, pp. 201-18.

On the organization and methods of teaching, see also: A. Dempf, *Die Hauptform mittelalterlichen Weltanschauung, Eine geisteswissenschaftliche Studie über die Summa*, Munich, 1925; P. Ranja, *Le denominazioni Trivium e Quadrivium con un singolare accessorio*, in *Studi medievali*, 1928, fasc. I; R.-M. Martin, *Arts liberaux*, in *Dict. d'hist. et de geogr. ecclési.*, Vol. 4, 1930, col. 827-43.

II.—*General expositions.*—The Middle Ages did not concern itself with the history of its philosophy. The first attempts relative to the history of mediæval thought date back to the Renaissance: some works by the humanists, reformers, or cartesianists contain items of information, which must, however, be interpreted with care, bearing in mind their tendentious character: L. Vivès, *De causis corruptarum artium*, 1555; Ch. Binder, *De scholastica theologia*, Tübingen, 1614; A. Tribbechovius, *De doctoribus scholasticis et corrupta per eos divinarum humanarumque rerum scientia*, 1665; 2nd edn., by Heumann, 1719; J. Thomasius, *De doctoribus scholasticis*, Leipzig, 1676.

Among modern works, the most important are: A. Stöckl, *Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, 3 vols., Mainz, 1864-6 (still has a doctrinal value); B. Hauréau, *Histoire de la philosophie scolastique*, 3 vols., Paris, 1872-80 (very scholarly, but sometimes goes astray on the matter of philosophical doctrines); Ch. Jourdain, *Excursions historiques et philos. à travers le moyen âge*, Paris, 1888; R. Eucken, *Die Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker*, Leipzig, 1890; 18th edn., 1922; M. de Wulf, *Histoire de la philosophie scolastique dans les Pays-Bas . . .* Louvain, 1895; *Histoire de la philosophie en Belgique*, Louvain, 1910 (2nd edn. of the preceding work); *Introduction à la philosophie néo-scholastique*, Louvain, 1904 (English translation by Coffey, under title *Scholasticism Old and New*, Dublin, 1907, the first part deals with the Middle Ages); O. Willmann, *Geschichte des Idealismus*, Vol. II, Brunswick, 1896, 2nd edn., 1908 (excellent); F. Picavet, *Esquisse d'une histoire générale et comparée des philos. médiévales*, Paris, 1905, 2nd edn., 1907; *Essais sur l'histoire générale et comparée des théologies et des philos. médiévales*, Paris, 1913 (collection of studies, with some questionable ideas); R. Seeberg, *Scholastik*, article in *Realenzyklopedie für protest. Theologie und Kirche*, 3rd edn., Vol. 17, pp. 705-32, Leipzig, 1906; J. Endres, *Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Philosophie im Abendlande*, Kempton, 1908, 2nd edn., 1911; Cl. Baeumker, *Die europäische Philosophie des Mittelalters*, in *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, I, p. 5, Berlin, 1909; *Die christliche Philosophie des Mittelalters*, in *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, 2nd and 3rd edns., 1913 and 1923; M. Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode*,

2 vols., so far published, Freiburg in B., 1909-11; *Die Philosophie des Mittelalters*, Berlin, 1921; *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben*, Munich, 1926 (collection of essays); E. Gilson, *Etudes de philos. médiévale*, Strasburg, 1921; *La philos. au moyen âge*, 2 vols., Paris, 1922, reprinted in one volume, 1925; J. Hessen, *Patristische und scholastische Philosophie*, Breslau, 1922; K. Brandi, *Mittelalterliche Weltanschauung, Humanismus und nationale Bildung*, Berlin, 1925; S. Reinach, *Lettres à Zoé sur l'histoire des philosophes* (3 vols.), II. *De la Scolastique à l'Encyclopédie*, Paris, 1926 (superficial and tendentious).

Recent works: B. Geyer, *Friedrich Ueberwegs Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, II. *Die patristische und scholastische Philosophie*, 11th edn., Berlin, 1928 (a fundamental and indispensable work; the same applies to the 10th edn. of 1915 for its retrospective bibliography); E. Bréhier, *Histoire de la philosophie*, I. *L'antiquité et le moyen âge*: (3) *Moyen âge et Renaissance*, Paris, 1928 (he exaggerates the influence of dogma); F. Sassen, *Geschiedenis der patristische en middeleeuwsche wijsbegeerte*, Nimeguen and Brussels, 1928 (a good manual); F. Palhoriès, *Vies et doctrines des grands philosophes à travers les âges*, 3 vols., Paris, 1928-9; P. Géný, *Brevis conspectus historiae philosophiae ad usum seminariorum*, Rome, 1928; F. Fiorentino, *Manuale di storia della filosofia*, 2nd edn., with chronological tables and index, by A. Guzzo, Venice 1928; G. de Ruggiero, *Sommario di storia della filosofia*, 2nd edn., Bari, 1929; C. Foligno, *Latin Thought during the Middle Ages*, Oxford, 1929; C. Friedlein, *Lehrbuch und Repetitorium der Geschichte der Philosophie*, 5th edn., Berlin, 1931 (very brief); W. Durant, *The Story of Philosophy*, London, 1932; E. Aster, *Geschichte der Philosophie, Mit einem Anhang: wie studiert man Philosophie?* Leipzig, 1932; E. Gilson, *L'esprit de la philosophie médiévale*, 2 vols., Paris, 1932.

III. *Sources and main tendencies.*—Platonism and neo-Platonism: W. Rubczynski, *Ueber die Einflüsse des Neuplatonismus im Mittelalter*, Cracow, 1891; *Neue Studien über den Neuplatonismus im Mittelalter*, Weryhos (review), 1900; G. Tarozzi, *La tradizione platonica nel medio evo*, Trani, 1892; C. Sauter, *Der Neuplatonismus, seine Bedeutung für die antike und mittelalterliche Philosophie*, in *Phil. Jahrb.*, 1910, pp. 183-95, 367-80, 469-86; P. Duhem, *La physique néoplatonicienne au moyen âge*, in *Revue des quest. scientifiques*, 1910, Vol. 68, pp. 10-60, 385-430; M. Grabmann, *Der Neuplatonismus in der deutschen Hochscholastik*, in *Phil. Jahrb.*, 1910, pp. 3 8-54; Cl. Baeumker, *Der Platonismus im Mittelalter*, Munich, 1916, republished in *Beiträge*, XXV, 1-2, 1928; *Mittelalterlicher und Renaissance-Platonismus*, in *Beitr. zur Geschichte der Renaiss. und Reformation*, Festgabe Schlecht, 1917, pp. 1-13; R. Jolivet, *Essai sur les rapports entre la pensée grecque et la pensée chrétienne*, Paris, 1931 (2nd part: *Plotin et S. Augustine ou le problème du mal*); W. Achenbach, *Die platonische und plotinische Geschichtsphilosophie als Fundament der mittelalterlichen*, Quakenbrück, 1933 (Dissertations of Munster W.).

Aristotelianism: S. Talamo, *L' aristotelismo nella storia della filosofia*, Sienna, 1873, 3rd edn., 1900, French translation, Paris, 1876; M. Schneid, *Aristoteles in der Scholastik*, Eichstadt, 1875; M. de Wulf, *Augustinisme et aristotélisme au xii s.*, in *Revue Néo-Scol.*, 1901, pp. 151-66; A. Chollet, *Aristotélisme de la scolastique*, in *Dict. de Théol. Cath.*, I, pp. 1869-87; A. Schneider, *Die abendländische Spekulation des XII. Jahrb. in ihrem Verhältnis zur aristotelischen und jüdisch-arabischen Philosophie*, Beiträge xvii, 4, Munster, 1915; J. Hessen, *Augustinismus und Aristotelismus im Mittelalter*, in *Franzisk. Studien*, 1920, pp. 1-13; C. Michalski, *Les courants philos. à Oxford et à Paris pendant le xiv s.*, Cracow, 1922; F. Ehrle, *L'agostinismo e l'aristotelismo nella scolastica del secolo xiii*, in *Xenia Thomistica* III, pp. 517-88, Rome, 1925; R. Jolivet, *Essai sur les rapports entre la pensée grecque et la pensée chrétienne*, Paris, 1931 (Part I: *Aristote et St. Thomas, ou l'idée de création*).

Augustinianism: Cf. Platonism, neo-Platonism, Aristotelianism. Also: K. Werner, *Die Scholastik des späteren Mittelalters*, Vol. III: *Der Augustinismus in der Scholastik des späteren Mitt.*, Vienna, 1884; E. Portalié, *La lutte de l'augustinisme contre l'aristotélisme thomiste*, in *Dict. de Théol. Cath.*, I, pp. 2506-14; M. de Wulf, *L'augustinisme 'avicennisant'*, in *Revue néo-Scolast.*, 1931, pp. 11-39.

IV. *Nature of Scholasticism.*—M. de Wulf, *Histoire de la philos. médiévale*, 5th French edn., I, pp. 10-32, 2nd English edn., I, pp. 6-28, London, 1926 (see pp. 26-8 for the bibliography of works before this date); *Y eut-il une philos. scolastique au moyen âge?* in *Revue néo-scol.*, 1927, pp. 5-27; *La philosophie au moyen âge, Questions de méthode*, in *Studia catholica*, 1927, pp. 369-86; *Le problème des écoles et des renaissances dans l'histoire de la philosophie*, Académie royale de Belgique, Bulletin de la classe des Lettres, 1928, pp. 325-46 (reprinted in *Revue Néo-Scolast.*, 1929, pp. 5-26: *Écoles et renaissances en philosophie*); E. Gilson, *Histoire des philos. médiévales et des doctrines religieuses*, in *Revue Philos.*, Vol. 99, July-Dec., 1925, pp. 289-90; *L'esprit de la philos. médiévale*, 2 vols., Paris, 1932; F. Sassen, *Uit de geschiedschrijving der middeleeuwse wijsbegeerte*, in *Studia Catholica*, 1925, pp. 123-38; L. Rougier, *La scolastique et le thomisme*, Paris, 1925; *De quelques contradictions internes de la scolastique*, *Congres d'hist. du christianisme*, 1928, III, pp. 83-93. (Rougier has been criticised in the following: G. Théry, *M. Rougier et la critique historique*, in *Revue des Jeunes*, 1927; P. Descoqs, *Thomisme et scolastique*, in *Archives de Philos.*, V, 1, 1927; B. de Solages, *Le procès de la scolastique*, in *Revue Thomiste*, 1927; *Une bataille pour la scolastique*, in *The New Scholasticism*, 1929, pp. 169-84.) *Tribune libre*, *Y eut-il une philosophie scolastique au moyen âge?* in *Revue Néo-Scol.*, 1927, pp. 225-31; A. Masnovo, *Una polemica intorno al carattere fondamentale della filosofia scolastica*, in *Riv. F.N.S.*, 1928, pp. 123-7; L. Gauthier, *Scolastique musulmane et scolastique chrétienne*, in *Revue d'hist. de la philos.*, 1928, pp. 221-53, 333-65 (cf. *Revue*

Néo-Scolast, 1930, pp. 121-3); E. A. Pace, *The Church and Scholasticism in their Historical Relations*, in *Catholic Historical Review*, 1928, pp. 55-68; E. Ugarte de Ercilla, *Vuelta a la historia de la filosofía medieval*, in *Estudios Ecclesiasticos*, 1930, pp. 48-68; F. Ehrle, *Die Scholastik und ihre Aufgaben in unserer Zeit*, 2nd edn., by F. Pelster, Freiburg in B., 1933.—Cf. also II, above.

V. *History of branches, and monographs on particular problems.*—LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY: C. Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande*, Vols. II-IV, Leipzig, 1861-70; R. Eucken, *Geschichte der philosophischen Terminologie*, Leipzig, 1879; O. Willmann, *Didaktik als Bildungslehre*, 3rd edn., Brunswick, 1903; *Geschichte des Idealismus*, Vol. II, 2nd edn., Brunswick, 1908; M. Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode*, two volumes so far, Freiburg in B., 1909-11; *Die Entwicklung der Mittelalterlichen Sprachlogik*, in *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben*, Munich, 1926, 104-41; P. Rotta, *La filosofia del linguaggio nella patristica e nella scolastica*, Turin, 1909; P. Vicnaux, *Nominalisme*, in *Dict. de Théol. Cath.*, Vol. XI, 1931, cols. 717-84; F. J. von Rintelen, *Das philosophische Wertproblem*, Vol. I: *Der Wertgedanke in der europ. Geistesentwicklung*, I. Altertum und Mittelalter, Halle, 1932.

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PSYCHOLOGY: M. Dessoir, *Abriss einer Geschichte der Psychologie* Heidelberg, 1911; O. Klemm, *Geschichte der Psychologie*, Leipzig, 1911; G. Brett, *A History of Psychology*: Vol. II. *Mediæval and early modern period*, London, 1921; G. Picard, *Essai sur la connaissance sensible d'après les scolastiques*, in *Archives de philos.*, VI, 1, 1926; W. Goltzmann, *Die Unsterblichkeitsbeweise in der Vaterzeit und Scholastik bis zum Ende des XIII. Jahrhunderts* Karlsruhe, 1927; M. Wright Bundy, *The Theory of Imagination in Classical and Mediæval Thought*, Urbana (Ill., U.S.A.), 1927; O. Lottin, *La théorie du libre arbitre depuis S. Anselme jusqu'à S. Thomas d'Aquin*, Louvain, 1929; J. Gessner, *Die Abstraktionslehre in der Scholastik bis Thomas von Aquin mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Lichtbegriffes*, Fulda, 1930.

ETHICS: A. Marcuse, *Das Wertproblem in der Scholastik*, Marburg, 1919; O. Dittrich, *Geschichte der Ethik*, Vol. III: *Mittelalter bis zur Kirchenreformation*, Leipzig, 1926; O. Lottin, *Les premiers linéaments du traité de la synderèse au moyen âge*, in *Revue Néo-Scolast.*, 1926, pp. 422-54; *Les premières définitions et classifications des vertus au moyen âge*, in *Revue des Sciences Phil. et Théol.*, 1929, pp. 369-407; *La nature de la conscience morale, Les premières spéculations du moyen âge*, in *Ephemerides Théol. Lovanienses*, 1932, pp. 252-83; *La valeur normative de la conscience morale, Les premières solutions du moyen âge*, *ibid.*, pp. 409-31; *Les débuts du traité de la prudence au moyen âge*, in *Recherches*, T.A.M., 1932, pp. 270-93; *La nature du péché d'ignorance, Enquête chez les théologiens du xii et du xiii s.*, in *Revue Théol.*, 1932, pp. 634-52, and 723-38; *Le problème de l' "ignorantia juris" de Gratien à S. Thomas d'Aquin*, in *Recherches T.A.M.*, 1933, pp. 345-68; A. Dempf, *Die Ethik des Mittelalters*, *Handbuch der Philosophie*, III, D. Munich, 1927; M. Müller, *Ethik und Recht in der Lehre von der Verantwortlichkeit, Ein Längsschnitt durch die Geschichte der kath. Moral-theologie*, Regensburg, 1932; P. Browe, *Beiträge zur Sexual-ethik des Mittelalters*, Breslau, 1932.

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ÆSTHETICS: M. de Wulf, *L'histoire de l'esthétique et ses grandes orientations*, in *Revue néo-scolast.*, 1909, pp. 237-59; J. Maritain, *Art de scolastique*, Paris, 1920; M. Grabmann, *Des Ulrich Engelberti von Strassburg, O.P. († 1277), Abhandlung De pulchro*, Sitz. M., 1925, 5 (General account in the beginning, pp. 8-22).

VI. *History of the Sciences*.—A. NATURAL SCIENCES. In General: F. Strunz, *Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften im Mittelalter*, Stuttgart, 1910; Ch. Singer, *Studies in the History and Method of Science*, 2 vols. so far, Oxford, 1917-21; L. Thorndike, *A History of Magic*

and *Experimental Science during the first thirteen centuries of our era*, 2 vols., New York, 1923, 2nd edn., 1929 (of great value, based on manuscripts); Ch. H. Haskins, *Studies in the History of Mediæval Science*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1924, 2nd edn., 1927 (a first-class work, the second edition has been much revised, with much new material); G. Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science*, 2 vols. so far, Baltimore, 1927-31 (a wide synthetic view, with special studies for translators); F. Dannemann, *Die Naturwissenschaften in ihrer Entwicklung und in ihrer Zusammenhänge dargestellt*, Vol. I, 2nd edn., Leipzig, 1928; W. C. D. Dampier-Whetham, *A History of Science and its Relations with Philosophy and Religion*, Cambridge, 1929; M. de Bouard, *Encyclopédies médiévales, Sur la connaissance de la nature et du monde au moyen âge*, in *Revue des Quest. hist.*, 1930, pp. 258-304.

Mathematics: M. Cantor, *Vorlesungen über Geschichte der Mathematik*, 4 vols., 3rd edn., Leipzig, 1899-1908; H. G. Zeuthen, *Die Mathematik im Altertum und im Mittelalter*, Leipzig, 1912; G. Loria, *Guida allo studio della storia delle matematiche*, Milan, 1916.

Physics and Chemistry: M. Berthelot, *Introduction à l'étude de la chimie des anciens et du moyen âge*, Paris, 1889; *Histoire des sciences. La chimie au moyen âge*, 3 vols., Paris, 1893; E. Gerland, *Geschichte der Physik*, Munich, 1913; J. M. Stillman, *Story of Early Chemistry*, New York, 1924.

Astronomy and Astrology: R. Wolf, *Handbuch der Astronomie: ihre Geschichte und Literatur*, 2 vols., Zurich, 1890-3; P. Duhem, *Le système du monde*, 5 vols., Paris, 1913-17; A. Birkenmajer, *Henri Bate de Malines, astronome et philosophe du xiii s.*, Cracow, 1923.

Geography: K. Kretschmer, *Die physische Erdkunde im christlichen Mittelalter*, Vienna, 1889; P. Mandonnet, *Les idées cosmographiques d'Albert le Grand et de S. Thomas d'Aquin et la découverte de l'Amérique*, in *Revue Théol.*, 1893, pp. 46-64 and 200-21; L. Gallois, *La cartographie du moyen âge et la carte attribuée à Christophe Colomb*, in *Revue Historique*, 1926, pp. 40-51.

Natural Sciences and Medicine: R. Burckhardt, *Geschichte der Zoologie*, Leipzig, 1907; G. Loisel, *Histoire des ménageries de l'antiquité à nos jours*, Vol. I, Paris, 1913.—E. L. Greene, *Landmarks of Botanical History*, I, London, 1910.—F. H. Garrison, *Introduction to the History of Medicine*, 4th edn., Philadelphia, 1928.

B. MORAL SCIENCES. History: J. Vismara, *Il concetto della storia nel pensiero scolastico*, Milan, 1925.

Philology: Louise R. Loomis, *Medieval Hellenism*, Lancaster. (Pa.), 1906; L. J. Paetow, *The Arts Course at Mediæval Universities, with special reference to Grammar and Rhetoric*, Urbana (Ill.), 1910; E. K. Rand, *The Classics in the Thirteenth Century*, in *Speculum*, 1929, pp. 249-69; Ch. Vandewalle, *Roger Bacon dans l'histoire de la philologie*, Paris, 1929.

Law: R. Sohm, *Institutionen, Ein Lehrbuch der Geschichte des römischen Privatrechts*, 17th edn., Leipzig, 1923; P. Girard, *Traité élémentaire de droit romain*, 7th edn., Paris, 1924; P. Vino-

gradoff and F. de Zulueta, *Roman Law in Mediæval Europe*, 2nd edn., Oxford, 1929.—A. M. Koeniger, *Grundriss einer Geschichte des katholischen Kirchenrechts*, Cologne, 1919; A. Van Hove, *Prolegomena ad Codicem juris canonici*, Malines, 1928.

VII. *History of Theology*.—Nature and Supernature, reason and faith: H. Ligeard, *La théologie scolastique et la transcendance du surnaturel*, Paris, 1908; Th. Heitz, *Essai historique sur les rapports entre la philosophie et la foi, de Bérenger de Tours à S. Thomas d'Aquin*, Paris, 1909; J. Guttman, *Religion und Wissenschaft im mittelalterlichen und modernen Denken*, Berlin, 1922; F. Sartiaux, *Foi et science au moyen âge*, Paris, 1925; Ph. Funk, *Ueberwelt und Welt im Mittelalter*, in *Hist. Jahrb.*, 1931, pp. 30-46; W. Betzendörfer, *Glauben und Wissen bei den grossen Denkern des Mittelalters*, Gotha, 1931; P. Dumont, *L'appétit inné de la béatitude surnaturelle chez les auteurs scolastiques*, in *Ephemerides Theolog. Lovanienses*, 1932, pp. 5-27; A. J. Macdonald, *Authority and Reason in the Early Middle Ages*, London, 1933; G. Engelhardt, *Die Entwicklung der dogmatischen Glaubenspsychologie in der Mittelalterlichen Scholastik*, in *Beiträge XXX*; 4-6, Munster, 1933. See also above, II and IV.

Apologetics: X. M. Le Bachelet, *L'apologétique au moyen âge*, in *Dict. Apol. de la Foi Cath.*, 4th edn., 1911, 199-205.

History of Dogmas: A. Von Harnack, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, Vols. II and III, 4th edn., 1909-10; R. Seeberg, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, Vols. I and II, 3rd edn., Leipzig, 1922-3; Vol. III (Middle Ages), 4th edn., 1930; J. Tixeront, *Histoire des dogmes*, 3 vols. (down to A.D. 800), Paris, numerous recent editions, English translation; C. Hefele and H. Leclercq, *Histoire des conciles*, 8 vols., Paris, 1907-21; H. Denzinger and Cl. Bannwart, *Enchiridion symbolorum et definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum*, 17th edn., Freiburg in B., 1929; J. de Guibert, *Documenta ecclesiastica christianæ perfectionis studium spectantia*, Rome, 1931.

Theology: P. Pourrat, *La spiritualité chrétienne*, Vol. II, Paris, 1924; M. D. Chenu, "Authentica" et "Magistralia," *Deux lieux théologiques aux xii-xiii s.*, in *Divus Thomas (Pl.)*, 1925, pp. 257-85; B. Geyer, *Der Begriff der scholastischen Theologie*, in *Synthesen in der Philosophie der Gegenwart* (= Festgabe A. Dyroff), Bonn, 1926, pp. 112-25; F. Cayré, *Précis de patrologie, Histoire et doctrine des Pères et Docteurs de l'Eglise*, 2 vols., Paris, 1927-30 (well documented); M. Grabmann, *Geschichte der katholischen Theologie*, Freiburg in B., 1933 (the first general history of theology; fills a great gap).

21. *Principal Collections*.—Under this title we group the publications which give information or materials relating to the three departments of historical research: *auxiliary sciences, sources, and works*.

I. *Dictionaries and Encyclopædias*.—*The Catholic Encyclopædia*, 16 vols., New York and London, 1907-14, Supplementary volume, 1922; *Christelijke encyclopædie voor het nederlandsche volk*, 6 vols.,

Kampen, 1925-31; *A Dictionary of Christian Biography and Literature to the end of the Sixth Century*, London and Boston, 1911; *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, new edn., 3 vols., New York, 1925-8; *Dictionnaire de Philosophie*, E. Blanc, Paris, 1906; *Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi catholique*, 4th edn., 4 vols., Paris, 1911-22; Tables and Index in 1931.—Letouzey of Paris has in hand the publication of a series of special encyclopædias relating to the religious sciences: *Dict. d'archéologie chrétienne et de liturgie*, 10 vols. so far published, A-M, Paris, 1903-33; *Dict. d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastiques*, 6 vols. so far, A-B, Paris, 1912-33; *Dict. pratique des connaissances religieuses*, 7 vols., Paris, 1925-33; *Dict. de théologie catholique*, 11 vols. so far, A-P, Paris, 1903-34. (Also: *Dict. de la Bible*, *Dict. de Droit canonique*, *Dict. de spiritualité*.) *Encyclopædia judaica*, 9 vols. so far, A-K, Berlin, 1928-32; *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, 12 vols., Edinburgh, 1908-21, index in 1927; *Handwörterbuch der Philosophie*, R. Eisler, 2nd edn., Berlin, 1922; *The Jewish Encyclopædia*, 12 vols., New York and London, 1901-5; *Kirchenlexicon*, 2nd edn., 13 vols., Freiburg in B., 1882-1903; *Kirchliches Handlexicon*, 2 vols., Freiburg in B., 1907-12; *Lexicon für Theologie und Kirche*, republication of the preceding in 10 vols., 4 vols. so far, A-H, Freiburg in B., 1929-32; *The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge*, 12 vols., New York and London, 1908-12, Index, 1914; *Philosophen-Lexicon*, R. Eisler, Berlin, 1925; *Realenzyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*, 3rd edn., 23 vols., Leipzig, 1896-1913; *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, 2nd edn., 6 vols., Tübingen, 1927-32; *Staatslexicon*, 5th edn., 5 vols., Freiburg in B., 1926-32; *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie*, A. Lalande, new edn., 2 vols. and supplement, Paris, 1928-32; *Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe*, R. Eisler, 4th edn., 3 vols., Berlin, 1927-30.

See also the general encyclopædias published in several countries. The biggest and at the same time one of the most recent, is the *Enciclopedia universal ilustrada europea-americana*, Bilbao-Madrid-Barcelona, 1905-30, 70 vols., 9 supplementary volumes have appeared between 1930 and 1933 (Letters A-S).

See lastly the biographical dictionaries. Here are for instance the latest published: *Dictionnaire de biographie française*, 6 fasc. so far, Paris, 1929-32; *Verfasserlexikon des deutschen Mittelalters*, 4 fasc. so far, Berlin, 1931-2 (indicates manuscripts and editions of works).

II. *Collections of texts and studies.*—*Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Texte und Untersuchungen* (the most extensive collection relating to the philosophy of the Middle Ages, founded by Cl. Baeumker in 1891, edited at the present time by M. Grabmann; it comprises at present 30 volumes, each as a rule composed of several separate sections; two Supplementband have been published in 1913 and 1923 in honour of Cl. Baeumker, on the occasion of his 60th and 70th birthdays; published by Ashendorff, Munster, W.)—*Bibliotheca de tomistas españoles*,

3 vols. (1, 2, 4), Madrid and Valencia, 1923-8 ; in 1928 the collection was divided into three sections : serie historica, s. monografica, s. reproductiva ; several volumes are announced.—*Bibliotheca franciscana scholastica medii ævi*, 7 vols. so far, Quaracchi, 1903-32.—*Bibliotheca philosophorum mediæ ætatis*, founded by C. Barach, 2 vols. so far, Innsbruck, 1876-78, publication interrupted.—*Bibliothèque des textes philosophiques*, founded by M. H. Gouhier, concerns itself with all periods of history, the third vol. is devoted to St. Anselm (1930), published by Vrin, Paris.—*Bibliothèque thomiste*, founded by Père Mandonnet, O.P., counts at present 17 vols. (1921-32), amongst them being *Mélanges thomistes* (Vol. 3, 1923), and *Mélanges Mandonnet* (Vols. 113 and 14), 1930), published by Vrin, Paris.—*Etudes de philosophie médiévale*, collection founded by E. Gilson, 16 vols. up to 1932, published by Vrin, Paris.—*Forschungen zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Pädagogik*, collection directed by M. A. Schneider, 5 vols. up to 1932, published by Meiner, Leipzig.—*Opuscula et textus historiam ecclesiasticam ejusque vitam atque doctrinam illustrantia*, Series scholastica et mystica edita curantibus M. Grabmann and F. Pelster, collection intended for students, 13 fasc. appeared between 1926 and 1933, published by Aschendorff, Munster en West.—*Patrologiæ cursus completus*, Migne, 162 Greek vols. and 221 Latin vols. (down to 13th cent.) ; supplement by Horoy, 5 vols.—*Les philosophes belges, Textes et études*, collection published by the Institut supérieur de philosophie of the University of Louvain, under the direction of M. de Wulf ; 12 vols. have appeared from 1901 to 1931.—*Philosophie und Grenzwissenschaften*, collection published by the Institut für scholastischen Philosophie of Innsbruck ; contains especially historical studies on the Middle Ages ; 4 vols. published in 1933.—*Pubblicazioni della Univ. cattol. del Sacro Cuore, Serie prima : scienze filosofiche*, 17 vols. had appeared by 1930 ; several are devoted to the Middle Ages, published by Vita e pensiero, Milan ; *Publications de l'Institut d'études médiévales d'Ottawa*, 2 vols. so far, Paris-Ottawa, 1932.—*Textus et documenta in usum exercitationum et prælectionum academicarum, Series philosophica*, 4 fasc. so far, Rome, 1932, published by the Gregorian University.

There are also the numerous historical, philosophical, theological and other collections, which from time to time make contributions to the history of mediæval philosophy.

III. Periodicals.—Numerous reviews dealing with philosophy, theology, history and general culture interest themselves nowadays in the thought of the Middle Ages. We give below a list of the periodicals which are of most use to the student of mediæval philosophy. Unless otherwise stated, they are published every three months.

Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, Berlin, 1887-1932 (has now ceased publication) ; *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, Paris, 1926 sqq. (Edited by E. Gilson and G. Théry, one volume each year) ; *Archivum franciscanum historicum*, Quaracchi, 1907 sqq. ; *Archivum fratrum prædicatorum*, Rome,

1931 *sqq.*; *Bulletin thomiste*, Kain, 1924 *sqq.* (complete bibliography on St. Thomas and his time); *Le moyen âge*, Paris, 1888 *sqq.* (a review of history and philology, interested in the Middle Ages in a general way); *Progress of Mediæval Studies in the United States of America*, Boulder, Colorado, 1923 *sqq.* (annual publication of the Mediæval Academy of America and the University of Colorado, under the direction of James F. Wilard, professor at the University of Colorado); *Récherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, Louvain, 1929 *sqq.* (publishes a very complete *Bulletin de théologie ancienne et médiévale*; the Bulletins of the four first years, 1929-32, with very useful tables, form a separate volume of 675 pages in small type, in which 1,205 recent studies are analysed and criticised); *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique*, Louvain, 1900 *sqq.* (complete bibliography of Church history, including the special history of letters, sciences, arts, etc.); *Revue néo-Scholastique de Philosophie*, Louvain, 1894 *sqq.* (includes numerous bulletins, chronicles, notes, discussions, etc., relating to the philosophy of the Middle Ages); *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, Kain, 1907 *sqq.* (annual bulletins, giving a brief analysis of the chief works published, also review of other periodicals); *Revue thomiste*, St. Maximin (Var), 1893 *sqq.* (appears six times a year, includes a review of periodicals); *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica*, Milan, 1909 *sqq.* (six times a year, review of periodicals); *Scholastik*, Valkenburg, 1926 *sqq.* (numerous reviews); *Sophia, Fonti e studi di storia nella filosofia*, Rome, 1933 *sqq.* (founded by M. Ottaviano, this review deals with all periods of history, and promises to publish a complete bibliography of the history of philosophy); *Speculum, A Journal of Mediæval Studies*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1926 *sqq.* (Publication of the Mediæval Academy of America, deals with the Middle Ages in general).

FIRST PERIOD

MEDIÆVAL PHILOSOPHY UP TO THE END OF THE TWELFTH CENTURY

CHAPTER I

General Notions

§ 1—*The New State of Society*

22. The new civilization.—The formation of the new societies out of the ruins of the Roman Empire in the West comprised various stages which must be carefully distinguished. The period of transition lasted until Charlemagne. A new civilization arises in the eighth century, and continues to the tenth and eleventh, in the constitution of the most characteristic features of the mediæval period, namely, the *particularism of the feudal system*. It reached its fullest expression in the twelfth century: for it was then that the characteristic results of this long period of preparation became manifest.

(i) Previous to Charlemagne, three main factors were at work: the passive *reception* of certain elements from Roman civilization; world Christianity; the *new races* of Celts and Germans (the latter included different races, Franks, Angles, Teutons, Normans, etc.). The Germans mingled with the Celts who had preceded them in the West, and also with the Latin elements. From this fusion there arose complex nations.

During all this period the first two factors predominated. The economic life, the administrative organization, the monetary system, and juridical institutions, remained Roman. It is of course true that the Church, which was present everywhere in its bishops, clerics, and Benedictine monks, had already begun the work of turning these barbarians into

civilized human beings. But the presence of these barbarians in various parts of the Empire had not, in point of fact, caused the devastation which has been ascribed to it, and it had not really overthrown the foundations of the existing civilization.

(ii) From Charlemagne to the end of the eleventh century. A new state of things manifested itself with the advent of the Carolingian dynasty, which coincided with the sudden advance of the Mahommedans, who blockaded the Mediterranean, stopped the commerce between Gaul and the East, and compelled the new peoples to fall back upon themselves.¹ From that time onwards we get the reaction of the mediæval peoples upon each other, and this enters into close combination with the two other factors. Under the directive influence of Christianity, which penetrated all the forms of social life, the legacy of the past was subjected to a new elaboration, an adaptation to the manners and institutions which were the product of a new temperament. The peoples who now come to the front are the neo-Latins of Gaul, Italy, and Spain, the Anglo-Celts (after the infusion of Norman blood), and the Teutons or Germans of beyond the Rhine. These are the peoples who play a part in the history of philosophy.

The empire of Charlemagne was dismembered under his successors, and while the kingdoms resulting from the various divisions became interiorly disorganized, the new civilization was threatened by invaders: the Mohammedans on the south, the Hungarians on the east. The Normans from the north penetrated far into Gaul, became assimilated to the existing populations, and from this mixture there arose a race with great racial endowments.

When it became clear that the successors of Charlemagne had become deficient in power, the land of France was divided up like a chess-board; petty nobles usurped the royal powers; a social organization came into existence based upon the personal loyalty of the vassal towards his suzerain, and on a free contract which regulated reciprocal rights and duties. This feudal régime developed first of all in France, where the Capet dynasty and especially the reign of Robert the Pious (996-1031) favoured cultural development. From France

¹ This is the very attractive thesis of our learned colleague, H. Pirenne. See *Un contraste économique : Mérovingiens et Carolingiens*, in *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire*, 1923, pp. 223, et seq.

it passed into England, when William the Conqueror and his knights (1066) introduced the French ideas into the barbarous society which the Saxon tribes had there instituted. Later on, the feudal system, with all its accompanying institutions, was destined to pass into Northern Spain, Southern Italy, and even into Palestine, thanks to the Crusades. As for Germany, this country was saved from the chaos into which it had been cast by the collapse of the Carolingian empire by the Saxon dynasty of the Ottos, who in the tenth century installed there a Cæsarian autocracy copied from the Roman Empire. Dukes, bishops, and abbots, held in a kind of military servitude, were the servants of the Emperor. The latter had himself crowned by the Pope, and in return claimed a decisive authority in the election of the Roman Pontiffs.

The Church became relaxed, and the Benedictine monasteries which the Normans had not burnt departed from the primitive rule. The foundation of the Abbey of Cluny in 910 was the starting point of a reform. Modelled upon the feudal hierarchy, the order of Cluny spread a vast network of thousands of monasteries throughout all Europe. Its religious influence was accompanied by a social influence. The Cluny monks worked for the abolition of slavery; they organized the Peace of God, the Truce of God, and collective pilgrimages; they denounced the unruly life of certain bishops, and protested against their investiture by the lay power.

The art of the book was the chief art of the monasteries: schools like that of St. Martin of Tours attained a remarkable degree of perfection in calligraphy, illumination, and miniatures. From the eleventh century, Romanesque architecture developed, and it was the Cluny monks who propagated it.

The economic régime of Europe during this period was above all agricultural. The great feudal possessions led to the organization of serfdom. It was only when towns began to develop, at the end of the eleventh century, that commerce in the West came into being once more.

(iii) The twelfth century was the springtime of feudal civilization, and the freshness of youth shone out in all the forms of human activity.

France was the centre of this movement. Louis VII inaugurated the new policy, which consisted of increasing the authority and dominion of the king. But he met with only a com-

paratively small measure of success, and sectionalism remained, though diminished.

Abbeys multiplied in number. In addition to the Order of Cluny, whose great riches hampered its activity, a new Benedictine order was found at Citeaux. The religious and social work of the Cistercians in the twelfth century was crystallized in the ascetic and authoritative figure of St. Bernard. His influence extended everywhere; he gave directions to kings and popes, to clergy and professors; he launched the Second Crusade; he encouraged the foundation of new religious orders, the Templars (1118), Carthusians (1132), Premonstratensians (1120), and the Augustinians of St. Victor, whose monastery in Paris became famous. Side by side with the fighting bishops, a survival of the primitive and rude feudal system, appeared prelates like Stephen of Tournai, William of Champeaux, and Peter of Corbeil, who were renowned for their intellectual worth. Paris possessed a model bishop in the person of Maurice de Sully (1160-1186), who was contemporary with the great educational changes in the French capital. The bishops of Chartres, Laon, and Tournai were patrons of learning. Like the King, they had to reckon with the middle classes of the towns, which had grown rich by commerce, insisted upon having privileges and charters, formed a new class over and above the feudal classes of clerics and serfs, and presented to society as a whole an ideal of individual liberty and independence.

Characteristic customs sprang up; they were a function of what may be called the feudal and communal virtue *par excellence*, namely, that of the *personal value* and *dignity of the individual*. The feudal man lived as a free man and alienated his activity only by contract. This sentiment was christianized by the Benedictine influence, and the Church extended its benefits to all souls redeemed by Christ. Fidelity to one's spoken word, brotherhood in arms, reciprocal devotion, honour and uprightness, respect for women, kindness towards children—these virtues developed into chivalry, a quasi-moral institution superposed upon the feudal system, and all its rites received a Christian interpretation. By a sort of contagion the manners of the middle classes also became more gentle, and *courtesy* presided over the social relations of educated people. Certainly, this picture of feudal virtues is only that

of an ideal, and the actual reality was full of faults, but it was an active ideal all the same, and the mediæval man felt its attraction in spite of the excesses of his qualities and failings.

Again, the twelfth century gave rise in France to new forms of art : the *Chansons de geste* (Roland, Ogier, and the Aliscans) created by the Troubadours and full of the ideas of chivalry ; the Latin hymns, written in language breathing the spirit of pure humanism by an Adam of St. Victor ; the poems of an Alan of Lille ; the correspondence between Abélard and Heloise ; and the various particular forms of Romanesque architecture and sculpture, of which the Benedictine abbeys were the promoters.¹

The Kings of *England*, who spoke French at their Court, resided in their French possessions, and were buried in the Abbeys of Caen or Fontevrault, were associated with the Kings of France in this expansion of civilization. The two countries were closely connected from the time when Henry II of England acquired considerable feudal possessions (from the Somme to the Gironde) through his marriage with Eleanor of Aquitaine, the divorced wife of Louis VII of France. The wars between the Kings of England and France were the quarrels of a suzerain and his vassal, inasmuch as Henry II depended upon Louis VII for his French lands. These quarrels did not prevent prominent Englishmen from sojourning in France, nor French nobles from crossing over to England, nor French clerics from holding English sees, especially that of Canterbury. Romanesque churches were built upon English soil by the Cluniacs, and Gothic ones by the Cistercians. The politics of Henry II were very similar to those of Louis VII : in short, there was a community of civilization in the two countries.

In *Germany*, the imperial autocracy was broken down step by step ; and by a process which was exactly the contrary of what was taking place in France, the country only tardily came to present a feudal and urban appearance. Towards the second half of the eleventh century, the Abbey of Hirschau, an offshoot of that of Cluny, began the reform of the monasteries ; courteous manners were introduced into the Court

¹ We are not here concerned with the oriental influences which explain the origin of Romanesque architecture, iconography and sculpture. See Male, *L'Art religieux au XIIe s. en France*, Paris, 1922, and the works of A. Kingsley Porter.

of the Souabes ; and the new Romanesque and Gothic art passed across the Rhine.

Italy remained ever faithful to the cult of the things of the spirit. Down to the eleventh century, the southern part of the peninsula remained attached to Constantinople—which explains the persistence of Greek culture in Calabria. Sicily came under Arabian domination from 902 to 1091, and it was to remain a centre of Arabian and Greek culture, even in the next century, when it passed over to the rule of the Norman kings. In the northern part of the peninsula, the eleventh century witnessed the resurrection of Roman Law ; it saw the production of the Glossary of the lexicographer Papias (about 1050) and the musical works of Guy of Arezzo. The Italy of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, which the German Emperors always wished to subjugate, was like France, England and Germany divided up into principalities. The Lombard towns in the North were municipal republics ; the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, founded in the beginning of the twelfth century by Norman knights and governed by kings of French descent, was a centre of French feudal culture. The Lombard League repulsed Frederic Barbarossa, and the kingdom of the Two Sicilies opposed both the imperial domination and the ever-growing power of the Popes.

Finally there was *Spain*, at the limits of Western and Arab civilization. The capture of Toledo in 1085 and of Saragossa in 1118 marked the first steps in the " reconquista " of territory from the Unbelievers. The connecting links between the various kingdoms and France multiplied in number, especially in the case of the kingdoms of Navarre, Castille, and Aragon. At the same time the Arab civilization which developed peacefully side by side with Western culture in Mahommedan regions, began to manifest its influence in the scientific, artistic and social spheres.

Lastly, above all the kingdoms which developed an internal organization by compromising between the central power and the feudal and urban elements, the *Papacy* tended more and more to play a cosmopolitan rôle from the temporal, spiritual and moral points of view. It exercised its ascendancy over the " three Christian kings " of France, England, and Spain. It assured the unity of faith and of discipline. Certainly there were numerous heretical movements in the twelfth century, but they

did not break up the religious unity of the West. They were rather like ripples upon the surface, which did not trouble the depths of a society saturated with Christianity.

On every side the great social forces which go to make up a civilization waxed strong. The feudal monarchy, the feudal nobles, the clergy, the middle classes of the towns, the country folk—all had their places well marked out; formulas were sought after which would safeguard the rights of all; great moral and religious sentiments animated the social body. Romanesque art flourished in all its strength, and the transition to Gothic architecture began to manifest itself; the living languages produced lyric and epic poems, while Latin returned to its beautiful classical forms. Everywhere there burst forth a great activity, which has well been termed the Renaissance of the twelfth century, in view of its productive power. Everywhere progress came about according to a certain gradual rhythm and by stages, without any sudden revolution or brusque change.

Such a civilization was ripe for works of a speculative character.

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§ 2—The Organization of the Schools

24. Types of Schools.—The Middle Ages made a great effort to develop education by utilizing the Christian schools which

had taken root under the Roman system, and by erecting new institutions. The schools in which philosophy was taught, in addition to other branches of knowledge, belonged to three types :

(i) *Monastic schools.* The Benedictines were the great educators of the West. We find them first of all in Ireland, in which country Greco-Latin culture flourished in quite a remarkable way from the seventh to the ninth centuries. Monasteries like those of Clonar, Bangor and Armagh, restored the classical tradition which had been lost. At this time Ireland was the one bright spot in the dark night which covered Europe. In fact it has been called the Lamp of the North. Sedulius, Alcuin, and Scotus Erigena came from its schools and passed over to the Continent.

Missionary monks who set out from Ireland (St. Columba and his disciple St. Gall, sixth and seventh centuries), and later on from England (St. Boniface, eighth century), took part in the restoration of the Benedictine schools, the former at Luxeuil and at St. Gall, the latter at Fulda. Other monks who came from Rome (St. Augustine of Canterbury, 596) rendered a similar service to England, and founded the schools of Wearmouth and Jarrow (made famous by Venerable Bede).

The ninth century witnessed a remarkable intellectual restoration, due to Charlemagne and his Benedictine helpers.

In the tenth and eleventh centuries the monks of Cluny, and in the twelfth century the Cistercians, carried on the founding of centres of studies, and the twelfth century, the golden age of monasticism, was also the golden age of the schools. The schools of Tours founded by Alcuin served as a model for those of Corbie (Paschasius Radbert, Ratramn), Münster (Ludger), Salzburg (Arnulph), Fulda (founded by Rhaban Maur), St. Gall (Notker Labeo). We may also mention in France the schools of Ferrières (Lupus of Ferrières), Cluny (Odo), Cîteaux, Fécamp, St. Remi at Rheims, Bec (Lanfranc, St. Anselm), Fleury (Abbo), Auxerre (Remi and Eric), St. Denys, St. Genevieve of Paris, and Aurillac ; in Germany the schools of Reichenau (Walfred Strabo), Corvey (Bovo II), Lobbes (Eracle), and of St. Laurent at Liège (Rupert of Deutz) ; in Italy, that of Monte Cassino (Alfanus, Didier) ; in Hungary the school of Czanad (founded in the eleventh century by Gerard of Czanad).

The Benedictine schools comprised two sections, the *schola interior claustrī*, reserved for the monks; and the *schola exterior*, open to seculars.

From the second half of the twelfth century, other branches grew out of the great family of monks in the West, and new religious orders opened schools. One of the most famous was that of the Canons of St. Victor in Paris, who followed the rule of St. Augustine.

(ii) *Episcopal, cathedral, or capitular schools*. In the eighth century, Chrodegang, a Canon of Metz (died 766) organized for the clergy attached to the episcopal churches a common mode of life modelled upon that of the cloister. In these schools also we find the same division into interior and exterior departments. They were under the authority of the bishop, acting through a chancellor.

The teaching posts (*scholasticum officium*) in these schools were held by persons of distinction. Often, especially in the early time, bishops, chancellors, and monastic abbots fulfilled the functions of the *scholasticus*. Later on this title was extended to the simple *magistri scholæ*.

Among the most famous schools we may mention: In England, the school of York (Alcuin); in Germany, those of Utrecht (Adalbode), Liège (Ratherus of Verona, Notger, Adelman); in France and the countries then connected with it, the schools of Tournai (Odo), Lyons, Rheims (Gerbert), Poitiers, Laon (Anselm and Ralph), Chartres, and Paris. The schools of Chartres, under the direction of Bishop Fulbert (960-1108) and after him, Yves of Chartres († 1115), went through two periods of splendour and rivalled the schools of Paris right up to the middle of the twelfth century. Adelman of Liège and Berengar of Tours followed Fulbert's lectures. In the twelfth century, the chancellors Bernard of Chartres, Gilbert de la Porrée, and Theodoric of Chartres were among the most prominent men of their time. In the ninth century Paris already possessed the three schools of St. Genevieve, St. Germain des Près, and the Cathedral school. Their fame went on increasing, and from the second half of the twelfth century the French capital attracted to its professional chairs all the best intellects and eclipsed the rival academies.

(iii) *Palace Schools, scholæ palatinæ or palatii*. These were attached to the Court and probably moved about with it. Their

professors were chosen from the ecclesiastical world, and they admitted to their lectures clerics and laymen indifferently.

The best known was that of Charlemagne and the French kings who immediately succeeded him.¹ Alcuin was the moving spirit in it; Eliseus Fridugise and Wizo assisted him; the members of the imperial household attended the lessons and took ancient academic names (Charlemagne became *David*, Alcuin was *Flaccus*, in memory of Horace, and *Eulalia virgo*, to whom Alcuin dedicated one of his treatises, was Charlemagne's cousin). After Alcuin, John Scotus Erigena, Fridugise (ninth century), Agobard, Candidus, and Rhaban Maur taught at the court of the Frankish kings.

Another palatinate school was that of the Otthos in the tenth century. In love with French culture, Otho III invited Gerbert of Aurillac to teach at his court, in order that, as he wrote in 997, he might polish off his *rusticitas saxonica* and communicate to him some spark of Greek culture, *Græcorum industriæ aliqua scintilla*.² The Ottonian renaissance was brilliant, but did not last long. From the eleventh century, the schools of Fulda, St. Gall and Reichenau declined, while that of Liège shone out for the last time in the eleventh century. From thence onwards the schools of Bec, Chartres, and Paris received many Teutons wishing to study.

The *scholastici* of the eleventh and twelfth centuries loved to travel from one school to another. Lanfranc and Manegold of Lautenbach wandered through France and Germany like nomads. William of Champeaux, Theodoric of Chartres, and Adelard of Bath taught in various centres, and Abelard, their contemporary, may be taken as a typical knight errant of dialectics.

In the same way the scholastic population moved about and followed well-known masters. Manuscripts were lent from one abbey to another, organizations were formed for the rapid copying of anything new, such as the courses of lectures by contemporary professors, or a newly discovered text of some Greek or Arabian author. All this helped to promote the uniformity of the programme of studies, methods of teaching, and the philosophical library.

¹ It is probable that the Merovingians already had at Treves a *Schola gallica Palatii* which Charlemagne merely renewed.—Willmann, *Didaktik*, I, p. 254.

² *Lettres de Gerbert* (983-987), edit. Havet, Paris, 1889, p. 172.

25. Programme of Studies.—The studies were established according to a hierarchical plan, the stages of which were clearly marked out in the twelfth century: the liberal arts at the base, philosophy in the centre, and theology at the top.

(i) *The liberal arts.* Previous to the Middle Ages,¹ the classification of the seven liberal arts (*artes liberales*) was spread abroad by Boethius, Cassiodorus, Martianus Capella and Alcuin. The expression was derived from *liber*, a book, or better still, a free man, in which sense the liberal arts are those which result from a mental discipline, in contrast with the servile arts which call for bodily work.

They were divided into two groups²: the trivium (*artes triviales, sermonicales, rationales*), which comprised grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic; and the quadrivium (*artes quadriviales, reales, physica, mathematica*) which comprised arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music. Sometimes we come across the expression *sapientia* or *methodus hybernica*, which indicates the part played by the Irish monks in the diffusion of the liberal arts. The number seven was itself looked upon as symbolic.³

Grammar included the study of the grammarians and the ancient and mediæval writers. Donatus and Priscian, who had taught grammar, the first at Rome, the second at Constantinople, were the classical grammarians, but a justification of grammatical rules was also sought in the Vulgate.⁴

Aelius Donatus, who was the master of St. Jerome at Rome (middle of fourth century), and the most celebrated grammarian of his time, left an *Ars minor* (for beginners) on the eight parts of speech, and an *Ars major* (in three parts)

¹ The branches of the *Quadrivium* are mentioned by Ammonius as a subdivision of mathematics (Zeller, *Die Philos. d. Griechen*, II, p. 177, n. 1). Mariétan claims to have discovered the origin of the complete classification of the liberal arts in St. Augustine (*Problème de la classificat. des sciences d'Aristotle à S. Thomas*, Paris, 1901, pp. 54 et seq. On the conception and history of the seven liberal arts, see especially R. M. Martin, O.P., *Arts liberaux (sept)*, in *Dict. d'hist et de géogr. ecclés.*, Vol. IV, 1930, cols. 827-43.

² From Boethius onwards, cf. Martin, *loc. cit.*, col. 827 (against P. Ranja, who does not trace it back previous to St. Isidore).

³ The seven arts are referred to in these lines: "Lingua, tropus, ratio, numerus, tonus, angulus, ratio—Gram loquitur, Dia vera docet, Rhe verba colorat, Mus canit, Ar numerat, Geo ponderat, As colit astra."—Willmann, *op. cit.*, p. 266.

⁴ Smaragdus, Abbot of St. Michel about 850 (cf. *Hist. litt. France*, IV, p. 455), writes: "Donatum non sequimur quia fortiolem in divinis Scripturis auctoritatem tenemus." Cf. Thurot, *Notices et extr. de divers man. latins pour servir à l'hist. des doctrines grammaticales au m.d.*, in *Not. et extra. des man. de la Biblioth. Nationale*, XXII, 2e p. (Paris, 1868), p. 81.

often commented on in the Middle Ages. Priscian of Cæsarea in Mauritania (about 500) is especially known for his *Institutio de arte grammatica* in eighteen books (finished before 526). A work, *De accentibus*, has been wrongly ascribed to him. To the grammatical authorities should be added Isidore of Seville, and above all Remigius of Auxerre (died about 908), author of a commentary on the *Ars minor* of Donatus. Later on, we get versified grammars appearing with the *Doctrinale* of Alexander of Villedieu and the *Græcismus* of Eberhard of Bethune (end of twelfth or beginning of the thirteenth century), and these met with considerable success. In Grammar the Latin classics, Virgil, Seneca, Horace, Terence, Juvenal, etc., and certain Christian writers such as Orosius, Gregory of Tours, and Boethius, were also read. For a long time the study of law was included with that of grammar, inasmuch as the definitions of Justinian supplied dictionary material; it was not separated from the liberal arts until about the time of Irnerius of Bologna (Chap. II, § 20).

Rhetoric was less sought after than by the Romans. Cicero, Quintilian and Marius Victorinus are mentioned in the *Heptateuchon* of Theodoric of Chartres as the favourite models in rhetoric.¹

Dialectics occupied the largest place in the trivium, and became preponderant in the eleventh and twelfth centuries; it developed in the measure in which the treatises of the *Organon* became known; it contributed to the rise of philosophical speculation properly so called, which endeavoured to free itself ever more and more from theological control.² In the twelfth century, Abelard speaks of the seven treatises which form the classical basis (*usus latinorum*) of teaching: the *Predicaments* and *Perihermeneias* of Aristotle; the *Isagoge* of Porphyry, and four books by Boethius. At the same time, other works of Aristotle were known.³

The relative importance attached to the branches of the trivium led to a diversity of tendencies. At Paris the influence of Abelard tended to the exclusion of grammar and rhetoric; at Chartres, the centre of humanism, on the other hand, the

¹ Clerval, *Les écoles de Chartres au moyen âge du Ve au XVIe siècle*, pp. 221 et seq.

² Cf. later on, and Martin, *loc. cit.*, col. 835 and 837.

³ V. Cousin, *Ouvrages inédits d'Abélard*, 1836, p. 336.

three branches of the *trivium*¹ received equal treatment ; at Orleans the place of honour was given to the Latin classics.² At one time, in certain places dialectics invaded the domain of grammar. The "modists," in their treatises *de modis significandi*, gave a dialectical analysis of the barbarisms of school Latin, which some even preferred to classical Latin. The movement was given an impetus by Peter Helias, and culminated in the thirteenth century in the appearance of speculative grammar.³

The *quadrivium* was not so successful as the *trivium*, for the reason that the technical knowledge which it called for was not so easily accessible. The encyclopædic data of ancient authors, the treatises of Boethius, the *Astrolabe* of Gerbert, and, from the time of Adelard of Bath, the theories of Euclid, served as a basis for the teaching of mathematics and astronomy. The study of music was connected with the ceremonies of worship.

(ii) *Philosophy*, which developed gradually, ought not to be looked upon as an extension or an annexe of dialectics, nor should it be included in the *trivium* (against Ferrère, Mariétan and most historians) ; it forms a new branch of knowledge which was given a place in the scholastic programme between the liberal arts below and theology above (Willmann). This hierarchical arrangement and the consequently preparatory character of the liberal arts were clearly established by the twelfth century. "Sunt tanquam septem viæ," says a codex of Bamberg : they are ways which lead to other sciences, to physics (a part of philosophy), theology, and the science of laws.⁴ The same distinction was emphasized by Hugh of

¹ See the letter-programme of Peter of Blois in Clerval, *op. cit.*, pp. 309 *et seq.*

² A thirteenth century poet, Henry of Andely, in an allegorical poem on the combat between the seven arts, deals with the conflict between the grammarians, represented by the Orleanists, and the dialecticians, represented by the masters of Paris. He depicts the army of the sciences cultivated at Paris marching to the assault of Orleans. This poem has been translated into English and republished with an introduction by L. J. Paetow : *The Battle of the Seven Arts* (Berkeley, 1914 and 1927). A. Neckam (*De naturis rerum, de laudibus divinæ sapientiæ*, vv. 607-610) sings the praises of Orleans, and many others do the same.

³ Cf. Wattenbach, *Deutschlands Geschichtsquellen im Mittelalter bis. z. Mitte d. 13. Jahrh.* Bd. I, 1904.

⁴ "Ad istas tres scientias (physica, theologia, scientia legum) paratæ sunt tanquam viæ septem liberales artes quæ in trivio et quadrivio continentur."—Cod. Q., VI, 30. Grabmann, *Die Gesch. d. Schol. Methode*, II, p. 39.

St. Victor¹ and the other authors of the first classifications of the twelfth century (Ch. II, § 14). It was also adopted in the *Hortus deliciarum* of Herrad de Landsberg.²

The iconography of the thirteenth century cathedrals and the minatures of the period provide us with a confirmation of this thesis: philosophy, represented according to the description of Boethius, is distinct from the liberal arts. It is sculptured separately at Laon and at Sens. In the stained glass of Auxerre, as in the manuscript of the *Hortus deliciarum*, it occupies a central lobe, with seven concentric lobes arranged round it,³ and in the mosaic pavement of the Cathedral of Ivrea, the Lady Philosophy is seated in the midst of the seven arts.⁴

(iii) *Theology* was taught simultaneously in the big schools. Its autonomous constitution was built up gradually, as we shall see later on. The work had already been accomplished by the time of St. Anselm, and the writers of the twelfth century distinguish the *humanæ sapientiæ amatores* (philosophers) and the *divinæ scripturæ doctores* (theologians).

26. Other sciences.—Side by side with this trilogy with which our history is mainly concerned, other sciences were cultivated, and it is important to note the place which they occupied in the studies of the time. Although the scientific *teaching* properly so called was limited to the *quadrivium*, other natural sciences were the subject of a somewhat rudimentary research. *Alchemy* attracted all those who were interested in the composition of bodies. *Medicine* was cultivated at Montpellier and in various Italian centres. There were two sources for the study of *natural history* in which Gerbert, the monks of Monte Cassino and the teachers at Chartres were interested: the first was a collection of facts made by Pliny and transmitted by the first encyclopædists; the second was the *Physiologus*, a curious treatise of the Patristic era which contained fantastic details concerning the habits and the history of animals, and which was at the same time a source of animal symbolism for Christian exegesis and art.⁵

¹ *Erud. didasc.*, lib., III.

² Willmann, *Didaktik*, I, 278, n. 1.

³ E. Male, *L'Art religieux du XIIIe siècle en France*, pp. 112 et seq.

⁴ A. K. Porter, *Lombard Architecture* (New Haven, 1907), Vol. I, p. 347.

⁵ Male, *L'Art religieux du XIIe siècle en France*, Chap. IX, Le monde et la nature, also *L'Art religieux du XIIIe siècle en France*, p. 49.

History was represented by the various annals. Those who cultivated it drew their inspiration from St. Jerome or Eusebius, and drew up local chronicles.¹

As for *law*—canon, Roman and feudal—this underwent a striking development in the eleventh century.²

27. Methods of Teaching.—(i) The *commenting* on a text (*lectio*) was the first and most natural form of teaching, and glosses of this kind abounded from the ninth to the twelfth centuries.³ The *disputatio*, a kind of socratic method based upon an exchange of opinion between master and pupil, appeared in the twelfth century when the *logica nova* was introduced. There were also quite early on treatises arranged according to plans, and later on we find synthetic compilations (*Sententiæ, Summæ*).

(ii) The *didactic systemization* of a particular question, rudimentary at first, was perfected at the end of the eleventh century, and the triadic framework became more general (*pro, contra, solutio*). This formal scheme indeed soon became dominant, although it was not adopted in every scholastic work.

(iii) The *liberal arts* and *philosophy* served as a preparation for *theology*, and from this there resulted a phenomenon which is peculiar to the Middle Ages and which became accentuated in the course of time: the mixing up of certain philosophical matters and arguments with others belonging to theology, and the introduction of philosophical arguments into theological spheres.

¹ Cf. Wattenbach, *Deutschlands Geschichtsquellen im Mittelalter bis z. Mitte d. 13. Jahrh.*, Bd. I, 1904.

² Ch. Haskins has published an anonymous list of works proposed as manuals for studies at the end of the twelfth century. He attributes it to Alexander Neckam (1157-1217) because of its literary resemblances to the *De naturis rerum* and other works of this author. Alexander Neckam taught at Paris between 1175 and 1195, and afterwards became Abbot of Cirencester. The list recommends the works to be studied by those who wish to be conversant with the seven arts, medicine, civil and canon law, and theology. It is one of the few documents of this kind previous to the drawing up of the university programmes in the thirteenth century. The list does not mention Avicenna in medicine, nor the *Almagest* in mathematics, nor the *Doctrinale* of Alex. of Villedieu, but it does give the *Metaphysics*, the *De Generatione et corrupt.* and the *De Anima* of Aristotle, and the works mentioned in the *Heptateuchon* of Th. of Chartres. See *A List of Text-books from the close of the twelfth century*. (Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, 1909, pp. 75-94, republished in *Studies* . . . ch. VIII *et seq.*, for all that concerns the branches of the *quadrivium*, history, the natural sciences, medicine, etc.)

³ This sense is retained in the English expression *lecture, reading*, and in the German *Vorlesungen*.

28. Philosophical library.—We may divide the principal works which comprised the philosophical equipment of this period into various groups. They were common to all the schools, and this, again, is yet another factor which helps to explain the uniformity of the current of philosophic thought in the West.

(a) *Greek philosophers.* The Greek authors were rarely read in their original tongue; almost everybody made use of Latin translations.

(i) **ARISTOTLE.**—(a) *Logic.* In the ninth century the *De Interpretatione* (περὶ ἑρμηνείας) was known in the translations of Marius Victorinus and Boethius; and from the end of the tenth, the *Categories*, in the translation of Boethius. The other translations by Boethius, the great initiator of the West, were at first neglected, and came into use either later on, or not at all.¹

Researches by B. Geyer have shown that towards 1125 Abelard had read the *Sophistical Arguments*, and that he quotes the *Prior Analytics*.² The *Heptateuchon* of Theodoric of Chartres, completed about 1141, contains the two books of the *Prior Analytics*, the *Topics*, and the *Sophistical Arguments*, that is, all the remaining books of the *Organon* except the *Posterior Analytics*.³ According to a note added to the Chronicle of Robert of Torigny for the year 1128, James of Venice had then already translated from Greek into Latin the *Topics*, the two *Analytics*, and the *Sophistical Arguments*, "although there was an older version of these same books."⁴ The *Posterior Analytics* existed in a triple Latin version in a thirteenth century manuscript discovered by Charles Haskins in the Cathedral Library at Toledo.⁵ The Arabo-Latin version

¹ A. Van de Vyver, *Les étapes du développement philosophique du Haut Moyen Age*, in *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire*, 1929, pp. 425-52, indicates the logical works utilised by numerous authors from the seventh to the twelfth centuries, and the collections or *corpus* of which some may have made use.

² B. Geyer, *Die alten lat. Uebersetzungen d. aristotelischen Analytik. Topik. u. Elenchik*, Philos. Jahrbuch. Bd. 30 (1917), pp. 37-40.

³ Clerval, *op. cit.*, pp. 222, 244 *et seq.*; A. Hofmeister, *Studien über Otto von Freising*, Neues Archiv. d. Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde, Bd. 37 (1912), p. 666.

⁴ *Monumenta Germaniæ Historica, Scriptorum*, Vol. VI, p. 489.

⁵ Ch. Haskins, *Versions of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics*, in *Studies in the History of Mediæval Science*, II, Cambridge, Mass., 1927, pp. 223-41, and particularly pp. 288 *et seq.* C. Baeumker, *Latein. Uebersetzungen der aristotelischen Analytica posteriora*, in *Phil. Jahrb.*, 1915, pp. 320-26.

contained in this codex, accompanied by the commentary of Themistius, is certainly the work of Gerard of Cremona († 1187) mentioned in the list of his translations from Arabic into Latin. One of the two Latin translations from the Greek contains a prologue by the translator (some suggest that he was Henricus Aristippus, archdeacon of Catania, who died in 1162; Bliemetzrieder identifies him with Burgundius of Pisa).¹ In this prologue the writer says that in his country (*apud nos*) "the version by Boethius" was only partly conserved and in a corrupt text, and that the French teachers did not dare to use that of James because of its obscurity. Towards the middle of the twelfth century, Otto of Freising (died 1158) popularized the new works of the *Organon* in Germany.

The second half of the twelfth century was in possession of the whole *Organon* of Aristotle. There was thus in the twelfth century a second partial introduction to the *Organon*, and it served as a basis for a classification of logic into *logica vetus* (the treatises known previous to the twelfth century), and the *logica nova* (treatises known later).²

(b) *Writings other than Logical*.—The early Middle Ages possessed neither the *Metaphysics* nor the *Physics* nor the *De Anima*, that is, they were not acquainted with any of the fundamental works of the peripatetic synthesis. Now if one takes the *Organon* by itself, it is easy to get a mistaken idea of the real opinion of the Stagirite, and to reduce his philosophy to a mere collection of logical rules. It was by indirect means (Chalcidius, Boethius) that certain metaphysical, physical and cosmological doctrines became known. Also we find complaints made concerning the obscurity of Aristotle, who, in fine, was looked upon simply as a logician.³

The thirteenth century indeed made full use of the great works of the Aristotelian synthesis, but this new influence of Aristotle, due to his metaphysics and natural philosophy, must be ascribed to an earlier date than is usually done. "This phenomenon has been universally placed too late," writes Mandonnet, "moreover, this second introduction of Aristotle

¹ *Noch einmal die alte lat. Uebersetzung der Analytica posteriora d. Aristoteles*, in *Phil. Jahrb.*, 1925, pp. 230-49; 1927, pp. 85-90.

² Cf. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant*, 2nd edn., Vol. I (*étude critique*), pp. 9-11.

³ Boethius calls him *turbator verborum*; an anonymous author of the tenth century speaks of the *aristotelicus labyrinthus* (Baumgartner, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11).

to the Latin world was spread out over a hundred years beginning with the translation of the fourth book of the *Meteors* by Henricus Aristippus previous to 1162."¹

The study of this great fact of literary history implies a two-fold line of research: the one is concerned with the translations themselves, their authors, dates, and value; the other deals with their diffusion and utilization.

Their diffusion can only be studied by looking for the first traces of the new doctrines. Thus Duhem discovered certain doctrines of Aristotelian physics in the Chartres writers (for instance, in the *De opere sex dierum* of Theodoric of Chartres).² But it has not been proved that this knowledge was due to direct contact with some Latin version of the *Physics* or of the *De cælo et mundo*.³ In the same way, Daniel of Morley in his *Liber de naturis inferiorum et superiorum*⁴ dedicated to John, Bishop of Norwich from 1175 to 1200, mentions various works to Aristotle, genuine or spurious. But according to Birkenmajer he derived his knowledge of these from Avicenna's paraphrase of the *De cælo et mundo*, save for one portion of the *De generatione et corruptione*, which seems to come from a Greco-Latin version.⁵

As for the versions themselves, we must distinguish between those from the Arabic and those from the Greek. It was principally by means of the Arabic that the science and philosophy of antiquity was revealed to the West. The translations from the Arabic were more numerous than those from the Greek, and the first to appear.⁶ They were also more imperfect, for they often misrepresented the thought of the author, and in many instances contained additions to the original text or glosses on it. If we remember that Aristotle's thought

¹ *Op cit.*, pp. 13-14.

² Duhem, *Du temps où la scolastique latin a connu la physique d'Aristote* (Revue de Philos., 1909, pp. 162-178).

³ A. Schneider, *Beiträge*, XVII, pp. 35-40.

⁴ Ed. Sudhoff, *Arch. f. Gesch. d. Naturwissenschaft u. d. Technik*, Bd. VIII (1917-18), pp. 6-40. Birkenmajer mentions another manuscript, *ibid.*, IX (1920-22), pp. 45-51. Also Bliemetzrieder, *Arch. f. Gesch. d. Mathem. d. Naturwissenschaft u. d. Technik*, X, 1927, pp. 338-44.

⁵ *Le rôle joué par les médecins et les naturalistes dans la réception d'Aristote aux XIIe et XIII s.*, in *La Pologne au VIe Congrès intern. des sc. hist.*, Oslo, 1928; Warsaw, 1930, pp. 3 et seq.

⁶ Birkenmajer says that the translations made directly from the Greek preceded those based on the Arabic text, and their utilization by the Latins began some years before Daniel of Morley, and, it would appear, at Salerno (*ibid.*, p. 4). But he is wrong, in our opinion.

underwent successive translations from Greek into Syriac, from Syriac into Arabic, less frequently from Arabic into Hebrew, and finally from Arabic or Hebrew into Latin—often through the medium of some vulgar tongue¹—we shall not be astonished that once the scholastics of the thirteenth century came into possession of translations from Greek into Latin they preferred these to the misleading versions of Arabian origin.

The true introduction of the West to the works of Aristotle was due to a collective enterprise of translation having its centre at Toledo. This town was conquered by the Christians in 1085 and was situated on the borders of two civilizations. The Arabian and Jewish population enjoyed a large measure of toleration under the Christian régime, and here Archbishop Raymond (1126-1151) maintained a college of translators which became famous, thus rendering inestimable services to Western knowledge. Among these translators we must mention the Archdeacon of Segovia, Dominicus Gundissalinus, i.e., "son of Gonzalez," also called Gundissalinus, and his Jewish collaborators, especially John Avendehut (= ibn David, son of David), also called Johannes Hispanus, or Joannes Hispalensis (John of Seville), and above all the Lombard Gerard of Cremona (died 1187). The last-named produced an extraordinary number of works²: in addition to the *Posterior Analytics* and Themistius' Commentary on them, he translated from Arabic into Latin works on Physics (*De naturali auditu*), the *De cælo et mundi*, the *De generatione et corruptione*, and the three first books of the *Meteorology*.

Under the heading of pseudo-Aristotelian writings, Gerard translated the first part and the end of the second part of the *De causis proprietatum et elementorum*, and the *Liber de causis* (or *Liber Aristotelis de expositione bonitatis puræ*³).

¹ "The usual method of the translators of the Middle Ages is well known: A converted Jew [or, we may add, an Arab] translated into the vulgar tongue—into Spanish, for example—the Arabic translation of the Greek text, and it was this second translation which was in turn put into Latin by the one who signed the finished product." (Lucquet, *Hermann le Dalmate*, in *R. hist. des. relig.*, Vol. 44, p. 415.)

² The mediæval catalogue of his translations, and the biography which precedes it, have been edited by Baldassare Boncompagni (Rome, 1851), by F. Wöstenfeld Göttingen, 1877), and by K. Sudhoff (*Archiv. f. Gesch. d. Medizin*, Bd. viii, 1914, pp. 75-80).

³ The Arabic and Latin texts have been published by O. Bardenhewer, *Die pseudoaristot. Schrift über das reine Gute, bekannt unter dem Namen Liber de causis*, Freiburg in B., 1882.

This little treatise is an extract from the *Στοιχείωσις θεολογική* (*Elementatio theologica*) of Proclus. It was commented upon by many scholastics, amongst others by Thomas Aquinas, who was the first to discover its true origin and to attribute it to Proclus.

To these versions of pseudo-Aristotelian works, John of Spain (Johannes Hispanus) added an extract from the famous *Secretum Secretorum* which was translated into so many languages, for he put into Latin for a Queen Theophina or Tharasia the part concerning dietetics (*De conservanda sanitate*). In the thirteenth century there appeared the complete version by Philip of Tripoli of this supposed letter to Alexander the Great, which was also known as the *Liber moralium de regimine dominorum*.¹ Alfred of Sareshel (Alfredus Anglicus), who also passed some time in Toledo, added the *De vegetabilibus* wrongly attributed to Aristotle, being in reality the *De plantis* of Nicholas of Damascus. He translated it from the Arabic text of Isaac ben Honein,² and dedicated the version to Roger of Hereford (about 1170); he also translated the *De mineralibus* or *De congelatis*, three chapters from Avicenna which are often found as an appendix to the fourth book of Aristotle's *Meteorology*.³

In the group of twelfth century translations from the Greek, which naturally calls for consideration after those from the Arabic, we may note the translation from Greek into Latin

¹ The version by John of Spain has been published by H. Suchier, *Denkmäler provenzalischer Literatur u. Sprache*, Bd. I (Halle, 1883), pp. 473-480 (Epistola Aristotelis ad Alexandrum cum prologo Joh. Hispaniensis) and by J. Brinkmann, *Die apocryphen Gesundheitsregeln des Aristoteles für Alexander den Grossen in der Uebersetzung des Johann von Toledo* (Leipzig, 1914). In the fifth fascicle of the *Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi* (Oxford, 1920), R. Steele gives the text of Philip of Tripoli, translated at the request of Guy of Valencia, with the glosses of Roger Bacon, and a treatise by the latter on this apocryphal work. On the identity of Philip, see Haskins, *Studies* . . . , 2nd. edn., pp. 138 *et seq.*

² Critical edition by H. F. Meyer, *Nicolai Damasceni De Plantis libri duo Aristoteli vulgo adscripti* (Leipzig, 1841).

³ The Arabian, Latin, and English texts have been edited by E. J. Holmyard and D. C. Mandeville, *Avicennæ de congelatione et conglutinatione lapidum, being Sections of the Kitâb al-Shifâ*, Paris, 1927. See concerning this work A. Pelzer, *Une source inconnue de Roger Bacon : Alfred de Sareshel, commentateur des Météorologiques d'Aristote*, Archivium Franciscan. Historic., Vol. XII, 1919, pp. 49-51. There was no mediæval translation into Latin of the *Theology* of Aristotle. This apocryphal work has been published in Arabic together with a German version by F. Dieterici: *Die sogenannte Theologie d. Aristoteles aus d. arabischen Handschriften zum erstenmal herausgegeben* (Leipzig, 1882); *Die Sogenannte Theologie d. Arist. aus d. Arabischen übersetzt* (Leipzig, 1883).

of the fourth book of the *Meteorology* made by Henricus Aristippus. Other works of the Stagiritae seem to have been translated from the Greek during this century, but the authors of these versions are not known. This applies to certain parts of the *Metaphysics*, the *Physics*, the *Parva Naturalia*, the *De generatione et corruptione*, the *De Anima*, and the *Ethica vetus*, which consists of Books II and III of the *Nichomachean Ethics*.¹

(ii) COMMENTARIES ON ARISTOTLE. (a) Porphyry's *Isagoge*, (also called the *Institutio* or *Introduction*, or *Treatise on the Five Words*), already extensively commented on by the later Grecian philosophers, enjoyed an immense popularity among the earlier mediæval thinkers in the translation by Marius Victorinus, and in the translation² with double commentary by Boethius. Porphyry was looked upon as a supporter of Aristotle, and his connection with an antagonistic school of philosophy was not even suspected.

The *Isagoge* studies the five predicables or ways in which the predicate of a judgment can be related to a subject (genus, species, specific difference, property, and accident); it served as an introduction to the *Categories* of Aristotle. Porphyry in the *Isagoge* did not get beyond this logical aspect of the predicables. He scarcely noticed the problem of the objectivity of universal ideas, and his statement of the question became the starting point of the controversy concerning the Universals (Chap. II, § 6).

¹ Robert Steele (*Questiones altere supra libros prime philosophie Aristotelis...* in *Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi*, fasc. xi, Oxford, 1932) published (pp. 255-312) the "oldest Latin version known" (p. xxi) of the *Metaphysica vetus* (it stops in the middle of the fourth chapter of Book IV or Γ, 1007 a 30). He identifies it with the *Metaphysica vetustissima* discovered by A. Birkenmajer (cf. his *Projet de l'Académie polonaise des sciences et des lettres pour la publication d'un Corpus philosophorum mediæ ævi*, Brussels, 1930, p. 4). See Birkenmajer in B. Geyer, *Die patrist. u. scholast. Philosophie* (= F. Ueberwegs *Grundriss d. Gesch. d. Philos.*, 2 Teil), Berlin, 1928, pp. 346 and 348. Also especially C. Baeumker, *Die Stellung d. Alfred v. Sareshel...* Sitz. M., 1913, 9, Munich, 1913, pp. 37 et seq., for the *De Anima*; Grabmann, *Forschungen über die lat. Aristotelesübersetzungen*, pp. 104-13, 124-37, and Pelster, *Die griech-lat. Metaphysikübersetzungen d. Mittelalters*, Festgabe C. Baeumker, Munster, 1923, pp. 91-101, on the *Metaphysica vetus*; Haskins, *Studies*, 2nd edn., pp. 224 et seq., on the fragment of the *Physics* which he discovered in the MS. Regin. lat., 1,955 ff., 88r-94v, in the Vatican Library; A. Pelzer, *Les versions lat. des ouvrages de morale conservés sous le nom d'Aristote en usage au XIIIe siècle*, in *Revue Néo-Scholast.* 1921, pp. 324-6, on the *Ethica Vetus*. Cf. the programme of studies published by Haskins quoted in note 2 on p. 57.

² Republished by A. Busse, Berlin, 1887 (Vol. IV of the *Commentaria in Aristotelem græca*, published by the Berlin Academy).

(b) The commentary of Themistius on the *Posterior Analytics* was translated from the Arabic by Gerard of Cremona, to whom was also due a version of many works by Alexander of Aphrodisius (*De tempore*; *De sensu*, *De eo quod augmentum et incrementum fiunt in forma et non in yle*, and probably *De intellectu*).

(c) Boethius commented on the *Categories*, and the *De interpretatione*. His other commentaries on the *Organon* were lost, or neglected during the early Middle Ages. (54)

(iii) As to Plato, a fragment of the *Timæus* was known in the translation of Cicero and Chalcidius. Already John Scotus Erigena mentioned this famous dialogue, which entered more and more into literary circulation. But the *Timæus* is obscure: more than one passage gives a misleading idea of the real thought of Plato; moreover, the eclectic commentaries of Chalcidius helped to make its understanding difficult; in fact we may say in general that during the first period this work was not properly understood at all. Works other than the *Timæus* were known only in occasional fragments, or by their titles (through Chalcidius). It was not until the twelfth century that some copies of the *Phædo* and the *Meno* found their way into circulation. Henricus Aristippus translated them in Sicily, and finished the first at Palermo in 1156.

(iv) Priscian of Lydia is represented in the eleventh century by a translation not very widely used (possibly made by John Scotus Erigena) of his replies to nine questions in psychology, physiology, and the natural sciences, addressed to him by Chosroes, King of Persia, about 531: *Prisciani philosophi solutiones eorum de quibus dubitavit Chosroes Persarum rex*.¹

The early Middle Ages did not know any other works of Greek philosophy; but the Latin writers and the Fathers had handed down the names of a great number of celebrated personalities, and there were extant fragments of the Epicurean, Stoic, and Pythagorean systems. No original work of néo-Platonism was known.

(B) LATIN PHILOSOPHERS. The legacy of Latin antiquity,

¹ Complete edition by J. Bywater, *Comm. in Arist. græca, Suppl. Aristot.*, Vol. I, part two, Berlin, 1886.

so rich in literature, reduces itself in the case of philosophy to the following :

(i) *A series of compilations dating from the period of Latin decadence.* Among them : the works of Marius Victorinus, whose *De definitionibus*, wrongly attributed to Boethius, was in use, and also a translation of the *Isagoge* of Porphyry conserved in part in the first commentary of Boethius ; the works of Claudius Mamertus of Vienne in Gaul (about 450), who wrote the *De statu animæ* in defence of the immortality of the soul against Faustus the Semi-Pelagian ; of Martianus Capella, who devoted to dialectics the fourth book of his encyclopædia *De nuptiis Mercurii et philologiæ* ; and of Donatus. To Macrobius and Donatus the Middle Ages owed much of their knowledge of the facts of ancient history.

(ii) *A number of neo-Platonist commentaries.* (a) Apuleius of Madaura was made use of in his writings *De dogmate Platonis* (also called *De habitudine Platonis*), and *De deo Socratis*. Another work, *Peri ermenia* (περὶ ἑρμηνείας) was falsely ascribed to him, and also a "hermetic" or occult work, *Asclepius*, translated from a Greek work by Hermes Trismegistus in which the latter replied to questions by Asclepius. Some scholastics attributed this work to an Egyptian philosopher, Mercurius, to whom also, following the author of the pseudo-Augustinian work, *De quinque hæresibus*, they ascribed a *Liber qui inscribitur Logostileos* (λόγος τέλειος) *id est verbum perfectum*,¹ although the reference here is to the same work, or rather to its Greek original.

(b) In the same group may be mentioned the Commentary which Chalcidius appended to his translation of the *Timæus*, and also the Commentary on *Scipio's Dream* by Macrobius. (33)

(iii) Certain works or portions of works of Cicero (the *De Officiis*, the *Topics*, commented on by Boethius, the *De Inventione*, commented on by Marius Victorinus, and the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, two spurious works known respec-

¹ Cf. M. Baumgartner, *Die Philosophie des Alanus de Insulis*, pp. 114-116 ; *Die Erkenntnislehre d. Wilhelm von Auvergne*, p. 5 ; M. J. Lagrange, *L'hermétisme*, in *Revue biblique*, 1924-6 ; *Apulei Platonici Madaurensis de philosophia libri*, edited by Paul Thomas, Leipzig, 1908 ; and *Hermetica*, edited, with English translation and notes by Walter Scott, 3 vols. so far published, Oxford, 1924-6.

tively as the *Rhetorica Prima* and the *Rhetorica Secunda*) ; Seneca (the *De Beneficiis* for instance) ; and Lucretius. Cicero was considered an authority on logic and rhetoric. As for Seneca, his stoic maxims made a ready appeal, because of their puritanism, to the few scholastics who wrote on ethics. From the beginning of the Middle Ages various apocryphal works were in circulation under the name of Seneca, such as his supposed correspondence with St. Paul, and the treatises *Formula vitæ honestæ* (or *De Quatuor Virtutibus*), really written by Martin, Bishop of Dumio and afterwards Archbishop of Braga (Bracara), also the *De moribus* and the *De paupertate*, writings dating back to the fourth century A.D.¹ On the other hand, Lucretius,² the authoritative exponent of Epicureanism, was looked upon with less favour by the scholastics, and appealed to more often by their adversaries. Thus the materialistic psychology of the Cathari borrows his arguments.

(C) *The Fathers of the Church*, the acknowledged founders of mediæval theology, handed down their own philosophical ideas and those of antiquity. They were called *sancti* as contrasted with the *philosophi*.

(I) Among them, ST. AUGUSTINE occupies the first place. The scholastics were greatly influenced by his psychology, and metaphysical theses were also borrowed from him. (45).

(ii) PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. The ascendancy of St. Augustine as a philosopher and an interpreter of dogma explains the fact that under his name were circulated a series of apocryphal works abounding in theories foreign to the spirit of Augustinianism. The principal pseudo-Augustinian treatises (their apocryphal character is established with the aid of St. Augustine's own *Retractationes*) are the following : (a) *Categoriæ decem*, an abridgment of the *Categories* of Aristotle which had a great influence ; (b) *Principia dialecticæ*, a grammatical work on the distinction between simple and compound terms ; (c) *Contra quinque hæreses*, in which the author especially quotes " hermetic " texts and gives them a Christian meaning ; (d) later, in the twelfth century, the *De Spiritu et Anima*, written by the Cistercian Alcher of Clairvaux, a veritable

¹ Hauréau, *Not. et extr. de qq. mss. latins*, II, 202, IV, 15, and 67.

² Isidore of Seville (60), and Rhaban Maur (63), two compilers, treat him with most favour.

manual of Augustinian psychology in great favour among the scholastics. (Ch. II, § 15.)

(iii) The early Middle Ages possessed treatises by ORIGEN in Rufinus's translations, GREGORY OF NYSSA (see iv, Nemesius), CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA, LACTANTIUS, ST. JEROME, and ST. AMBROSE, whose *Hexæmeron* embodied a number of Aristotelian theories. JOHN CASSIAN, the Semi-Pelagian (died 435) against whom St. Augustine wrote his last works, transmitted some philosophical notions to the Middle Ages through the writings of Alcuin and Rhaban Maur. In particular, his treatise *De Institutis Cænobiorum* and the *Collationes Patrum XXIV* were widely read.

(iv) Up to the sixteenth century, a work entitled *De Natura hominis* (περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπου) written by Nemesius, Bishop of Emesa, was attributed to GREGORY OF NYSSA (*Gregorius Nyssenus, or Nicenus*). This work was translated by Alfano, Archbishop of Salerno (1058-1085) and in 1115 by Burgundius of Pisa, the Jurist, who dedicated his work to Frederick Barbarossa.¹ Burgundius, to whom is also due a version of ten medical works by Galen, translated the homilies of St. John Chrysostom, St. Basil, and, about 1150, the *De Fide Orthodoxa* by St. John Damascene, the St. Thomas of the East, who died before 758. This work (ἐκδοσις ἀκριβῆς τῆς ὀρθοδόξου πίστεως) comprised the third and last part of the (πηγὴ γνώσεως) of the Doctor of Damascus. There was also in the twelfth century another translation of Chapters I to VIII of the third book.²

¹ C. Baeumker, *Nemesius (Wochenschrift für klass. Philologie, 1896, 1095-1102)*; B. Domanski, *Die Psychologie d. Nemesius*, p. xii. Alfano's translation has been published by Holzinger (Leipzig and Prague, 1887), and by C. Burkhard (*Nemesii episcopi Premnon physicon sive περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπου liber a N. Alfano . . . in latinum translatus*, Leipzig, 1917), who has also published that by Burgundius (*Gregorii Nysseni [Nemesii Emesini] περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπου Progr., Vienne, 1891-1902*). Grabmann (*Gesch. d. scholast. Methode*, II, pp. 75 *et seq.*) divides the translations undertaken in the twelfth century from Greek into Latin into two groups: the first was the work of men in contact with the Byzantine world and comprised James of Venice, Burgundius of Pisa and Moyses of Bergamo. To these we may add, with Haskins (*Studies*, 2nd edn., pp. 215-22), Leo the Pisan (Tuscan), brother of Hugh Eterien, and Paschal the Roman. To the second group belonged Henricus Aristippus, preceded in the tenth century by the arch-priest Leo of Naples, who about 950 translated the *Story of Alexander* by pseudo-Callisthenes (edited by F. Pfister in *Sammlung mittellatein. Texte* of Alfons Hilka, Heidelberg, 1913), and in the eleventh century by Alfano, Archbishop of Salerno.

² See Haskins, *Studies*, 2nd edn., pp. 206-9, and J. de Ghellinck, *Le mouvement théologique du XII^e siècle* (Paris, 1914, pp. 245-267).

(v) We must also mention the writings of pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and of Maximus the Confessor. The treatises *De Hierarchia Cælestia*, *De Hierarchia Ecclesiastica*, *De Divinis Nominibus*, *De Theologia Mystica*, and ten letters which were known in the West in the eighth century, were translated between 828 and 835.

Pope Paul I sent a Greek copy to Pepin about 758 ; Michael I, Emperor of Constantinople, sent another to Louis the Pious, who received it at Compiègne in 827, and put it in the Library of the Abbey of St. Denis. Hilduin, the Abbot of the monastery (who forged the eleventh letter to Aristophanes), translated the works of pseudo-Dionysius, with the help of several collaborators, between the years 828 and 835, at the command of Louis the Pious, basing himself solely on the copy received in 827 (now Greek MS. 437 in the Bibliothèque Nationale of Paris).¹

It was on this same manuscript that was based the translation

¹ The Abbey of St. Denis, a centre of Hellenism in France, possessed two translations in the name of William in the twelfth century. One of them, William the Doctor or Le Mire, of Gap in Provence, brought there Greek manuscripts from Constantinople, and translated the Life and Sentences of Secundus. See L. Delisle, *Journal des Savants*, 1900, pp. 725-32, and A. Hilka, *Das Leben u. die Sentenzen des Philosophen Secundus des Schweigsamen in der altfranzös. Literatur nebst krit. Ausgabe der lat. Uebersetzung des Wilhelmus Medicus Abtes von Saint-Denis*, in 88. *Jahresbericht des schlesischen Gesellschaft für vaterländ. Kultur*, Breslau, 1910. The translation of Hilduin will be published by G. Théry, the author of numerous studies on Dionysius, such as *Contribution à l'histoire de l'aréopagisme au IXe s.*, in *Le Moyen Age*, 2e série, vol. 25, 1923, pp. 111-53 ; *Recherches pour une édit. grecque historique, du ps. D.*, in *The New Scholasticism*, 1929, pp. 353-442 ; *L'entrée du ps. D. en Occident*, in *Mélanges Mandonnet*, Vol. 11, Paris, 1930, pp. 23-30 ; *Hilduin et la première traduction des écrits du ps. D.*, in *Revue d'hist. de l'Eglise de France*, 1923, pp. 23-39 ; *Le texte intégral de la traduction du ps. D. par Hilduin*, in *Revue Hist. Eccles.*, 1925, pp. 33-50 ; 197-214 ; *Etudes dyonisiennes*, I. *Hilduin, traducteur de D.* (= *Etudes de philos. médiévale*, edited by E. Gilson, XVI), Paris, 1932 ; *Scot Erigène, traducteur de D.*, in *Bulletin Du Cange*, Vol. VI, 1931, pp. 1-94, and *Archivum latininitatis mediæ ævi*, 1931, pp. 185-278 ; *Inauthenticité du comment. de la Théologie mystique attribué à J. Scot Erigène*, in *La Vie Spirituelle*, 1923, Vol. VII, pp. 137-53 ; *Existe-t-il un comment. de J. Sarrazin sur la "Hierarchie celeste" du Ps. D.* in *Revue Sc. Phil. Theol.*, 1922, pp. 72-81 ; *Les ouvrages dyonisiennes de Thomas Gallus in La Vie Spirituelle*, 1932, vol. 31, pp. 147-67 ; Vol. 32, pp. 23-43 ; Vol. 33, pp. 129-54. See also : M. Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben*, Munich, 1926, pp. 449-68 (revised edition of a study which appeared originally in *Festgabe A. Ehrhard*, Bonn, 1922, pp. 180-99) ; P. Lehmann, *Zur Kenntniss der Schriften des Dionysius Areopagita im Mittelalter*, in *Revue Benedictine*, 1923, pp. 81-97 ; M. Cappuyns, *Jean Scot Erigène* (Theses for Doctorate of Theology of Louvain) ; 1933, pp. 150-61. The version of Scot Erigena will be found in Migne, *P.L.*, vol. 122. His translation, and those of J. Sarrazin and Traversari, as well as the *Extractio* of Th. Gallus, accompany the commentaries of Dionysius the Carthusian in his *Opera omnia* (Cologne, 1536 ; *ibid.*, 1556, Quentel), reprinted at Tournai (vol. 15 and 16, 1902).

of the Dionysian corpus undertaken about 860 by John Scotus Erigena at the request of Charles the Bald. Anastasius the Librarian, known for his translations of historical, hagiographical and conciliar texts, improved the translation by Scotus Erigena about 875, with the help of a manuscript brought from Constantinople, and enriched it with his own commentaries, and scholia by Maximus and John, Bishop of Scythopolis.¹ John Sarrasin, the friend of John of Salisbury, undertook a new translation about 1167. It was this translation which inspired a *Compendiosa extractio* by Thomas Gallus, a Victorine, who died as Abbot of Vercelli in 1246. In spite of his ignorance of Greek, and thanks to his twenty years of meditation, he was able to compose this lively and practical adaptation of the writings of Dionysius, and present it in the language of the time, often in the form of a summary with commentary.² In the thirteenth century appeared the version by Robert Grosseteste, and in the fifteenth that of the Camaldulense Ambrose Traversari.

Scotus Erigena also translated the *Ambigua* of Maximus (*Ambigua in Gregorium*, an explanation of difficult passages contained in the sermons of St. Gregory Nazianzen), and the *Sermo de imagine* (περὶ κατασκευῆς ἀνθρώπου) of St. Gregory of Nyssa, which Dionysius Exiguus had already translated into Latin in the sixth century.³

(D) *Arabian works written by Mohammedans or Jews.*—Some products of Arabian science became known to the West in the eleventh century through the Benedictine monks of Monte Cassino. CONSTANTINE THE AFRICAN, who was born in Carthage and became a monk under Abbot Didier (about 1060) after long journeys to the East and Egypt and a stay at Salerno, made free translations of medical works from the Greek and Arabic, and in particular those of the Jew ISAAC BEN SALOMON ISRAELI (ninth century), and perhaps also his works on the *Elements* and the *Definitions*. The Lotharingian WALCHER, who was in England in 1091, employed the astrolabe as used by the Arabs, long before ADELARD OF BATH. In the twelfth century, the latter translated the Tables of Al-

¹ Cf. M. Manitius, *Gesch. d. lat. Literatur d. Mittelalters*, I, 1911, pp. 678-9.

² Théry, *Les œuvres dyonis. de Th. G.*, in *La vie spirituelle*, vol. 32, 1932, p. 42.

³ 53 : Cf. M. Cappuyns, *J. Scot Erigène*, pp. 162-78.

Khwarizmi¹ (1126). Hugh of Santalla (Hugo Sanctalliensis) translated into Latin a round dozen of works on astronomy, astrology, meteorology, geomancy, and other subjects, dedicating almost all of them to Michael, Bishop of Tarrazona in Aragon (1119-51).² At the same period, Plato of Tivoli, Robert of Chester or of Ketene (also called Robertus Retinensis), Roger of Hereford and Hermann of Carinthia (Hermann the Second or the Dalmatian) made known other astronomical works,³ while two Pisans, Rusticus and Stephen of Antioch translated works on medicine.⁴

The Westerns also became acquainted with the religion of Islam. Peter the Venerable, Abbot of Cluny (died 1155), who passed some time in Spain, entered into relations with several translators. In this way he caused several works to be translated in Latin: the Koran and the *Chronica mendosa Sarracenorum* by Robert of Ketene, two little treatises on Mahomet (*De generatione Mahumet* and *Doctrina Mahumet*) by Hermann the Dalmatian, a little *Summa* against the Saracens by Master Peter of Toledo, assisted by Peter of Poitiers, secretary to Peter the Venerable. He himself wrote a work against the Saracens.⁵

But it was the translators of the College of Toledo who transmitted the principal works of Arabian and Jewish philosophers to the Latin West in the twelfth century. John of Spain (Johannes Hispanus) translated not only astronomical works by Albategni (Al-Battani), Alchabitius (Al-Kabi'si),

¹ Cf. Haskins, *Studies* . . . 2nd. edn., pp. 113-9, and 22 *et seq.* For the astrolabe in the early Middle Ages, see A. Van de Vyver, *Les premières traductions latines (Xe-XIe s.) de traités arabes sur l'Astrolabe*, in *Memoirs of the First Internal Congress of Historical Geography*, Brussels, 1931, II, pp. 266-90, and J. Millas Vallicrosa, *Assaig d'història de les idees físiques i matemàtiques a la Catalunya medieval*, Vol. I (Estudis Universitatis Catalans, Série monogràfica I), Barcelona, 1931. This last author ascribes most of the work to the translator Lupitus (Llobet), of Barcelona, a correspondent with Gerbert.

² See ch. iv. of *The Translations of Hugo Sanctallensis*, in Haskins, *Studies*, 2nd. edn., pp. 67-81, and J. Ruska, *Tabula smaragdina*, Heidelberg, 1926, pp. 177-80.

³ See Haskins, *Studies* . . . 2nd. edn., pp. 11, 120-6, for the first three personages, and pp. 43-66 for Hermann of Carinthia (who must be distinguished from Hermann Contractus or Perclus, the Benedictine polygrapher of Reichenau, who died in 1054, and also from Hermann, the German, a translator who lived in the middle of the thirteenth century). On pp. 48 and 56-66 will be found extracts and an analysis of his half-scientific, half-philosophical work, *De essentiis*.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 130-5.

⁵ See P. Mandonnet, *Pierre le Vénérable et son activité littéraire contre l'Islam*, in *Revue thomiste*, 1893, pp. 328-41 (but see Haskins, *Studies* . . . 2nd. edn., p. 47). Cf. Migne, *P.L.*, Vol. 189.

Alfraganus (Al-Fergani), Albumasar (Abu Ma'schar), but also important philosophical works. Among them we may mention the *De Intellectu* of Alkindi, the *De Differentia inter Animam et Spiritum* of the Christian doctor and philosopher Costa ben Luca (Constabulus), the *De Scientiis* of Alfarabi, the *Fons Vitæ* of the Jew Avencebrol (Salomon Ibn Gebirol), the philosophy of Algazel (Al-Gazzali), considerable portions of the philosophical encyclopædia of Avicenna (Ibn Sina) called in Arabic the *Kitab al Schifa* or *Book of Healing* and in Latin *Sufficientia* (amongst others, the *Metaphysics* and the *Liber de Anima* or *Sextus Liber Naturalium*). In the case of many of the translations last referred to, the manuscripts mention the collaboration of Dominic Gundisalvi (Gundissalinus).

By means of these works and especially through Avicenna's Encyclopædia, which is a paraphrase of Aristotle, the doctrine of the Stagirite was transmitted in great fullness to the West independently of the later versions of Aristotle due to Gerard of Cremona (see above). Among the translations from Arabic into Latin by the latter we must mention in addition to many books on Greek and Arabian medicine, mathematics and astronomy,¹ the *Canon* of Avicenna, a big work on medicine, the *Optics* of Alhazen (Al-Hasan ibn al-Heitam), the *Liber Definitionum* and the *De Elementis* of Isaac Israeli, the *De Scientiis* of Alfarabi, his *Distinctio super librum Aristotelis de naturali auditu*, and works by Alkindi such as his *De somno et visione*, *De quinque essentiis*, and *De ratione*.²

¹ About the same time there appeared in Sicily translations from Greek into Latin of the *Pneumatica* of Hero of Alexandria, three works of Euclid (*Data*, *Optica*, *Catoptrica*), and the *Elementatio physica* or *De Motu* of Proclus. These four last versions were the work of an anonymous translator who also rendered into Latin about 1160 the *Almageste* of Claudius Ptolemæus, with the assistance of Eugenius the Admiral, to whom is also due the translation into Latin from Arabic of the *Optics* of the same author. Cf. Ch. H. Haskins, *The Sicilian Translators of the Twelfth Century* in *Studies* . . . 2nd. edn., pp. 155-93.

² To the two translations of the *De scientiis* of Alfarabi, by John of Spain and Gerard, edited by A. Gonzalez Palencia, the one after the printed copy of Camerarius, the other from the MS. Lat. 9335 of Paris (pp. 81-115 and 117-76, in *Alfarabi, Catalogo de las ciencias, edicion y traduccion castellane* = Publicaciones de la Facultad de filosofia y letras, Universidad de Madrid, Vol. II, Madrid, 1932) should be added his *De ortu scientiarum*, translated probably by Dominic Gundisalvi and published by C. Baeumker (*Beiträge*, xix, 3, 1916). Cf. P. M. Bouyges, *Notes sur les philosophes arabes connus des Latins au moyen âge*, in *Mélanges de l'Université de S. Joseph*, vol. 7-9, Beyrout, 1914-24. E. Gilson (Arch. H.D.L.M.A., 1929-30, pp. 115-26), gives a critical edition of the mediæval latin text of the *De intellectu* of Alfarabi, followed by a French translation (pp. 126-41). L. Massignon (*ibid.*, pp. 151-8) adds notes on the original Arabic text.

Thus, by a strange turn of the wheel, the Christians in the West received from the Arabs, thanks to these versions, a considerable number of the philosophical and scientific works of the Greeks which the Syrian Christians had translated from Greek or Syrian into Arabic four or five centuries before at the request of the Caliphs.

(E) *Mediæval Writers*.—We must include in the list of works read widely during the early Middle Ages those first writers belonging to the new races (Ch. II, § 4). Thus at first Gregory the Great was quoted more than St. Augustine. Other mediæval authors such as Hilary of Poitiers soon attained a wide circulation. Later on the works of St. Anselm and books like the *Liber Sex Principiorum* attributed to Gilbert de la Porrée became classics.

29. Bibliography.—*Teaching in the early Middle Ages*: cf. 20, I. Also: L. Maître, *Les écoles épiscopales et monastiques de l'Occident depuis Charlemagne jusqu'à Philippe-Auguste*, Paris, 1866; F. Picavet, *Histoire de l'enseignement et des écoles du IXe au XIIIe s.*, in *Revue internat. de l'enseignement*, 1901; M. Roger, *L'enseignement des lettres classiques d'Ausone à Alcuin*, Paris, 1905; H. Waddell, *The Wandering Scholars*, London, 1907; G. Robert, *Les écoles et l'enseignement de la théologie pendant la première moitié du XIIIe s.*, Paris, 1909; revised edn. by G. Paré, A. Brunet, and P. Tremblay, under the title, *La Renaissance du XIIe siècle, Les écoles et l'enseignement*, Publications of the Institute of Mediæval Studies of Ottawa, III, 1934; H. O. Taylor, *The Classical Heritage of the Middle Ages*, 3rd edn., New York, 1911; E. Norden, *Die lateinische Literatur im Uebergang vom Altertum zum Mittelalter*, in *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, I, 8, 3rd edn., 1912; E. K. Rand, *Prudentius and Christian Humanism*, in *Transactions of the American Philosophical Association*, 1920, 72-83; *A Vade-mecum of Liberal Culture in a Manuscript of Fleury*, in *Philol. Quart.*, 1922, pp. 258-77; J. Stuart Beddie, *Libraries in the XIIth Century: their Catalogues and Contents*, in *Anniversary Essays in Mediæval History by Students of Ch. H. Haskins*, Boston and New York, 1929, pp. 1-24; F. Sassen, *L'enseignement scolastique à Rolduc*, in *Revue Néo-Scolast.*, 1934, Vol. 36, pp. 78-100; J. C. Russell, *Hereford and Arabic Science in England about 1175-1200*, in *Isis*, 1932, pp. 14-25.

Translations: For translations previous to the XIIth century, see, besides the works mentioned in notes: A. Jourdain, *Recherches critiques sur l'âge et l'origine des trad. lat. d'Aristote*, Paris, 1819; new edn. by his son Charles, 1843 (the starting point of research, and a first synthesis, still indispensable, gives specimens of translations, pp. 402-50); V. Rose, *Die Lücke im Diogenes Lærtius*

und der alte Uebersetzer, Hermes I, 1866, pp. 367-97; *Ptolemæus und die Schule von Toledo*, *ibid.*, VIII, 1874, pp. 327-49 (two fundamental articles); F. Wustenfeld, *Die Uebersetzungen Arab. Werke in das Lateinische seit d. XI Jahrh.* (in *Abhandl. d. Kgl. Gesellschaft d. Wissenschaften zu Göttingen*, Bd. 22), Göttingen, 1877; M. Steinschneider, *Die hebraïschen Uebersetzungen d. Mittelalters u. die Juden als Dolmetscher*, Berlin, 1893 (a monument of erudition); *Die arab. Uebers. aus d. Griechischen* (= Beihaft V. 2 u. XII zum Centralblatt für Bibliothekswesen), Leipzig, 1889 and 1893; *Die europäischen Uebers. aus d. Arabischen bis Mitte d. 17 Jahrhunderts* (in *Sitzungsberichte d. k. Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-hist. Klasse*, Bd. 149 u. 151), Vienna, 1905-6 (excellent works); M. Grabmann, *Forschungen über die lat. Aristotelesübersetzungen d. XIII Jahrhunderts* (Beiträge XVII 5-6), Munster i. W. 1916 (the best general work, to be corrected and completed by later studies; at the end there is a list of incipits); S. D. Wingate, *The Mediæval Latin Versions of the Aristotelian Scientific Corpus, with special reference to the Biological works*, London, 1931 (well informed; a good synthesis).

We may also mention: O. Hertwig, *Die Uebersetzungsliteratur Unteritaliens in d. normannisch-staufischen Epoche*, Centralblatt für Bibliothekswesen, III, 1886, pp. 61-90, 223-5, 505; L. Leclerc, *Histoire de la médecine arabe*, Paris, 1896; A. Bjornbo, *Die mittelalt. lat. Uebersetzungen aus d. Griechischen auf dem Gebiete d. mathemat. Wissenschaften*, in *Archiv. für d. Gesch. d. Naturwissenschaften u. d. Technik*, I, 1909, 385-94. Cf. also the works of Haskins, Thorndike, Sarton, and Manitius (18, vii, and 20, vi).

Modifying its project of a *Corpus philosophorum mediævi*, the Union académique internationale announces a critical edition of the greco-latin versions of Aristotle, limited to 250 copies (!) (to appear at the Libreria dello Stato at Rome. It reserves for the Mediæval Academy of the United States the commentaries of Averrhoes on Aristotle with the arabo-latin translations. See on this subject the Bulletin of the Classe des Lettres et des Sciences morales et politiques of the Académie royale de Belgique, 5th series, Vol. 18, 1932, pp. 345-64.

§ 3.—*Division of the First Period*

30. Monographic studies.—The study of the masters who flourished down to the end of the twelfth century (Ch. II) may be arranged in three chronological sections, differentiated by characteristics of an external nature.

I. From the fourth to the eighth centuries. The Latin writers of the fourth to the eighth centuries—Chalcidius, Marius Victorinus, Macrobius, and Martianus Capella—were brought up under the influence of Roman ideas, and were personalities of transition: they exercised an influence on the first writers

of the Middle Ages who were their contemporaries or immediate successors, and transmitted to them a number of doctrines from antiquity (§ 1). They were themselves influenced by eclectic and encyclopædic preoccupations, and in this resemble the first writers of the Middle Ages. In contrast to them, St. Augustine was a teacher of doctrine (§ 2). His prominent personality forms the connecting link between the patristic period and the Middle Ages, which he completely dominated. One could study him either with reference to the past which preceded him, or to the future which was to follow, and it is this second point of view which interests us here. Next to St. Augustine we can put the figure of pseudo-Dionysius, whom circumstances make a Western, and whom all read and study (§ 3). From the fifth to the ninth century we get a series of intellectuals issuing from Celtic and Germanic stocks: these are the first mediæval thinkers (§ 4). They appear successively at Rome (Gregory the Great), in the kingdoms of the Ostrogoths (Boethius, Cassiodorus) and of the Visigoths (Isidore of Seville), in Celtic England (Venerable Bede), in the Palatine School of Charlemagne, or in the monasteries under the influence of the Carlovingian renaissance (Alcuin, Rhaban Maur). Except for Boethius, the philosophic aim is secondary in the majority of these. Living in the atmosphere of the thought of antiquity, they confine their ambition to the composing of encyclopædias of knowledge, which their contemporaries and successors eagerly study.

Philosophy really originates in the ninth century. From that time onwards we find something more than the mere repetition of Greek and Roman ideas, and the philosophic productions reflect the mentality of the new races.

Bearing these things in mind, and also the fact that the twelfth century witnessed not only the first attempts at a scholastic systematization, but also the manifestation of the most characteristic features of the feudal system, and further that this twelfth century was the golden age of the schools, we get a further grouping of the masters: before the twelfth century, and in that century.

II. *From the ninth to the twelfth century.* The appearance in the ninth century of a philosopher of the temper of John Scotus Erigena (§ 5) stands out as a unique fact. His contemporaries and his successors do not follow him in the path of

philosophic synthesis, but take up, timidly at first, and more boldly later on, the study of a particular question, that of universals (§ 6). In the eleventh century, St. Anselm endeavours to co-ordinate the elements acquired (§ 8). For reasons which will be explained later on, we have to pay attention to the relations which begin to be manifest in the eleventh century, and even earlier, between philosophy on the one hand, and theology and law on the other (§ 7).

III. *The twelfth century* confers upon mediæval civilization its definitive character. An extraordinary tension is manifested in ideas, and gives rise to complex and disparate movements. The scholastics renew with avidity the study of the problem of universals, and the introduction of the new logical works of Aristotle fans the fire of the discussions. It is in the French schools that these take place, and for the most part at Laon, Chartres, and Paris. William of Champeaux professes at one time an exaggerated realism (§ 9), but this very soon comes to be concentrated in the schools of Chartres, the most brilliant centre of culture during the first half of the twelfth century (§ 10). Then the fame of Chartres begins to diminish before the renown of the schools of Paris, the extension of which brings about the creation of the first mediæval university. Exaggerated realism meets on all sides with opponents, who in the most varying ways (§ 11) endeavour to harmonize the individuality of the real being with the generality of the being as conceived. Abelard—a prominent fighter in the field—triumphs over exaggerated realism, and resolves the problem in a new and definitive way (§ 12). Gilbert de la Porrée follows in his footsteps (§ 13). At the same time the didactic methods are perfected, terminology becomes more exact, and important doctrines begin to take shape. Although we do not find systematizations comparable with those of the thirteenth century, we find interesting attempts at a synthesis in Hugh and Richard of St. Victor (§ 14), Isaac of Stella, Alcher of Clairvaux and Alan of Lille (§ 15). John of Salisbury, a typical representative of the spirit of the time, takes up the study of political questions (§ 16). At the same time we notice the appearance of materialistic and dualistic doctrines, and we observe the names of a few pantheists (§ 17). Lastly, the history of philosophy cannot pass over the Summists and Sententiaries, who fill the twelfth century, and begin the

period of theological systematizations (§ 18), nor again the mystics, who have a golden age in the thirteenth century (§ 19) or the jurists in Roman, feudal and canon law, who strengthen and multiply the links between their own discipline and philosophical teaching (§ 20).

31. Synthetic studies.—After this first series of studies, we shall endeavour, in Chapter III, to set forth some general views, to mark the progress which has been made in philosophy (§ 1), point out the uniformities which are revealed (§ 2), stress the characteristic features which link up philosophy with civilization (§ 3), and outline the general relations of philosophy to theology, speculative and mystical, and to civil and canon law.

An appendix will be devoted to Byzantine, Jewish and Arabian philosophies (Chapter IV).

32. Bibliography.—Cf. 20. Also the following: G. Brunhes *La foi chrétienne et la philosophie au temps de la Renaissance carolingienne*, Paris, 1903; J. de Ghellinck, *Le mouvement théologique du XIIe siècle*, Paris, 1914; J. A. Endres, *Forschungen zur Geschichte der frühmittelalterlichen Philosophie*, Munster, 1915; A. Schneider, *Die Erkenntnislehre bei Beginn der Scholastik*, Fulda, 1921; G. Kafka and H. Eibl, *Der Ausklang der antiken Philosophie und das Erwachen einer neuen Zeit* (Gesch. der Philos. in Einzeldarstellungen, Vol. 9), Munich, 1928; A. Van de Vijver, *Les étapes du développement philosophique du haut moyen âge*, in *Revue belge de philologie et d'hist.*; 1929, pp. 425-52; A. Landgraf, *Handschriftenfunde aus der Frühscholastik*, in *Zeitschrift für kath. Theol.*, 1929, pp. 95-111; A. Landgraf, *Some unknown writings of the early scholastic period*, in *The New Scholasticism*, 1930, pp. 1-22; *Zur Lehre von der Gotteserkenntnis in der Frühscholastik*, *ibid.*, 1930, pp. 261-88; P. Pourret, *Les origines de la théologie scolastique, Les précurseurs du IXe au XIe siècle*, in *Revue apologetique*, 1932, pp. 391-404; O. Lottin, *La nature de la conscience morale, les premières spéculations du moyen âge*, in *Ephemerides theologicæ lovanienses*, 1932, pp. 252-83; *Les débuts du traité de la prudence au moyen âge*, in *Rech. T.A.M.*, 1932 pp. 270-93.

CHAPTER II

The Masters of the First Period

§ 1.—*Latin writers of the Fourth and Fifth Centuries*

Chalcidus, Marius Victorinus, Macrobius and Martianus Capella were Latin writers of the fourth and fifth centuries who, by their philosophical activity and eclectic and encyclopædic tendencies, formed a link between Greco-Latin antiquity and the early Middle Ages. While they were attached to the neo-Platonist school, they nevertheless laid aside its metaphysical preoccupations and devoted themselves to the work of translation and of philosophical exegesis.

33. Chalcidius (beginning of fourth century).—The Commentary of Chalcidius on the *Timæus* was principally inspired by that of Posidonius, perhaps through the intermediary of Adrastus and Albinus.¹ Chalcidius apparently did nothing more than translate a work of co-ordination made by some Greek author who himself made use of Numenius. Thus the work reflects the eclecticism, Platonist in tendency, which flourished in the second century A.D. and lacks originality. It contains extracts from works of Plato other than the *Timæus*, a statement of various Aristotelian theories (it is worthy of note that the author rejects the definition of the soul as the form of the body), a few texts of Chrysippus and Cleanthus together with a comparison of their doctrines, also theories of Pythagoras, Philo, Numenius, etc., and likewise extracts from Greek writers on medicine, Ionians, Eleatics and the Atomists of the pre-Socratic period: so that Chalcidius was regarded up to the twelfth century as one of the principal sources for the history of Greek philosophy. This helps to explain the great influence of his Commentary.

¹ The dependance is not certain. See the critical remarks of Raechter against the thesis of Switalski, in Ueberweg, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, Vol. I, 12th edn. (1926), p. 649, note 2.

34. Marius Victorinus.—This grammarian and rhetorician (about 350) translated the *Categories* and *De Interpretatione* of Aristotle, the *Isagoge* of Porphyry, and various neo-Platonist works. We also owe to him some commentaries on Cicero and neo-Platonist works, as well as some original treatises on logic, *De definitionibus*, *De syllogismis hypotheticis* (lost). Marius was converted to Christianity, and wrote several theological works, still extant in great part. By his influence upon St. Augustine, he helped to form the Christian neo-Platonism of the Bishop of Hippo.

35. Ambrosius Theodosius Macrobius, brought up on Roman traditions although not himself a Roman by birth, wrote a Commentary on the *Somnium Scipionis*, a portion of Cicero's *De Republica* (VI, 9). The Middle Ages was provided in this treatise with an exposition of neo-Platonism after the manner of Porphyry and Proclus. It contains in a condensed form (I, 14) the great doctrines of the Monistic emanation theory of the Alexandrian writers, and in our opinion sufficient notice has not been taken of these fundamental texts; the supreme principle, God, engenders eternally by virtue of a conscious and necessary generation (*superabundanti majestatis fœcunditate*) a second principle, the *mens* or νοῦς. The latter, which is by nature purely intelligible like its Source, whom it knows, engenders in its turn the world-soul. This is less perfect, carries within itself the germ of multiplicity, and spreads out its universal life into the corporeal things of heaven and earth. By the world-soul which is in a sense divine, all things are bound together in a sort of universal sympathy; everything is by nature intelligible. The intelligible is projected forth into the manifold appearances of bodies, just as a light may be reflected in numerous mirrors without suffering any alteration in itself.¹

¹ Deus, qui prima causa et est et vocatur, unus omnium quæque sunt, quæque videntur esse, princeps et origo est: hic superabundanti majestatis fœcunditate de se mentem creavit. Hæc mens, quæ νοῦς vocatur, qua patrem inspicit, plenam similitudinem servat auctoris: animam vero de se creat posteriora respiciens. Rursus anima patrem qua intuetur, induitur, ac paulatim regrediente respectu in fabricam corporum, incorporea ipsa degenerat. . . . Macrobius, *Comment. ex Cicerone in somnium Scipionis*, I, 14. Secundum hoc ergo cum ex summo Deo mens, ex mente anima sit; anima vero et condatur et vita compleat omnia quæ sequuntur, cunctaque hic unus fulgor illuminet et in universis appareat, ut in multis speculis, per ordinem positis, vultus unus; cumque omnia continuis successionibus se sequantur . . . invenietur . . . a summo Deo usque ad ultimam rerum fœcem una mutuis se vinculis religans et nusquam interrupta connexio, *ibid.*

In addition to this theory of hypostases subordinated to each other, Macrobius reproduces several particular theories of neo-Platonism. He emphasizes the functions of beauty and light which accompany Being. He holds that the human soul is immaterial and immortal, united to the body by a forced union¹ and ought to aim at deliverance. He assigns to morality the task of freeing the soul from its bondage to the body. He distinguishes with Plotinus between the political virtues of man living in society, the purgative virtues (*purgatoriæ*) of the man seeking to free himself from the demands of sense, the virtue of the free man (*purgati*) who has already attained this end, and finally the contemplative virtues (*quæ in ipsa divina mente consistunt*) introducing man to the mystical contemplation which is the ideal even of life here below. He combines these four Plotinian grades of virtue with the classification of virtues into Wisdom, Justice, Temperance and Fortitude (Plato), which differ in meaning according to the degree of advancement of the soul in the purgative way.

We may add that the Commentary of Macrobius is full of neo-Pythagorean ideas on the symbolism of numbers and their astronomical applications, and that he found a place for polytheism in his system, so that the work is really a syncretic product of neo-Platonist paganism.

Macrobius was also the author of *Saturnalia*; like Marius Victorinus he made use of a commentary on the *Timæus* which connects him with Posidonius. He transmitted a mass of mathematical and astronomical data. Towards the end of his life Macrobius seems to have been converted to Christianity.

36. Martianus Capella, of Carthage, went to Rome and wrote (about 430) an encyclopædia in nine books compiled from Varro and other grammarians, called *De nuptiis Mercurii et Philologiæ* (from the title of the first two books), or *Satyricon* (from its combination of prose and verse, after the manner of the satire Menipæus). Each of the books III to IX is devoted to one of the seven liberal arts. Martianus thus popularized the *trivium* and the *quadrivium*. The seven arts are represented under the form of young maidens escorting Philologia, Apollo's bride. Grammar, for instance, is a daughter of Memphis, and carries on a tray instruments for loosing the tongues of children. Dialectics is represented

¹ Ad hæc terrena corpora deducitur, I, 12.

by a woman with an emaciated countenance, holding in one hand a serpent, and in the other concealing a fish-hook. The Middle Ages eagerly studied this encyclopædia because it was an attempt at a classification of human knowledge and drew up a plan of study. It was commented upon (Remigius of Auxerre), translated (Notker Labeo), and was a source of inspiration for the plastic arts.

37.—Bibliography.—Chalcidius.—F. Mullach, *Fragmenta philosophorum græcorum*, Vol. II, pp. 147-258, Paris, 1867; J. Wrobel, *Platonis Timæus interprete Chalcidio cum ejusdem commentario*, Leipzig, 1876; B. W. Switalski, *Des Chalcidius Kommentar zu Platon Timæus* (Beiträge, III, 6), Munster, 1902.

Marius Victorinus.—Philosophical writings: cf. F. Ueberweg, *Grundriss*, Vol. I, 12th edn. (1926), p. 648. Theological writings: Migne, *P.L.*, Vol. 8, 999-1310; P. Monceaux, *Hist. litt. de l'Afrique chrétienne*, Vol. III, Paris, 1905, pp. 373-422; *L'Isagoge latine de Marius Victorinus*, in *Mélanges offerts à L. Havet*, Paris, 1909, pp. 289-310; J. de Ghellinck, *Reminiscences de la dialectique de Marius Victorinus dans les conflits théologiques du XI^e et du XII^e s.*, in *Revue Néo-Scolast.*, 1911, pp. 432-5.

Macrobius.—L. von Jan, *Macrobi opera*, 2 vols., 3rd edn., Leipzig, 1893; M. Schedler, *Die Philosophie des Macrobius und ihr Einfluss auf die Philosophie des christlichen Mittelalters* (Beiträge XIII, 1), Munster, 1916.

Martianus Capella.—Editions: F. Eyssenhardt, Leipzig, 1866; A. Dick, Leipzig, 1925.

§ 2.—St. Augustine

38. Life and Writings.—Augustine, who was born in 354 at Tagaste, of a Christian mother, spent a troubled youth. He first took up the teaching of rhetoric, at Tagaste, Carthage, Rome, and, from 384 to 386, at Milan. He was attracted to Manichæism by the simple solution it offered to the problem of evil, and at first he preferred it to the Christian solution. Next he turned towards the scepticism of the New Academy, only to give this up after reading the neo-Platonist writings in the translation of Marius Victorinus, and especially the works of Plotinus. From this time onwards he was drawn towards a spiritualist philosophy. He was converted to Catholicism at Milan, after hearing St. Ambrose, who baptized him in 387. The following year Augustine returned to Africa, and eventually became a bishop in 395. Until his death in 430 he unceasingly combated Pelagianism and the Manichæism to which he had previously adhered.

The life of St. Augustine is clearly reflected in his works. He discourses on his states of mind, he speaks of his inmost sentiments, he engages in dialogues with God. On the other hand, the influence of his life upon his doctrine has often been pointed out. Thus, the dominant rôle which he assigns to the will in mental life suggests to us the interior struggles which he had to go through in order to overcome his errors and renounce his sensual life : a will of iron was required to enable him to triumph. Or again, these same disorders of the flesh lead him to an exaggerated contempt for the body which was the source of his miseries.

From the philosophical point of view, his chief works are : *Confessionum libri XIII*, an autobiography written about 400, in which he relates the history of his intellectual and moral formation down to the death of his mother in 387 ; *Retractionum libri II*, written about 427, and containing a critical summary of the works he had written since his conversion ; *Contra Academicos*, written against the neo-Sceptics whose doubts he had for a time shared ; *Soliloquiorum libri II* ; *Liber de immortalitate animæ* ; *De quantitate animæ* ; *De magistro* ; *De libero arbitrio* ; and *De anima et ejus origine*. The celebrated works *De civitate Dei* and the *De Trinitate*, which are for the most part dogmatic and apologetic in scope, abound also in philosophical considerations.

St. Augustine's language is rich and colourful, but often lacking in precision. His was not a didactic mind, and pre-occupations of scientific methodology were foreign to his outlook. He wrote giving free rein to his thought.

39. Augustine and Greek Philosophy.—Situated at the summit of the ridge which separates antiquity from the Middle Ages, Augustine sums up and condenses in his works a great part of the intellectual treasures of the ancient world. He knows the Epicureanism which he criticises, the Scepticism which he at one time held, and afterwards refuted, the Stoic and literary eclecticism by which he had been influenced, the philosophy of Plato which he read in the translations of Marius Victorinus and to which he awarded the highest praises (*vir sapientissimus et eruditissimus*).¹ He quotes Aristotle only three times (*vir excellentis ingenii et eloquio*

¹ *Contra Acad.* III, 17.

Platoni quidem impar),¹ and seems to have no knowledge of his system,² apart from his dialectic. He is inspired above all by neo-Platonism, which he identifies with Platonism.

This is not the place for a detailed examination of the neo-Platonism of St. Augustine. Let it suffice to say that while he derived from that source his method of investigation by consciousness, his exaggerated distinction between the sensible and the suprasensible, and several isolated doctrines in metaphysics and psychology (the sovereign good, the opposition between body and soul, mystical detachment, etc.), Augustine on the other hand denied and opposed other features of the Plotinian system, such as its polytheism of inferior gods, metempsychosis, and last but not least, its monistic and emanative tendencies.³ To the decadent triad, the fatalistic emanation of the spiritual and sensible work through the energies of the *voûs*, and the eternity of the world-soul, Augustine opposes the unicity of God and the trinity of consubstantial persons, the identity of God with the eternal reasons according to which He knows the world, creation *ex nihilo*, and the substantial distinction between God and creatures and between each of the latter. Augustine belongs definitely to the line of pluralistic philosophers.

Various explanations have been offered why, in spite of his fundamental disagreement with neo-Platonism, Augustine never ceased to praise it.⁴

40. Faith and Reason.—The philosophical doctrines of Augustine are frequently embedded in religious considerations

¹ *De civitate Dei*, VIII, 12.

² He thinks that the philosophy of Aristotle does not differ essentially from that of Plato, and he does not separate Plato from the Alexandrians.—Grandgeorge, *S. Augustin et le néo-platonisme*, p. 52.

³ The monistic and emanative tendencies of Plotinism have been denied by M. Picavet, and recently *a propos* of St. Anselm—by M. Koyré, in *L'idée de Dieu dans la philos. de S. Anselme*, pp. 77-83. But even if the One of Plotinus is an individual, and distinct from the rest of reality—a contestable theory which we cannot discuss here—all reality outside the One is a Becoming of the Intelligence issuing from the One; everything is dependent upon the thought of the *voûs* and has no being outside it, so that beginning with the Intelligence, issuing from the One and inferior to It, the monistic tendencies of the Plotinian system can hardly be called into question. Cf. Inge, *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, New York, 1918, and Arnou, *Le désir de Dieu dans la philosophie de Plotin*, Paris, 1921.

⁴ Grandgeorge, *S. Augustin et le néo-platonisme*, Paris, 1896, p. 36, remarks that he was brought up in neo-Platonism, that he endeavoured to draw the neo-Platonists and convert them to Christianity, that many of his isolated theories are definitely neo-Platonist, and that Simplicianus complimented him on having read the neo-Platonists.

from which it is not easy to disengage them. That is because they, like all the other elements of his wide culture, including even his rhetoric, are fused together with the religious element, and the whole becomes one unique wisdom. Neo-Platonism, which similarly confuses philosophy with religion, helped to determine his attitude on this point.

The directive principle of this unique wisdom is the *Crede ut intelligas*, which has as its complement the *Intellige ut credas*. Belief in God and in the Holy Trinity is the way which leads us to discover Him and to understand Him in his works. All knowledge is reduced to God, and He is the centre of perspective towards which all Augustine's speculative thought is directed. In this he is the prototype of the Christian thinker, and he cannot contemplate God without experiencing the transports of love with which his soul was filled.¹ We are thus in presence, not of two objective orders, philosophy on the one hand and theology on the other, which the mind calmly studies in turn, and each of which has its autonomous significance, but rather in presence of one great whole, in which the two points of view intertwine, compenetrates, and complete each other.

At the same time, while St. Augustine did not elaborate a philosophical synthesis in the strict sense of the phrase, he nevertheless provided the framework for such a synthesis, which moreover he adopted from Greek thought.² He arranges the problems under three heads: knowledge (*dialectica, logica* or *scientia rationalis*), being (*physica*), and will (*ethica*). Accordingly, we will set forth his philosophical doctrine under these headings, neglecting here the development which his thought underwent on certain points.

41. Dialectics.—Dialectics, the basic discipline, studies knowledge as such, and the way of attaining to the truth.³ St. Augustine saw clearly the primacy of the problem of knowledge: the analysis of consciousness, the critique of the

¹ Deum et animam scire cupio. Nihilne plus? Nihil omnino.—*Soliloq.*, I, 7. Si sapientia Deus est . . . verus philosophus est amator Dei.—*De civit. Dei*, viii, 1. O veritas, veritas! quam intime etiam tum medullae animi mei auspirabant tibi.—*Conf.* iii, c. 6.

² Cf. P. Monod, *Essai de synthèse philosophique d'après le XI^e livre de la "Cité de Dieu,"* in *Archives de philos.*, VII, 2, 1930, pp. 142-85.

³ *De ordine*, II, 13; *De civit. Dei*, VIII, 10.

judgment, the conditions upon which the possession of truth and certitude depend, are the main themes of his philosophy.

1. *The refutation of scepticism* is the necessary starting point of intellectual effort. Certitude exists, and is necessary for happiness. Consciousness¹ gives us certitude of the reality of the thinking ego,² of the first principles of the logical, metaphysical, and moral orders, and of the intellectual representations of the external world (*ratio, intellectus*).

2. But certitude is not of the same order in all the kinds of knowledge. With Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus, the Bishop of Hippo affirms the central doctrine of ideological spiritualism : there is a distinction of nature between sensation—the object of which is the particular, the multiple, the changing—and thought, which grasps the abstract, the indivisible, the stable. Now, sense knowledge does not rise above the level of *opinio* ; it has not the value of truth, for it is transient like its object, and dependent upon a corporeal organ, whereas truth itself is immutable. *Truth and certitude reside in thought*, the object of which is the intelligible world, the sum total of eternal, necessary and immutable truths.

If we have in thought a confidence which we refuse to sense perception and its fugitive data (Plato), this is because we know the norm of the rectitude of thought. This norm is not to be found in ourselves, or in other finite beings, it can only be the conformity of our knowledge with the divine Ideas, prototypes of the beings which are made known by our senses. (See later on.)

How are sensations and thoughts produced in us ?

3. *Sensation* is an activity of the soul. It is the consciousness which the soul has of the impression received by the corporeal organ ; the action of the object upon the sense organ is merely the preliminary condition for the act of sensation. Sensation is one of the aspects of the animating function which the soul exercises with regard to the body. Augustine here does not profess either occasionalism or innatism : he teaches that the soul, being superior to the body, cannot really

¹ Noli foras ire, in te redi, in interiori homine habitat veritas.—*De vera relig.*, 72.

² *De civit. Dei*, XI, c. 26. All this fine passage should be read. Attention has often been called to the close similarity between the *Si enim fallor, sum* of Augustine and the *Cogito, ergo sum* of Descartes.

be acted upon by it, but rather utilises *actively* the organs of sense as an instrument of knowledge.¹

4. *Rational knowledge*, or science in the broad sense of the term, is an activity superior to sensation, and presents a double aspect: the "rational knowledge of temporal things," or *science* in the strict sense (*ratio inferior*); and *wisdom*, or "intellectual knowledge of eternal things" (*ratio superior*). The former has as its aim the needs of action; the latter finds its end in contemplation.² The former comprises the various acts by which the soul directly discerns and judges temporal things; and this active appreciation of the reality which has been perceived in sensation, and the images of which are retained in the memory, is quite specifically human. But Augustine adds at once that the *ratio superior*, which is more sublime, makes us conscious of the foundation of these certitudes by finding them in God, the source of essences and of their intelligibility.³

Free from passivity already in sensation, the soul is *a fortiori* free in the exercise of this twofold intellectual knowledge, and in—

5. *Science*, in the first place. As this consists in the knowledge of material things, it implies a certain relation between the soul and things, but Augustine does not define the nature of this relation. It is agreed by all that he does not profess the Platonist doctrine of reminiscence, which would be a radical Occasionalism, but the genesis of the concepts of empirical things is left unexplained. One point seems certain: the soul draws forth its ideas from its own being, and attributes them to things because it perceives in them the material realization of these ideas. But in what sense does the soul find the ideas within itself? Here comes in the doctrine of the *divine illumination*, and of *wisdom*.

¹ Cf. F. van Steenberghen, *La philosophie de S. Augustin d'après les travaux du Centenaire*, in *Revue Néo-Scolast.*, 1933, pp. 256-9. A bibliography of recent works is given there.

² Cf. *De Trinit.*, XII, 14 and 15 (n. 22 and 25).

³ Non sunt tamen rationis expertia nec hominibus pecoribus communia. Sed sublimioris rationis est judicare de istis corporalibus secundum rationes incorporeales et sempiternas, quæ nisi supra mentem humanam essent, incommutabiles profecto non essent.—*De Trinit.*, XII, 2. Cf. *De libero arbitrio*, II, and the admirable commentary of Kleutgen in *La philos. scolast.*, II, 411-51, which is superior to many contemporary studies, and undeserving of the comparative oblivion into which it has fallen.

6. *Wisdom* is the knowledge of the eternal truths. The characteristics of truth (eternity, necessity, immutability) imply the existence, above the human intelligence, of a subsistent and uncreated norm or Truth which is God. This divine truth dominates human thought, and imposes itself upon it. To explain it, Augustine generally has recourse to the metaphor of light. "The divine light is reflected in us." Accordingly, his doctrine has been called that of the "divine illumination" of our minds. The truth of our knowledge, he writes rests upon God,¹ "the sun of the soul" (neo-Platonism). "In this light we see the immutable truth of things."² The image recurs constantly in all kinds of forms. But other comparisons also intervene. We are told that the divine truth expresses itself in us after the manner of a seal, which leaves its imprint upon the wax.³ Or again, the *De Magistro* represents God as the interior master of the soul. These formulæ, and others, played a considerable historical part in the thirteenth century, and the difficulty in their interpretation explains how opposed systems could invoke them in turn in their support.

What is the precise function of this divine light and of its presence in the soul? We think that it may have different meanings, and that these have in fact been given to it:

(a) It is certain that the divine illumination ought not to be understood in an *ontologistic* sense, as if our minds contemplate immutable truths directly in the divine essence. The divine illumination or divine presence is the object of a demonstration, and not of an intuition. Direct intuition gets only as far as the reflection which the divine light produces in the soul, just as, in the illustration of the seal and the wax, we see the imprint, but not the seal itself which was pressed upon it.

(b) It is equally certain that in many passages, the illuminative action of God signifies the creative act, to which the soul and the intellect owe their reality.⁴

(c) On the other hand, many texts have a purely metaphy-

¹ Deus intelligibilis lux, in quo et a quo et per quem intelligibiliter lucent quæ intelligibiliter lucent omnia.—*Sol.*, I, c. I, 3.

² Ea non posse intelligi nisi ab alio quasi suo sole illustrentur.—*Sol.*, I, c. 8, 15.

³ *De Trinitate*, xvi, 15.

⁴ For instance, *De civit. Dei*, X, 2.

sical sense, and not an ideogenetic one. They are but the paraphrase of St. Augustine's favourite doctrine concerning the ultimate basis of certitude. This is the case with the important passages in the *De Trinitate*, where the *ratio inferior* is contrasted with the *ratio superior*, the one sufficing to raise us above the animal world, the other alone enabling us to understand that the essences of all things are in conformity with the *incommutabilia vera*, and that in this way the necessity and immutability of human knowledge, and in particular of the first principles, rests upon God.¹ "To see the truth of contingent beings in the Divine light" is accordingly to arrive at God as the terminus of a reasoning process. This theory is fundamental for the understanding of the discussions which begin in the thirteenth century on the divine illumination, and many scholastics—including the best among them—have not understood it in any other sense.

(d) Lastly, and this brings us back to the ideogenetic point of view, other texts merely see in the presence of the divine light in the soul, a spiritual irradiation by means of which the soul becomes capable of penetrating the intelligible, and of grasping in an immediate and *a priori* way the most general ideas, and the necessary principles which are derived from them. The manner of action of this light is not clearly set forth. Augustine stops, deliberately perhaps, rather than give too precise explanations. He likes to leave the images in a certain blurred state, and it seems that one must not interpret this illuminative presence in the sense of an efficient causality properly so called, as if God supplies the soul with its ideas piecemeal, by impressing them upon the human mind in the course of its earthly life.²

42. Physics.—Physics deals with the problems of being or of the real; it studies the categories of beings which make up created nature, and to it may be attached what reason teaches us about God, the origin of all reality.

1. God. His existence is demonstrated *a posteriori*, from the contingent character of the world, from the order of the

¹ *Liber lxxxiii quaest.*, q. 46. Cf. *De Trinitate*, XII, 15.

² This is the thesis of Portalié, in *Dict. Théol. cath.*, article *Augustin*, col. 2334, *et seq.* He gives to all the Augustinian formulæ this ideogenetic sense. He does not mention the *ratio inferior* and the *ratio superior*, which are not capable of being interpreted in this way.

universe, from the witness of consciousness, and from universal consent. The existence of God shines forth before the mind like the sun: "ut oculis sol demonstratur." But we saw above that the study of intellectual knowledge leads to the affirmation of God. The favourite proof of St. Augustine rests on the interpretation of the characters of necessity and immutability of our ideas, and of the primordial judgments which are the basis of our knowledge and of our conduct: the object of these ideas can be necessary and immutable only because it participates in the divine essence; our judgments on truth, goodness and beauty require that there should be an absolute truth, goodness, and beauty which is related to them as a norm. Hence God exists.¹ The existence of God is the necessary condition, not only of reality, but also of active thought.

The nature and attributes of God are the subject of long expositions. God is unique (against the Manichæans), infinitely good, perfect, simple, eternal, and elevated above the categories, so that man is not able to comprehend him (neo-Platonism). The finite is his work; it is distinct from God, and created in time. The conservation of beings is a continued creation, and the Divine Providence extends to all things.

The divine knowledge is the subject of magnificent developments, and it is to this study that is attached the theory of *exemplarism*. The intuition which God has of His own essence implies the vision of all limited essences which are possible outside Him and through Him, and which constitute so many pale and far off imitations of His infinity. This objective relation of resemblance, which Augustine calls by various names (*exemplar, idea, species, forma, ratio*), varies from one type to another (the essence "lion" and the essence "man" imitate God in different ways; *principales formæ quædam vel rationes rerum, in divina intelligentia continentur*), and in each type, from one individual to another (*singula igitur propriis sunt creata rationibus*).

From amongst all these possibles, God made a choice by creating the actual world. This world accordingly existed in God before it was realised, "as the plan of a building is conceived by the builder before it is erected,"² and as beings

¹ *De libero arbitrio*, II.

² Cf. especially *Liber LXXXIII quaest.*, q. 46.

are created in conformity with the divine types or ideas, these ideas are the ultimate bases of all contingent *reality*, and the supreme foundation of the *intelligibility* of essences. Upon them also rests, as we have seen, the *certitude* of our knowledge.

This exemplarism radically transforms one Platonist theory: the Ideas which, for Plato, exist side by side with God, become God Himself considered in the infinite perfection of his knowledge. Already Philo had brought about a like fusion of doctrines, but it is under its Augustinian form that exemplarism was known to the Middle Ages. We also see at once that Augustine gave a no less radical transformation to the neo-Platonist theory according to which the Ideas are a decadent product of the *voûs* the result of a kind of scattering abroad of its thought.

When he speaks of God's knowledge, Augustine loves to introduce this other neo-Platonist doctrine, that "being is light in the measure in which it is" (Plotinus). He calls God the "uncreated light" (a term which is found in the books of the Bible), and identifies Him with the intelligible sun of Plato. Similarly, he applies the theory of light to the beings called into existence by the creative act: these are participating or derived lights, which must be carefully distinguished from the uncreated light.¹

2. *The corporeal world.*—(a) The characteristic of luminosity belongs not only to spiritual beings (angels, human souls), but also, although in a less degree, to bodies. This luminous character in which they share is the noblest element in their nature. This is a doctrine of pure Platonism and neo-Platonism, which Augustine co-ordinates with the doctrine of creation.

(b) In order to explain the constitution of bodies, Augustine places in them a matter and a form, and although in certain places his idea of matter suggests a chaotic mass, various passages in the *Confessions* speak of matter as of an indeterminate principle, incapable of existing without a form. It is in virtue of this notion that he admits a *quasi materia* in the angels. Any connection between matter and a quantitative state of corporeal being is foreign to his physics. Similarly, he does not seek to explain substantial changes by means of

¹ Aliud est lux quod est Deus, aliud lux quam fecit Deus.—*Contra adv. legis et prophet.*, I, c. 7, 10.

the composition of matter and form. The terms he uses remind us of Aristotle, but his meaning is really Platonist.

(c) God has placed in matter a latent treasure of forces, constituted according to the eternal exemplars or divine ideas corresponding to the material essences. These are the seminal reasons, *rationes seminales* (Stoicism, Neo-Platonism), the successive germination of which when the opportune circumstances are realized, *acceptis opportunitatibus*,¹ give rise to particular beings. All bodies have thus been created since the beginning of the world, the first ones in the perfect state, the others in germinal dispositions placed within the former. Evolution or development takes place only within one and the same species, and not from one type to another, for to each natural species of body there corresponds a distinct "reason."²

(d) The world is beautiful, because it is clothed with goodness and light (Plotinus). The presence of evil or of privation renders beauty more striking (*lucentior*). Augustine praises the beauty of nature and of the human body. His æsthetic optimism and metaphysics of the world have their foundations in the mind of God, who must have thought out harmonious relations between the various essences.

Man.—(a) The soul is a *spiritual substance*. Augustine proves this by the characteristics of intellectual representations, and by the knowledge which the soul possesses of itself. The *immortality* of the soul follows from its spirituality and its participation in the immutable and eternal truths. When called upon to give his opinion on the *origin* of the soul, the African philosopher hesitated, and his doubts had their effects throughout the early part of the Middle Ages: on the one hand the transmission of original sin inclined him to *Traducianism* or *Generationism*, according to which the soul of the child

¹ *De Gen. ad litt.*, VII, 28.

² [Note by translator.] St. Augustine does, however, allow a certain kind of transmutation of species, that is he allows that from living beings of one kind, or from their corrupting bodies, there may arise beings of a lower kind, and he explains this by saying that these also may be said to have been created in the beginnings of things, *quia inerat jam omnibus animatis corporibus* (note that he is speaking of seminal reasons in *living* bodies) *vis quædam naturalis, et quasi præseminata et quodammodo licitata primordia futurorum animalium quæ de corruptionibus talium corporum pro suo quæque genere ac differentiis erant exortura*. *De Genesi ad litteram*, Lib. III, 14. See a discussion of this subject in E. C. Messenger, *Evolution and Theology*, London, 1931, pp. 44, et seq.

proceeds from that of its generators; on the other hand, he did not definitely reject *Creationism*, which teaches the immediate creation of souls at the moment of generation. There is *only one soul* in us, and this soul which is thus unique and simple (against Plato) penetrates and vivifies the whole body.

(b) Man is constituted by a soul and a body, but these keep their own substantial nature; the soul makes use of the body¹ and governs it.² Augustine explains their union by introducing an intermediary connected with light. He never quite freed himself from these Platonist influences, although we come across formulæ which seem to be inspired by a very different spirit.

(c) The soul manifests itself by *manifold activities*, and these do not really differ from the substance: Augustine mentions for preference the *memory*—the permanent storehouse of conscious life, always present to the soul—the *understanding*, and the *will*—one of the numerous tripartite divisions in which he discovers an image of the Trinity.

43. Ethics.—This third philosophical discipline has as its subject the problems relating to the will. It studies the nature of beatitude, and the voluntary tendency of man towards this supreme end.

(a) The *will* is preponderant in psychic life, and Augustine affirms its primacy of honour over knowledge. It is not only that the internal sense and intelligence become active under the order of the will—the purity of the will and its desires is even a condition of wisdom. The pure and holy soul, “*quæ sancta et pura fuerit*”³ can alone aspire to a knowledge of truth by the *ratio superior*. Truth is a good which must be loved with all the energies of the soul. Moreover, the adhesion of the mind to certain mysterious truths—such as the union of the soul with the body or the nature of God—only comes about by an intervention of the will. Finally, the will possesses this other prerogative: it is psychologically and morally free.

(b) The *moral system* of Augustine closely unites the life of nature with that of grace: it builds up the idea of Christian

¹ Homo anima rationalis est mortali atque terreno utens corpore.—*De moribus Ecc. cath.*, I, 27.

² Regendo corpori accommodata.—*De quant. animæ*, 13.

³ *Lib. LXXXIII Quæst.*, 966.

perfection, and never ceases to oppose the new ideal to happiness and virtue as conceived by the Stoics, Epicureans, and neo-Platonists.¹ In this sphere more than in any other it is difficult to separate philosophy and theology.

Everything is good in the measure in which it has being (Plato). God, the Supreme Goodness, is our last end, and the union of the soul with God will be its supreme happiness (Eudaimonism). This union will be brought about by the beatific vision, which so far from involving unconsciousness (neo-Platonism), will exalt personality.

The justice of God and the necessary relations between essences are the foundation of the *absolute distinction between good and evil*. The controversies in which Augustine engaged with Manichæism, Pelagianism and semi-Pelagianism led him to study the problems of evil, liberty, grace, and predestination. Evil does not share the realm of being with the good (Manichæism) ; it is nothing positive, otherwise the scorpion would die of its own poison. How could it have *being*, seeing that all being is an imitation of the divine goodness and light ? Evil is a privation of good, and consequently only affects contingent things endowed with a certain degree of goodness. As for the conciliation of human liberty and the Divine government by grace and predestination, the texts which relate to this matter have been the subject of age-long controversies, chiefly theological in character, and the most divergent systems have based themselves upon the Doctor of Hippo.

The Augustinian Ethics does not confine itself to the study of individual action ; it develops into numerous political and social doctrines.

44. Political and Social Doctrines.—The *De Civitate Dei* is an apologia for the City of God against paganism, the earthly city. The former began with the creation of angels, and received its definitive expression in the Church of Christ, which, in the days of Augustine, had just developed its official organization with the Empire. The second, the *civitas terrena*, began after the fall of the first man, and is the sum total of the human communities which have come successively into being to ensure the temporal good of their members, and of which the Roman Empire is the most perfect form.

¹ Cf. Mausbach, *op. cit.* (46).

Augustine does not give us a systematic study in this work, any more than he does in his others, but the picture which he draws of the earthly city, subordinated to the divine city, and equally necessary, involves questions of political and social order which will play a decisive part in the Middle Ages. Here are the chief doctrines :

1. The *summum bonum* on earth consists in peace,¹ of which Augustine has left this profound definition : “*Pax omnium rerum tranquillitas ordinis.*” Even war has as its object the re-establishment of peace. Hence it is not the reign of justice which constitutes the perfection proper to the city, for order and peace may reign without justice (against Cicero).

2. Unitive views : unity of the heavenly city, and of the Church (*omnium christianorum una respublica est*²) ; unity of the human race, and equality of men (*proximus homini est omnis homo*) ; unity of history, or of the series of events, which are the stages through which Providence conducts men towards felicity ; so that this work has been called the first philosophy of history.

3. Optimism : the civil society, in spite of the presence of evils, is overflowing with terrestrial benefits,³ it is a beneficial, and admirable institution.

4. *Natural* character of family and social life (Aristotle). The despotic power of the *pater familias*, as defined by the Roman law, is a consequence of sin, and the same is true of slavery, an amelioration of which is advocated by Augustine. Private property is not of divine right, but a conventional institution.

5. The power of the prince is of divine origin : it belongs to the government of Providence. Augustine requires in the ruler a number of qualities which make him a kind of superman.⁴

45. Augustine and the Middle Ages.—Augustine was not only the principal channel by which numerous elements of Greek philosophy were passed on to the Middle Ages, but also he imposed upon the whole West the study of his own

¹ XIX, 11-15.

² XXII, 26-7.

³ XXV, 1.

⁴ V, 24.

doctrines. All the centuries revere him, and are inspired by him. The great number of spurious works attributed to him is another proof of his great reputation.

The legacy of Augustine to Scholasticism consists above all in a series of doctrines on the nature of God, the divine ideas, creation, and the spirituality of the soul, which all tend to correct the naturalistic tendencies of Aristotle in a Platonist direction, and which the scholastics succeed in co-ordinating with these same tendencies. It is Platonism, again, which inspires his proofs of the existence of God and his theory of knowledge, both of which were widely discussed. As for the social and political theories of the *De Civitate Dei*, their influence was universal and lasting.

In theology, Augustine was the *maximus post apostolos ecclesiarum instructor*. Such was the judgment of Peter the Venerable, and the whole Middle Ages ratified this opinion.

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§ 3.—*Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite*

47. Pseudo-Dionysius.—Although he belongs to the Byzantine world, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite can be included among the early Western masters by reason of the wide circulation of his writings, and their influence upon the Latin world. Of all the Byzantine writers previous to the Great Schism which was to set up age-long barriers between the Eastern and Western Churches, pseudo-Dionysius was the only one who was introduced into the schools of the Latin world, through the fortunate circumstances to which we have already referred (28). He was translated frequently and commented upon, which shows how much his teaching met some of the basic aspirations of the Middle Ages. He thus became a Western by adoption.

The writer of these works was falsely identified throughout the Middle Ages with St. Dionysius the Areopagite, the disciple of St. Paul. There have been long discussions as to his identity, and periodically attempts have been made to identify in the writings the characteristics of some known author.¹ The chronology of the works is still uncertain, but it seems that they can be attributed to the end of the fifth or the beginning of the sixth century. They are not mentioned before the time of the great religious Council of Constantinople in 533, and Hypatius of Ephesus maintained that they were spurious. On the other hand, Pope Martin I upheld their authenticity, and introduced them into the West. The treatises of pseudo-Dionysius on the Divine Names, the Mystical Theology, the Celestial Hierarchy, the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, and his ten letters contain a systematic conception of the Christian system, and theological data which their author endeavours to harmonize with the neo-Platonist philosophy.

As for St. Augustine, so also for pseudo-Dionysius, God is the centre of all speculation. He is studied by a double method, positive (*καταφατική*) and negative (*ἀποφατική*); the former attributing to God all the perfections revealed by the study of creatures, the latter by the method of

¹ Quite recently P. Stiglmayr has endeavoured to identify him with Severus of Antioch: a hypothesis rebutted by J. Lebon, *Le pseudo-Denys et Sévère d'Antioche* (Revue Hist. Ecclés., 1930, pp. 880-915) and by R. Devreesse, *Denys l'Aréop. et Sévère d'Antioche* (Arch. H.D.L.M.A., IV, 1929, pp. 159-67).

negation and transcendence excluding all the imperfections found in the attributes studied in created being. The treatise on the *Divine Names*, which studies in detail the divine perfections, consists for the most part of speculation of this kind. From the first point of view, God may be called goodness, being, light, unity. From the second point of view He should be called non-being, so much so that the highest knowledge which we have of God is at the same time a mystic ignorance (*Treatise on Mystical Theology*).

The negative way has the primacy over the other. God is not an object : He is beyond everything that is, and hence beyond the knowable, since knowledge has being for its limit. From this transcendental point of view, God is not only above contradictory affirmations and negations, but also his super-substantial nature is enveloped in obscurity. He dwells in the secret and impenetrable dwelling of Stability. The *Treatise on the Divine Names* contains complex and difficult doctrines on the Divine super-eminence, super-goodness, super-essence, and super-unity, which have no proper name and no proper concept.

The internal Divine processions are called the Persons of the Blessed Trinity. The external Divine processions are the beings which God brings into existence outside Himself by means of creation. Before He creates, God has within Himself the exemplars of all things, but once things have been created, they are substantially distinct from God.¹ Creation is an effusion of His goodness, the paramount Divine attribute, a radiation of His light. Just as God is super-goodness, super-beauty, super-light by reason of His infinity, so also limited beings are good, beautiful, luminous in the measure in which they have being. Goodness indeed extends further than being, for it dominates also over non-being, and is above both the one and the other. Evil, explained after the manner of the *De malorum subsistentia* of Proclus, is nothing in itself, it is simply a deficiency in a being which itself is good. All emanation of the infinite into the finite is excluded from the thought of pseudo-Dionysius, but the penetration of the divine goodness into good creatures enables this writer to say that God fills creation with his presence and life, and that created beings are symbols of the Deity.

¹ Koch, *op. cit.* (51), p. 194.

The world is the object of Divine Providence. Between God and man are ranged the heavenly spirits (*Treatise on the Celestial Hierarchy*), of which the ecclesiastical hierarchy is the reflection (*Treatise on the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*).

God, the end of created things, draws all things to Himself by the love which He inspires. The good, after descending into the creature, reascends to its starting point. Deification, which brings about this return (*θεωσις*), extends to inorganic beings as well as organic, for all things have within themselves a desire for the divine. In the case of man, this return towards God, the terminus of the mystical ascent, involves the ravishment of knowledge and the delirium of love in various forms.

Thus the created is led back to the uncreated by "analogies," and by these is meant both the relation of creatures to God (love, and desire of deification), and the relation of God to created things (divine ideas and theophanies).¹

48. Pseudo-Dionysius and Neo-Platonism.—Numerous parallels have shown that pseudo-Dionysius was greatly influenced by Proclus and Plotinus, in his terminology, his formulæ, and in a number of particular doctrines. His theory of light (*ἀγλαία*) and of the beauty which is light, the pre-eminence he gives to goodness, and his positive and negative descriptions of God, remind us of Plotinus. His mystical teaching adopted from the Alexandrians, their allegories, their description of mystic states, their theory of prayer and of the divine nature of ecstasy, "in which like is known by like."

But like the other Christian writers who were nourished in the thought of neo-Platonism, Augustine at their head, pseudo-Dionysius rejects the most characteristic feature of neo-Platonism, namely, its monism. His philosophy is a pluralistic one, for it reaches the transcendence of God, and the substantial distinction between God and that which is other than Him. In the same way, his mystical theology is individualistic, as is all Christian mysticism, for it founds the divine union upon grace (Ch. III, § 4).

49. Pseudo-Dionysius and Scholasticism.—We find the

¹ Lossky, *op. cit.* (51), p. 309.

persistent influence of pseudo-Dionysius right through the Middle Ages.

In Philosophy, he is, with Augustine, the great inspirer of all those who delight in drawing up hierarchical tables of reality, with God at the summit.

He is also one of the most powerful sources of mediæval Neo-Platonism, and from him are derived numerous points of detail, of a neo-Platonist character. All those who study beauty depend upon him.

His influence is paramount in mystical theology, and his treatises are an inexhaustible source for all those who describe the ascent of the soul towards God. The exalted terms he employs, and certain equivocal and obscure expressions were open to misunderstanding, and while the majority interpreted these in the sense of a real distinction between God and the soul, there were some monistic interpretations which claimed to follow him.¹

We have already mentioned the numerous translations which were made of pseudo-Dionysius (28). Scotus Erigena, Hugh of St. Victor, John Sarrasin, Thomas Gallus, Robert Grosseteste, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Peter Olivi, Francis of Meyronnes and Dionysius the Carthusian all commented on his works either in whole or in part.

50. Maximus the Confessor (580-662), one of the first admirers of pseudo-Dionysius, was the author of commentaries which contributed in a great measure to give a pluralistic interpretation to the texts of this author, and which were in turn utilized by John Scotus Erigena and others. Like pseudo-Dionysius, he moved in a sphere of neo-Platonist influence, and adapted neo-Platonism to Christianity.

51. Bibliography. — Pseudo-Dionysius. — Edition of works: Migne, *P. G.*, Vols. 3-4.—On Latin translations, see above, 28.

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¹ Koch, *op. cit.* (51), p. 194.

der dionys. Schriften, in *Theolog. Quartalschrift*, 1895, pp. 353-420, 1896, pp. 290-8; *Römische Quartalschrift*, 1898, pp. 353-98; *Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita in seinen Beziehungen zum Neuplatonismus und Mysterienwesen*, Mainz, 1900; G. Krüger, *Wer war Pseudo-Dionysius?* in *Byzantinische Zeitsch.*, 1899, pp. 302-5; H. F. Müller, *Dionysios, Proklos. Plotinos* (Beiträge XX, 3-4), Munster, 1918; G. Théry, *Recherches pour une édition grecque historique du Pseudo-Denys*, in *The New Scholasticism*, 1929, pp. 353-442; R. Devreesse, *Denys l'Aréopagite et Sévère d'Antioche*, *Arch. H.D.L.M.A.*, Vol. IV, 1929, pp. 159-57; J. Lebon, *Le pseudo Denys l'Aréopagite et Sévère d'Antioche*, in *Revue d'Hist. ecclés.*, 1930, pp. 880-915; V. Lossky, *La notion des "analogies" chez Denys le pseudo-Aréopagite*, in *Arch. H.D.L.M.A.*, Vol. V, 1930, pp. 279-309; E. Stéphanou, *Les derniers essais d'identification de pseudo-Denys l'Aréopagite*, in *Echoes d'Orient*, 1932, pp. 446-69; S. Denys l'Aréopagite, *Œuvres traduites du grec, précédées d'une introduction par Mgr. Darboy*, Paris, 1932.

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§ 4.—The First Mediæval Writers

52. General characteristics.—Chalcidius, Marius Victorinus, Macrobius and Capella were Romans upon whom the influence of Christianity was not too manifest. But with Boethius begins another line of writers, who belong directly to the Middle Ages: in the first place, they are Christians; again, they are in contact with the new mediæval civilizations just coming into being, although their education is still fundamentally Roman (this is the case with Boethius and Isidore of Seville especially), and lastly, in their encyclopædias drawn from ancient sources, they manifest some of the rough qualities of the new Western races (instances are Bede, Alcuin, and Rhaban Maur).

53. Claudius Mamertus, of Vienne in Gaul, born about 474, wrote against the semi-Pelagian theories of Cassian, Faustus (Bishop of Regium in 452) and Gennadius, according to whom all creatures, and therefore also the human soul, are characterized by quantity, and are accordingly material.

His treatise *De statu animæ*, written in 468 or 469, defends in the manner of St. Augustine the spirituality of the soul, its simplicity, which is not compromised by the distinction between memory, thought and will, and its presence in all parts of the body according to the totality of its being.

54. Boethius is the most prominent philosophic personality in this group of thinkers. The fifth century witnessed the rise of an original civilization in the kingdom of Theodoric, king of the Ostrogoths in Italy, which produced excellent fruit until the invasion of the Lombards broke its spirit (568). Art began to flourish, and we still admire at Ravenna the architecture and painting to which it gave rise.

Manlius Severinus Boethius was a first-class representative of humanistic and philosophic culture. He belonged to the lineage of the Anicii, and while quite young was sent, about 480, to Athens, where he came into contact with Aristotelianism, neo-Platonism and Stoicism.¹ In 510 he became the minister of Theodoric, who showered honours upon him (he is sometimes called Manlius the consul). Suspected of political high treason, and perhaps accused of practising astrology,² he was thereupon disgraced, imprisoned, and executed in 524 or 525 at the king's orders.

Boethius considered it a patriotic duty to instruct his fellow citizens on the great problems of thought. That explains why, in spite of his active life, he has left a considerable number of works. In philosophy, he planned to translate Plato and Aristotle,³ and to show how their tendencies could be harmonized. Although he was not able to realize this completely, he managed to write a number of important works, which constitute so many portions of the edifice he had planned. They are :

1. Translations (28). Besides the *Introduction (Isagoge)* of Porphyry to the Categories of Aristotle (*Isagoge*), Boethius translated various treatises by the Stagirite : the *Categories*,

¹ R. Bonnaud, *op. cit.* (65), p. 200.

² *Ibid.*, p. 201.

³ Ego omne Aristotelis opus quodcumque in manus venerit in romanum stilum vertens eorum omnium commenta latina oratione prescribam (*De interpretatione*, ed. iia, I,ii). On the translations by Boethius, see P. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant*, 2nd edn., Vol. II, pp. 7-9; M. Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der schol. Methode*, I, pp. 150 et seq.; Manitius, *op. cit.*, pp. 25 et seq.

the *De interpretatione*, the two *Analytics*, the *Topics*, and probably also the *Sophistical Arguments*.¹

Until the beginning of the twelfth century, however, there was no further mention of the translations of the last three works, either in manuscripts, library catalogues, or in written works. But in the twelfth century itself they were said to exist, at the very moment when the second part of the *Organon* (*Logica nova*) was being translated anew. This presents us with a problem. Was the translation by Boethius definitively lost at the beginning of the Middle Ages, as some think,² or was it once more put into circulation in the twelfth century? The solution of this problem depends upon the results of the complete study of the manuscript tradition of the works of Boethius (authentic or spurious), and the philological examination of the linguistic peculiarities of his treatises, which in turn must wait until the critical edition of his works which has just begun, is completed. These studies will at the same time enable us to say whether Boethius translated other treatises of Aristotle besides the *Organon*, as was believed in the Middle Ages, for the thirteenth century mentions in particular the *littera Boethii*, and again, translations by him of the *De anima*, the *Physics*, and the *Metaphysics*. However this may be, he himself, as we have said, announced his intention of translating and commenting upon the whole of Aristotle.

2. Commentaries: a double commentary on the *Isagoge*, in the translation of Marius Victorinus, the first presented in the form of a Ciceronian dialogue, the second in a more technical and precise style³; one commentary, if not two, on the *Categories*; two on the treatise *De Interpretatione*, consisting in two and in six books respectively, and which constitute his chief logical work. Boethius also commented

¹ Boethius himself mentions his translations of Aristotle, and his commentary on the *Topics* (cf. Migne, *P.L.*, Vol. 64, coll. 812, 816, 822, 830, 1051, 1052, 1173, 1184, 1191, 1193, 1216), according to S. Brandt, *Entstehungszeit u. zeitliche Folge d. Werke von Boethius*, *Philologus*, Bd. 62 (1903), pp. 250, 261. See the contrary opinion in A. Kappelmacher, *Der schriftstellerische Plan d. Boethius*, *Wiener Studien*, Bd. 46 (1929), pp. 215-25.

² For instance, Van de Vyvere, *Les étapes . . .* (32) pp. 426 et seq. Cf. V. Rose, *Hermes*, I, 1866, p. 382.

³ The first, in two books, follows closely and almost exclusively the commentary of Porphyry on the *Categories* arranged in questions and answers (J. Bidez, *Boèce et Porphyre*, in *Revue belge de philol. et d'hist.*, II, 1923, pp. 189-201); the second, in five books, included also Boethius' translation of the *Isagoge*.

on the *Topics* and probably also on the two *Analytics* and the *Sophistical Arguments*. And lastly, he commented on the *Topics* of Cicero.

3. Original treatises : *Introductio ad categoricos syllogismos*, *De categoricis syllogismis*, *De hypotheticis syllogismis*, *De divisione*, *De topicis differentiis*, all of them works highly thought of in the early Middle Ages.¹ The scholastics also mention his works on Mathematics (*De institutione arithmetica* ; *Geometria* ?) and on music (*De institutione musica*), and above all, his work *De Consolatione philosophiæ*, which he wrote when in prison in Pavia (Ticinum).

While the majority of these treatises are written in a precise and technical language, the last mentioned work is expressed in an elegant prose style, intermingled with poems, and bears witness to the wide culture of its author, and his knowledge of antiquity. Philosophy visits the prisoner, and appears in the guise of a splendid lady, whose description later on inspired the statues of philosophy in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. She carries on the lower fringe of her robe the letters θ and π , the initial letters of theoretical and practical philosophy, and a ladder placed against her breast symbolises the steps which lead to wisdom. Philosophy consoles Boethius in his misfortune, and shows that no earthly goods can give happiness. One must turn to the principle of universal love, the Supreme Good, to whom Philosophy prays, and who is a personal God. The presence of evil in the world, and the harmonizing of the divine foreknowledge with human freedom, are problems only to our limited intelligence, which does not comprehend the divine simplicity. The same is true of the *fatum*, which is merely the execution of the providential plan. God alone is eternal, but the world is characterized by perpetuity, for from the philosophical standpoint, nothing can come from nothing. The *De consolatione* is an original work, which contains the foundations of a moral and metaphysical system.²

To the last period of the life of Boethius belong various theological opuscula, which he drew up in the form of letters, dealing with questions then much discussed : *De sancta*

¹ See Van de Vyvere, *Les étapes* . . . (32).

² Cf. Rand, *On the Composition of Boethius' Consolatio Philosophiæ*, who on this point disagrees with Usener, for whom the work is an encyclopædia.

Trinitate; Utrum Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus de divinitate substantialiter prædicentur; De hebdomadibus; De persona et duabus naturis in Christo. The *De fide catholica* also seems to belong to him, though this attribution has been contested.¹

55. Boethius as a philosopher.—Although he was very individual in his way of treating philosophy, and was subjected to many different influences, the thought of Boethius was inspired in the main by Aristotle. Down to the end of the twelfth century he was the principal channel by which Aristotelianism was transmitted to the West: he set forth his doctrines, he inaugurated methods of translating and commenting upon him.

1. The doctrines taken up or adopted were borrowed, without much inter-connection, from various parts of Aristotle's works.

In *dialectics*, to begin with, Boethius was the great interpreter of the Aristotelian teaching. Not only his translations and commentaries, but also his original abridgments, which long took the place of the unknown parts of the *Organon*, formed the basis of dialectical studies. He was regarded as equal, if not superior, to Aristotle.

Boethius was also a pioneer or rather an educator in the matter of Aristotelian *metaphysics*, in the sense that all its important doctrines are to be found in germ in his writings. We find therein scattered fragments of theories on matter and form, change, potency and act, substance and personality, and the four kinds of causality. The *De consolazione* reproduces the argument for the immovable mover, and we shall see (§ 6) that his commentaries on the *Isagoge* not only gave rise to the discussion of the problem of universals, but also helped the scholastics to arrive at a definitive solution. It was only necessary to co-ordinate and give precision to his formulæ in order to rediscover the Aristotelian realism.

The theory of being or of *esse*, which occupies a place in the

¹ To the objection that the style of the *De fide catholica* is different from that of the other writings of Boethius, Rand, who is in favour of its authenticity, replies that the same might be said of the *De consolazione philosophiæ*; and that Boethius, like St. Jerome, has a twofold style, the one esoteric and technical, the other exoteric and popular. Cf. *Founders of the Middle Ages*, p. 156.

foreground, and which so strongly influenced the scholastics, is similarly developed on the lines of the Aristotelian metaphysics. To understand this theory, we must lay down the two following points. The first is that by *esse* Boethius means the constitution or essence, and not existence.¹ The *De Trinitate*, and the *Liber de hebdomadibus*, which contain the important texts, do not use the term otherwise, and it is also the sense in which the term is chiefly used in the *De consolatione*; at the same time, some passages, especially in the commentaries of Porphyry, refer to the act of existence. Another point is that *esse*, or essence, is identified with the *forma*, the determinant or constituent *par excellence*: "Omne namque esse ex forma est."²

Starting from this position, Boethius builds up a hierarchy of reality, and states the opposition between God and creatures in a form which was interpreted in different ways by his mediæval commentators and admirers. God is pure form, or pure being: *esse ipsum*, or again—for the notions are identical—*forma essendi*. On the other hand, all other beings are composite in their essence, which comprises parts. A corporeal being is constituted of matter and form. An incorporeal being has within itself a similar composition. Is not a body the indetermined receptacle which receives a form? Thus, a creature is not pure being: *Non est id quod est*.³ It is but an image or reflection of being. Thus there is a contrast of nobility and of perfection which, in the order of essences, places God and created being on altogether different planes. Boethius indeed says of creatures that their *esse* comes into existence, but there is no question here of a real composition between essence and existence, combining with that of matter and form. The scholastics who interpreted the texts in this sense—amongst them St. Thomas—appealed to them in order to claim the great authority of Boethius for their own theories.⁴ Boethius by no means neglects the

¹ This thesis, to which we fully subscribe, has been established by Roland-Gosselin (*Le De ente et essentia de S. Thomas*, Paris, 1926, pp. 142-45), and by Brosch in a fine recent work (85).

² *De Trinit.*, ed. Peiper, 152, II.

³ Sed divina substantia sine materia forma est atque ideo unum et est id quod est. Reliqua [beings other than God] enim non sunt id quod sunt. Unumquodque enim habet esse suum ex his ex quibus est, id est ex partibus suis. . . . Igitur non est id quod est.—*De Trinit.*, 153, II. The "parts" are matter and form.

⁴ Roland-Gosselin, p. 186, Brosch, p. 117.

creative act which calls finite beings into existence: he postulates this. In order to explain it, he makes a sober but frank use of the neo-Platonist images of the *processio*, or again of the river which overflows: the created *esse* flows from (*defluit*) the uncreated *esse*.¹ But Boethius gives us often to understand that this is only a metaphor, and that all real participation must be denied: the form of the divinity cannot really spread outside itself, nor introduce into itself something other than itself. Otherwise we should have to say that everything is God, which cannot be allowed.² Boethius is an opponent of pantheism, and anchors his metaphysics to the rock of pluralism. The infinite *esse* is distinct from the finite *esse*. The establishment of these fundamental points throws much light on the interpretation of many a scholastic doctrine set forth by his successors as the authentic teaching of the master.

In psychology, Boethius has left concise passages concerning the nature and process of knowledge, which are Aristotelian in character.

Lastly, he mentions the famous Aristotelian division of the theoretical philosophical sciences (metaphysics, mathematics, physics), and he knows the analytical method, although his preferences go to deductive and synthetic expositions.

2. His literal translations of Aristotle (*cum verbum verbo expressum comparatumque reddiderim*)³ inaugurated a sure and precise method, and created a special vocabulary which was to be taken up and perfected in the Middle Ages. Boethius fixed the Latin form of a number of Aristotelian expressions and definitions.

3. Lastly, he presented technical models of the way in which a commentary should be made—and a commentary was the class of work which the Middle Ages loved and took up with avidity.

Boethius also put into circulation a goodly number of neo-Platonist ideas. Is not his favourite notion of harmonizing Aristotle with Plato itself of neo-Platonist origin? The *De*

¹ Non potest esse ipsum esse rerum, nisi a primo esse defluerit.—*Lib. de hebdom.*, 173.

² Ea est enim divinæ formæ substantiæ, ut neque in externa dilabatur nec in se externum aliquid ipsa suscipiat.—*Consol.*, III, 12. Ex quo fit ut omnia quæ sunt Deus sint, quod dictu nefas est.

³ Ed. Brandt, p. 135.

consolatione philosophiæ stresses the ineffable character of the first principle, the divine goodness, in which all things share, and towards which all things return. We find in him the theory of reminiscence set forth in language which recalls the commentary of Proclus on the *Timæus*; his teaching concerning divine foreknowledge and freedom is influenced by Jamblichus and Proclus. But in all these borrowings, Boethius avoids anything which might seem to be a concession to monism. His God is a personal one, and in his theism he surpasses not only Plotinus, but also Plato and Aristotle. His doctrine on Providence respects the rights of the human person, which he stresses, and of which he has left a celebrated definition: *persona est rationalis naturæ individua substantia*. Hence the neo-Platonism of Boethius has been freed from the neo-Platonist spirit.

We also find it in some Stoic doctrines, and he speaks of resignation to destiny in terms which remind one of the Porch. Again, he allots a prominent part in his theories on the divine nature, creation, and exemplarism, to pythagorean theories on number and unity.

We may add that Boethius is a student of St. Augustine. He states the Platonist doctrine of reminiscence in terms of the Augustinian doctrine of the *incommutabilia vera*. He stresses the peace which all things desire, the unity of the world, and the Providence of God. In addition to sense knowledge, and the *ratio* which is dependent upon it, he mentions the Augustinian manner of reaching God by an intuition of consciousness.¹

56. Boethius as a theologian.—The theological writings of Boethius are no less remarkable. In the first place, the theological questions which he treats involve grave metaphysical problems, and he takes the opportunity to introduce a number of philosophical notions (for instance, those of substance and person). Next, he treats them according to logical methods, and in this respect provides the mediæval thinkers with an example of a theological exposition expressed in an Aristotelian mould. Again, he initiates a theological method destined to have a great success, namely, the utilization in theology of philosophy, or the speculative method. The content of

¹ Cf. K. Brüder, *op. cit.* (65).

dogma is a datum independent of philosophy, but the latter is not for that reason to be set aside. It can be utilized to explain and interpret dogmas, to show their mutual relations, and their harmony with reason. In this task of interpretation, reason respects dogma as an initial datum, and is prepared to stop rather than to contradict it in a case where it realises that it is powerless to serve it: "Hæc si se recte et ex fide habent," is what he writes when dedicating his *De Trinitate* to John the Deacon, "ut me instruas peto; aut si aliqua re forte diversus es . . . fidem si poteris rationemque conjunge."¹ The *Crede ut intelligas* is wholly implied in his attitude. Boethius moreover reaches the result that investigations conducted in the light of pure reason alone harmonize quite well with the faith.

Thus Rand and Klinger are right when they say that we already find in Boethius a clear distinction between faith and reason (*fides, ratio*).² That is why in the *De consolacione* he does not speak of Christianity, but constructs a system of natural theology by the unaided human reason; while in the *Opuscula sacra* it is the theologian who speaks. Such a distinction provides a simple solution of the difficulties which have been raised concerning the Christianity of Boethius, and shows to what a high degree of intellectual maturity this fifth century thinker had attained.

Rand advances the hypothesis that it was the Christianity of Boethius which destroyed his reputation in the eyes of Theodoric, and that his supposed negotiations with a foreign power were a mere pretext: Boethius, he suggests, put himself at the head of the conservative Catholics, in opposition to the Arianism of the sovereign.

57. Influence of Boethius.—From what we have said it is plain that Boethius transmitted the most varied elements to the philosophy of the Middle Ages. We shall find them sorted out and completed in the syntheses of the thirteenth century. Hence it is not surprising that his authority should have been compared to that of Aristotle and of Augustine.

The theological works of Boethius were the subject of many

¹ *Tract.*, II, 68.

² F. Klinger, *De Boethii consolacione philosophiæ* (Philol. Untersuchungen), Berlin, 1921, Conclusion; Rand, *op. cit.* Cf. the fine study by Rand in *Founders of the Middle Ages*, ch. v, *Boethius the scholastic*, pp. 178-9.

commentaries, from John Scotus Erigena and Remigius of Auxerre to Thomas Aquinas. Still more numerous were the glosses on the *De consolazione Philosophiæ*, which the Middle Ages eagerly read, and which inspired philosophers, poets, and romancers from John Scotus Erigena to Chaucer. The work gave rise to a literary genus of its own: the books "On Consolation" which are found throughout the Middle Ages, and some of which, as for instance the *Consolatio theologiæ* by John of Dambach (fourteenth century), reproduce the technique of Boethius.¹ Lastly, his Aristotelian commentaries and his philosophical works became classics, and enjoyed a universal reputation, especially at the beginning of the Middle Ages.

58. Cassiodorus (about 477-570), a disciple of Boethius, was also a minister of Theodoric. Like Martianus Capella, he was a pedagogue, and in his treatises *De orthographia*, *De artibus ac disciplinis liberalium litterarum*, and *De institutione divinarum litterarum*, he endeavoured to set forth all that he was learnt concerning the *trivium* and the *quadrivium*, chiefly in the school of Boethius. His opusculum *De anima*, utilized by Rhaban Maur and Hincmar, defends the spirituality of the soul after the manner of Claudius Mamertus, and under the inspiration of Augustine.

Another compiler, Martin, bishop first of Dumio and afterwards of Braga (Bracara) (died 580), was the author of moral works largely based on Seneca: *Formula vitæ honestæ* (or *De quattuor virtutibus*), *De ira*, *Pro repellenda jactantia*, *De superbia*, and *Exhortatio humilitatis*. The *De paupertate* and *De moribus* are of doubtful authenticity.²

59. Gregory the Great (sixth century).—The personality of Gregory the First, known as the Great, who was Pope from 590 to 604, emerges from the chaos caused in Italy by the collapse of the Kingdom of the Ostrogoths. He was a Benedictine monk prior to becoming the founder of the mediæval Papacy, and it was he who sent Augustine the monk to evan-

¹ A. Auer, *Johannes von Dambach und die Trostbücher vom 11 bis zum 16 Jahrh.*, Beiträge, xxvii, 1-2, 1928.

² Manitius, *Geschichte der latein. Lit.*, I, p. 110. Cf. Migne, *P.L.*, Vols. 72, 73 (1025-62), 74 (381-94), 84 (574-86) and 130 (575-88). On the *De quattuor virtutibus* see L. R. Lind and A. Rapp, *A Manuscript of the Tractatus de q.v.*, in *Speculum*, 1933, pp. 255-7.

gelize England. His writings are the work of a practical moralist, attentive to the happenings of the time, but caring not for Greek tradition. In this respect he is a great contrast to Boethius. He is a mediæval personage. With all the roughness of the new races, he prefers action to speculation, and devotes himself entirely to the spreading of Catholicism and the extirpation of Arianism. His *Moralia* consist of an allegorical and moral interpretation of the Scriptures in which a great number of practical questions without connection with the text are introduced. This work had a wide circulation in the period which followed, and even in the thirteenth century.¹ His *Homilies* and *Dialogues* are also referred to.

60. Isidore of Seville (seventh century).—When the Visigoths penetrated into Spain (414) they amalgamated with the Hispano-Roman race, and from this fusion there resulted a remarkable people. Their King, Chindasvinto, made a codification of laws, known under the name of “Fuero Juzgo” and breathing the spirit of the primitive juridical ideas of the race. Together with the writings of Orosius (417), *Historiarum libri VII*, and the works of Isidore, they constitute the principal intellectual monuments of a civilization which was arrested when at its height by the coming of the Arabs from 711 onwards.

ISIDORE OF SEVILLE, *Hispalensis* (about 570-630), who probably belonged to the Hispano-Roman element in Carthagera, and became Archbishop of Seville, provides us with an excellent illustration of the encyclopædic tendencies of the time in his chief work, *Originum seu Etymologiarum libri XX*. This collection of human knowledge deals not only with the seven liberal arts, but also with all the scientific data which its author had managed to assemble: medicine, jurisprudence, Scripture, languages, and literature, etymologies, scraps of anthropology, zoology, geography both universal and local, architecture, agriculture and horticulture, the art of waging war, descriptions of the metals, weights and measures, navigation, clothing, etc. Worthy of note are his treatment of the divine origin of power, the obligation on the part of the State of defending the Church, the subjection of all, including the king, to law and justice, the separation of the private patrimony of the monarch and the patrimony of the Crown,

¹ Manitius, *op. cit.*, pp. 98 *et seq.* Cf. Hurter, *Nomenclator*, I, 557.

and the prestige, inviolability and hereditary character of royalty.¹

These theories made a great impression on the Middle Ages, which derived much pleasure and profit from the *Etymologies* of Isidore. His *Libri tres sententiarum*, a collection of dogmatic and moral sentences, was likewise consulted, and this kind of work was greatly imitated. When the Visigoths had to flee before the Arabs, they took with them into the Pyrenees as a precious possession the writings of the great Archbishop.

61. Venerable Bede (672/3-735).—This monk of Jarrow (Northumberland) was another writer who enjoyed a great reputation. He represents the Celtic culture of the Irish monasteries of the seventh century, and was looked upon as the greatest mind of his time. His chief work, *Historia ecclesiastica gentis Anglorum*, reflecting the exuberant character of similar works by Gregory of Tours, is regarded as the first effort at a serious English history. In addition to treatises on theology, Bede was the author of various scientific and chronological works, in particular of an opusculum *De orthographia*, and another entitled *De natura rerum*, evidently inspired by Isidore of Seville.²

62. Alcuin and the Carolingian Renaissance.—In 778, Charlemagne gave to Bangulf, Bishop of Fulda, the famous charter in which he encouraged the foundation of monastic and episcopal schools. This was the signal for a brilliant revival of studies constituting one of the best titles of the Emperor to renown. The renaissance of the eighth and ninth century was not exclusively philosophical in character: it extended to all the branches of learning then known. Furthermore, it was in more direct connection with classical antiquity than with patristic learning. The men of this period reproduced all they were able to save from the Barbarian invasions; they col-

¹ Altamira, *Historia de la Espana*, etc., I, 216. Other works by Isidore: *De natura rerum*, *De numeris*, *De viris illustribus*, *Historiæ*, and *Chronicles*. See Manitius, *Gesch. d. latein*, I, p. 52 *et seq.* Julian of Toledo, a contemporary of Isidore was influenced by him: Ch. H. Beeson, *The Ars Grammatica of Julian of Toledo*, in *Miscellanea Ehrle*, Vol. I, 1924, pp. 50-70.

² Manitius, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-87. In the Middle Ages the work *De Mundi cœlestis terrestisque constitutione liber* was wrongly attributed to Bede, and also a collection of philosophical texts, *Axiomata philosophica venerabilis Bedæ*, taken from a great number of authors, many of whom belong to a later date. For the first-mentioned work see Duhem, *La physique néo-Platonicienne au m. d.*, p. 47. He attributes the work to a disciple of Macrobius.

lected the raw materials of which others after them could make use in more original philosophic works. Alcuin and Rhaban Maur personify this work of compilation. This was also the period of the first theological controversies, so that the Carolingian Renaissance constitutes the first definite stage in the formation of the speculative mentality of the early Middle Ages. At the same time, one must not exaggerate the importance of these speculative activities. From the philosophical point of view we find nothing which has the appearance of a powerful or original work: people confine themselves to repeating things already known. The merit of the scholars who surrounded Charlemagne consisted in their external organization of the schools, which opened the way to the more fruitful work of their successors.

ALCUIN or ALCHVINE (about 730-804) was the leading spirit in the emperor's educational reforms. Himself a former pupil of the school of York, Alcuin met Charlemagne at Parma in 781, and taught for eight years at the imperial court. The monarch and his sons and daughters attended his lectures. After a very busy life, Alcuin retired to the Abbey of St. Martin at Tours, founded a school, and died there. He was rather a compiler and a grammarian, and does not deserve the great reputation he has enjoyed as a philosopher. There is nothing in his work on logic which is not found in Boethius and Cassiodorus. The liberal arts, the basis of all learning, may be likened to the seven columns of wisdom, *nec aliter ad perfectam quemlibet deducit scientiam nisi his septem columnis vel etiam gradibus exaltetur*.¹ The psychological ideas developed in the letter *De animæ ratione ad Eulaliam Virginem*² are Augustinian in character. This applies especially to his definition of man (*anima et caro*), his conception of the relation between the soul and body, his notion of sensation and pain, tripartite division of the faculties (which he does not distinguish from the essence of the soul) and the central place given to God and the soul. On the other hand, the moral doctrines developed in this latter are borrowed from Cassian.³ The

¹ *Grammatica*, Migne, P.L., Vol. 101, 855 c.

² Other works by the same author on philosophy are: *De virtutibus et vitiis ad Widonem comitem*; *Grammatica*; *De dialectica*; *De Rhetorica*. Cf. Manitius, *op. cit.*, pp. 273-88.

³ Seydl, *op. cit.* (85).

theological works of Alcuin display the same encyclopædic character.

If Alcuin lacked originality, he was nevertheless an organizer of learned institutions and a sower of ideas. He transplanted into Germany the culture and learning of Ireland. He introduced the *trivium* and the *quadrivium* into the school of the palace, and his books survived him as manuals. He had one disciple of note, Rhaban Maur, who indeed became more famous than his master. The schools which sprang up as a result of the impulse which he gave to study continued to be philosophical centres up to the foundation of the University of Paris. Fredegise was another of his disciples.

63. Rhaban Maur (ninth century).—From the point of view of philosophy, the most significant representative of the encyclopædic literature of the first part of the Middle Ages was Rhaban Maur (Magnetius Hrabanus Maurus, 776/784-856), the disciple of Alcuin of Tours. He was the founder of the school of Fulda and afterwards Archbishop of Mayence. His work *De clericorum institutione*, in which he recommends the study of the liberal arts and of the ancient philosophers, gained for him the title of "præceptor Germaniæ"; his treatise *De rerum natura* extended still further the list of subjects treated by Isidore of Seville, and constituted the encyclopædic dictionary of the early Middle Ages. Rhaban Maur gathered up amongst other ancient texts a hundred lines from Lucretius, on which was based the knowledge of Lucretius and Epicurus possessed by the pre-scholastics. Rhaban follows the Latin philosopher in holding that all things save God are by their nature corporeal.¹ He also wrote Biblical commentaries. Servatus Lupus of Ferrières, Walafrid Strabo, and Candidus of Fulda were among his disciples: their writings however have very little interest for the historian of philosophy.

Amongst the early writers of the beginning of the period under consideration, we ought also to mention certain humanists, commentators on works of logic, and teachers of renown, whose principal merit was that they encouraged studies and this prepared indirectly for the coming of philosophy. Such were in the ninth century SERVATUS LUPUS, a teacher at

¹ Cf. Philippe, *Lucrèce dans la théologie chrétienne du III^e au XIII^e siècle*, p. 58 (Paris, 1896). Rhaban was at the same time an exegete and commentator on the Bible.—Manitius, *op. cit.*, p. 288.

Ferrières, and ODO of CLUNY. In the tenth century, BOVO II, Abbot of Corvey in Saxony (who wrote a commentary Platonist in tendency on the *De consolazione philosophiæ* of Boethius, while ADALBOLD OF UTRECHT (died 1026) interpreted it in a Christian sense.¹ POPPO OF FULDA and REINHARD OF ST. BURCHARD are less well known. Special mention should be made of RATHERUS OF VERONA (tenth century), and especially of NOTKER LABEO of St. Gall (died 1022), who, in addition to translating works into German (the *Categories* and the *De Interpretatione* of Aristotle, the *De Consolatione Philosophiæ* of Boethius, the *De nuptiis Mercurii et philologiæ* of M. Capella) also wrote on music and rhetoric, and initiated in his school a series of commentaries on the arts and on the works of dialectics then known. The *Hortus deliciarum* of HERRAD OF LANDSBERG, written in the twelfth century for the instruction of religious, may be mentioned among the last encyclopædic works of this first period. But it already shows signs of the progress of scholasticism. In particular we find therein a division of philosophy into *ethica*, *logica*, *physica*, and the seven liberal arts serve as a preparation for philosophy.²

64. Jonas of Orleans.—Already in the ninth century, Jonas (born before 780, died 842/3), who was at the Court of Louis the Pious before he was appointed Bishop of Orleans, wrote a treatise, *De institutione regia*, dedicated to Pepin of Aquitaine. We find in this, besides practical and pastoral matter, some principles on power. The royal power comes from God. It has as its object justice, the well being of the people, and the protection of the Church. If the king fails in his duty, he becomes a tyrant. The author does not say whether in such a case he should be deposed.³ The picture which he gives of the prince and the qualities which he ought to manifest is apparently based on the "mirror of the prince" in the *De Civitate Dei*. It constitutes a first statement of principles which later on will be more clearly set forth and codified.

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¹ Endres, *Studien z. Gesch. der Frühscholastik*, Philos. Jahrb., 1912, p. 364 et seq.

² Willmann, *Didaktik*, I, 278, n. 1.

³ J. Reviron, *op. cit.* (65).

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Servatus Lupus, Walafrid Strabo, Candidus, Notker Labeo.—U. Berlière, *Un bibliophile du IXe s., Loup de Ferrières*, Mons, 1912 ; A. Jundt, *Walafrid Strabo : l'homme et le théologien*, Cahors, 1900 ; L. Eigl, *Walafrid Strabo*, Vienna, 1908 ; F. Zimmermann, *Candidus, Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Frühscholastik*, in *Divus Thomas (F.)*, 1929, pp. 30-60 ; E. H. Sehrt and T. Starck, *Teutonicus Notker der Deutsche Werke, nach den Handschriften*, I, 1, Boethius, *De consolatione philosophiæ*, Halle (S.), 1933.

Jonas of Orleans.—J. Reviron, *Les idées politico-religieuses d'un évêque du IXe s., Jonas d'Orléans et son 'De institutione regia,' tude et texte critique*, Paris, 1930.

§ 5.—John Scotus Erigena

66. Life and writings.—Born in Ireland between 800 and 815, John Scotus Erigena¹ made his first studies in some Irish monastery. He belonged to the group of distinguished

¹ The early manuscripts have Johannes Scotus Eriugena, Baeumker, *Jahrb. für Phil. und spek. Theol.*, 1893, p. 346, n. 2. In the ninth century the Irish were called Scoti, and Eriugena means "one who belongs to the people of Erin." The texts and contemporaries who mention Scotus are gathered together by Traube, *Monumenta Germ. Hist. Patæ Aevi Carolini*, III, 518 (1896).

foreigners who gathered together in Gaul in the time of the Carolingian culture. There he was introduced to Greek, the technique of grammar, philosophy and theology. We find him at the Court of Charles the Bald in 850-1, and there he occupied a prominent position. At that moment he was leading a full, active life as a thinker, and he intervened in important theological controversies by publishing his work *De prædestinatione*. This intervention was unfortunate, for it resulted in a set-back: called upon to act as a peacemaker between the two parties in conflict, he displeased both of them (§7). The hostile reception given to this work turned Erigena's mind away from controversy, and he did not conceal this fact. Henceforth he directed his attention towards philosophy, and a new period began in his literary formation. Up till then, Scotus had based himself almost exclusively on Latin authors, Cassiodorus, Martianus Capella, ¹ Isidore, and above all St. Augustine and Boethius, upon whose *De consolazione philosophiæ* he seems to have written a commentary.² But from 851 onwards he was in touch with Greek.³ At a time when Alcuin hardly knew the Greek alphabet, Scotus knew the language very well, and was very proud of his Hellenism. In 858, at the request of Charles the Bald, he translated and commented on the works of pseudo-Dionysius (except the *Mystical Theology*),⁴ which has been presented to Louis the Fair in 827 (28) and (49). Hilduin had attempted a translation which was very defective, and Scotus took up the work again, basing himself on the original manuscript (about 860-2). Then he translated the Ambigua of Maximus the Confessor, and the *De imagine* (περὶ κατασκευῆς ἀνθρώπου) of St. Gregory of Nyssa. Finally, at the end of his translating period, he wrote the *De divisione naturæ* (between 862 and 866), with which we may link up his commentaries on pseudo-Dionysius and St. John. This great and noteworthy work, written in a vigorous style, and in which, according to the manuscripts, we can distinguish successive forms or editions,⁵ is written in the dialogue form so dear to the Carolingian authors. A

¹ Cappuyns, *op. cit.* (76), p. 75, denies that he wrote the *Annotationes in Mart. Capellam*.

² Rand, *Joh. Scotus*, p. 97.

³ Jacquin, *Le néo-Platonisme de J. Scot*, in R. Sc. P.T., 1907, p. 678

⁴ The commentary which is attributed to Scotus belongs to the thirteenth century.

⁵ Cappuyns, *op. cit.*, p. 194.

master (*nutritor*, N) gives explanations to a disciple (*alumnus*, A), and replies to his questions. This accounts for the repetitions and digressions in the work. The Latin Fathers, and still more the Greeks, are extensively quoted in it, and the author displays a manifest preference for texts in which the neo-Platonist tendency is obvious. Scotus especially delights to harmonize the thought of Augustine with that of the Greek neo-Platonists. According to Rand, towards the end of his life Scotus would seem to have written commentaries on the *Opuscula theologica* of Boethius.¹ Scotus disappears from the scene of history with Charles the Bald, and apparently did not live after 870.

67. Faith and Reason.—We have already seen that the first works of Scotus were devoted to theological controversies. Throughout his life, he continued to deal with the interpretation of Christian doctrine, and of the Scriptures in which this is contained.

Two main lines of thought are worth noting in his theological explanations :

I. Scotus starts from the neo-Platonist and Augustinian principle that there is no distinction at all between philosophy and religion, and that accordingly there can be no contradiction between them.² Do they not both emanate from the divine wisdom? The Scripture (*auctoritas*) is the chief source of our knowledge of God.³ Reason (*ratio*) establishes its data,

¹ We possess revisions and developments of the text in the form of marginal notes. Cf. Rand, *Autographa des J. Scotus*, with photographs of the *De divisione* from the Reims MS. This manuscript contains marginal notes, which are incorporated into the text of the Bamberg manuscript together with new additions, and also in a Paris manuscript. Rand has pointed out as many as five revisions. He has shown (*Supposed autographa of J. the Scot*) that these notes were not written by J. Scot himself, but were added by scribes working under his direction. Manitius, *op. cit.*, p. 338, mentions in addition, as works by Scotus, a translation of Priscianus Lydus, an extract from Macrobius, and some poems.

² *De div. prædest.*, I, i: "Quid est aliud de philosophia tractare nisi veræ religionis, qua summa et principalis omnium rerum causa Deus et humiliter colitur et rationabiliter investigatur, regulas exponere?"

³ *De div. naturæ*, I, 64: "Sacra siquidem scripturæ in omnibus sequenda est auctoritas." I, 66: "Vera enim auctoritas rectæ rationi non obsistit, neque recta ratio veræ auctoritati. Ambo siquidem ex uno fonte, divina scilicet sapientia, manare dubium non est." Also, in an often quoted passage (I, 69): "Omnis enim auctoritas quæ vera ratione non approbatur, infirma videtur esse. Vera autem ratio, quoniam suis virtutibus rata atque immutabilis munitur, nullius auctoritatis astipulatione roborari indiget." In this the author places reason above the authority of the Fathers, but not above all authority.—Jacquin, *Le rationalisme de J. Scot*, p. 748. Cf. Ueberweg-Geyer, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

illuminated as it is by God. Far from attacking dogma, Scotus thus wishes to remain faithful to it : his great aim is to respect it, and the glosses which he writes with his own hand in the margin of the *De divisione naturæ* tend to attenuate the effect of too daring expressions concerning God.¹

2. This first principle is coupled with another : reason is the judge of the interpretation which should be given to Scripture. This principle modifies completely the system of harmonies which Scotus establishes between the two. "Auctoritas ex vera ratione processit, ratio vero nequaquam ex auctoritate. Omnis enim auctoritas, quæ vera ratione non approbatur, infirma videtur esse."² At the most, the exegesis given by the Fathers constitutes a probable argument in favour of the meaning to be given to a dogma.

Fortified with this second principle, Scotus found it easy to adapt dogma to his personal conceptions, by having recourse to allegory, and sacrificing at one time the logic of his system, or at another the dogma itself. These adaptations, which constitute a chapter in the history of mediæval theology, do not concern us except as an illustration of Scotus' method.

In this way Scotus identifies the divine persons with stages in the unique Substance : the Father is the "uncreated nature," the Son is the divine Logos, and the "created nature which does not create" is identified with the Holy Spirit. Similarly, the doctrines of the Fall and Redemption are interpreted in the manner of Gnostic symbolism. The primitive body, "as it was conceived in second nature," was free from imperfections. And thus we are in a violent state of degradation (Plato, Plotinus). The return of man to his former state and into the bosom of God is to be brought about by the redemption through Christ.

Bearing in mind these principles which govern his theological interpretations, we may call Scotus the father of mediæval rationalism. In contrast with modern religious rationalism, which in the name of reason rejects the Christian doctrine, the religious rationalism of the Middle Ages claimed to establish the data of this doctrine in the name of reason. Others followed in the way opened up by Scotus and ended in heresy.

¹ Rand, *Autographa*, p. 6-7. Cf. Scotus' words when commenting on St. John's Gospel : "In omnibus quæ scribo suspendor virorum ac priorum Patrum iudicio. Interim dico quæ sentio."—*Ibid.*, p. 6, note.

² I, 69.

68. Metaphysics.—The *De divisione naturæ* is above all a metaphysical work, for it is summed up in a table of the hierarchical structure of reality. We also find in it a theory of knowledge, but even this is expressed in terms of metaphysical conceptions.

The metaphysical table itself is composed of two sections, which complete each other. The first is primordial and synthetic, the other is secondary, and analytic; and to these correspond two processes of knowledge.¹

The secondary and analytical way in which Scotus represents reality is based on Boethius, and, through this channel, upon the logical works of Aristotle. God and creatures are therein clearly distinguished; the substances of the sensible world are multiple and independent. Accordingly, we cannot in any way place God and created things in one and the same logical category, nor predicate the one of the other.

But there is a more elevated and more profound way of regarding reality, an *altior* or *gnosticus intuitus* which establishes interdependences and co-ordinations of a different type. In his study of these, Scotus changes his mentors: he abandons Boethius and Aristotle, and turns instead to Augustine, pseudo-Dionysius, Maximus, and also Gregory of Nyssa.

These synthetic views of reality are in the foreground, and give the real meaning of the *De divisione naturæ*. Here is a summary: There is only one reality worthy of the name, in the sense that all other things depend upon it, and return towards it: this reality is God. Hence we may distinguish in the divine being (*natura*) a fourfold stage or division: uncreated and creating nature; created and creating nature; created and non-creating nature; and lastly, nature which is neither created nor creating, and towards which all returns.²

This is an Augustinian and neo-Platonist setting in which between God as the starting point (1°) and terminus (4°) there is room for the created world as conceived in God (2°) and as realised outside God (3°).

1°. *Nature uncreated and creating*, or God in His primordial infinite reality, possesses all perfections. By reason of his very

¹ Cf. Note 4, p. 129.

² Videtur mihi divisio naturæ per quatuor differentias quatuor species recipere: quarum prima est in eam quæ creat et non creatur, secunda in eam quæ creatur et creat, tertia in eam quæ creatur et non creat, quarta quæ nec creat nec creatur. (*De divisione naturæ*, I, 3.)

infinity, God is impenetrable so far as we are concerned. He is above the categories, for these cannot be applied to the being who can neither be conceived nor expressed.¹ Transcending all that is accessible directly to us, he is for us a *non-being*, and the super-elevation of his *essentia* justifies the negation of all the attributes possessed by created being (Negative Theology, cf. 47). Not only is God unknowable by us: He is impenetrable to Himself, for knowledge implies the duality of the knower and the known, and all duality is repugnant to the Infinite. “Deus itaque nescit se quid est, quia non est quid, incomprehensibilis quippe in aliquo et sibi ipsi et omni intellectui.”²

2°. *Nature created and creating*.—This God, exalted above all categories, is called the only true essence, “*ipse namque omnium essentia est, qui solus vere est*”³—a fundamental theme which reappears in very many forms, and to which all returns. Now God first of all engenders in Himself the *primordiales causæ*, or *primordialia exempla* of all things. He knows these as reflections of the perfection contained in his abysmal entity (*abyssus*). These “*species vel formæ in quibus omnium rerum faciendarum priusquam essent, incommutabiles rationes conditæ sunt*,” which Augustine describes in magnificent terms, are called “creations” by God. But this expression must not be taken in the technical sense of a production *ex nihilo*, but signifies in the mind of Scotus an abstracted aspect of the divine essence. In contrast to Augustine, but after the manner of the neo-Platonists, he regards the divine “ideas” as an auto-determination involving a certain decay. These ideas are eternal, but not “co-eternal.” They are multiple, like the genera and species of which they are the archetypes, but the Logos maintains them in unity. The scattering forth is consummated in the third stage, when the generic and specific essences are spread out into the multiple and limited.

3°. *Nature created but not creating*, or the collective exterior-

¹ Nam in ipsis naturis a Deo conditis, motibusque earum, categoriæ qualiscumque sit potentia, praevalent (categoriarum virtus). In ea vero natura quæ nec dici nec intelligi potest, per omnia in omnibus deficit.—*Ibid.*, I, 15. Migne, *P.L.*, Vol. 122, c. 463.

² II, 28.

³ I, 13.

izations of the divine ideas.¹ Whether they be corporeal or incorporeal, the beings realized in time in conformity with their eternal exemplars are presented as so many participations of the divine essence (*assumptio*,²), or distributions of the divine gifts.³ They are likewise divine theophanies: deity is found in the very entrails of the world. Scotus derives *θεος* from *θέω* to run.⁴ Or again, he compares the multi-form appearances of God to the indefinitely varied reflections of light on the feathers of a peacock.⁵ God is in particular things, yet without losing anything of His immutability; He finds Himself in determined beings, and thus emerges from the depths of His infinity. Thus, at the base of all is the unique substance, God. "Nil (or non) enim extra (divinam naturam) subsistunt. Conclusum est ipsam solam vere ac proprie in omnibus esse, et nihil vere ac proprie esse quod ipsa non sit. . . . Proinde non duo a seipsis distantia debemus intelligere Deum et creaturam, sed unum et id ipsum."⁶

It is worth while to note a twofold feature which is found in individual things which constitute this third stage of "nature." On the one hand, each individual thing is real only by virtue of its Logos or the *causa primordialis* which penetrates it. And as this is of a spiritual order, it follows that sensible beings depend on the suprasensible. They depend upon spirit, and ultimately on the divine; their corporeal state is not their true reality, but an illusion, a non-being, a reflection. This gives a very marked Platonist and neo-Platonist sense to the conception of Scotus, and to this point we shall return.

A second feature accentuates this same neo-Platonist character: the flowering forth of the ideas in concrete beings

¹ Et creari et creare conspicitur divina natura. Creatur enim a seipsa in primordialibus causis, ac per hoc seipsum creat, hoc est, in suis theophaniis incipit apparere, ex occultissimis naturæ suæ finibus volens emergere, in quibus et sibi ipsi incognita, hoc est, in nullo se cognoscit, quia infinita est, et supernaturalis . . . descendens vero in principiis rerum ac veluti seipsam creans in aliquo inchoat esse. . . . Creatur ergo et creat in primordialibus causis; in earum vero effectibus creatur et non creat.—III, 23, col. 689. Cf. III, 4, c. 633.

² Est igitur participatio divinæ essentiæ assumptio.—III, 9, col. 644.

³ Est igitur participatio . . . divinarum dationum et donationum a summo usque deorsum per superiores ordines inferioribus distributio.—III, 3, c. 630.

⁴ Ipse enim in omnia currit, et nullo modo stat, sed omnia currendo implet.—I, 12.

⁵ IV, 5.

⁶ III, 17, col. 678.

obeys a certain rhythm : the *causæ exemplares* are hierarchized according to genera and species, the higher genus being "reflected" before the lower, the latter before the species type, the species type before its individual realizations.¹ Substance and the other categories, classified after the manner of Aristotle, are arranged in a similar descending scale which corresponds to the compenetrating articulations of reality. This is an exaggerated realism.

4°. *Nature which does not create and is not created*, or God as term of the universe. Everything which starts from a principle tends to return into this same principle ; the terminus of a movement is the return to its starting point. *Finis enim totius motus est principium sui . . . quod appetit et quo reperto cessabit, non ut substantia ejus pereat, sed ut in suas rationes, ex quibus profectus est, revertatur.*² The universal cause draws to itself all things which have arisen from it, but without in any way moving itself, and by the sole efficacy of its beauty.³ Everything returns to God. This resolution of the theophanies is a kind of deification, *θεωσις*, which, in particular, results in the final disappearance of evil and in the union of man with God.

69. Theory of knowledge.—In dependance upon these metaphysical ideas, and at the same time in support of them, Scotus presents a double theory of knowledge. Two cognitive methods put us in contact with what we may call the double structure of reality.

By the external senses (*sensus exterior*) man knows corporeal things, the diverse, the multiple, and the transitory, which we know to be the shadow of reality itself. The *sensus interior* (which corresponds to abstractive knowledge) finds in these sensible appearances the constitution or essence, with its degrees from the species up to the supreme genus. Reasoning (*ratio*) links up species and genera to the primordial causes, that is to say, to the exemplary ideas, which the intelligence (*intellectus*) identifies with God. This is an analytic

¹ *Intelligitur quod ars illa, quæ dividit genera in species et species in genera resolvit . . . non ab humanis machinationibus sit facta, sed in natura rerum ad auctore omnium artium condita.*—IV, 4, col. 748-9.

² V, 3, c. 866.

³ "Ita rerum omnium causa omnia, quæ ex se sunt, ad seipsam reducit, sine ullo sui motu, sed sola suæ pulchritudinis virtute," I. 75. He compares this attraction to that of a magnet, *magnes*.

process, an affirmation of pluralism, which grasps as distinct not only created things among themselves, but also God and creatures. It is accordingly a process which forbids the historian to place God and the created being in one and the same genus or one and the same order.

The second mode of knowing is more perfect (*altior*), more mysterious (*gnosticus contuitus*), and Scotus describes it by means of the terms used by Maximus (*ex verbis venerabilis Maximi*¹). We find here once more the three functions (*sensus interior, ratio, intellectus*), which suggest the three aspects of the soul (neo-Platonism), and are one of the many images of the Trinity to be found in ourselves (Augustine). But this time the starting point is the vision of God by the *intellectus*; God becomes the centre of converging perspectives which gather together all reality into one vast unity. The description of the *superessentialis essentia* is conducted by the *intellectus* according to the double method of the positive and negative theologies (cf. 47): on the one hand Scotus ascribes to God, in a symbolic way, all the perfections scattered abroad in the limited world; from another point of view he excludes them, in order to show the elevation of His *essentia* above all predicates. "Essentia ergo dicitur Deus, sed proprie essentia non est."² In the second degree of knowledge, the *ratio* has some knowledge of the indefinable God, namely, the *primordiales causæ*, which the *sensus interior*, the third source of knowledge, then perceives in the genera and species of the theophanies outside God. But *all this multiplicity is at every moment gathered together by the intellectus into one vast unity.*³

The two ways of knowing are fully described in Book II, and the two points of view from which they approach reality are set forth in a significant passage in which John Scotus sums up his views on the primary Nature, and announces its later developments.⁴

¹ II, 23, col. 572.

² I. 14.

³ Cf. col. 572-8. Here is the conclusion: "omnia vero et una omnium causa et multiplicationis momentum incipere, et unitatis simplicitatem, qua in ea æternaliter et incommutabiliter subsistunt, nullo modo deserere . . . per intellectum purissime cognoscit."

⁴ Quoniam in superiori libro de universalis Naturæ universali divisione, non quasi generis in formas, seu totius in partes—non enim Deus genus est creaturæ, nec creatura species Dei, sicut creatura non est genus Dei neque Deus species creaturæ: eadem ratio est in toto et partibus: Deus siquidem non est totum creaturæ neque creatura pars Dei, quomodo nec creatura est

70. Nature of man.—Man is a *microcosmos*, uniting in himself the material and the spiritual (*copulantur*).¹ His nature is explained by the double metaphysical method. On the one hand, each individual man possesses his body and his soul,² and this soul, simple and unique, is the better part of him. On the other hand, all our souls are compenetrated by the one type of humanity, and like the rest of creation, humanity is a projection of the divine.

The exposition which we have just given raises numerous questions of exegesis and of history, and in particular, the following :

1. Is this systematic construction a speculative theology, or a philosophy ?
2. If it is a philosophy, is the metaphysics which it sets forth monistic or pluralistic ?
3. What were its sources ?
4. In what sense was it interpreted by Scotus' contemporaries and successors ? What was its influence ?

71. Philosophy or theology ?—The *De divisione naturæ* has often been regarded as a work of theology, and Scotus recent historian, Dom Cappuyns, does not regard it as anything else.³ He emphasizes the fact that the whole study of reality is made in the light of the divine, and of the *theoria theologica*. The fact cannot be denied. But the *altior intuitus*, which constantly puts before the reader the contemplation of the divine Essence, still belongs to the order of rational enquiry, and results in a *philosophical* doctrine of the Supreme Being. On the other hand, it is in our opinion none the less certain that the *De divisione naturæ* is an ordered and unified construction of reality *as such*, in which limited beings, which are outside God and other than Him, are studied *for their own sake* ; shadows when viewed in relation to God, finite beings are real when we regard them in themselves (third stage).

totum Dei, neque Deus pars creaturæ [analytical study of reality]—quamvis altiori theoria juxta Gregorium Theologum pars Dei simus . . . metaphoriceque Deus dicatur et genus, et totum, et species, et pars ; omni quod in ipso et ex ipso est, pie ac rationabiliter de eo prædicari potest—sed intelligibili quadem universitatis contemplatione—universitatem dicto Deum et creaturam [synthetic study] breviter diximus, nunc etc., lib. II, I, col. 523.

¹ II, 3, col. 530.

² IV, col. 754.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 269 and 385.

Then again, the individuals of one and the same species constitute one unit, so that all men are united in one and the same *humanitas*. Species and genera are hierarchized in accordance with the typical rhythm of exaggerated realism.¹ Lastly, the ascending return mentioned in the fourth stage is a real return. All this is metaphysics, or philosophy, and to take away from Scotus the title of philosopher is to take away from his personality.

Scotus is a philosopher also when he insists that all theological constructions should be carried out in accordance with the rules of dialectics, for, as he characteristically says, "*Nemo intrat in cælum nisi per philosophiam.*"²

72. Monism or pluralism?—Is the deductive metaphysics of the *De divisione naturæ* monistic or pluralistic? We call "monistic" a doctrine which teaches the compenetration of many or of all beings in one single being (partial or integral monism), and we call "pantheistic" a completely monistic system which gives to this One Being the attributes of the Supreme Being. A "pluralistic" system, on the other hand, holds that every being which exists or may exist is characterized by internal indivision (*indivisum in se, individuum*), and its individuality entails its distinction from everything else (*distinctum ab omni alio*), from which it follows, not only that the created world cannot be confused with God, but also that created beings themselves are multiple and distinct from each other.

Now the metaphysical texts with which the *De divisione naturæ* is filled affirm in some cases the unity and compenetration of all things in God, and in others the plurality and diversity of things. The former describe the *assumptio* of the divine essence into the finite in all kinds of ways, and have a marked monistic sound, which explains why the majority of historians have regarded Scotus as a monist and a pantheist. Other texts establish no less clearly the distinction between God and created things, or again are concerned to show that the *aliud* is compatible with the enveloping unity of the unique essence. On which of these two series of texts must we dwell for preference?

¹ In his excellent work, Dom Cappuyns refers to this matter only in one line of a note on p. 314, and says that he is not concerned with it.

² *Annotationes*, 38, 11; quoted by Cappuyns, *op. cit.*, p. 305.

Let us say to begin with that the two conceptions expressed in these texts have an *objective and realist* sense ; if there is any monism in them, it is not that of a subjective poem, elaborated in the recesses of consciousness, after the manner of the post-Kantian idealism,¹ any more than the dismemberment of Nature is a metaphorical one.² Everything has a real significance, outside the mind ; Scotus is an objectivist metaphysician, like all the philosophers of his time, and indeed like all the philosophers of the Middle Ages.

Having said this, must we make a choice between the texts which have a monistic sound, and those which sound pluralistic, while endeavouring to explain their parallel development ?

No. The two series can be harmonized. Scotus is not a monist (Gilson and Cappuyns have established this definitely), for he holds that the substance of God and created substances are not identical. We can give an acceptable meaning to the texts which seem to be monistic, provided we carefully define the limits of the enveloping unity, and the lacunæ in Scotus's description of these.

The limits of unity. The latter rests, not on a substantial identity of God and the finite, but on hierarchical relations between them. God is situated at the top of a ladder, as it were, and every created perfection is viewed in relation to God. Here we have a unitive conception which gathers together into one whole, not only God and the prototypes which are identical with Him (D. Cappuyns' exemplarist monism), but also God and real beings, existing or possible *outside of Him*. Thus we are brought back to the hierarchical conception, as stressed by pseudo-Dionysius, Maximus, Augustine, Boethius himself, when they say that God alone is really being, and that viewed in relation to God, all the rest is non-being. In the order of theophanies, the multiple is the shadow of the one. Thus individuations fade away in presence of the essence-type, i.e., the specific and generic reality which is reflected in them ; this in its turn is but a reflection when we compare it with the exemplary causes conceived in the divine mind ;

¹ Delacroix, for instance, who regards Scotus as a subjective pantheist, writes : " He teaches that it is possible by a mere conscious effort to attain to the most profound aspects of the divine." *Essai sur le mysticisme spécul.*, p. 2.

² Gilson, Preface to book by G. Capelle (mentioned later on), p. 7. Similarly, Cappuyns writes, à propos of the four *naturæ*, that this " scheme is only a mental conception " (*op. cit.*, p. 311). To this should be added : " corresponding to objective reality."

these causes themselves are inferior to the super-essential Essence, so that ultimately God alone is Being. But all this leaves to limited beings (third nature) their independent substantial value and their hierarchical order.¹ That is why Scotus is so careful to insist that the supreme infinity of God must be placed in an inaccessible realm, and why he over and over again repeats that God is all, that the finite is nothing, and that a unique sympathy binds all things to God.

Its insufficiencies and lacunæ? They arise from the blunt opposition between these two series of texts, which overlap each other, and are found face to face with each other without any attempt by their author to harmonize them. In his *altior aspectus* of reality, Scotus declares that God is the veritable being, but he does not explain in what sense God is one with the beings distinct from him. Hence there is nothing which justifies us in saying that he understands this unity in the sense of the universal presence, or of the divine immensity, as we find in Thomism. Scotus' meaning remains uncertain, and we may say with Gilson that he did everything possible to puzzle his readers and to conceal his real thought. Expressions such as the divine *processio*, *assumptio*, *generatio* in other beings are of doubtful meaning, and in addition, the theory of exemplary Ideas, regarded as on a plane lower than the super-essence of God, favour an interpretation in the sense of a divine becoming.²

¹ Dom Cappuyns concludes that the system of Scotus is an exemplarist monism. The unity in question does not deal with the order of existence of created things, for, he says, it belongs solely to the order of exemplary causality, and concerns the manner in which the essences are known by God, and consequently are contained in Him. This is true but not the whole truth, for it neglects the reality of created being realised outside God. The *De divisione* would then be merely a long commentary on the exemplarist thesis of Augustine. But that would be an excessive simplification, and would deprive the work of Scotus of all originality. Moreover, such a conception would be misleading, for it involves taking the word "monism" in an unusual sense, to mean simply that the divine ideas which are the prototypes of essences, are not other than God. But in that sense all the pluralists of the Middle Ages would be monists—as Dom Cappuyns would indeed seem to allow, for he speaks of a Christian Monism.

² The majority of historians who regard Scotus as a monist explain the passages in which he safeguards the distinction between beings as indicating the *intentions* of the author. Thus Poole (*op. cit.*, p. 59), and still more Koyré (*L'idée de Dieu dans la philosophie de S. Anselme*, p. 160); also Dorries and Bett. But from this standpoint there would have been no monists in the Middle Ages, for all made a great effort to harmonize the diverse with the unity of reality—to the detriment of logic. But once monism is accepted, the diverse must be sacrificed, and no dialectical artifice will help to re-establish it.

However, in any case the *De divisione naturæ* remains a very remarkable work, and one which sets forth a noteworthy systematization of reality. Although a man of his time in the sense that he used sources which were open to all, Scotus nevertheless surpassed his contemporaries because these were incapable of rising above particular questions. For this reason he remains the greatest thinker, and the isolated one in the ninth century.¹

73. Sources.—John Scotus Erigena, who delights to detail the sources of his thought, owes the strong neo-Platonist inspiration characterizing the *De divisione naturæ* to pseudo-Dionysius, Maximus, Gregory of Nyssa, and also Augustine. He did not know Plotinus² or Proclus. Could he have been ignorant of Macrobius, whom he does not mention? It seems hardly likely in so well informed a thinker, and the numerous texts which, by their studied vagueness or lack of precision suggest a monistic realism to the reader, remind one of passages in the Commentary on Scipio's Dream.

74. Influence.—Although Erigena's philosophy was not understood by his contemporaries, it nevertheless exercised a great influence on the development of Western thought in the Middle Ages. We find his doctrines of the *theoria* or of the contemplation of God, the *causa superessentialis*, the soul and its parts, in a philosophical letter of Almannus of Hautvillers to Sigibod, Archbishop of Narbonne (873-85), and in the accompanying commentaries. The majority of those who utilized his *De divisione naturæ* interpreted his unitive ideas in the sense of a real monism. Their opinion is of importance if we wish to understand the opposition which the work aroused, its condemnations, and also its utilization. Already in 860-2, Pope Nicholas I complained of the bold

¹ In our previous edition, we called John Scotus an "anti-scholastic," studying him from a point of view different from that which we adopt here. In that edition, instead of taking the word "scholastic" in a *chronological* sense, we gave it an *ideological* significance. See the Preface to this present edition. Ueberweg-Geyer (p. 168) calls Scotus' work "die selbständigste und hervorragendste philosophische Leistung bis auf Anselm und Abaelard." Taking the word "scholastic" in a doctrinal sense, Delacroix (*Revue de synth. hist.*, 1902, p. 105), Baumecker (*op. cit.*, p. 322) and Glossner (*Jahrb. für Phil. und spek. Theol.*, 1906, p. 403), allow that Scotus cannot be included among the scholastics; Grabmann (*Gesch. der schol. Meth.*, I, 208) questions it.

² M. Techert (*op. cit.*) points out striking resemblances between texts in Plotinus and John Scotus, but the latter may have come across these indirectly.

opinions which Scotus had developed in the *De divisione naturæ* without submitting the work to previous censure. We find traces of the *De divisione* in Heiric and Remigius of Auxerre, and also in Gerbert. Berengar appeals to it. In the twelfth century, Abelard, Isaac of Stella, Garnier of Rochefort, Alan of Lille, are acquainted with his doctrines. Anselm of Laon and Simon of Tournai quote the *Perifision*. William of Malmesbury (died about 1143) praises him. The *Clavis physicæ* of Honorius of Autun is based upon him.¹ Again, the *De intelligentiis* of pseudo-Avicenna, which dates from the middle or latter part of the twelfth century, borrows from Scotus numerous formulæ with a monistic significance and combines them with texts from Augustine and Avicenna.² At the end of the twelfth century, Amalric of Bene drew from the *De divisione* his own pantheistic theories; the Albigenses also appealed to it, which explains why on Januray 25th, 1125, Pope Honorius III condemned the *De divisione naturæ*, which had already been forbidden in a Council at Sens.³ Although the Pope ordered that the work of the Palatine philosopher, which was still being read *in nonnullis monasteriis et aliis locis*⁴ should be burnt, it did not altogether disappear from literary circulation. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries it is included in two catalogues,⁵ and numerous manuscript copies of it have come down to our own time.

As for the *Opuscula Sacra* of John Scotus, these were widely used until Gilbert de la Porrée undertook a similar task. It was through Scotus translation and commentaries on pseudo-Dionysius that the first period of the Middle Ages came into contact with the thought of Greek mysticism.⁶

75. Human monopsychism.—The *De Constitutione Mundi* of pseudo-Bede refutes the opinion of certain philosophers who believed in the world-soul, and held that this unique

¹ Endres, *Honorius Augustodunensis*, Kempten, 1906, pp. 241-5. Endres mentions long passages copied from the *De divisione naturæ*.

² E. Gilson, *Les sources gréco-arabes de l'augustinisme avicennisant*, in Arch. H.D.L.M.A., IV, 1929, pp. 93 and 142-9.

³ *Chartul. Univ. Paris*, I, 106-7.

⁴ Jacquin, *L'influence doctrin. de J. Scot au début du XIIIe s.*, pp. 105-6. The author thinks that the Pope may have had in mind some Cistercian abbeys; Isaac of Stella, Garnier of Rochefort, and even Alan of Lille belonged to the Cistercian Order.

⁵ Manitius, *op. cit.*, p. 329.

⁶ Leo IX condemned in 1050 the *Liber de Eucharistia* which was circulated under the name of Scotus.

soul confers racial unity and impersonal immortality upon mankind. "According to this doctrine, no one man is worse than another, since one and the same good and immaculate soul resides in all bodies; but we may say that it is more degenerate in one body than in another. . . . Again, according to this doctrine, no man dies, for he is not separated from the soul, although he may be separated from the four elements."¹ Is this a sort of pre-Averrhoism?² The name is not well chosen. We have here only a partial monism, a simple application to man of the doctrine of the unity of the cosmic soul and a logical commentary on the doctrines of Macrobius.

Possibly the treatise of pseudo-Bede refers to the teaching of Macarius Scotus. Ratramnus of Corbie, in his work *De quantitate animæ*, attributes to him a similar psychology and sets out to refute it.³

76. Bibliography.—Editions: Migne, P. L., Vol. 122 (Ed. Floss). Commentaries of Martianus Capella: cf. Hauréau, *Notices et extraits* . . . Vol. 20, 2e p., 1 et seq., Paris, 1862. Comment. on the *Opuscula sacra* of Boethius: E. K. Rand, *Johannes Scottus*, in *Quellen und Untersuchungen zur lateinischen Philologie des Mittelalters*, I, 2, Munich, 1906. Partial editions: cf. Geyer, F. Ueberwegs *Grundriss* . . . 11th edn., p. 166.—See also: A. Schmitt, *Zwei noch unbenutzte Handschriften des Johannes Scottus Erigena*, Bamberg, 1900 (shows that the Floss edition of the *De divisione naturæ* is insufficient); L. Traube, *Autographa des Johannes Scottus*, in *Sitz. M.*, 26, 1, 1912 (posthumous edition by Rand); E. K. Rand, *Supposed Autographa of John the Scot*, in *Univ. of California Publications in Classical Philology*, 1920, 135-40.

Studies: R. L. Poole, *Illustrations of the History of Mediæval Thought and Learning*, London, 1884, 2nd edn., 1920; Cl. Baeumker *Ein Traktat gegen die Amalricianer*, in *Jahrb. für Philos. und skept. Theol.*, 1893, p. 346; 1894, p. 222; M. Jacquin, *Le néoplatonisme*

¹ Sicut unus vultus in pluribus speculis et in uno speculo plures vultus apparent, ita una anima in pluribus rebus, et ubique omnes vires suas habet licet in diversis habeat exercitium pro habilitate corporum.—Migne, P.L., Vol. 90, c. 902. Nullus homo videtur esse pejor alio, quia una eademque anima bona et immaculata in sua natura est in omnibus corporibus, sed dicitur magis degenerare in uno quam in alio . . . secundum hanc quoque sententiam nullus homo moritur, ita quod patiat separationem animæ, quanquam separatur a quatuor elementis. . . . Præterea dicunt quidam eandem mundanam animam pariter cum humana anima esse in homine . . . sicque hominem duas animas asserunt habere—*ibid.*, col. 903.

² Renan, *Averroes et l'averroïsme*. Cf. Duhem, *La physique néo-platonicienne*, p. 45.

³ All that remains of this treatise is the letter to Odo of Beauvais. "Dicit namque quod omnis homo unus homo sit per substantiam. Quod si ita est, sequitur ut non sit nisi unus homo et una anima."—*Mon. Germ. Hist.*, Ep. 6, 151, n. 11.

de Jean Scot, in *Revue Sc. Phil. et Theol.*, 1907, pp. 674-85; *Le rationalisme de J. S.*, *ibid.*, 1908, pp. 747-8; *L'influence doctrinale de J. S. au début du XIIIe s.*, *ibid.*, 1910, pp. 104-6; F. Vernet, *Erigène*, in *Dict. de Théol. cath.*, Vol. 5, 1913, 401-34; A. Schneider, *Die Erkenntnislehre des Johannes Eriugena im Rahmen ihrer metaphysischen und anthropologischen Voraussetzungen*, 2 vols., Berlin, 1921-3; H. Dorries, *Zur Geschichte der Mystik. Eriugena und der Neuplatonismus*, Tübingen, 1925; H. Bett, *Johannes Scotus Eriugena, a Study in Mediæval Philosophy*, Cambridge, 1925; M. Techert, *Le plotinisme dans le système de Jean Scot Erigène*, in *Revue Néo-Scholast.*, 1927, pp. 28-68; A. Levasti, *Skotus Eriugena und der hl. Anselm*, in *Philos. Jahrb.*, 1929, pp. 506-9; C. Albanese, *Il pensiero di Giovanni Eriugena*, Messina, 1929; K. Eswein, *Die Wesenheit bei J. S. Eriugena*, in *Philos. Jahrb.*, 1930, pp. 189-206; G. Théry, *Scot Erigène, traducteur de Denys*, in *Bulletin du Cange*, 1931, pp. 185-278; *Scot Erigène, introducteur de Denys*, in *The New Scholasticism*, 1933, pp. 91-108; P. Kletler, *Johannes Eriugena, Eine Untersuchung über die Entstehung der mittelalterlichen Geistigkeit*, Leipzig, 1931; W. Seul, *Die Gotteserkenntnis bei Johannes Skotus Eriugena unter Berücksichtigung ihrer neuplatonischen und augustinischen Elemente*, Bonn, 1932; G. C. Capelle, *Amaury de Bène, Etude sur son panthéisme formel*, Paris, 1932; M. Cappuyns, *Jean Scot Erigène, sa vie, son œuvre, sa pensée*, Louvain-Paris, 1933 (excellent bibliography, pp. xi-xvii).—A. Wilmart, *La lettre philosophique d'Almanne et son contexte littéraire*, in *Arch. H.D.L.M.A.*, 1928, pp. 285-321 (publishes the text).

6.—The Problem of Universals

77. Its place in Philosophy.—The question of the universals arises in all philosophies. It is concerned with the correspondence which exists between our intellectual concepts, which are abstract and general, and extramental reality. Introspection shows that we have two kinds of knowledge of objects. In addition to *sensation*, which represents the concrete and individual aspect of material objects (*this* oak tree, *this* gnarled trunk, and so on), we have another kind of knowledge, which we term *intellectual*, and which presents to us the same reality but without any note of individuality: reality is in this kind of knowledge *abstract* or detached from its connection with the individual. This kind of knowledge tells us what the thing is *as such*—oak tree *as such*, trunk *as such*, roughness *as such*, and so on. Because this intellectual concept is abstract, i.e., considered apart from the individual characteristics which accompany it in its realised form in nature, it is capable of being *universalized*, that is to say,

applied to a quite indefinite number of existing or possible objects, to all oak trees for instance, or to all rough objects.

The question then arises: Are these true conceptions? Seeing that the characteristics of the object as intellectually *conceived* are other than those of the object *as existing* outside us, do these concepts give us any information about the extramental world, and if so what kind of information?

Four answers are possible.

(i) *Exaggerated realism* affirms that there is an adequate correspondence between extramental reality and the real as conceived, for it attributes to the former the selfsame characteristics of abstraction and generality which are found in the latter. *The oak tree, the roughness exist as such*, independently of the particular oak trees and rough objects which are perceived by our senses. Exaggerated realism, advocated by Plato and ascribed to him by the Middle Ages, answers the difficulty by this naïve reply.

But does not this do violence to common sense? Is not every existing thing an individual, and are not individuals independent of each other in their existence?

If we accept these last statements, which constitute the thesis held by Aristotle and by *all the opponents of exaggerated realism*, there remains the difficulty: how then can an abstract concept be in conformity with an extramental world consisting only of individual things?

(ii) No doubt, reply the *Conceptualists*, with William of Occam and Kant, the individual is the only existing substance: doubtless also we represent reality by means of abstract concepts, distinct in kind from sensation, and of which the content can be universalized; certainly again in language there correspond to these notions *names* which are general in form; but this way of representing things has no foundation in the things themselves, and we have nothing to justify us saying that, *apart from our thought*, individuals *possess* distributively or separately the essence which we conceive in thought: the universals have no objectivity other than that fabricated by the mind; an objectivity, not a real one.

(iii) *Moderate realism*, or *Aristotelian realism*, also called *Thomistic realism*, accepts both the ideal and the real value of the concept.

It accepts all the data of the conceptualists : the individuality of every reality, the general form of names, the abstract character of thought, the ideal value of the series of concepts which go to make up our scientific construction of the real : it accepts all these, but completes them. For instead of confining the mind within itself, moderate realism holds that *these abstract views of things are derived from individual things*. This kind of representation is doubtless *inadequate*, since it is obtained by leaving out of consideration the particular way in which the real which is conceived exists outside us, but it is *true*, inasmuch as there is nothing in this abstract type which is not entirely verified in the individual thing. As for the universality of the concept, this is an ulterior characteristic which presupposes abstraction and is added to it.

(iv) There remains yet another possible solution : the opposite of that of Platonist realism ; everything real in the external world is individual, also every representation of this real is singular too. Between sensation and thought there is no distinction in kind.

78. The scholastic solutions of the problem.—The fourth solution mentioned above never existed in mediæval scholasticism, for it would have upset a fundamental theory : the distinction *in kind* between sensation and thought. It finds a place only in sensualist or positivist systems like the Modern *Nominalism* of Taine, and we are not concerned with it in this History.

The three other solutions did appear in scholasticism. All three presuppose from psychology the suprasensible nature of abstract knowledge, and also take as their metaphysical postulate the principle that there does exist a reality which is independent of our minds and to which our minds must conform. Here is the historic order in which these solutions appeared.

(i) Exaggerated realism flourished from the ninth to the twelfth century.

(ii) Moderate realism reached its perfect form towards the middle of the twelfth century.

(iii) Numerous solutions combating exaggerated realism constituted many steps towards moderate realism.

(iv) Conceptualism was formulated in the fourteenth century.

79. How the question came to present itself at the beginning of the Middle Ages.—Although it would not be possible artificially to reduce the history of scholasticism to a monotonous quarrel about the problem of universals (13), nevertheless this problem was one of the first to arise, and it absorbed a great deal of thought.

To understand its significance in the beginning of the Middle Ages, and how it was set forth and solved from the ninth to the eleventh centuries, it must be borne in mind that it did not arise spontaneously, but was suggested by certain texts of Porphyry and Boethius, very simple in appearance but obscure, and which many circumstances combined to make the subject of the first speculations.

(i) Porphyry in his *Isagoge* or Introduction to Aristotle's Categories, considers the problem only in relation to the generic and specific notions which we conceive of a reality taken as the subject of a judgment, and he sets out the problem in three stages: (a) Do these genera and species exist really in nature, or are they purely mental constructions? (b) (If they are realities) are they material or immaterial? (c) Do they exist apart from sensible things or are they realized in these?¹ The first question alone attracted attention, inasmuch as the other two have no meaning unless we reject the purely subjective character of universals. Now this first question was expressed as follows: are genera and species things in themselves, self-sufficing for existence, *subsistentia*, substances, or are they simple (*nuda*) products of the mind, *sive subsistant, sive in nudis intellectibus posita sint*? From the point of view of terminology, the question consists of an alternative: does the reality in which our universal notions correspond exist in the generic or specific state or not? The logical point of view (the function of the predicate in a judgment) or the psychological (abstractive character of thought) are not dealt with, and thus the formula is really very incomplete. Moreover, after enunciating the threefold problem, Porphyry refused to

¹ "Mox de generibus et speciebus illud quidem sive subsistant sive in nudis intellectibus posita sint, sive subsistentia corporalia sint an incorporalia, et utrum separata, a sensibilibus an in sensibilibus posita et circa hæc consistentia, dicere recusabo."

answer it : *dicere recusabo*, and the scholastics never knew that in other works Porphyry solved the question in a Platonist sense.

(ii) Boethius, who wrote two commentaries on the *Isagoge*, sets out the problem in the same way as Porphyry. He also asks the question in connection with genera and species, i.e., the universal predicates, which are *necessarily connected* with a subject inasmuch as they express its essence, or constitution. The objectivity of other types of union (*proprium*, *accidens commune*) apparently do not interest him. Moreover, in all his examples the subject is a *substantial* being, for instance, man. In other words, he studies the genus and species of the category of *substance*, the first in position and in importance in the list of the ten categories. He does not raise the question in connection with the other nine categories of objects thought of (quality, quantity, activity, etc.), though one might ask of these also how they belong to a subject.

What solution does Boethius offer ? In his second commentary, which is the more important of the two, he holds that genera and species are at one and the same time *subsistentia* and *intellecta* (first question), the resemblance between things being the foundation (*subjectum*) both for their individuality in nature and for their universality in thought. Genera and species are incorporeal, not indeed by nature, but by abstraction (second question) ; they exist both in sensible things and apart from them (third question).¹ Although we thus find in these statements by Boethius the foundation of the Aristotelian solution of the problem (55), they were not sufficiently clear for early thinkers : Boethius was not understood.²

We may add that Boethius, who was *the* professor of logic for the first generations of the Middle Ages, insists on the

¹ Sunt igitur hujusmodi res in corporalibus atque in sensibilibus rebus. Intelliguntur autem præter sensibilia ut eorum natura perspicui et proprietates valeat comprehendendi. Quo circa cum et genera et species cogitantur, tunc ex singulis in quibus sunt eorum similitudo colligitur, ut ex singulis hominibus inter se dissimilibus humanitatis similitudo, quæ similitudo cogitata animo veraciterque perspecta fit species . . . Cogitantur vero universalis, nihilque aliud species esse putanda est nisi cogitatio collecta ex individuorum dissimilium numero substantiali similitudine.—Migne, *Patrol. Latina*, Vol. 64, col. 84 and 85.

² In the twelfth century Godfrey of St. Victor addresses Boethius in these mocking words : " Assidet Boethius stupens de hac lite—Audies quid hic et hic afferat perite—Et quid cui faveat non discernit rite—Nec præsumit solvere litem definite " (quoted by Loewe, *Kampf zwischen Realismus u. Nominalismus im Mittelalter*, p. 30.).

verbal side of logic. When explaining the title of the categories, which he also calls the *decem genera entium*, he writes : *prædicamentorum tractatus, non de rebus sed de vocibus est*.¹ We shall see later on how this opinion helped to formulate the *sententia vocum* and the *secta nominalis*. Not indeed that Boethius went astray concerning the relation existing between these names general in form (*voces*) and the things which they signify (*res*) : by studying the former, we attain to a knowledge of the latter (*assumere*). But a purely logical consideration of the matter concerns itself only with the meaning of the verbal forms.²

These then are the historic texts with which the first scholastics were confronted. They considered themselves bound not only by Porphyry's alternative, but also by the very terms in which this was enunciated. Hence, like Porphyry and Boethius, they limited their enquiry to subject to a threefold restriction :

(1) Although the question arises in connection with *all* abstract concepts, they discuss it only in connection with generic and specific concepts (cf. (3)) ;

(2) And, indeed, only the generic and specific concepts of *substance* : man, animal, Socrates. They do not concern themselves with qualities, actions, etc., which are equally capable of being known by means of generic and specific notions. Again, they do not concern themselves with the *proprium* or of the *accidens commune* which can be predicated of substance (and indeed of any other subject), and which equally with generic and specific predicates, possess that abstract form for which we are seeking the extramental equivalent.

Of the five predicables of Porphyry, only two are studied : of the ten categories of reality capable of becoming predicates or subjects, only one is dealt with, that of substance. Lastly :

(3) The controversy is confined to the *logical* and *metaphysical* aspects : on the one hand, the genera and species are regarded as predicates of substance in a judgment ; on the other hand, they discuss whether the thought-content exists as such or does not exist, outside the mind. The *psychological*

¹ *In Categorias Aristotelis*, I, P.L., Vol. 64, col. 162, A.-D.

² Quoniam res semper cum propria significatione conjunctæ sunt . . . quare recte de vocabulis disputans proprietatem significantium vocum de his quæ significabantur, id est de rebus assumpsit. *Ibid.*, col. B.

genesis of abstract ideas and their critical value does not enter into consideration.

Hence there are two possible replies in terms of the Porphyrian formula: genera and species either exist as such, that is to say, humanity, life, rationality, etc., are subsistent realities (*subsistentia*), or else they are ultimately just mental facts (*nuda intellecta*). Or more simply still, either they are *things*, or they are not.

80. Exaggerated realism.—Those who held the affirmative were the exaggerated realists, *reales*. We may say that they solved the question *in re*. Exaggerated realism was the first solution adopted in point of time: the chronicler Heriman (eleventh century) gave the name of *antiqui doctores*¹ to those who taught the existence *in re*; Abelard again spoke of it as an *antiqua doctrina*,² and up to the end of the twelfth century, its adversaries were known as *moderni*.

This solution owed its credit above all to its simplicity. It all held together without any complication, inasmuch as its fundamental assertion was that there is an adequate correspondence between extramental reality and reality as conceived in thought. Moreover, it seemed to furnish a very simple explanation of the doctrine of the transmission of original sin.

Each genus or species thought of represents a genus or species existing in reality (*subsistentia*), in which individuals share. But in opposition to Plato who separated these essences from the material world, the realists of the early Middle Ages held that they were immanent in particular things. Humanity exists as such, but it exists in the collection of men.

We need not dwell upon an Athenian sage, ATHENIENSIS SOPHISTA, whom we meet at the court of Charlemagne, and who attributes reality to death because it has to receive the prize of life. Nor upon FREDEGIS, Alcuin's successor at Tours, who in a work *De nihilo et tenebris* attributes reality to darkness, basing himself upon the text of Scripture which says that Egypt was covered with a darkness so thick that it could be felt by the hand. According to Fredegis, to every

¹ *Liber de restauratione monasterii S. Martini Tornacensis*, ed. Waitz (Monum. Germ. historica, SS., t. XIV, p. 275), see the text later on.

² Similarly we read in an anonymous manuscript of the twelfth century published by Hauréau (*Not. et extr. ms. lat. Bibl. nation.*: Vol. XXXI, 2e p., p. 201): "Est autem antiqua sententia et quasi antiquis erroribus inveterata."

name corresponds a thing, and to negative vocables corresponds "nothing." This "nothing" is an indeterminate matter from which has been made all things save God, even the human soul. In a letter to Agobard he develops the same ideas, but Agobard wrote a reply in which he defended the thesis that souls are created by God.¹

At the end of the ninth century, realism enters upon a philosophic phase with REMIGIUS of AUXERRE (about 841-908), who succeeded his master Eric in the chair of the Abbey of Auxerre, but abandoned the latter's teaching. Later on Remi taught at Rome (862) and at Paris, where he was the first to introduce dialects. He was a philologist and a humanist; we possess a commentary by him on the *Ars minor* of Donatus, widely used until the twelfth century, and also commentaries on Priscian, several Latin poets, and on Martianus Capella. In the last-named work Remi makes great use of a similar work by John Scotus Erigena. Rand has discovered commentaries by Remigius on the *opuscula sacra*, and Stewart has found commentaries on the *De Consolatione Philosophiæ* of Boethius. According to Remigius, the reality of individual things consists in their participation (*partitio substantialis*) in a higher reality, namely, the species (*homo est multorum hominum substantialis unitas*), and the species together form the numerical unity of the genus. Accidental reality also is found in a universal state, which is shared in by particular beings: eloquence existed before Cicero, and he received a modality of it.²

81. Gerbert.—The tenth century began with a period of anarchy. The Normans burnt down the monasteries, and the schools passed through a fatal crisis. Learning could not attain once more its normal state until the Cluniac reform and the erection of new abbeys. Gerbert was a shining light in this tenth century darkness. He was one of those who helped to bring about the revival fostered by the Capets, and was the first of a long line of famous French teachers.

Born towards the middle of the century, Gerbert was brought up in the monastery of Aurillac which Odo of Cluny had reformed, and he spent three years in study with the Arabs in Spain. At Rheims and at Paris, where he taught in turn,

¹ *Liber contra objectiones Fredegisi Abbatis.*

² Hauréau, *Not. et extr.*, XX, ii, 20.

he acquired a European reputation, which led to his being invited to the court of the Ottos. He made several stays there, and exerted a great influence, especially on the mind of Otto III, who wrote him flattering letters (p. 58). Later on Gerbert became Abbot of Bobbio (982), Archbishop of Rheims, Ravenna, and finally Pope under the name of Sylvester II (died 1003). One of his contemporaries called him the "philosopher-Pope."

Gerbert commented on more Aristotelian works than any of his contemporaries, and a century later St. Auselm and Roscelin knew no other works of the Stagirite. He was acquainted with the *Trivium* and the *Quadrivium*, he wrote on geometry and arithmetic, and handed on the elements of Arab science. He was at the same time a scholar, a humanist, a writer, an orator, and a savant. His *Letters* show him to have been a superior sort of man, and the monk Richer, a pupil of Gerbert, professes in his *Historiæ* a very legitimate admiration for him. Of Gerbert's philosophical teaching we possess only the account given us by Richer of a dialectical encounter with Otric at Ravenna in the presence of Otto I (970); an opusculum *De rationali et ratione uti*, and another of less importance, *De corpore et sanguine Domini*. Should Gerbert be placed among the extreme realists (Hauréau)? Certain texts are explicit; for instance he takes from J. Scotus Erigena the following declarations and makes them his own: "*Non enim ars illa, quæ dividit genera in species et species in genera resolvit, ab humanis machinationibus est facta: sed in natura rerum ab auctore omnium artium . . . est usitata.*"¹ But we must bear in mind that Gerbert was above all a logician; metaphysics only comes into his writings here and there (we do find the distinction between act and potency), and he does not give a clear and decisive answer to the questions of Porphyry. As a moralist, Gerbert had a liking for certain Stoic doctrines. His moral philosophy is fragmentary. He defends the political subordination of all Christians to the Roman Church.

Gerbert's lectures were frequented by the realist FULBERT, who founded the school of Chartres, Bishops GIRARD and LENTHERIC, the historian Richer, and others, all well known men of action in the eleventh century.

¹ *De corp. et sanguine Domini*, Migne, *Patrol. Latina*, 139, 189, B.

82. Odo of Tournai (or of Cambrai) flourished at the Cathedral School of Tournai during the second half of the eleventh century, and gave a new impetus to realism. For five years (previous to 1092) he was a teacher, and had many pupils. He then founded in the same town the Abbey of St. Martin, became Bishop of Cambrai, and died at the Monastery at Anchin (1113). The chronicler Heriman, his disciple, who has left us a charming description of the professorial career of Odo,¹ narrates, that, following the example of Boethius and the ancient doctors, he taught dialectics from the realist standpoint, *in re*, and did not imitate certain moderns who treat it verbally, *in voce*, "proud spirits with excessive pretensions, having no other object but to be looked upon as wise men, and to this end inventing new interpretations of Porphyry and Aristotle."² In this connection he engaged in controversy with Raimbert of Lille, an upholder of these novelties.

In his principal work, *De peccato originali*,³ Odo defends the classic thesis of realism and applies it in an interesting way to the following Catholic doctrines :

(i) *The transmission of original sin.* The human race forms only one specific reality scattered amongst its many representatives at any given moment of history. When Adam and Eve sinned, the entire substance in all its ramifications then existing was infected, and subsequent generations, living an anticipated life in that vitiated substance, have all suffered from the consequences.⁴ This is obviously a kind of human monopsychism.

(ii) *The continual creation of souls* when human beings are born. Since the substance of a new-born child is simply that of the species, in what sense is this original substance re-born ? Odo replies : That which God produces when a child is born is not a substance, but a new *property* of one *unique substance already existing*. At the surface, as it were, of the permanent substratum of humanity appear variable individual properties : men differ from each other only by accidents. From this it is

¹ See De Wulf, *Histoire de la Philosophie en Belgique*, Louvain, 1910, pp. 24-32.

² Dialecticam non juxta quosdam modernos in voce, sed more Boetii antiquorumque doctorum in re discipulis legebat.—Heriman, *op. cit.*, p. 275.

³ Heriman also mentions the following works of Odo : *The Sophist*, *Liber Complexionum*, *De re et ente*.

⁴ *De peccato originali*, Lib. II, P.L., Vol. 160, col. 1079.

easy to understand that Odo appreciates the arguments of the Traducianists.

83. The first adversaries of exaggerated realism.—The realists soon encountered numerous opponents. All agree in defending in the name of Aristotle, Boethius, and common sense this thesis: "Universals are not things realised *in the universal state* in nature, for the individual alone exists." They are not *subsistentia*, but *nuda intellecta*. We shall see that this phrase designates successive solutions which become more and more precise.

A commentary by a certain JEPa belonging to the end of the ninth or the beginning of the tenth century, is merely a collection of texts taken chiefly from Boethius and Macrobius. The author explains them in glosses without manifesting his own views, and he reproduces without any additions the logical teaching of Boethius that the universal applies to an individual subject.¹

ERIC OF AUXERRE (841-876) followed the lectures of Servatus Lupus at Ferrières, heard Elias the Irishman, who introduced him to the philosophy of John Scotus, and himself taught at Auxerre. Hauréau attributes to him commentaries on the *Interpretation*, the *Dialectics* and the *Book of the Ten Categories* of pseudo-Augustine, the *Isagoge*, the Latin text of Apulæus's *Syllogism*, and on various works of Boethius.² In his commentaries anti-realist tendencies are manifest. The *species* does not exist as such, but is merely a way in which the mind groups (*coarctare*) individuals; the same is true of genera, in which we gather together species or inferior genera under one name (*in unum coacta nomen*).³ Eric stresses the thesis that only individual substances exist: *black* and *white* cannot exist except in a subject modified by them.

¹ Re-edited by C. Baeumker and B. S. von Waltershausen, *Frühmittelalterliche Glossen des angebl. Jepa zur Isagoge des Porphyrius*, Beiträge, XXIV, 1, Munster, 1924. M. Melandre, *Iepa ou Scot Erigène* (Arch. H.D.L.M.A., Vol. VI, 1931, p. 277) suggests that these are the same person, but the formulæ of Boethius cannot easily be reconciled with the exaggerated realism of John Scotus.

² *Hist. de la philos. scol.*, I, 193. According to Baeumker, only a portion of the Commentaries on the *Categories* of pseudo-Augustine should be attributed to Eric. In the opinion of Clerval (*op. cit.*, p. 105), these Commentaries were written by a disciple of Rhaban Maur. Cf. Rand, *Joh. Scotus*, p. 83. Manitius does not think it likely that Eric was the author of the Commentaries on Boethius, and he attributes the Commentary on Martianus Capella to the Irishman, Dunchad (*op. cit.*, 502).

³ Texts in Hauréau, *op. cit.*, I, p. 194.

An anonymous commentary on Martianus Capella, written by a contemporary of Eric, together with another commentary of the same period on the *Categories* of pseudo-Augustine¹ must be included amongst the anti-realist productions of this time.²

84. Roscelin and the *Sententia Vocum*.—In the eleventh century there was an interesting group of anti-realists or opponents of exaggerated realism: they maintained that genera and species are *voces*, or words, and they severely criticise those who look upon them as *res*. This is the *sententia vocum*, or *ars sophistica vocalis*. Roscelin is thought to have originated it. His contemporary, Otto of Freising, says of him: "Qui primus nostris temporibus sententiam vocum instituit."³ On the other hand, an anonymous chronicle of the eleventh century⁴ gives him a forerunner in a certain John.⁵

Roscelin was born at Compiègne about 1050. He taught at Compiègne, Loches, and Besançon, and was in communication with Lanfranc, St. Anselm, and Yves of Chartres. He was accused of Tritheism at a Council of Soissons (1092), where under the threat of excommunication he denied the doctrines imputed to him. Later on, however, he returned to them. We find him successively in England, Rome and Tours, where he had Abelard for a pupil. We lose sight of him about 1120.

A letter addressed to Abelard is the only writing of Roscelin we possess,⁶ and we are obliged to judge of his teaching from

¹ Known as Barach's anonymous author, after the writer who first made him known.—*Ibid.*, p. 23, note.

² According to Reiners, *Der Nominalismus in der Fruhscholastik*, pp. 8-9, the Commentaries of Eric and his anonymous contemporary were not concerned with the question of Universals.

³ *Gesta Frederici Imperat.*, I, 47, in *Monum. German.*, SS. XX, 376.

⁴ *Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France*, ed. Dom, Bouquet, XII, Paris, 1871, p. 3.

⁵ This philosopher, identified by some with John Scotus Erigena (see *Revue Thomiste*, July, 1897, article by Père Mandonnet) and by others with John the Deaf or John the Doctor, of Chartres, a pupil of Fulbert (Clerval, *op. cit.*, pp. 122 et seq.), is a person of whom little is so far known. The *Liber miraculorum Sanctæ Fidis*, compiled about the beginning of the eleventh century by Bernard of Angers, mentions a certain Johannes Scottigena, a contemporary of the author, and whom he very carefully distinguishes from J. Scotus Enigena. Possibly he is the same as the unknown John of the anonymous chronicle.—A. Thomas, *Nos Maîtres, Un Jean Scot inconnu* (*Revue internat. enseignement*, 1903, p. 193).

⁶ Hauréau suggests Roscelin as the author of a text which he has discovered, *Sententia de universalibus sec. mag. R.* (*Notices et extr. qq. man. lat.*, Paris, 1892, V. 224), but this is only a conjecture. Moreover, this document attributes at least an ideal value to universals, and therefore admits the existence of universal concepts. Cf. V, 326.

the writings of St. Anselm, Abelard, an anonymous epigrammist, John of Salisbury,¹ and from the account of the *De generibus et speciebus* of Abelard.

One thing is certain : Roscelin figures in them as above all an opponent of realism : in nature the individual alone exists,² genera are not *res* (the *subsistentia* of Porphyry). What, then, are they ? At least they are words in universal form (*voces*), vocal emissions (*flatus vocis*) composed of letters and syllables. The question of universals is thus reduced to a somewhat childish point in elementary phonetics ; it is a question of the *universale in voce* as opposed to the *universale in re* and the *universale in intellectu* with which Roscelin does not concern himself.

But did Roscelin adopt a more advanced position in the controversy ? Was he a sensualist,³ as has so often been said, that is, did he deny to the understanding the power of forming abstract ideas endowed with universality, or again did he exclude all relation between the *voces*, *flatus vocis*, and the universal concept ? There is nothing to justify this interpretation of Roscelin's *sententia vocum*. Certainly, following Boethius and under his influence, Roscelin gives a classification of words (*voces*) rather than of things (*res*). But we do not see what foundation there is for the statement that, as opposed to Boethius, he does not grant to universal terms a relation of correspondence (*assumere*) with things. That is a question with which he does not deal.

Roscelin's solution is a weak one, but it is a step in the right direction ; the two theses which it implies, namely, the existence of the individual and the generalized form of the elements of language, are the first manifestations of the moderate realism of the twelfth century.

The *nuda intellecta* are words of general form, or *voces*—such is the opinion of Roscelin. The interpretation based on this idea was later on described as that of the *nomina*, and thus the word *nominales* came to be used for the first time.

¹ *Polycraticus*, VII, 12. Fuerunt et qui voces ipsas genera dicerent et species ; sed eorum jam explosa sententia est, et facile cum auctore suo evanuit. (Ed. Webb, Vol. II, p. 142.) Cf. *Metalogicus*, II, 17.

² Nam cum habeat eorum sententia nihil esse præter individua.—*De generibus et speciebus*, edit. Cousin, *Ouvrages inédits d'Abélard*, p. 524. Anselm speaks in the same way, see p. 125.

³ Ueberweg-Baumgartner, *Grundriss*, 10th edn., 1914, p. 258. Baumgartner in his account follows the thesis of Reiners.

We shall explain later on in what sense one may speak of Roscelin's "Nominalism" (§ 12).

Roscelin was also criticised by St. Anselm and Abelard in connection with a less clear notion which he set forth of the whole and of a composite substance. According to St. Anselm, he held that colour, for instance, does not exist independently of the horse which serves as a support for it, and that the wisdom of the soul has no being outside the mind which is wise.¹ He did not admit the real existence of parts in a whole such as a house or a man. The word alone would possess these parts: *sicut solis vocibus species, ita et partes ascribebat.*² May not these somewhat obscure texts be affirmations in another form of the unique reality of individual substances?

Roscelin owes his fame to the theological tritheism which he advocated, rather than to his teaching on universals: the three divine persons are three independent beings, after the manner of three angels; if usage permitted, we could say that there are three Gods. In order to save the dogma, Roscelin adds that the three divine persons have only one will, and one and the same power.³ This marked tritheism,⁴ which St. Anselm and Abelard combined in refuting even after the retractations of its author, seems to be a dubious application of his anti-realism: in the mind of Roscelin, a divine person is an individual and independent substance.

85. Verbal logic and sophistry.—John of Salisbury tells us that the *sententia vocum* did not long survive Roscelin.⁵ Amongst its adherents was his contemporary Raimbert of Lille (82). That which the monk Heriman learnt from the latter agreed with the teaching of the master of Compiègne: Universal substances are merely vocal breathings, which means,

¹ *De fine Trinit.*, 2.

² *Liber divisionum*, in Cousin, *Ouvr. inéd. d'Abelard*, p. 471. "Ita divinam paginam . . . pervertit, ut eo loco, quo Dominus partem piscis assi comedisset, partem hujus vocis, quæ est piscis assi, non partem re intelligere cogatur."—Cousin, *P. Abaelardi opera*, II, p. 151.

³ "Audio . . . quod Roscelinus clericus dicit in Deo tres personas esse tres res ab invicem separatas, sicut sunt tres angeli, ita tamen ut una sit voluntas et potestas, aut Patrem et Spiritum Sanctum esse incarnatum; et tres deos vere posse dici si usus admitteret."—Letter of St. Anselm to Fulk.

⁴ See the other side, Picavet, *op. cit.* (86), p. 25.

⁵ Alius ergo consistit in vocibus, licet hæc opinio cum Roscelin suo fere omnino jam evanuerit.—*Metal.*, II, 17, *P.L.*, Vol. 199, p. 874, c. Cf. *Politicus*, VII, 12, quoted on p. 110 n. Robert of Paris and Arnulphus of Laon are also mentioned as holding this view.

according to Heriman, "eos de sapientium numero merito esse exsufflandos." Here he is just paraphrasing Anselm, whose words contain the same raillery: "A spiritualium quæstionum disputatione sunt exsufflandi."¹ He goes on to say that in order to explain the long-winded verbiage (*ventosam loquacitatem*) of Raimbert of Lille, someone simply breathed into his hand (*manuque ori admota exsufflans*). This kind of reasoning approaches the sophism, and justifies the appellation *ars sophistica vocalis*.

These verbal sophisms had been in use from the very beginning of the Middle Ages. Fridugisus, according to his rival Agobard of Lille, excelled in extracting unexpected consequences from his syllogisms, and Candidus, who in 822 succeeded Rhaban Maur at Fulda and became a Master at the Court of Charlemagne, made use of syllogistic extravagances in his *Dicta* (63). These dialectical travesties were multiplied in the eleventh century, and the *sententia vocum* was bound to favour them. Certain lay professors coming from Italy and passing from one school to another after the manner of the time, implanted these tendencies in the centres of studies in the West. They were known as *philosophi*, *dialectici*, *sophistæ*, *peripatetici*; and the genuine remains of their works shows that they well deserved the severe epithets (*scholaris infantie nœniæ*) applied to them by Peter Damian. Anselm of Besate (*Anselmus Peripateticus* of Parma, first half of eleventh century) personifies the type, and his *Rhetorimachia*, in which he mocks at the principle of contradiction, is a model of sophistry. When these dialecticians turned their attentions to theology and proclaimed the absolute rights of their methods, they ended by falling into heresies, and it is easy to understand that they met with opposition from the theologians.

86. Bibliography.—On the question of universals: J. H. Loewe, *Der Kampf zwischen Realismus und Nominalismus im Mittelalter, sein Ursprung und sein Verlauf*, Prague, 1876 (Abhandl. der kön. böhm. Gesellschaft der Wiss., 6th series, Vol. 8—a good work); M. de Wulf, *Le problème des universaux dans son évolution historique du IXe au XIIIe s.*, in *Archiv für Gesch. der Philos.*, 1896, pp. 427 *et seq.*; B. Hauréau, *Notices et extraits . . .* (in octavo), Vol. V, pp. 290-338; J. Reiners, *Der aristotelische Realismus in*

¹ *Op. cit.*, Migne, *P.L.*, p. 265.

der Frühscholastik, Bonn, 1907; *Der Nominalismus in der Frühscholastik* (Beiträge, VIII, 5), Munster (W.), 1910. Cf. also 20, V (Logic and epistemology) and 32.

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Studies: F. Picavet, *Gerbert ou le pape philosophe*, Paris, 1897; H. Brémond, *Gerbert*, Paris, 1906; F. Eichenbrun, *Gerbert (Silvester II) als Persönlichkeit*, Leipzig, 1928 (Beitr. zur Kulturgesch. des Mittel. und der Renais., 35, debateable); F. Delzangles, *Gerbert*, Aurillac, 1932.

Odo of Tournai (or Cambrai).—Editions: Migne, *P. L.*, Vol. 160, pp. 1071-1102.—*Histoire littér. de la France*, Vol. IX, pp. 583 and 606.

Roscelin.—Editions: *Lettre à Abelard*, in J. Reiners, *Der Nominalismus* . . . (above), 63-80; F. Picavet, *Roscelin philosophe et theologien, d'après la legende et d'après l'histoire*, 2nd edn., Paris, 1911. (Cf. Appendice, pp. 112-43.)

Studies: F. Picavet, see above. B. Adlhoch, *Roscelin und S. Anselm*, in *Phil. Jahrb.*, 1907, pp. 442-56; E. Buonaiuti, *Un filosofo della contingenza nel secolo XI., Roscelino*, in *Rivista storico-critica delle sc. teolog.*, 1908, pp. 195-212.

§ 7.—*Theologians, canonists and jurists (from the ninth to the eleventh century)*

87. Theological Controversies.—From the ninth to the eleventh centuries there was a series of theological controversies which involved many philosophical problems.

1. The Controversy on Predestination and Freedom was stated by a monk of Orbais, Gottschalk, who died in 866-9. He followed St. Augustine in hesitating as to how to harmonize human freedom with divine grace. From the absolute predestination of good and bad he infers that man is God's plaything and that there is neither freedom nor responsibility. Dom Morin has recently discovered a series of *Quaestiones grammaticales* of Gottschalk, which show that he also occupied a position among the grammarians of the Carlovingian epoch.

Gottschalk's teaching caused a considerable sensation. Rhaban Maur and especially Hincmar of Rheims (806-82), and to a less degree the deacon Florus of Lyons defended human freedom. Ratramnus of Corbie, the master of Gottschalk, and Servatus Lupus took his side; very soon opponents and defenders of Gottschalk combined against John Scotus Erigena, who had intervened in the debate and advanced an equally bold theory. Gottschalk's doctrine was condemned in the synods of Mainz (848) and Quiercy (849).

Of Ratramnus we possess an opusculum *De anima*,¹ dedicated apparently to Charles the Bald, and in which he discusses the question "sitne anima circumscripta sive localis." His conclusion; the *incorporalitas* and *inlocalitas* of the soul, is supported by patristic texts and established by original arguments. In another opusculum, *De quantitate animæ*, written against a monk of Beauvais, he defends pluralism in the human species (*dicit namque quod omnis homo unus homo sit per substantiam*).²

2. Ratramnus of Corbie also took a prominent part in the controversy on Transubstantiation. His *De corpore et sanguine Domini* opposes the realist and traditional interpretation of Paschasius Radbertus of Corbie, the author of a similarly named work, and prepared the way for Berengarius.

¹ Published by D. Wilmart, *loc. cit.* (92).

² *Monum. Germ. histor., Epist. ævi carol.*, IV, 153.

Berengarius of Tours (about 1000-1088) was a disciple of the school of Chartres, and his ideas on universals seem to belong to those of the anti-realists. He took as his motto: *rationibus omnia velle comprehendere*. Reasoning is of greater weight than sacred authorities: *relictis sacris auctoritatibus ad dialecticam confugium facis*.¹ He held that the accidental qualities of the eucharistic bread and wine (colour, figure, taste, etc.) cannot remain without the underlying support which upholds them and which Aristotle calls substance. Hence the Gospels cannot have meant to teach a *real transubstantiation*, but the body and blood of Christ are present in the sacramental species in a mysterious manner. Berengarius was a restless and fiery spirit, and caused trouble in the schools. Lanfranc (about 1010-1089) attacked him, and Adelman of Liège (1048), Durandus of Troarn, Hugh of Breteuil and other former fellow students of Berengarius at Chartres opposed his theories.

A treatise composed by another Berengarius and addressed to Gregory VII undertakes to refute them.² Four synods condemned them in the course of the eleventh century.

88. Opposers of dialectics.—The position taken up in the matter of the doctrine of the Trinity had led Roscelin into a veritable tritheism. Again, the verbalism advocated and practised by the professional *dialectici* (84) favoured the introduction into theology of methods of discussion worthy of sophists. We know through Otloh of St. Emmeran and others that a group of dialecticians, exaggerating still more the verbalistic tendencies of Anselm of Besate, despised all authority in the exposition of dogma.

These excesses brought about a reaction, and the eleventh century witnessed the rise of a group of theologians who in varying degrees turned against dialectics and philosophy, which in their view had been guilty of so great faults. They desired no theological method other than the literal interpretation of the Scriptures. This opposing movement was connected with an attempt at monastic reform centring in

¹ According to Lanfranc, *De corp. et sang. Domini*, cap. 7 and 17.

² Dom Morin, *Béranger contre Bérenger*, loc. cit. (92). The author proposes to identify this Berengarius with a monk of St. Evroul. Cf. A. J. Macdonald, *Berengariana*, in *Journal of Theol. Studies*, 1932, pp. 180-6.

Benedictine abbeys in France and Germany. The most prominent personalities in this group belong to the eleventh century: in Hungary Gerard of Czanad; in Italy Peter Damiani; in Germany Manegold of Lautenbach and Otloh of St. Emmeram.

The hermit monk Gerard, who studied the liberal arts in Italy, his native country, and also in France, and afterwards became bishop of Czanad (died 1046), does not condemn either dialectics or the profane sciences, but he desires that these shall adopt a submissive attitude towards theology. He is the author of a *Deliberatio Gerardi Moresenæ ecclesiæ episcopi super hymnum trium puerorum*.

Peter Damiani, a hermit monk, was born at Ravenna in 1007, became Bishop of Ostia in 1057, and died in 1072. He despised terrestrial knowledge. The liberal arts are useless; dialectics is a *superfluum*. Damiani protests against the religious who make light of St. Benedict's rule and take pleasure in the rules of Donatus (*parvipendentes siquidem regulam Benedicti, regulis gaudent vacare Donati*).¹ All the same, he himself makes use of reasoning in his *De Divina Omnipotentia*, dedicated to Didier of Monte Cassino, in which he shows that the rules of human knowledge cannot be applied to God. Commenting on the words of the psalmist *Omnia quæcumque voluit fecit*, Damian claims an absolute omnipotence for God. The Almighty has not subjected nature to invariable laws; and if He wished He could bring about that that which happened in the past did not happen. Certainly such an assertion seems to violate the principle of contradiction; but this principle is valid only for our poor human reasoning (*ordo disserendi*) and does not apply to the Majesty of God and sacred knowledge.² If it sometimes happens by way of exception that dialectics deals with the mysteries of the Divine Power (*mysteria divinæ virtutis*), it ought not to dominate but rather to consider itself inferior to the dogma in question. The servitude of philosophy is a corollary of its lack of value and its impotence. "Quæ tamen artis humanæ perita, si quando tractandis sacris eloquiis adhibetur, non debet jus magisterii sibimet arroganter arripere, sed *velut ancilla*

¹ *De perfectione monachorum*, c. 11, Migne, *P.L.*, Vol. 145, c. 306.

² Hæc porro impossibilitas recte quidem dicitur, si ad naturæ referatur inopiam, absit autem ut ad majestatem sit applicanda divinam.—Migne, *P.L.*, Vol. 145, c. 612.

dominæ quodam famulatus obsequio subservire ne si præcedit oberret."¹

The same idea is found in Gerard of Czanad, but the image of philosophy as the *ancilla theologiæ* appeared in him for the first time, and was destined to be widely used. It has been appealed to in order to show that the Middle Ages despised human reason. But as a matter of fact it represents the opinion of only a restricted group of theologians.

As for Otloh of St. Emmeram, who lived at Ratisbon (about 1010-1070), and wrote *Dialogus de Tribus Quaestionibus*, and *Liber de Tentationibus Suis et Scriptis*, one of the first autobiographical works of the Middle Ages, the doubts which haunted him and of which he gives a striking account, lead him to declare that profane science contains much *superflua*, that its usage ought to be forbidden to monks since the latter have renounced the world in order to devote themselves to divine knowledge (*res divinæ*); and that dialectics is inferior to the Scriptures. He knows of dialecticians who placed the authority of Boethius above that of the Holy Bible, "*magisque Boetio quam sanctis Scripturis in plurimis dictis crederent.*"² But he does not condemn dialectics in itself, and he himself makes use of certain arguments, which incidentally are as superficial as those of Damian.

Manegold of Lautenbach, who travelled through France and Germany as an itinerant professor, and then entered a monastery until his death (after 1103), entertained similar suspicions towards philosophy. His opusculum *Manegoldi contra Wolfelmum Coloniensem*, written about 1083, endeavours to show that the philosophy of Macrobius and of Plato, and the Logic of Aristotle are tissues of errors, irreconcilable with dogma, and dangerous to those who study them. Hence philosophy is a *superfluum*, which ought to recede into the background.

But Manegold, like Damiani, succumbs to philosophy's attractions. By way of exception, dialectics is good. He utilizes it in moral subjects, and following Macrobius, he adopts the neo-Platonist classification of the virtues into *politica*, *purgatoria*, and *purgata*. He also employs philosophy in political matters, in which it plays a prominent part. We

¹ *De divina omnipotentia*, c. 5, Migne, P.L., Vol. 145, col. 63.

² *Prol. De tribus quaestionibus*, Migne, P.L., vol. 146, col. 60.

shall return to this subject, after mentioning a later attitude which begins to manifest itself in the theologians of the eleventh century.

89. Lanfranc.—Born at Pavia about 1010, and in turn a jurist at Bologna, and a wandering dialectician, Lanfranc travelled through France from one school to another; later on he retired to the Abbey of Bec, which, under his direction, acquired a great reputation (*magnum et famosum litteraturae gymnasium*).¹ One of his disciples, Guitmund of Aversa, says of him that God made use of him in order to give a new life to the liberal arts. He was followed by a group of admirers. But Lanfranc abandoned dialectics for theology, and took part in the battle against Berengarius. Later on he was appointed Archbishop of Canterbury (1070), where he remained until his death (1089). With Lanfranc a new idea appears. The liberal arts and philosophy are good in themselves: it is merely their abusive use in theology which is to be condemned (*non artem disputandi vituperat, sed perversum disputantium usum*).² Lanfranc makes use of philosophical reasoning, but he never gives it a value above that of the Scriptures. Since he recognizes the respective rights of philosophy and theology, we may say that he accepts their distinction.

Profane science is thus released from the ban which had been placed upon it by the rigorists, who themselves had in practice employed it, thus offending against their own principle.

90. Manegold of Lautenbach and the beginnings of political philosophy.—The quarrels between the Papacy and the Empire, and the extensive controversies to which they gave rise, raised the question of the nature of the State, and of its relation to the Church, from the philosophical point of view.

The early sources which Manegold had at his disposition, and which may have suggested some of his doctrines, were:

i. Texts of Cicero: there is a law of nature, an unwritten law, impressed upon the soul of man, and made known to us by an interior *vox*; men are equal by nature (against Aristotle);

¹ William of Malmesbury, *De gestis Pont. Angl.*, I, 1, Migne, *P.L.*, Vol. 179: c. 459.

² Migne, *P.L.*, Vol. 150, col. 323. Cf. Endres, *Die Dialektiker*, etc., p. 33.

justice is essential to the State, and where it does not reign the State disappears (*De Legibus*, I, 6, 19).

(ii) Certain passages in Seneca concerning the natural equality of men, and a state of innocence in which the State and private property were absent and unnecessary.

(iii) Texts in the Roman jurists of the third century A.D. (Ulpianus and Florentinus) gathered together by Isidore of Seville. Here we get doctrines of Stoic origin on the popular origin of political authority—*Res publica, res populi*¹—and on the distinction of law into *jus naturale, jus gentium, jus civile* (60).

(iv) The *De Civitate Dei* (44).

Peter Damian, Gregory VII, Otto of Verceil, Otloh of St. Emmeram, and Honorius of Autun, took part in the controversy between the Pope and the Empire, and touched incidentally on political questions. Similarly Otto of Freising in his *Chronicle* and *Gesta Frederici* did not get beyond the quarrel. He speaks of the opposition between the earthly and Divine cities, and makes the interesting remark that from the time of Christ there is but one city—the Catholic Church (*ecclesia*) with two functions, the priesthood and the monarchy.² But does he not study the organization either of civil or ecclesiastical society.

On the other hand, Manegold of Lautenbach ascends to pure theory, and profits by the events of his time to seek the proper foundation for the doctrines he sets forth. For his *Liber ad Gebhardum* and his *Opusculum contra Wolfelmum* combine discussions on the rights of the Empire and the Papacy with reflections on the office of authority in the State. Divine in its origin, the monarchy is a function, *officium*,³ which must be exercised for the good of the community and conformably with justice. Thus the prince ought to manifest moral qualifications, which the German writer describes

¹ Even the saying: "Quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem" is not absolute, for the text continues: "utpote cum lege regia, quæ de imperio ejus lata est populus ei et in eum omne suum imperium et potestatem conferat," see Carlyle, *op. cit.* (20, V), I, 64.

² Quia omnis non solum populus, sed et principes exceptis paucis catholici fuerunt, videor mihi non de duabus civitatibus, sed pene de una tantum, quam ecclesiam dico, hystoriam texuisse.—*Chron.* IV, Prol. in *Mon. Germ. Histor.* SS. Vol. XX.

³ Quod rex non sit nomen naturæ sed vocabulum officii, cap XXX. *Manegoldi ad Gebhardum liber, Libelli de Lite*, I, p. 365.

after the manner of St. Augustine. If he becomes a tyrant and forfeits his office, like Henry IV who had just been deposed, he breaks the contract made with his people when the latter placed him in power (*pactum quo eligitur*). He may be dismissed, writes Manegold in his rough German tongue, like the swineherd who allows the flock confided to his care to be dispersed.¹ The theory of the *pactum* outlined in these passages is certainly the most remarkable feature in Manegold.

91. Canonists and Jurists.—With the eleventh century we get the first collections of canon law: Burchard of Worms, Deusdedit, Yves of Chartres (died 1117), were the first representatives of the Rhenish, Gregorian (Gregory VII) and French groups.² These early codifications were primarily practical in character, and inspired by the political and religious situation. Thus the questions of the Pontifical supremacy and of the value of the sacraments conferred by schismatics were introduced by the canonists of the Gregorian group, and Yves of Chartres dealt with the Berengarian controversy. Theologians made great use of these codifications, and took from thence many literary and patristic quotations. But with the *Decretum* and the *Polycarpus* of Yves of Chartres unitive tendencies made their appearance, and canonists following the theologians began to undertake the delicate task of harmonizing contradictory texts of the Fathers or of the *authentici doctores*. While Isidore of Seville sided with the earliest authority in a case of disagreement, the preface of the *Decretum* of Yves of Chartres distinguishes between what is obligatory and what is optional, strict justice and mere equity, precept and counsel. The question of harmony entered upon a new phase when Abelard introduced the principles of philosophical order into canon law.

We shall indicate later on the progress accomplished by Civil, Roman and Feudal law from the middle of the eleventh century.

92. Bibliography.—Gottschalk.—His writings on predestination are lost; we possess poems and hymns of his; on his grammatical works see below.—Studies: C. Lambot, *Opusculs grammaticaux de Gottschalk*, in *Revue Bénédictine*, 1932, pp. 120-4; N. Ficker-

¹ Neque enim populus ideo eum super se exaltat ut liberam in se exercendæ tyrannidis facultatem concedat, sed ut a tyrannide ceterorum et improbitate defendat.—*Mon. Germ. hist., Libelli de Lite*, I, p. 365.

² Grabmann, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 234-46; II, p. 216

mann, *Wiederkannte Dichtungen Gottschalks*, *ibid.*, 1932, pp. 314-21 ; B. Lavaud, *Précurseur de Calvin ou témoin de l'augustinisme ? Le cas de Gotescalc*, in *Revue Thomiste*, 132, pp. 71-101.

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§ 8.—St. Anselm of Canterbury

93. Life and Writings.—Born of a Patrician family at Aosta in 1033, St. Anselm became Abbot of the Norman Abbey of Bec (1078), whither he went at the invitation of his master Lanfranc. Like the latter, he occupied the archiepiscopal see of Canterbury (from 1093 till his death in 1109). His biography was written by the monk Eadmer, whose material has not yet been utilized in a definitive manner.

Amongst his certainly authentic works, the most important are the *Monologium*, which reminds one of the *Confessions*

of St. Augustine, the *Proslogium* (between 1070 and 1078), the *Liber apologeticus ad insipientem* (in reply to Gaunilo), the *De fide Trinitatis et de Incarnatione Verbi*, the dialogues *De Grammatico*, *De Veritate*, *De libero arbitrio*, and the *Cur Deus homo*.

With a marked predilection, Anselm bases himself on St. Augustine, and his thought is inspired by the Doctor of Hippo. "Nihil potui invenire me dixisse quod non catholicorum Patrum et maxime beati Augustini scriptis cohæreat" (preface to *Monologium*). His attitude of mind is principally that of a metaphysician; secondarily he was a moralist and a psychologist.

94. Natural Theology.—The metaphysics of St. Anselm constitutes one great Natural Theology. God is the exemplary, efficient, and final cause of the intelligible and sensible world: this is the central doctrine of the *Proslogium* and the *Monologium*. The deductive method, which starts from above and interprets the created by the uncreated, presides over all the Anselmian developments on the existence and nature of God.

His arguments for God's existence are well known, and several are original. The proofs in the *Monologium* may be reduced to three: (1) All good things share in one and the same goodness; this goodness must be the good-in-itself, which cannot be communicated; it is the sovereign good. "Illud igitur est bonum per seipsum, quoniam omne bonum est per ipsum" (*Monol.*, c. 1). The same argument is applied to greatness. (2) There are degrees in the perfection of beings. Since an infinite number is impossible, there must be a maximum and infinite perfection. (3) Finite things have not being by themselves, but must receive it from a Supreme Being, who exists of himself. These three proofs start from the fact that finite beings exist, and infer from their hierarchical character that there exists a Being at the summit of the scale.¹ The Platonist and Augustinian inspiration is evident here.²

¹ Baeumker (*Witelo*, p. 290 *et seq.*) and Grunwald (*op. cit.*, p. 30) give a purely logical and conceptual sense to these arguments, as opposed to Stöckl (*Gesch. d. Philos. d. Mitt.*, I, 163) who endeavours to see in them an appeal to the principle of causality, and Domet de Vorges (*op. cit.*, p. 233) who sees a resemblance between them and the proofs of St. Thomas.

² E.g., *De Libero Arbitrio*, II, 1; *De Trinitate*, VIII, 3.

Anselm's name is above all attached to an argument contained in the *Proslogium* known as the Ontological Argument. "We certainly believe," he writes, addressing himself to the Deity, "that Thou art a being such that a greater cannot be conceived. . . . Now, such a being cannot exist merely in our understanding which conceives it. For if it were only in our minds, it could be thought of as also existing in reality, which is greater. If, therefore, that than which a greater cannot be thought is in the mind alone, the very thing than which a greater cannot be thought is that than which a greater can be thought. But certainly this cannot be. Therefore it cannot be doubted that there is something than which a greater cannot be thought, both in the mind and in reality."¹

This argument, remarks Thomas Aquinas,² passes from the subjective or ideal order to the objective or real order. To *conceive* a being which is the greatest possible and therefore contains the note of existence does not authorize us to pass to the affirmation of the extramental existence of such a being.

Already a contemporary of Anselm, the monk Gaunilo, of Marmoutier-les-Tours, attacked the ontological argument in his *Liber pro insipiente adversus Anselmum in Proslogio ratiocinantem*, and maintained that it was not convincing for an atheist. The mere idea which we have of a thing is no guarantee of its real existence. If the argument were valid, it would prove too much, and we could equally demonstrate the existence in the ocean of the most beautiful of all islands, in basing ourselves upon the imagination we have of it. Anselm's reply (*Contra insipientem*) points out justly that the existence which we think of is necessary in the case of God—his essence is to exist—but contingent in the case of the perfect island. He does not, however, counter the principal objection, which has to do with the very method of his reasoning. Incidentally he points out that the idea of the greatest or most perfect being implies the notion of a Personal God.

¹ *Proslogium*, Ch. II. Et quidem credimus te esse aliquid quo nihil majus cogitari possit. . . . Et certe id quo majus cogitari nequit non potest esse in solo intellectu. Si enim vel in solo intellectu est, potest cogitari esse et in re, quod majus est. Si ergo id quo majus cogitari non potest est in solo intellectu, idipsum quo majus cogitari non potest est quo majus cogitari potest. Sed certe hoc esse non potest. Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid, quo majus cogitari non valet, et in intellectu et in re (from Daniel's text, *op. cit.*, p. 5).

² *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 2, a. 1, ad. 2.

Considered from the logical point of view, the objections of Gaunilo and St. Thomas are peremptory. But Anselm's argument is more than the cold analysis of a concept, or a dry logical decomposition of the *idea* of God. He presupposes an intimate and living presence of God in the soul. The vague and imperfect idea of the Infinite results from a first mysterious contact which is not subject to the restraints of syllogistic reasoning and constitutes a sort of primordial fact. The analysis of the infinitely perfect is a later procedure. Hence a complete interpretation of the argument ought in our opinion to deal with it from the two-fold point of view of psychology and logic.¹

In any case the term "ontological argument" generally adopted is an unfortunate and misleading one. It savours of Kantism, which makes the object of metaphysics to be not real being but the idea of being and the psychological conditions of its presence in the mind. We must also point out that the "ontological argument" has nothing in common with the system of thought known as Ontologism, or the vision of ideas in God.

The argument of the *Proslogium* did not receive much notice from the immediate successors of Anselm, who were more preoccupied in harmonizing the writings of the Fathers, and in stating doctrines in dialectical terms, rather than in giving a speculative treatment to the great philosophical problems implied in the preliminaries to faith. This explains why the influence of Anselm on the theology of the twelfth century was less penetrating than that of Abelard. But the influence

¹ Historians do not agree as to the meaning and value of this argument. Domet de Vorges, Baeumker, Grunwald and Fischer interpret it in a purely logical sense, and see in it a new application of the principle of exaggerated realism. Ragey, Dom Adlhoch and others defend a psychological interpretation: the idea of the perfect in our minds can only be explained by the objective existence of the perfect from which we derive the idea. Before Adlhoch, van Weddingen saw in the argument the expression of a higher instinct whose term is the Absolute. Ad. Dyroff adopts the interpretation of Adlhoch, which is allowable, but in addition tries to find an empirical foundation for the argument, which seems unacceptable. *Der ontolog. Gottesbeweis des h. A. in der Scholastik* (in *Probleme der Gotteserkenntnis*, Munster, 1928). K. Barth (99) compares it with the argument from *rationes necessariae* (97), and thinks that we have to deal not with a proof strictly so called of the existence of God, but rather of an elaboration of the data given by faith: this elaboration transposes it into a theory understood by the intelligence. This is an explanation similar to that which we ourselves suggested in our preceding edition (p. 124).

of the "ontological argument" was very much greater in the thirteenth century.¹

Bruno of Segni (died 1123), who adopted it in Theology, defended its dialectical value; William of Auxerre took it up; William of Auvergne, Alexander of Hales, and Bonaventure leaned towards it; Duns Scotus interpreted it ("potest colorari illa ratio Anselm"). Others such as Albert the Great, Thomas of Strasburg, and Giles of Rome, allow that the proposition "God exists" is evident for cultivated minds. Thomas Aquinas rejects these opinions, and vigorously combats all the *a priori* proofs for the existence of God.

The Divine attributes—simplicity, immutability, eternity, creation and omnipresence—are identical with God Himself, and their study is simply a chain of deductions in which Anselm brings out what is implied in the idea of the Infinitely perfect Being whose essence is to exist. The *Monologium* stresses the Divine knowledge. Before creating the world, God possessed in His infinite nature and knew the *ratio* of everything which was to exist some day, the *exemplum, sive forma vel similitudo aut regula*.² Here we have the Exemplarism of St. Augustine.

The metaphysics of truth is simply the extension of this. "Res sunt veræ quando sunt ut debent."³ In other words, he deals only with ontological truth (the *ut debent* is the conformity of things with the destiny assigned them by their immutable essences, which are imitations of the Divine essence), although in order to arrive at this he sets out from the truth of the judgment. Truth is the certitude of things, and can be attained to only by the intelligence—*veritas est rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis*. It is eternal, superior to the mind which is subject to change, and its foundation must be in God who willed things to be what they are—a metaphysical doctrine which is correct, though incomplete.

The conservation of things is merely a prolonging of their

¹ Ueberweg-Geyer, *Grundriss* . . . p. 202. Descartes reproduced the argument in its logical form. Leibniz modified it somewhat, and "coloured" it after the manner of Duns Scotus in basing himself on the possibility of the Infinite Being. For the history of the ontological argument see Grunwald, *op. cit.*, p. 87 *et seq.*, Baeumker, *op. cit.*, p. 300-317; Domet de Vorges, *op. cit.*, pp. 280-298; Daniels, *op. cit.*, Folliatre, *op. cit.*, Koyré, *op. cit.*

² Quoniam priusquam fierent universa, erat in ratione summæ naturæ, quid aut qualia aut quomodo futura essent.—*Monologium*, cap. 9.

³ *De Veritate*, 11.

creation.¹ The Trinity of divine persons is explained by the *memoria*, *intelligentia* (Word of God), and the *amor* which proceeds from both.

95. Exaggerated Realism.—Already in the first two proofs in the *Monologium* we recognize the basic method of exaggerated realism: the transferring outside the mind of the attributes and degrees of being as they are conceived in the mind. Justice, truth, and goodness exist as such, apart from the just, true and good things which share in them. Indeed, this doctrine of the gradation of essences (goodness, greatness, justice) serves to prove the existence of a supreme Unity, placed at the summit of the hierarchy of Reality. Geyer remarks, rightly in our opinion, that the principle of exaggerated realism is not necessarily implied in the proof in the *Proslogium*.²

In the name of this exaggerated realism, Anselm combats the tritheism of Roscelin. If every existing being is individual, said Roscelin, the persons of the Blessed Trinity form three gods. Anselm replies: "He who does not understand how many men are specifically one only man cannot understand that several persons, each one of which is God, are one only God."³

In this text the two opposing theses are clearly set forth: for the realists, the *species* has an adequate and real objectivity, and all men constitute only one and the same humanity; for the anti-realists, real existence is found only in individual men.

The world of sensible things is not the true world, but a kind of participation in intelligible realities, and it is interesting to note that Anselm attributes the error of Roscelin and the anti-realists to the incapability of their reason freeing itself from sense data, in which everything is particular. "In eorum quippe animabus, ratio, quæ et princeps et iudex omnium debet esse quæ sunt in homine, sic est in imaginationibus corporalibus obvoluta, ut ex eis se non possit evolvere."

The realism of Anselm is thus more than the simple affirmation of the extramental reality of genera and species, for it is

¹ Sicut nihil factum est nisi per creatricem præsentem essentiam, ita nihil viget, nisi per ejusdem servatricem præsentiam.—Cap. 13.

² *Grundriss* . . . , pp. 201-2.

³ Qui nondum intelligit quomodo plures homines in specie sint unus homo, qualiter comprehendit quomodo plures personæ quarum singula perfectus Deus est, sint unus Deus?—*De fide Trinitatis*, 2.

a method of uniting the individuals to the species, the species to the genus, and the genera to God. But that does not justify us in inferring with Rousselot or De Remusat that Anselm is a pantheist: God is other than His creatures. Moreover, the individuality of each one of these persists, in spite of the hierarchical superposition of genera and species. In the *Dialogus de grammatico*, Anselm discusses whether *grammaticus* ought to be included under the category of "substance" or under that of "quality," and concludes that this word designates a quality, *vox significans qualitatem*; but throughout this dialectical and verbal discussion there is evident the Aristotelian theory according to which the subject to which the quality "grammaticus" belongs is this particular "homo grammaticus"; that the substance in the primordial sense of the word is the individual (*substantia prima*) and that "second substances" (genera and species), although possessing a real extramental equivalent, are substances only in a derivative sense (*substantia secunda*).

96. Psychology and Moral Philosophy.—Like St. Augustine, Anselm sees a reflection of the divine life in the threefold structure of the higher activities, *memoria, intelligentia, amor* (*Monol.*, c. 33), but he hesitates when dealing with their relation with the soul. The fundamental principle of ideological spiritualism is enunciated: sensation and thought are quite distinct. Sensation is pure activity, so much so that its cognitive contribution is only the development of a deposit pre-existing in the soul. Intellectual knowledge, which attains to the inmost being of things by means of abstraction, extends to spiritual substances and to God.¹ Anselm speaks of the sensible origin of ideas, but does not deal with the difficulties to which this problem gives rise; he outlines the theory of intentional species without falling into the erroneous ideas concerning these attributed to him by certain historians; he dwells with pleasure on the immediate knowledge which the soul possesses of its own existence, *semper sui meminuit anima* (*Monol.*, c. 46); in dealing with intellectual knowledge he assigns to the Divine light an influence which recalls the Augustinian theory of the ultimate foundation of truth.²

¹ J. Fischer, *Die Erkenntnisslehre Anselms von Canterbury*, p. 24 et seq.

² Quanta namque est lux illa de qua micat omne verum quod rationali menti lucet.—*Proslog.*, c. 14. Cf. Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

God dwells in the soul, and the latter experiences His presence. This facilitates the ascent of the soul from sensible things to the ideal essences of genera and species, and from thence to God. Without denying the reality of sensible things, Anselm disengages himself from them in order to rise to the suprasensible and the Divine. The body is a weight which the soul drags about, and an independent substance (Augustine). Still, although ignorant of the application of the hylomorphic theory to the human compound, Anselm affirmed the unity of man in his double nature, material and spiritual, and he never wearied of stressing his individuality. He hesitated when dealing with the origin of the soul.

His moral system is principally theological. He explains the problem of the transmission of original sin very much after the manner of Odo of Tournai, and adopts the Augustinian theories concerning evil and predestination.¹ Free will continually preoccupied his mind, and he devoted two treatises to this subject. He defines liberty as the power of conserving the rectitude of the will and of obeying reason.² Hence, since reason proclaims the Divine sovereignty, human liberty ultimately becomes conformity with the Divine will.³ The lower appetites ought to submit themselves to the dictates of reason, for otherwise man would fail to attain to his real good. It is reason, therefore, which directs the will, and this intellectualism is likewise manifest in the notion of beatitude, which consists in the contemplation of God, the Supreme Unity.

. 97. Faith and Reason.—Anselm understands the relation between philosophy and theology after the manner of Lanfranc his master. But he makes a step forward, inasmuch as he condenses his theory on the relations between the two sciences in formulæ which breathe the spirit of St. Augustine. The first lays down the primacy of faith over reason: “neque enim quæro intelligere ut credam, sed credo ut intelligam.”⁴

¹ *De concordantia præscientiæ, prædestinationis et gratiæ cum libero arbitrio.*

² *Libertas arbitrii est potestas servandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem.—De lib. arb., i.*

³ “The ideal man, as St. Anselm conceives him, is endowed with a will and liberty modelled on those of God.”—Folliatre, *op. cit.*, p. 376.

⁴ *Proslog.*, i; Migne, *P.L.*, Col. 158, c. 227. Hence the “crede ut intelligas” implies strictly only to theology. Domet de Vorges thinks that this aphorism has a more extended bearing in the system of St. Anselm, and refers to the dispositions requisite in all who wish to attain to truth: “to believe in the true is a necessary disposition in order to discover it.”—*Op. cit.*, p. 135. This is going too far.

The second establishes that faith is perfected by a rational study: *rationes necessariae* ought to confirm the content of a dogma once the latter has been established. They do not lead to faith, but presuppose it, and enlighten it. "*Negligentia mihi videtur, si postquam confirmati sumus in fide, non studemus, quod credidimus, intelligere*" (*Cur Deus Homo*, c. 2).

If, however, a Christian does not succeed in understanding a point of doctrine, he must nevertheless believe it, because of the primacy of faith. To Fulk of Beauvais Anselm writes, in view of the council which was to judge Roscelin: "Christianus per fidem debet ad intellectum proficere, non per intellectum ad fidem accedere, aut si intelligere non valet, a fide recedere."¹ Hence there can be no reason for calling Anselm a rationalist. His principles concern the believer, and not the philosopher, and the method to which they will lead in the following century in the schools of Abelard, Gilbert de la Porrée and Hugh of St. Victor will belong to theology, not to philosophy.

Passing on to the application of his principles, Anselm undertakes the rational justification of certain dogmas, such as the Trinity, and Redemption by Christ. It is possible that he goes beyond the rules which he himself had laid down.²

98. The Work of Anselm.—Anselm appeared in history at a time when Romanesque art was beginning to flourish, the feudal system was coming into being, and a characteristic civilization was being prepared for on all sides. He belonged to the past and at the same time was a herald of the future, so that he has been called the last of the Fathers of the Church and the first of the scholastics.³

With him the scholastic natural theology was constituted for the first time, with its metaphysical foundation and its strongly pluralistic orientation. God is clearly distinct from

¹ *Epistolæ*, Migne, *P.L.*, vol. 158, c. 1193.

² "He unconsciously approximates to rationalism without falling into it." Heitz, *Essai historique sur les rapports entre la philosophie et la foi, de Bérengar de Tours à Thomas d'Aquin*, p. 63. Grabmann (*Die Schol. Meth.*, I, pp. 265 sqq.) does not allow this suggestion of rationalism.

³ Grabmann (*Die Schol. Meth.*, p. 258), calls him the Father of Scholasticism, but for the sole reason that he applied the dialectic method to matters of faith. Draeseke on the other hand writes: "One cannot strictly call Anselm a scholastic," for his thought is not confined to dialectics. (*R. de Philos.*, 1909, p. 641.) St. Anselm is a scholastic on philosophical grounds, for his works contain doctrines in metaphysics, psychology and natural philosophy which belong to the scholastic patrimony.

his works; the problems connected with God are linked up with the problems of being, and metaphysics definitely bursts asunder the narrow bonds of the problem of universals. Anselm's psychology, although incomplete, enunciates the fundamental doctrines of spiritualism.

At the same time Anselm attempted a first grouping of doctrines. The synthesis which he built up was far from being complete, but it prepared the way for others, and it was the first which could rival the philosophy of John Scotus Erigena.¹ Anselm reminds one of Gregory VII, who, in the religious and political order of things, organized the Church, defined its relations with the State, and prepared the ground for the work of a Gregory IX or an Innocent III: he was the Gregory VII of Scholasticism.

No less important was his influence on the development of mediæval theology. He completed the work of Lanfranc, and gave a strong impulse to the systematization of theological material, which progressed rapidly in the twelfth century and reached its climax in the thirteenth. Bruno of Segni (1049-1123), Abbot of Monte Cassino, and Honorius of Autun the hermit of Ratisbon, whom we shall consider later on, were inspired by his teaching. His name became an authority, chiefly for the representatives of the ancient Franciscan school.

99. Bibliography.— Editions: Migne, *P. L.*, Vols. 158-9 (reproduces the edition by G. Gerberon (1675), an attempt at a critical edition, but inadequate); F. Schmitt, *S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia*, 6 vols., London and Edinburgh, 1946— (new critical edition);² A. Koyré, *S. Anselme de Cantorbéry, Fides quærens intellectum, id est Proslogion, liber Gaunilonis pro insipiente atque liber apologeticus contra Gaunilonem*, Paris, 1930 (text and French translation; Biblioth. des textes philos.); A. Beccari, *Sant' Anselmo d'Aosta, Monologio*, Turin, 1930; E. Bianchi [edition of the *Monologium*], Sienna, 1931; C. Ottaviano, *Anselmo d'Aosta, Il Monologio*, Palermo, 1933

¹ Was St. Anselm a neo-Platonist, as maintained by Koyré? (*op. cit.*). This can only be upheld by means of an equivocation already pointed out in connection with St. Augustine (See Section 39, pages 81-2. Anselm was frankly a pluralist and a creationist, and hence he rejected that which was specifically neo-Platonist. Moreover, he was acquainted neither with Plotinus nor with Proclus, with whom Koyré connects him.

² Up to 1951 only the first four volumes of this new edition have been issued.

(Italian translation with notes ; in *Antologia del pensiero medievale*, I).

Studies : Van Weddingen, *Essai critique sur la philos. de S. A.*, Brussels, 1875 ; E. Domet de Vorges, *S. Anselme*, Paris, 1901 ; B. Adlhoeh, *Glossen zur neuesten Wertung des anselm. Gottesbeweises*, in *Philos. Jahrb.*, 1903, pp. 163 et seq., 300 et seq., 365 et seq. (discussion with Domet de Vorges ; cf. also his earlier and later studies) ; C. Grunwald, *Geschichte der Gottesbeweisen im Mittelalter . . .* (Beiträge, VI, 3), Munster, 1907 ; C. Baeumker, *Witelo* (Beiträge, III, 2), Munster, 1908 (cf. pp. 290-310). In Dec., 1909, on the occasion of the eighth centenary of St. Anselm, there was a special number of the *Revue de phil.* A. Daniels, *Quellenbeiträge und Untersuchungen zur Gesch. de Gottesbeweise im 13 Jahrh.* (Beiträge, VIII, 1-2), Munster, 1909 ; J. Fischer, *Die Erkenntnislehre Anselms von Canterbury* (Beiträge, X, 3), Munster, 1911 ; N. Balthasar, *La méthode en théodicée, Idéalisme anselmien et réalisme thomiste*, in *Annales de l'Institut supér. de philos.* (Louvain), 1912, pp. 423-67 ; C. Folliatre, *La philos. d'A. de Cantorbéry*, Paris, 1920 ; A. Koyré, *L'idée de Dieu dans la philos. de S. A.*, Paris, 1923 ; H. Ostlender, *Anselm von Cant., der Vater der Scholastik*, Dusseldorf, 1927 ; P. Rosa, *S. A. de Cantorbéry*, Bruges, 1929 ; A. Levasti, *Sant' Anselmo, Vita e pensiero*, Bari, 1929 ; W. Betzendörfer, *Glauben und Wissen bei Anselm von Canterbury*, in *Zeitschr. für Kirchengeschichte*, 1929, pp. 431-43 ; G. von der Plaas, *Des hl. Anselm 'Cur Deus homo' auf dem Bodem der jüdisch-christlichen Polemik des Mittelalters*, in *Divus Thomas* (Fr.), 1929, pp. 446-67, 1930, pp. 18-32 ; A. Jacquin, *Les rationes necessariae de S. A.*, in *Mélanges Mandonnet*, II, pp. 67-78, Paris, 1930 ; E. Druwe, *La première réaction du 'Cur Deus homo' de S. A.*, in *Rech. de science religieuse*, 1930, pp. 162-66 ; A. Wilmart, *Le premier ouvrage de S. A. contre le trithéisme de Roscelin*, in *Revue T. A. M.*, 1931, pp. 20-36 ; *La tradition des lettres de S. A.*, *Lettres inédites de S. A. et de ses correspondants*, in *Revue Bénédictine*, 1931, pp. 38-56. K. Barth, *Fides quærens intellectum, Anselms Beweis der Existenz Gottes im Zusammenhang seines theolog. Programms*, Munich, 1931 ; M. Losacco, *La dialettica in Anselmo d'Aosta*, in *Sophia*, 1933, pp. 188-93 ; A. Antweiler, *Anselm von Canterbury, Monologion und Proslogion*, in *Scholastik*, 1933, pp. 551-61.

§ 9.—William of Champeaux

100. **William of Champeaux** was born in 1070 and died as Bishop of Chalons in 1120. He attended the lectures of Manegold of Lautenbach and Anselm of Laon. In 1103 he held a chair in the cathedral school of Paris, and there opposed the teaching of Roscelin, under whom he had studied

at Compiègne. He himself was in turn bitterly attacked by one of his own pupils, Peter Abelard.

The principal sources of information concerning the teaching of William of Champeaux are the works of Abelard, and the *De generibus et Speciebus* (120). His dialectical treatises are lost. He also wrote a book of *Sentences*, extracts of which have been published by G. Lefèvre. According to Abelard and the work *De Generibus*, William of Champeaux changed his opinions from time to time, and successively held the two following views :

(i) A form of exaggerated realism, which thanks to him came once more into favour, and which we may call the "*Identity*" Theory. The universal essence of substance is unique and identical in all its subordinate members ; its whole reality is contained in each of them ; the individual is merely an accidental modification of the specific substance, and the species an accident of the generic essence.¹

Abelard found it a simple matter to ridicule this doctrine ; if each man is the whole human species, then the latter is whole and entire in Socrates at Rome, and in Plato at Athens. Consequently, Socrates is present wherever the human essence is found ; at the same moment he is in Rome and in Athens, which is evidently absurd,² and, Abélard adds, leads directly to Pantheism. The satires of Abélard drove William from the school of Notre Dame, in 1108, and he retired to the Abbey of St. Victor, where he opened a new school and changed his theory.

(ii) The "*Indifference*" Theory. "Sic autem istam tunc suam correxerat sententiam ut deinceps rem eandem non essen-

¹ Erat autem (Willelmus) in ea sententia de communitate universalium, ut eandem essentialiter rem totam simul singulis suis inesse adstrueret individuus : quorum quidem nulla esset in essentia diversitas, sed sola multitudine accidentium varietas.—*Abelardi opera*, Amboise's edition, p. 5. We find the same doctrine in the *Dialectica* of Abélard : . . . in singulis hominibus numero differentibus eadem est hominis substantia quæ hic Plato per accidentia fit, ibi Socrates, per illa (edit., Geyer, p. 10). Also in the *De Generibus et Speciebus*, edited by Cousin, *Ouvr. inédit. d'Abélard*, p. 153.

² *De Gener. et Speciebus*, p. 514. We come across the same refutation of the "elegant inexactitudes" (*pulchra mentientes*) of realism in an anonymous work on genera and species published by Hauréau (*Not. et extr. de qqes. man. lat.*, V, 306) : "Sed quotiescumque homo qui est in Socrate agit vel patitur, et homo quo est in Platone agit vel patitur, cum sit eadem essentia, et sic (Platone) agente aliquid, agit Socrates et quælibet alia substantia, et flagellato Socrate flagellatur quælibet alia substantia, quod est inconveniens et etiam hæresis" (No. 17813, *Bibl. Nat.*, fol. 16).

tialiter, sed indifferenter diceret.”¹ William, then, had given in to the arguments of his opponents, and had forsaken Exaggerated Realism,² for here he subscribes to the “Indifference” Theory, one destined to have great success (113).

The *Sentences* state that in Peter and Paul there is one and the same essence (“secundum indifferentiam et secundum identitatem”), for the humanity they possess is the same, that is to say, it is the object of one and the same concept. But in the order of reality, each possess his own humanity, for they are two men having a similar essence.³ This is pure anti-realism. Roscelin and Abelard will not express themselves otherwise.⁴

The warm discussions aroused by William of Champeaux echoed throughout the French schools during the first half of the twelfth century. His extreme opinions found followers among the philosophers of Chartres, while the reaction to which they gave rise led other scholastics to more careful solutions, which were to become definitive.

As a theologian, William greatly depended on Anselm of Laon, his master. He was the author of a *De origine animæ* which Anselm opposed in a fragment *De animabus hominum*.⁵

101. Bibliography.—Editions: Migne, *P. L.*, Vol. 163 (fragments). G. Lefèvre, *Les variations de G. de Champeaux et la question des universaux*, Lille, 1898 (publishes the *Sententiæ vel quæstiones* xlvii).—Studies: B. Adlhoeh, *War Wilhelm von Champeaux Ultrarealist?* in *Philos. Jahrb.*, 1909; F. Picavet, *Note sur l'enseignement de G. de Champeaux d'après l'Historia calamitatum d'Abélard*, in *Revue internat. de l'enseign.*, Oct., 1910.

¹ Cousin, *op. cit.*, p. 6. In this text Hauréau reads *individualiter* instead of *indifferenter* (*Not. et extr. de qqs. man. lat.*, V, 324, and *Hist. phil. scol.*, I, 338). In this case William of Champeaux would not be an upholder of the “Indifference” Theory. But we prefer with Cousin to read *indifferenter*, for what possible meaning can be attached to the formula as given by Hauréau: “the same reality existing according to its individuality in all individuals; *ut eandem individualiter rem totam simul singulis suis inesse adstrueret*”?

² Cum hanc ille correxisset, immo coactus dimisit sententiam, etc.—Cousin, *ibid.*

³ Ubicumque personæ sunt plures, plures sunt et substantiæ. . . . Non est eadem utriusque (scil. Petri et Pauli) humanitas, sed similis, cum sint duo homines.—*Guillelmi Campellensis Sententiæ vel Quæstiones XLVII*, Lefèvre's edition, p. 24.

⁴ This is not the opinion of Lefèvre, who distinguishes three formulæ in the successive positions adopted by William of Champeaux, adding to the theories of identity and of indifference that of the similitude of essence. But the second and third formulas are both opposed to exaggerated realism, and are indistinguishable.

⁵ Fr. Bliemetzrieder, *Autour de l'œuvre théolog. d'Anselme de Laon*, in *Rech. T.A.M.*, 1929, pp. 435-83.

§ 10.—*The School of Chartres*

102. The School of Chartres.—Founded by Fulbert in 990, the school of Chartres occupied a prominent position in the first half of the twelfth century. The most popular masters who taught there made it a stronghold of the Platonist philosophy. Exaggerated Realism was the favourite solution, and it owed its long life to the philosophers of Chartres. But while men like William of Champeaux confined themselves to this single problem, the masters of Chartres incorporated it into a comprehensive metaphysical system, which set forth systematic views of God and the structure of reality.

A place of honour was given to the *Timæus* of Plato and to the writings of Boethius, and especially to his treatises on arithmetic and music which, like the *Timæus*, are filled with speculations of a Pythagorean character on unity and number. The *De Trinitate* of Boethius suggested not only the conceptions of being and its hierarchical character held at Chartres, but also those ardent theological speculations which, there as elsewhere, constituted the end of philosophy. Although put in the second rank, Aristotle was regarded as a great authority, and in logic his reign was supreme. The logic of Chartres is no longer the dry dialectics of the ninth century, but a study of the construction of knowledge, vivified by the great treatises of the *logica nova* which were indeed first utilized there, and well utilized. It is in these treatises that the Stagirite lays down the rules for systematization, the function of the first principles, and the methods of scientific architecture. The philosophers of Chartres found therein support for that love of deduction which is characteristic of all Platonists.

Another remarkable feature of the School of Chartres was its cultivation of the *trivium*. Rhetoric and the study of the Latin classics was considered an indispensable preliminary to all intellectual culture. Philosophy benefited by this taste for literature, for the philosophical works of the School are full of classical allusions, and are written in a very pure Latin which has won for the best of them an honourable place in the history of mediæval Latin literature. Their language was not merely technical, it was also elegant.

We may add that the *quadrivium* (particularly astronomy and mathematics), and the physiological and medical sciences

were likewise closely studied. They were familiar with Hippocrates and Galen, and possessed treatises of Arabian science, transmitted by Constantine the African. Thus Chartres was a centre of general culture.

About the same time the Cathedral was built and the innumerable statues which ornament the edifice were carved in the workshops of the town. The liberal arts occupy their own place in the Virgin's Porch.

103. Bernard of Chartres (not to be confused with Bernard of Tours (*Silvestris*) or with Bernard of Moélan) was the first of an interesting line of masters at Chartres. He taught from 1114 to 1119, and in 1117 had Gilbert de la Porrée among his hearers. Later on (before 1120) William of Conches and Richard the Bishop attended his lectures. Bernard was Chancellor of Chartres from 1119 to 1124 and died before 1130. He left a treatise *De Expositione Porphyrii*. John of Salisbury, who calls him *perfectissimus inter Platonicos sæculi nostri*,¹ has in addition preserved for us some fragments of other works which are lost.

Bernard sets forth a metaphysical table of the types of being :

God, the supreme and eternal reality ; *matter*, derived from nothingness by the creative act of God ; and the *Ideas* or forms, prototypes which are eternal, but not co-eternal with God (cf. John Scotus Erigena). By these the world of existences and possibilities is present to the Infinite intelligence. How are these three principles related to each other in the mind of this philosopher ? According to John of Salisbury, Bernard taught that God created what he calls the "*formæ nativæ*" upon the model of these Immutable Ideas. The former are distinct from the latter, as a copy is distinct from the original ; hence all suggestion of pantheism is avoided. These *formæ nativæ* or "*reasons*" of things, when united to matter form perishable beings.² Divine ideas and *formæ nativæ* thus correspond to two aspects of reality (in God and outside God) which Bernard brings together in a synthetic view. The

¹ *Metalog.*, IV, 35, in Migne, *P.L.*, Vol. 199, c. 938.

² *Ideas tamen quas post Deum primas essentias, negat in seipsis materiæ admisceri, aut aliquem sortiri motum, sed ex his formæ prodeunt nativæ, scilicet imagines exemplarium.—Ibid.*

formæ nativæ being an imitation of God's ideas, we can see why, according to John of Salisbury, Bernard intended to harmonize Plato and Aristotle.

After the general metaphysical framework, we must examine more closely Bernard's conception of the constitution of perishable beings composed of matter and a "native form."

In the first place, these *formæ nativæ* have a universal mode of existence, so much so that the Exaggerated Realism of Bernard is expressed in a way similar to the original Platonism : substantial essences (generic and specific) are endowed with unity and fixity throughout the series of irradiations which correspond to sensible things ; in fact, they alone are corporeal being, and the rest is but a fleeting shadow. Bernard even seems to have extended this doctrine to accidental realities, like Remigius of Auxerre (80).

As for the *materia primordialis* with which the *formæ nativæ* unite, it is an already constituted but chaotic mass (*Timæus*) which undergoes a series of transformations under the influence of these forms. This dynamism, which is very different from the Aristotelian theory, constitutes one of the favourite conceptions of the School of Chartres. We find it side by side with this other Platonist thesis : Nature is personified, and constitutes a peculiar kind of organism superior to the individual things which it contains, and hence it has a soul. Numerical relations (Pythagoras) regulate the information of Nature by the world-soul, as well as that of material things by the Ideas. Bernard of Chartres had numerous disciples ; John of Salisbury mentions William of Conches and Richard of Coutances, professor at Paris in 1122, and afterwards Bishop of Avranches till his death in 1182 ; and a still greater number flocked to the lectures of his successors, and especially those of Theodoric, his younger brother, under whom the Schools of Chartres reached the highest point of their development.

104. Theodoric of Chartres.—Thierry, or Theodoric, was *magister scholæ* at Chartres in 1121. He taught at Paris in 1140, having John of Salisbury as one of his pupils ; returned to Chartres in 1141, where he succeeded Gilbert de la Porrée as chancellor, and died before 1155. Of his works we have extant the *De sex dierum operibus*, the *Eptateuchon*, and a commentary on the *De inventione rhetorica ad Herenium*. A commentary

on the *De Trinitate (Librum hunc)*, recently published¹ is probably his work. Theodoric personifies for us the Humanist, Platonist, and scientific tendencies of the School of Chartres. About 1130 he put himself at the head of a campaign against the Cornificians, who wished to reduce the programme of study and proscribed the cultivation of literary form. Hence his designation by John of Salisbury as *artium studiosissimus investigator*.

We have already referred to the progress realised by Theodoric in *Logic*: his *Eptateuchon*, a manual on the seven liberal arts in use at Chartres, is a mirror of the dialectical culture of the twelfth century, and mentions important parts of the *Organon*, which was probably popularized by him (28). He was equally interested in mathematical, natural, and medical science; he introduced astronomical treatises into Chartres, and in 1144 received from Hermann the Dalmatian, at that time his pupil, the translation which the latter had made of Ptolemy's *Planisphere* from Arabic into Latin. In every way he was one of the most learned men of his time.

Theodoric soon adopted a metaphysic impregnated with Platonist, neo-Platonist, and Pythagorean doctrines, and of which Exaggerated Realism is simply one feature.

It contains interesting developments on the unity of God, the relations between God and created beings, the way in which individuals exist in the species, and on the reality of the latter.

God is the supreme *unitas*. Theodoric proves his existence by *probationes arithmeticae*: all multiplicity, and therefore the world of creatures, supposes unity. Theodoric dwells with pleasure and at great length on unity, the origin of number. Then he applies all these considerations of a mathematical order to the order of reality, and to God who is at its summit. This is a typical method, borrowed from Pythagoreanism, and not without its difficulties and embarrassments in exegesis. God, like number, is *unitas, æqualitas, immutabilis*. Now, the proper object of *Sapientia* or philosophy is the immutable (Plato). "*Philosophia enim est studium sapientiæ. . . . Sapientia autem est comprehensio veritatis eorum quæ sunt id est immutabilium*" (*De Trinitate*, p. 6).

¹ By W. Jansen (109), who at the same time gives a new edition of the *De sex dierum operibus*. Our quotations are from this edition.

The relations between God and creatures are expounded in a theory on essences (*formæ*), regarded before and after creation. Before creation, the essences are absorbed (*relapsæ*) in God, and are God. "Omnium formæ in mente divina consideratæ una quodammodo forma sunt, in formæ divinæ simplicitatem inexplicabili quodam modo relapsæ" (p. 17 and 18). God is the exemplar of all things, "quia juxta formam illam divinam unaquæque res suam habet essendi æqualitatem" (p. 15). On the infinite essence is based the degree of being of the finite *formæ*, and their immutability, *æqualitas*. For even if no men existed, and consequently no humanity, the *forma humanitatis* would be none the less imperishable.¹ Here we are back again in the ideas of Bernard, and the well-known Augustinian theory, the whole being expressed in an elegant terminology.

But Theodoric indulges in statements like these: omnes quoque formæ una forma sunt; forma divina omnes est formæ (*Librum hunc*, p. 16). Or again: God is everything, God is all things. The deity is the form of being of particular things—divinitas singulis rebus forma essendi est (pp. 21, 108). Again: the existence of creatures are *participationes* of God, the true Unity. And the creation is represented as the production of the multiple out of the one.²

Hauréau and Clerval considered that these texts of the *De sex dierum*, which moreover are confirmed by the declarations in the *Librum hunc*, are tantamount to an affirmation of pantheism. But this is incorrect. We must interpret them in the light of the explicit declarations with which Theodoric accompanies them, and also bear in mind the sources whence he has derived them.

His declarations exclude all compenetration of God and created being. After formulating the thesis, "divinitas singulis rebus forma essendi est," he at once adds: each one of these beings, of which God is the principle in the way that light is the principle of the luminous, possesses an *essence distinct* from that of God. The creator, and the work of His

¹ Si forte nullus homo exstiterit . . . humanitas quidem esse desinit, forma tamen quantum in se est, ad simplicitatem formæ divinæ quodammodo relapsa, nunquam . . . perit, p. 17.

² Unitas, quæ multiplicata componit numeros, vel unitates, ex quibus numeri constant, nihil aliud sunt quam veræ unitatis participationes quæ creaturarum existentiae sunt.—*De sex dierum*, p. 109.

hands, are different beings.¹ The commentary on the *De Trinitate* also explains this idea, and contains noteworthy statements on the essential distinction between God and created beings. Theodoric there tells us that from the fact that "forma divina rerum omnium forma est," we must not infer the ridiculous conclusion (*deridenda illatio*) that God is *humanitas*, for the divinity cannot contract a union with matter: "*divinitas namque immateriari non potest*" (p. 16). But humanity has reality only in matter. Hence there is an evident distinction between the essence of God and that of humanity. "*Licet ergo divina forma omnes sit formæ, eo scilicet quod est omnium rerum perfectio et integritas, non licet tamen concludere quod divina forma sit humanitas.*" And Theodoric adds emphatically—any more than one could say that God is "stone" or "wood" or anything similar.²

But in that case what exactly does Theodoric of Chartres mean by these sayings of the school, which, in their clear-cut form, sound so strange? The sources whence they were derived enables us to solve the problem. Theodoric is inspired by the *Timæus* of Plato, the *De Trinitate* of Boethius, and the same writer's treatises on the liberal arts. As soon as we compare these puzzling formulæ to the doctrines of Boethius on *esse* (55), they become quite clear. The reference is throughout to the plane of essence, and not that of existence.³ God alone is the *forma essendi* of all things, because the essences of all things are modelled upon his being. The *æqualitas* of the Infinite Being is the measure of the reality which belongs to a finite essence. "*Forma namque divina rerum omnium forma*

¹ At æterum nihil est aliud quam divinitas; unitas igitur ipsa divinitas est. At divinitas singulis rebus forma essendi est; nam, sicut aliquid ex luce lucidum est vel ex calore calidum, ita singulæ res esse suum ex divinitate sortiuntur. Unde Deus totus et essentialiter ubique esse vere perhibetur. Unitas igitur singulis rebus forma essendi est. Unde vere dicitur: "*Omne quod est, ideo est quia unum est*," p. 108. (Cl. Bæumker has shown that in the last sentence we must read "ideo est," and not "in deo est," as Hauréau did (109), p. 63 (*Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil.*, X, 138, n. 37). This formula, Pythagorean in inspiration, is found in the majority of his contemporaries.) Sed cum dicimus singulis rebus divinitatem esse formam essendi, non hoc dicimus quod divinitas sit aliqua forma, quæ in materia habeat consistere.—Hauréau, *ibid.*

² p. 21. Accordingly we do not accept the view of Geyer: "Der 'panthéisme chartrain' . . . tritt hier klarer zutage als in den bisher bekannten Texten" (*Ueberwegs Grundriss* . . . p. 235), nor that of Jansen, according to whom the pantheism of Theodoric is beyond question (ohne Zweifel), *op. cit.*, p. 93.

³ There is no question here of explaining the creature by a composition of essence and existence, any more than there is in Boethius. We pointed this out in our previous edition, Vol. I, p. 154.

est, *id est perfectio earum et integritas* " (p. 16). Thus we are in presence of merely a relation of exemplarism which establishes a gradation between limited essences and God. All these theories are incorporated in a scheme of Pythagorean and Platonist inspiration, resulting from the seductive tendencies in the writings of Boethius on music and arithmetic. That is why the real unity of God is linked up with mathematical unity, and the plurality of beings with the plurality implied by number. The parallelism leads Theodoric to adopt a method peculiar to himself, and to which he closely adheres. He deals only with the *static* order of reality, and the problems of becoming do not interest him.

If we consider the proper reality of these forms, as they exist outside God, they receive numerous individuations. The relation between individuals or singular things with these form-types brings us back to exaggerated realism. Humanity is numerically one, right through the mobile procession of individuals in which it exists. "*Natura semper una est, personæ diversæ, ut in his quidem mutabilibus humanitas sine dubio una est in omnibus, diversæ vero sunt humanitati personæ, ut Plato, Socrates et Cicero*" (p. 4). Theodoric, like Plato, is constantly preoccupied with assuring the stability, the *æqualitas essendi*, of the essences,¹ ultimately depending upon the divine *æqualitas*.

The multiplicity which affects humanity, as other forms, is due to the *materia* to which it is united, and which involves it in becoming. "*Forma namque informatur a materia. Itaque mutabilis rei contactu in mutabilem sui transit inconstantiam*" (p. 8). Form and matter are interpreted in terms of act and potency, but Theodoric does not realize the resources of this metaphysical duality, which he has derived from Boethius. *Matter* is created by God.

In *Cosmology*, Theodoric accepts the ideas of his brother, and establishes their conformity with the Scriptural account of creation. We find in the *De sex dierum* the first traces of the Peripatetic doctrines concerning place, the necessarily circular movement of the heavens, and the presence of an immobile earth in the centre of the world.

We may add that the speculations of Theodoric concerning unity and the generation of number out of unity serve to

¹ Humanitas æqualitas quædam et integritas essendi hominem est, p. 15.

explain the Blessed Trinity, and this is the chief reason why he is so partial to them. It is not necessary for us to deal with this aspect of his thought.

John of Salisbury, Hermann the Dalmatian, Robert of Retines were some of the best known disciples of the Chartrain philosopher.

105. Clarembald of Arras, first provost (1152) and then archdeacon of Arras, was one of the disciples of Theodoric, whom he calls *doctor meus*. He was the author of a commentary on the *De Trinitate* of Boethius, written after 1153. It is a vigorous work, written in a concise, elegant and lively style.¹ It follows closely the lines of the *Librum hunc*, but on more than one question it excels it in breadth and depth of treatment.

An Introduction explains the place occupied by theology in a classification of the sciences, in which the Aristotelian and Platonist schemes are combined.² The author says that theology has as its object the *contemplatio formarum quæ nihil debent materiæ* (p. 27). He calls it the *intima philosophiæ disciplina* (p. 36). It is, after the manner of the Platonists, the study of the stable, and therefore of God, from the twofold standpoint of reason and of faith.

1. As in Theodoric, the doctrine of unity and number is invoked to explain the unity of God and the multiplicity of created things. Following the formula of Boethius, God is the *forma essendi*; and to prove His existence the master has recourse to the Aristotelian argument from motion. Itself a pure form, the divine intelligence is endowed with ideas or forms which are in turn free from all matter. With the other Chartrain masters (*nostri doctores*, p. 67), he says that these forms are *in Deo complicatæ*. They are the norms of the stability of finite essences, "quia formæ cujusque rei perfectio rei et æqualitas, supra quam res ipsa non est ipsa, infra quam res ipsa non est ipsa" (p. 58).

As to the forms which exist outside God in corporeal things, these are merely the images of the Divine forms, and they are

¹ Edited by W. Jansen (109). Some expressions are new: intellectibilitas; concatenatio; non esse a sæculo auditum ("we have never heard it said").

² Cogitatio theorica (comprising mathematica, physica, theologia); logica; ethica.

imprisoned in matter.¹ This at once reminds us of the Platonist doctrine of the reflection of reality in space.

Clarembald insists that any mixture of the divine Ideas, and hence of God, with matter, would be a degradation, and like his master, he recoils from any such monstrosity. "Forma sine materia æternitas est et ipsa Deus est" (p. 60). Since the corporeal types are not the divine forms themselves, but a copy of them, the substantial distinction between God and the corporeal world is assured. We have not noticed any formal declarations on the origin of matter: Theodoric explains this by a creative act, and doubtless this was also the idea of his disciple.

Coming now to the relation existing between the *purissimæ formæ* in God and the form-types in bodies, we have a series of texts in which the latter are set forth as flowing from the former. "Omnis corporum forma ab illa forma . . . profluit" (p. 58). They descend from them (*descendunt*) by a kind of fall or degeneration (*degeneraverunt*). Then, adopting the formulæ of Boethius and Theodoric, the Arras master declares that only God is the *forma essendi*, that man and the finite participate in God, who is in all things and everywhere. "Prima illa entitas in omnibus rebus est forma essendi . . . ubicumque aliquid est essendi forma est. At ubique aliquid est; ergo ubique forma essendi est. Sed Deus essendi forma est. Deus igitur per essentiam ubique est" (p. 59).

Are we this time in presence of monism, and of a fusion of the Infinite in the finite?² No; the explanation of the relation between God and the corporeal world deals with, not a question of origin, but a question of hierarchy, nature and perfection. The form-type which vibrates in corporeal individuals—the type man for instance—is only a waste product if we compare it with the Divine idea. God is the only *forma essendi* because, compared to Him, all the rest is as if it were not. If God Himself were really spread abroad into the world, and if the corporeal type imprisoned in matter were the real prolonging of the divine forms, no artifice could avoid the contamination, or, we might say, the destruction

¹ Formæ instæ quæ in corporibus sunt, ab ideas divinæ mentis vel a quattuor illis purissimis substantiis [water, air, earth, fire] descendentes, ratione posterioritatis ab illis degeneraverunt, non formæ sed formarum imagines recto appellari debent, p. 68. Cf. p. 58.

² Theory of Jansen, p. 93.

of God. Clarembald would not have anything to do with such a notion, at any price. Theodoric would no longer be *doctor meus* if he led him astray on this important question. The only difference between the master and his disciple is that the latter is bolder in his expressions, and that he allows his imagination to stray in quest of new and strong metaphors, in which his temperament as a Latinist plays its part. Bernard Sylvestris will manifest this tendency still more. As in Theodoric, all these expressions which at first sight are so equivocal merely accentuate certain phrases in Boethius (55). Even the metaphor of a flowing forth and of a flux is found in Boethius, and its literal sense vanishes in presence of express declarations of the philosopher. Clarembald, no more than his master, is not interested in the problems of becoming, which alone are capable of expressing a metaphysic in the tonality of monism.

After a metaphysic of this kind, the exaggerated realism of species naturally follows, and the Arras master sets this forth very clearly, although, he says, this question does not interest him much. Referring to Gilbert de la Porrée ("ille doctor hoc est episcopus Pictaviensis," p. 45), he writes: "Quoniam famosi doctores quidam singulos homines singularibus humanitatibus homines esse disseminaverunt, operæ pretium duximus ostendere unam et eandem humanitatem esse, qua singuli homines sunt homines" (p. 42). To prove this, he invokes the unity of the species *humanitas*. "Si igitur hæc species 'homo' non est nisi una, et hæc species 'humanitas' non est nisi una." Individuals are merely accidental modifications of one unique essence or form. "licet eadem humanitate sint homines (e.g., Socrates, Plato, and Cicero), propter accidentium tamen varietatem subintrat inter eos hominum pluralitas."

All this theory of corporeal beings, including man, in which one unique form is clothed with individual characteristics, is linked up with the twofold principle of form and matter, act and potency. The Aristotelian inspiration of this is undoubted, but the theory of the Stagirite is misrepresented on more than one point, and deprived of its dynamic sense which is the soul of it. When corporeal being has been spoiled of all its *qualitates substantiales*, matter is the *informis* residue, of which one cannot say what it is, and by reason of which one

form (earth, for instance) can become another form (e.g., brass). Matter is always in a state of flux ("materia semper in motu et fluxa"), and constitutes the *vertibilitas* of things, their *possibilitas* (p. 44, etc.). The form alone is the *actus rei*. "Omnis esse ex forma est . . . quoniam forma perfectio rei et integritas est" (p. 63). While on the one hand every limited form is moulded in matter, the form without matter is the immutable, the *ens a se*, *actus sine possibilitate*, *necessitas*, *æternitas*. "Et ipsa Deus est."

Such a theory of matter and form is obviously a combination of Aristotelian data from the *Physics*, with Platonist data on the non-being of matter, regarded as merely the spatial receptacle of forms.

2. Following from these metaphysical conceptions, Clarembald distinguishes between four faculties of knowing. The senses, the imagination and the reason have need of an *instrumentum*, that is, the external organs, the air, and the humours contained in the centre of the head in the part called *logistica* ("ær subtilissimus qui a physicis lux ætherea appellatur").—Clarembald does not say whether the *ratio* is intrinsically dependent or not on its organ—the question does not interest him—but he does say that the discerning of good from evil, and the particular from the universal, belongs to the *ratio*, and that such knowledge is at the disposal of all, inasmuch as all have within themselves this ethereal light, in a more or less subtle state.

On the other hand, the soul which concentrates its attention on the divine, however feebly, and on forms as they are in God, has nothing more to do with organs, for the material cannot give knowledge of the Creator and Orderer of nature.¹ This fourth faculty, called *intellectibilitas*, is given only to a small number of men, and particularly to the prophets.

All this shows that the theory of knowledge is set forth, not with a psychological aim, but as a complement of metaphysics, and to illustrate the importance of the knowledge of forms, and of God who contains them. It is equally clear that this knowledge is a special privilege, and is superior to the abstraction of reality from sense data.

¹ Cum autem anima ad divinæ formæ quantulamcumque cognitionem erigitur, nullo prorsus utitur instrumento, quoniam ejus cognitionem natura nequaquam dare potuit, qui conditor naturæ subsistit et artifex, p. 54. Cf. p. 36.

3. We may add that, in the mind of the Arras master, while all that he has enunciated has a philosophical bearing, his typical doctrine of the structure of reality is put to the service of theology. For him, as for the majority of the doctors of the twelfth century, philosophy, although distinct from theology, is destined for its service. His theological work, however, does not concern us here. Let it suffice to say that the doctrines of Abelard and of Gilbert de la Porrée are expounded at length, and criticized. They are mentioned by name, while Theodoric of Chartres continues to be called familiarly *doctor meus*. There is also mention of an *adversarius*, in whom Jansen would see the holder of a heresy which was current in the diocese of Arras, and concerning which Gottschalk wrote personally (1152) to Pope Eugenius III.¹

106. Bernard of Tours, or Bernhardus Silvestris, who is perhaps to be identified with Bernard of Moélan, Chancellor of Chartres about 1156, was another typical representative of the School of Chartres. Between 1145 and 1153 he composed at Tours and dedicated to Theodoric of Chartres an allegorical poem, half prose, half verse, entitled *De mundi universitate*. Two parts, *megacosmos* and *microcosmos*, study respectively the universe and man, the former being the more important. This work, in which the humanist aim is dominant, clothes in a poetic mantle the Platonist and Pythagorean data which had become the common possession of the Chartrains. Metaphysical notions are transformed into scenic personages, and explanations take the form of drama. Bernard makes a wholesale use of the commentary of Chalcidius on the *Timæus*, and sets forth a fantastic cosmogony in a Christian setting. The theme is as follows: *Nature* begs *Noys* to repair the chaos of *Hyle*, or prime matter, and *Noys*, in response to the petition, fashions the universe.

It is important to note that *Noys*, or the thought of God, is not a mere creature of God (Macrobius), but God Himself, or the *Verbum*. The ideas of God are God Himself. *Noys* applies to matter only the *copies* of these Ideas, and this at once establishes a substantial distinction between God and corporeal things, although the notion of creation does not enter in to explain the origin of matter. Moreover, the animating

principle of the world is other than the Noys. It is the World Soul (entelecheia), a finite reality which, with the help of Nature, *Physis* its workman, and the helpers of *Physis*, organizes the various beings. The hierarchical arrangement of genera and species, set forth in the sense of the exaggerated realism of the Chartres School, forms part of the execution of this cosmic plan.

This work, which Gilson regards as an interpretation of the data of Genesis,¹ contains nothing from the philosophic point of view which Bernard may not have learnt from his masters. It is neither monistic nor pantheistic. The poetical form makes its explanation difficult on more than one point.

107. William of Conches (about 1080-1154) is linked up with the School of Chartres through his master Bernard (1110-1120), his humanism, his opposition to the Cornificians, his devotion to the physical sciences, and his early philosophical doctrines. After teaching in Paris about 1122, he became tutor to Henry Plantagenet. Besides an unpublished commentary on the *Timæus*, and another on the *De Consolatione Philosophiæ*, which was regarded as a classic until the fourteenth century, William wrote a treatise entitled *Philosophia*, often attributed to Venerable Bede or to Honorius of Autun, a dialogue entitled *Dragmaticon Philosophiæ* (about 1145), of which the *Secunda* and *Tertia Philosophia* are extracts, and a *Summa Moraliū Philosophorum*, known under many names and often ascribed to Hildebert of Lavardin.

At the commencement of his career, William leaned towards Exaggerated Realism. Led astray by a transposition of Pythagoreanism into theology, he maintained the doctrine that the Holy Spirit is identical with the world-soul. He was attacked by William of St. Theodoric, retracted, and gave up metaphysics in order to devote himself to the study of the sciences.

Medical studies occupied the place of honour in the Schools of Chartres.²

William of Conches familiarized himself with the physiological

¹ E. Gilson, *op. cit.* (109).

² They had there the *De Arte Medica* of the doctor Alexander, the *Isagoge Johannitii*, the *Aphorisms* of Hippocrates, the *De Pulsibus* of Philaretus, the *De Urinis* of Theophilus, the *Theorica* of Constantine the African, and Galen's *Commentaries*.—Clerval, *op. cit.*, p. 240.

theories of Galen and Hippocrates through the translations of Constantine the African, and linked them up with the process of sense knowledge. It was Constantine who introduced into the Western Schools the study of the physiological concomitant of knowledge, and indeed he stressed too much the organic side of things, for he came dangerously near to confusing the psychic and physiological aspects of sensation. Adelard of Bath, William of St. Theodoric, William of Hirschau, and many others were influenced thereby, and we shall come across traces of it again in the thirteenth century.

The masters of Chartres with whom we have hitherto dealt gave to the universe an explanation based on the composition of matter and form; but William had recourse to the atomic hypothesis: the four elements consist of combinations of homogeneous and invisible particles.¹ All the works of nature, including the human body with its highest vital perfections, originate in the plasticity of the atoms: hence the soul is in no sense the constituent form of the body. We need not be surprised to find in William of Conches the doctrine of the world-soul, which he identifies with the Holy Spirit—this co-exists in every man with his own soul. Walter of St. Victor vigorously attacked this doctrine in his pamphlet *Contra Quatuor labyrinthos Franciæ*, and accused its author of heresy.

The *Moralium dogma philosophorum*, attributed to William of Conches by Hauréau, and regarded as of uncertain authorship by others,² is one of the few moral treatises of the early Middle Ages. It is a collection of precepts, devoid of originality, and borrowed principally from Seneca (*De Beneficiis*) and Cicero (*De Officiis*). Following their example, the author devotes his attention to questions of detail, such as the distinction between that which is useful and that which is upright, and the minute description of virtues. We must not expect to find therein the economy of the scholastic moral system, and in particular the last end and the essence of morality are not dealt with.

There exist anonymous compilations of William of Conches,

¹ Elementa sunt simplæ et minimæ particulæ, quibus hæc quatuor constant quæ videmus. Hæc elementa nunquam videntur, sed ratione divisionis intelliguntur (*Elementa philos.*, I, Migne, Vol. 90, col. 1132). William is evidently inspired by the *Timæus*.

² Williams, *op. cit.* (109).

and a Munich manuscript contains a summary of his philosophy. In addition, an anonymous *Summa Radulfi* was based upon him, and at the end of the thirteenth century Bartholomew of Pisa made a paraphrase of his doctrines—all facts which indicate the reputation enjoyed by William of Conches in the schools.¹

With William of Conches the immediate and direct evolution of the Chartres Realism came to an end. Other personalities of the twelfth century have been placed in the light coming from this brilliant school, and owed to it a part of their formation. But either they abandoned the realism which was traditional there and taught elsewhere, or else they were influenced by other preoccupations.

108. Conclusion.—A close spiritual relationship united the masters of Chartres in their way of understanding and solving philosophical problems.

Their excessive realism is beyond question. It affects above all the species or substantial essence: the human individuals have reality only in and by the one unique *humanitas*. The universe is a plurality of irreducible types, constituting profound and distinct spheres of reality, which irradiate forth into multiple individuals. Exaggerated realism also extends to accidental attributes like quality, in which individuals share. It plays a less prominent part in the study of the genus common to several specific types, for instance, life. The reason is, apparently, that to the genus there does not correspond an exemplar or idea in God.

Platonists in their exaggerated realism, the Chartrains were Platonists also in their endeavour to explain the stability of essences by the divine *æqualitas*. On this important question their Platonism was supplemented by the doctrines of Augustine and Boethius. As in Augustine, the Ideas are God, regarded as the exemplar of all finite types, existing or possible. Compared to the divine Ideas, the corporeal types are only shadows. Like Boethius, whose formulæ they held in high esteem, the Chartrain philosophers stress the distance which separates the divine perfection from the imperfection of created things: God alone deserves to be called the *forma essendi*. Some say explicitly, and the others implicitly

¹ Grabmann, M. G., p. 32.

suppose, that the creative act alone explains the appearance of limited being and of matter, in which the reflections of the divine forms are localized. Creation is a primordial datum, a postulate which it would be superfluous to demonstrate.

The Chartrain philosophers were peaceful contemplators of the order of essences, and hardly mentioned the problem of becoming. Absolute monism or pantheism was foreign to their spirit.

109. Bibliography.—Editions: Fragments of Bernard of Chartres in John of Salisbury (Migne, *P. L.*, Vol. 199, col. 666 and 938). Theodoric: P. Thomas, *Mélanges Graux*, Paris, 1884, prints extracts from the commentary on the *De inventione rhetorica*.—Clarembald: W. Janssen, *Der Kommentar des Clarenbaldus von Arras zu Boethius De Trinitate*, Breslau, 1926 (publishes also the *Librum hunc*, probably by Theodoric of Chartres, and republishes extracts from the *De sex dierum operibus*, also by Theodoric, published already in 1893 by Hauréau).—Bernard of Tours: C. S. Barach and J. Wrobel, *Bernardus Silvestris, De mundi universitate libri duo*, Innsbruck, 1896.—William of Conches: Migne, *P. L.*, Vol. 90, col. 1127-78, republishes the *Philosophia* of William amongst the works of Bede; Vol. 172, col. 29-102, amongst the writings of Honorius of Autun. Fragments of the *Secunda* and *Tertia Philosophia* in V. Cousin, *Ouvrages inédits d'Abélard*, Paris, 1836, pp. 669-77. Fragments of the commentary on the *Timæus*, *ibid.*, pp. 648-57. (Identified by Hauréau.) Ch. Jourdain has published the Glosses on the *De consolatione philosophiæ*, in *Notices et extraits . . .* (Collections in quarto), XX, 2, Paris, 1862. J. Holmberg, *Das Moraliū dogma philosophorum des Guillaume de Conches*, Upsala, 1929 (Latin text with translation in old French and in Middle Low Franconian).

Studies: Bernard of Chartres: E. Gilson, *Le platonisme de Bernard de Chartres*, in *Revue Néo-Scholast.*, 1923, pp. 5-19.—Theodoric: P. Duhem, *Thierry de Chartres et Nicolas de Cues*, in *Revue des Sc. Phil. Theol.*, 1909, pp. 525-31; *Le système du monde*, Vol. III, pp. 184-93.—Clarembald: cf. W. Jansen, above.—Bernard of Tours: E. Gilson, *La cosmogonie de Bernardus Silvestris*, in *Arch. H.D.L.M.A.*, III, 1928, pp. 5-24. William of Conches: H. Flatten, *Die Philosophie des Wilhelm von Conches*, Coblenz, 1929; J. R. Williams, *Authorship of the Moraliū Dogma Philosophorum*, in *Speculum*, 1931, pp. 392-411. R. Klíbanksky announces an edition of the philosophical works of Theodoric of Chartres, and a general study on the school.

§ II.—*The opponents of exaggerated realism*

110. The anti-Realist formulæ.—Under this heading we group together numerous solutions which carried on the war

against *Exaggerated* Realism. Faithful to the mind of Boethius, these solutions are so many steps towards *Moderate* Realism. They are known to us chiefly through John of Salisbury. All consist of :

(i) Anti-Realist declarations : being exists only in the individual state and in consequence, as Boethius says, the ideas of humanity, life, and reason do not refer to universal realities, but to the individual substance, e.g., *this* man, looked at from different points of view.

(ii) The affirmation that all men are *unum et idem*, but this *unum* is a product of thought.

To this group of anti-Realist solutions at the first half of the twelfth century belong the doctrines of Adelard of Bath and of Walter of Mortagne, i.e., indifferentism, and the theory of the *collectio*.

111. Adelard of Bath and the theory of the "respectus."—Adelard of Bath, professor at Paris and at Laon, completed his scientific education by a voyage to Greece and to Spain. The *Quæstiones Naturales* resulted from this contact with a new world. In the prologue he praises the *Gallicarum sententiarum constantia* and the *Gallica studia*. In addition to a translation of Euclid made from the Arabic in 1116, an *Astrolabe* dedicated to Henry Plantaganet, and mathematical works, Adelard left a work *De eodem et diverso*, written in 1105-16, and dedicated to Bishop William of Syracuse. It consists of a dialogue between Philosophy (the unchangeable, *de eodem*), and Philocosmy (changeable knowledge, *de diverso*), full of Platonism as found in early sources (Chalcidius, Augustine, Boethius), and in the contemporary productions of Chartres. Plato is called *familiaris meus*. The treatise also contains a short description of the liberal arts, and Adelard's statements about dialectics show that he was acquainted with the whole of the *Organon*.

The *De eodem et diverso* opposes Exaggerated Realism : the same concrete being is genus, species and individual all at once, but according to different aspects (*respectus*).¹ Genus and species are ways of regarding the individual ; they are the terminus of a more profound intuition, *altius intuentes, acutius*

¹ Si res consideres, eidem essentiæ et generis et speciei et individui nomina imposita sunt, sed respectu diverso.—Willner, *ibid.*, p. 11.

considerata.¹ "Nihil ratione certius, nihil sensibus fallacius" (p. 13). Hence, the unity of the generic element in different individuals belongs to the conceptual and not to the real order, and the theory of the *respectus* is a stage in the development of anti-Realism. If Plato accords a separate reality to genera and species, this is because he considers them *extra sensibilia, in mente divina*. This leads Adelard to conclude: "Sic viri illi (Plato and Aristotle), licet verbis contrarii videantur, re tamen idem senserunt" (p. 23). Adelard does not examine the question further. The logical point of view of predication is uppermost in the treatise, and this leads to difficulties in the interpretation of the text. The same is true of an anonymous commentary on the *Isagoge*, which was published by Willner in an appendix to his edition of Adelard.

Adelard was more than an opponent of Exaggerated Realism. The *De eodem et diverso* and the *Quæstiones naturales* reveal him as a psychologist and a man of science, cultivating observation and experience. His psychology is inspired by Platonism and Augustinism. Intellectual knowledge, which is the only source of certitude, is innate, and the senses do not exert any causal influence upon its production. The immaterial soul created by God is a substance independent of the body, to which it is violently united. The faculties are identical with the soul.

From Constantine the African, Adelard adopted a theory concerning the localization of the functions of the soul, and various physiological ideas coming from Galen and Hippocrates. His cosmology, like that of William of Conches, consists of an atomism resembling that of Democritus; he stresses the Pythagorean idea of unity and harmony, and looks upon the universe as one great organism.

112. Walter of Mortagne and the theory of the "status."—

Born at Mortagne in Flanders, Walter² was educated in the

¹ Eosdem autem acutius intuentes videlicet non secundum quod sensualiter diversi sunt, sed in eo quod notantur ab hoc voce "homo" specimen vocaverunt —p. 11. Quoniam igitur illud idem quod vides, et genus et species et individuum sit, merito ea Aristoteles non nisi in sensibilibus esse proposuit. Sunt enim ipsa sensibilis, quamvis acutius considerata.—p. 12.

² Cf. De Wulf, *Histoire de la Philosophie en Belgique* (2nd edit., 1910), p. 34.

school of Tournai. From 1126 to 1144 he taught rhetoric and philosophy at Ste. Geneviève (Paris), and died as Bishop of Laon in 1174. Of his works we possess a *Tractatus de Sancta Trinitate*, and six *opuscula* of little philosophical interest. Walter adopts the Platonist attitude in a letter to Abelard, and regards the body as an obstacle to the exercise of the higher faculties of the soul.

It is through John of Salisbury that we know the formula of the *status* defended by Walter of Mortagne.¹ According to different states (*status*), Plato is an individual (Plato), a species (man), and subaltern or supreme genus (animal, substance). The text is laconic, and gives rise to exegetical difficulties, and in addition he refers to a second theory of the *status*.² The formula of Walter of Mortagne is simply another way of describing the *respectus* of Adelard of Bath, for both express themselves in similar terms when treating of the real identity of the individual, genus, and species.

Again the *Polycraticus*, VII, 12, attributes a conceptual function to the *status*, and affirms the existence of individuals alone: "Inde est quod sensibilibus aliisque singularibus apprehensis quoniam hæc sola veraciter esse dicuntur, ea in diversos status subvehit, pro quorum ratione in ipsis singularibus specialissima generalissimaque constituit."

According to a hypothesis of Hauréau, Walter would be the author of a text contained in MS. 17813 of the Latin Section of the *Bibliothèque Nationale*,³ in which we come across a new formula: indifferentism.

113. Indifferentism.—Besides the document just mentioned, we possess an account and a refutation of indifferentism in the *De generibus et speciebus*, in which we find the expression: *Sententia de indifferentia*. The formula "secundum indifferentiam" already occurs in the sentences of William of Champeaux, and was favoured by this writer when he gave up his realism

¹ *Metalog.*, II, 17: Eorum vero qui rebus inhaerent (the Realists), multæ sunt et diversæ opiniones, siquidem hic, ideo quod omne quod est, unum numero est (Migne wrongly gives: omne quod unum est, numero est) aut rem universalem, aut unam numero esse, aut omnino non esse concludit . . . Partiantur itaque status duce Gautero de Mauritania, et Platonem, in eo quod Plato est, dicunt individuum; in eo quod homo, speciem; in eo quod animal, genus, sed subalternum, in eo quod substantia, generalissimum.—Migne, *P.L.*, Vol. 199, 874-5.

² John of Salisbury mentions yet another theory of the *status*.

³ *Not. ex extr. qqnes man. latins*, V, 313, et seq. Paris, 1892.

(100). It is also found in the *Glossulæ super Porphyrium* of Abelard (Cousin's edition, p. 552).

It may be enunciated as follows. Every existing thing is an individual, but in every individual there are determinations which belong to it alone and which differentiate it from all others (*differens*), and also specific and generic realities which are found without any difference (*indifferentes*) in the other individuals of the species and genus. In so far as they are endowed with life and reason, men form an *unum et idem*. "Sed simpliciter attendatur Socrates, non ut Socrates, id est in omni proprietate Socratis, sed in quadam, scilicet in eo quod est animal rationale mortale, jam secundum hunc statum est differens et indifferens: *differens* a qualibet alia re existente hoc modo quod, ipse Socrates nec secundum statum hominis, nec secundum aliquem alium, est essentialiter aliquod aliorum; item *indifferens* est, id est consimilis cum quibusdam, scilicet cum Platone et cum aliis individuis hominis in eo quod in unoquoque eorum est animal rationale mortale. Et attende quod Socrates et unumquodque individuum hominis, in eo quod unumquodque est animal rationale mortale sunt *unum et idem*."¹ Although the text does not state the nature of this unity which is found in Socrates and the rest of men, it can only be a product of thought, for nothing exists outside the individual, *nihil omnino est præter individuum*.² Indifferentism is an anti-Realist formula.

114. The theory of the "collectio."—The same applies to the theory of the *collectio*, defended by the author of the *De generibus et speciebus* after expounding and refuting successively the theories of identity, indifferentism, and that of the *voces* (Roscelin). Every essence exists in the individual state. We call species the collection (*collectio*) of beings possessing this same essence, the unity thus attributed being based on the similarity of nature belonging to each one.³ In other words,

¹ Hauréau, *op. cit.*, V, 313 (Paris, 1892).

² *De gen. et spec.*, Cousin's edition, p. 518.

³ "Et sicut Socratitas quæ formaliter constituit Socratem, nusquam est extra Socratem, sic illa hominis essentia quæ Socratitatem sustinet in Socrate, nusquam est nisi in Socrate. Speciem igitur dico esse non illam essentiam hominis solum quæ est in Socrate, vel quæ est in aliquo alio individuorum, sed totam illam collectionem ex singulis aliis hujus naturæ conjunctam," —pp. 524 and 525. "Neque enim diversum judicaverunt unam essentiam illius concollectionis a tota collectione, sed idem, non quod hoc esset illud, sed quia similis creationis in materia et forma hoc erat cum illo."—p. 526.

while the preceding formulæ approach the question from the point of view of comprehension, the formula of the *collectio* looks at the *species* from the point of view of its extension. But why restrict the collection to the beings existing at a given moment? Why not include the possible beings? From his peculiar way of regarding the *collectio* the author derives certain consequences from the point of view of logical predication, but this does not prevent him from subscribing to the fundamental theses of anti-Realism.

John of Salisbury attributes to Jocelin of Soissons a theory of the *collectio* which agrees fairly well with the account in the treatise *De generibus et speciebus*: "Est et alius qui, cum Gausleno Suessionensi episcopo, universalitatem rebus in unum collectis attribuit, et singulis eamdem denuit" (*Metal.*, II, 17).

Finally, he also mentions an author who replaced *status* by *maneries rerum* (*Metal.*, II, 17; Migne wrongly has *materies rerum*), and regards this solution as an ultra-realistic one. After mentioning the theory of the *maneries rerum*, John of Salisbury concludes: "Longum erit, et a proposito penitus alienum, si singulorum opiniones posuero, vel errores; cum ut verbo comici utar: Fere quot homines, tot sententiæ" (II, 18).

Whatever the term employed—whether it be the *respectus* of Adelard of Bath, the *status* of Walter of Mortagne, the *non differens* of the indifferentists, or the *collectio* of Jocelin of Soissons—all these theories are rejections of Exaggerated Realism, and constitute so many steps towards the definitive solution. The decisive step was taken by Abelard.

115. Bibliography.—Adelard of Bath.—Editions: The *Quæstiones naturales* exist in various MSS. Edition based on Paris MS, by M. Müller (Beiträge, XXXI, 2), 1934. H. Willner, *Des Adelard von Bath Traktat De eodem et diverso*, Beiträge, IV, 1, Münster, 1903.—Studies: H. Willner, above. Ch. H. Haskins, *Adelard of Bath*, in *English Historical Review*, 1911, pp. 491–8.

William of Mortagne: Edition of the *De sancta Trinitate*, in B. Pez, *Thesaurus anecdot. novissimus*, II, 2 (Augsburg, 1721); *Letter of William in d'Archéry, Spicilegium*, III, Paris, 1723.

For the *De generibus et speciebus*, cf. Abelard (120).

§ 12.—*Abélard*

116. Peter Abélard was born at Le Pallet in 1079 of a military family. From the School of Roscelin he passed to that of William of Champeaux. He taught dialectics in turn at Melun, Corbeil, and at Paris, where he quarrelled with his old master. He occupied chairs at the School of Notre Dame and at Mont St. Geneviève. He was initiated in theology by Anselm of Laon, and in 1113 he himself taught the sacred science in the French metropolis before an enthusiastic audience. He was obliged to leave Paris in consequence of his romantic relations with Heloise, and he retired to the Abbey of St. Denis. He continued to keep in touch with Heloise, but the letters which purport to have been exchanged between them would seem to be a product of his romantic imagination. Later on the master retired to the solitude of Le Paraclet, and opened a school, to which flocked numerous hearers. A first condemnation took place in 1121. He became abbot of the monastery of St. Gildas in Brittany in 1125, then returned to Le Paraclet ; finally, from 1136 to 1140 he yielded to the attraction of the School of St. Geneviève in Paris, became famous there once again, and counted John of Salisbury among his hearers. In consequence of strong complaints of heresy formulated against him by St. Bernard, Abélard was summoned before the Council of Sens (1141), but he appealed to the Pope, and wrote out a defence in justification of his doctrine, the *Apologia* or *Apologeticus*. This, however, did not prevent him from being condemned by a Bull of Innocent II, who ordered him to maintain silence. As a result of these events, the master retired to Cluny, where he was received by Peter the Venerable. He died in 1142.

Abélard possessed the temperament of a feudal knight, excessive both in his faults and in his virtues. His *Historia calamitatum mearum* (1133-36) and his letters to Heloise count among the rare autobiographies of the time, and manifest the sentimentality of their author. He is boastful and bitter in his criticism of his contemporaries, and his judgment on them must be discounted. The recently discovered texts of Abelard magnify his personality, and reveal him as a mind of a very uncommon calibre. In philosophy he dominates the twelfth

century. More and more this champion of dialectics assumes an attractive rôle in history.

Abélard is very much given to dealing with the same subjects in successive treatises. This explains why his philosophical and theological works raise difficult questions of grouping and chronological arrangement.

Geyer suggests that we should distinguish three groups of logical works :¹

1. The literal commentaries on isolated treatises, prior to 1121. Such are the ones of which Cousin has published extracts from various manuscripts. There are others still unpublished, but not all are by Abélard. Abélard himself calls these glosses *Introductiones parvulorum*.

2. Systematic expositions of the whole of logic (1113 to 1120). These also are in the form of glosses. They are preceded by an introduction to the *Isagoge*, comprise several treatises, and discuss various philosophical questions, which their author deals with in a personal way. We possess this systematic *Logica* in two forms, called, from the Incipits, *Ingredientibus* and *Nostrorum petitioni sociorum*. Geyer has published from the former the glosses on Porphyry, the *Categories*, and the *Periermeneias*; and of the latter, the *Glossulæ super Porphyrium*. According to the Lunel MS.,² this is later than the former, and is an elaboration of it. It was written after 1120.

3. The *Dialectica*, published in great part by Cousin, a personal work and not a mere commentary. It dates from a later period, perhaps the second stay at Paris, for it mentions William of Champeaux and Roscelin, who died in 1121, and who would not have been mentioned by Abélard during their lifetime.

In theology, we may mention the *De unitate et trinitate divina*, written in 1118, condemned in 1121, and which exists in a double redaction. The *Theologia christiana* (1123-4) is a revision and a justification of the first treatise, and was in

¹ *Op. cit.* (120), p. 592.

² The *Glossulæ super Porphyrium* discovered by Ravaisson and summarised by de Remusat (*Abélard*, Paris, 1845, Vol. II, p. 93) were lost. Geyer has rediscovered them in a double form at Lunel, and Grabmann has found another manuscript at Milan, very similar to that of Lunel. Geyer publishes after the *Nostrorum petitioni* some anonymous glosses which resemble it and which he attributes to a disciple. He compares the tripartite division of the *Dialectica* with that of *Theology*, which in turn comprises three works.

turn represented in a third work, the *Theologia*, of which we possess the first part under the wrong title *Introductio ad theologiam*, and which is of uncertain date. We may also mention the *Sic et non* (1121-2), in a double redaction, and the *Scito te ipsum*, a moral treatise written between 1125 and 1138.

The *Historia calamitatum mearum* and the *Apologia* occupy a place apart. The *Dialogus inter Judæum, philosophum et christianum* dates from the stay at Cluny (1141-2).

117. Philosophy.—Abelard says of philosophy that it is the *scientia discernendi*, and the man who discerns is he “qui causas occultas rerum comprehendere ac deliberare valet” (p. 506).¹ Like Plato, he divides it into physics, ethics and logic (or dialectics), but he does not follow out this classification in a methodic manner. Apart from moral subjects, all his speculations are scattered in the dialectical treatises.

1. *The problem of universals and “nominalism.”* The very title of the works of Abelard is sufficient to indicate the prominent position he allots to logic, but this logic is made to serve fundamental philosophical questions, and especially the problem of universals.

Abelard first of all criticises the exclusivism of Roscelin, and deals the death-blow to exaggerated realism, by ridiculing William of Champeaux. Then, after demolishing, he builds up.

With this end he utilizes the theses enunciated before him by other opponents of exaggerated realism, and especially the *nihil est præter individuum*. Individual beings alone are capable of existing; every existing substance is individual; this particular man, this particular horse: “Singuli homines discreti ab invicem, cum in propriis differant tam essentiis quam formis” (p. 19). He willingly allows this other thesis of Roscelin, that human language is composed of conventional words which are general in form: *nativitas sermonum vel hominum institutio*.

Abelard goes beyond these elementary data, with which his predecessors had been content. On the one hand this word (*vox*) covers an abstract and general notion, and hence it is a *nomen* or *sermo*, i.e., in conformity with the terminology of Boethius, a discourse related to a content which is signified,

¹ Quotations, the source of which is not indicated, are taken from the Geyer edition (120).

a reality which is thought of: *nomen est vox significativa*. On the other hand, this *nomen* has a logical function; it is capable of being predicated of several subjects in a judgment, *natum prædicari de pluribus*. The unity of the logical order which belongs to the name "man" when we say "Peter is a man, and Paul is also"—only affects the predicate in the judgment. So that from this point of view the universal *nomen* is not a *res*. For a *res*, being an individual substance, can only be predicated of one subject, *rem de re prædicari monstrum ducunt*.

So far Abelard has considered only the logical function of the universal. It is in this sense that John of Salisbury attributes to him the theory of the *sermones*, and that on two occasions he compares his theory to that of Roscelin.¹ It is likewise in this sense that he calls him the founder of the *nominalis secta*. Following the English historian we can describe as "nominalism" the position, principally in logic, which consists of the various theories just quoted, but it must be borne in mind that this twelfth century nominalism has a very special sense. It is different from the nominalism of the fourteenth century, and still more from modern nominalism.

In this restricted sense, and in order to stress the finesse with which Abelard reviews the types of connection between predicates and subjects, we may with Geyer call this nominalism "eine Sprachlogik" (p. 623).

But there is in the dialectical works of Abelard more than a *scientia sermonicalis*. The master sets forth, in concise, elegant and decisive terms, some new theories which clarify the position of Boethius, and approximates to that of Aristotle.

For now the philosopher sets out the real problem: does the *nomen*, the idea "man" for instance, attain to something

¹ Shortly after the text concerning Roscelin (§6, n. 24), the *Metalogicus* adds: Alius sermones intuetur et ad illos detorquet quidquid alicubi de universalibus meminit scriptum. In hac opinione deprehensus est peripateticus palatinus Abælardus noster qui multos reliquit, et adhuc quidem aliquos habet professionis hujus sectatores et testes. Amici mei sunt, licet ita plerumque captivatam detorqueant litteram, ut vel durior animus, miseratione illius movetur. Rem de re prædicari monstrum ducunt, licet Aristoteles monstruositatis hujus auctor sit.—II, 17, Migne, *P.L.*, Vol. 199, col. 874. Again, after the text concerning Roscelin, the *Polycraticus* says: Sunt tamen adhuc qui deprehenduntur in vestigiis eorum [i.e., of those who look upon universals as *voces*] licet erubescant auctorem vel sententiis profiteri, solis nominibus inherentes, quod rebus et intellectibus substrahunt sermonibus ascribunt.—VII, 12 (Webb's edition, I, 142). Remusat, *op. cit.*, II, 104, gives an epitaph on Abelard which says: et genus et species sermones esse notavit.

similar in each man, *quod pluribus commune est rebus*? The question is a very important one, *quam rem in ipsam intelligam quæro*.

Abelard answers by a theory which is both psychological and criteriological.

Although each human individual is a substance distinct from every other, I grasp something which is similar in all men, namely, the *natura rei*. This content of thought leaves aside the individualizing envelope which clothes every element of reality, and it is this characteristic stripping off by the mind which constitutes the abstractive process. Genera and species are therefore immanent in individuals, and conversely, the *natura rei* is reflected in the terms which are combined by logic.¹

And here is the criteriological aspect of the reply. A concept of this kind is faithful, though inadequate; for there is nothing in the idea of man which does not as a matter of fact belong to every man, although I do not and cannot grasp the complete reality of which each man is constituted: *nihil nisi quod in ea est intelligo, sed non omnia quæ habet attendo*. If I were to deny the existence in the individual state (*status*) of any element of reality which I conceive, then my concept would be erroneous, *cassus*. But this is not the case, *non est ita*. My mind operates *divisim*, but does not affirm the *divisa*.²

This could not be improved upon, and Abelard surpasses not only Roscelin, but also the theorists of the *collectio*. The latter did not succeed in rising above the extension of the concept, "*quidam universalem rem non nisi in collectione*

¹ Neque enim substantia specierum diversa est ab essentia individuorum, nec res ita sicut vocabula diversas esse contingit. . . . Cum videlicet nec ipsæ, species habeant nisi per individua subsistere, etc."—*Dialect.*, ed. Cousin, p. 204.

² "Nunc . . . diligenter perquiramus, scilicet quæ sit illa communia causa secundum quam universale nomen impositum est . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 19). "Intellectus scilicet universalium fieri per abstractionem et quomodo eos solos, nudos, puros, nec tamen cassos appellamus, definiendum est" (*ibid.*, p. 24). One might think that abstraction deforms reality: "hujusmodi autem intellectus per abstractionem inde forsitan falsi vel vani videbantur, quod rem aliter quam subsistat, percipiant . . . rem aliter quam sit, videntur concipere atque ideo cassi esse. Sed non est ita. Si quis enim hoc modo aliter quam se habeat res intelligat . . . iste profecto cassus est intellectus." Abelard replies by this decisive text: "Sed hoc quidem non fit in abstractione. Cum enim hunc hominem tantum attendo in natura substantiæ vel corporis, non etiam animalis vel hominis vel grammatici, profecto nihil nisi quod in ea est, intelligo, sed non omnia quæ habet attendo . . . Aliter tamen quodam modo quod aliud est modus intelligendi quam subsistendi. Separatim namque hæc res ab alia, non separata intelligitur . . . Intellectus per abstractionem divisim attendit, non divisa, alioquin cassus esset."—*Ibid.*, pp. 25-6.

plurium sumunt" (p. 14). But Abélard deals with the *natura rei*, or the content of the concept before considering its elasticity. The triple question of Porphyry now becomes an easy one to solve (*facile*) (p. 27). It is not surprising that John of Salisbury, a partisan of the Aristotelian solutions, should have written of Abelard and of his followers as *amici mei*.

2. *The widening out of the problem of universals led Abelard to consider the question of ideology.* He develops at great length two important scholastic theses.

In the first place, there exists a distinction of nature between the sensible and imaginative perception, which is confined to the particular, and which we possess in common with animals, and the abstractive perception, "which perceives the same reality in another way," and which is peculiar to man. Anselm was aware of this doctrine, but he did not develop it. The abstractive perception, which is a fundamental activity of the mind, grasps a reality which is common to many individuals (*intellectus universalium*), and its content is not the singular (*intellectus universalium res ut discretas nullo modo attingunt*, p. 525). But there is also mention of an *intellectus singularium* which "propriam unius et quasi singularem formam tenet, hoc est ad unam tantum personam se habentem" (p. 21). Abelard does not discuss further this intuition of the individual by the mind. Neither does he explain what he means by a higher mode of knowledge, "*intelligentia solius Dei et valde paucorum hominum*" (p. 331), which is completely independent of the activity of the senses or even of the object to be known upon the soul.

For in the normal way—and this leads us to Abelard's second thesis, the content of abstract perception is drawn from the data of the senses, just as in a picture the design is perceived through the colours (p. 123). Accordingly, "*homines sensibus degunt*" (p. 331). The senses are the "*duces intellectus*," and Abélard does not fail to point out that already in the sensorial complexus there is contained the whole treasure of reality which the intelligence is to abstract from it. When we see a white horse, the sense perceives not only the white, but the foundation itself of the whiteness (*albedinem in fundamento*) and the substance of the horse (*substantiam equi*, p. 95).

3. *Abélard gathered together and emphasized the chief thesis of pluralistic metaphysics.* Every substance is individual. God alone is *substantia incommutabilis, simplex*, and when we call Him Intelligence or Providence or apply to Him any other attribute (*forma*), we are not dealing with anything in Him which is not His very substance (p. 27). Hence the *formæ exemplares* are God Himself.¹ He is distinct from every other being, *divina substantia ab omnibus formis aliena* (p. 515). Human beings have a *personalis discretio* (p. 49), which constitute their individuality. Their personality would remain even were they to lose all their accidents, "*ut si hic calvus non esset vel hic simus*" (p. 64).

In several passages in the logical works we find the couple of matter and form, but Abélard did not rise as far as the Aristotelian idea. The *forma* for him is an accidental determination, received in a pre-existing subject or *materia*, just as the contour of a statue is received in the bronze. He declines to allow that a composition of this kind can strictly apply in the case of the *animale* and *rationalitas* which constitute man (p. 79).

4. *Abélard was also one of the principal moralists of his time*, and he has indeed been called the founder of the moral system of the Middle Ages. His moral doctrines are still incorporated into a theological framework, but we see the beginnings of purely rational solutions in the constant endeavour, revealed in the *Scito te ipsum*, to refer all ethical problems to the subjective conscience—a notion which occupies a central place in his doctrine. Intention is more important than the act, and an error in judgment lessens the fault. Studies on sin, grace and freedom count among his favourite subjects, and he looks upon Christian morality as a *reformatio* of natural ethics.

118. Theology.—No less important was the contribution of Abélard to scholastic theology. One fundamental question concerns us here: the relations between philosophy and theology. It will be useful to distinguish between Abélard's principles, and his applications of these.

The principles themselves are noteworthy. Here are the most important :

¹ *Introd. ad theolog.*, I, 9 (Migne, *P.L.*, Vol. 178, c. 991, A).

Although there is an impassable gulf between faith and reason, and accordingly between the theology and the philosophy which are based upon these, if theology is to reach the dignity of a science it must make use of philosophy, and particularly of dialectics. The help which the latter can give is of various kinds.

In the first place, we may see the influence of the dialectic spirit in this new and very clear division of the subject-matter which Abélard proposes—a characteristic division, which will serve as a criterion when we have to deal with the diffusion of his ideas. *Fides, caritas, sacramentum* are the three main ideas around which all others are grouped.¹

Next, the constructive methods of theology are borrowed from dialectics: we must seek in the authorities the *for* and *against* of each question, in order then to work out a suitable solution. With greater mastery than in the *Dialectica*, Abélard practices this pedagogical method in his *Sic et non*, and helps to ensure its success. Dealing with a hundred and fifty theological questions, he assembles together a collection of divergent texts which he borrows principally from Yves of Chartres. This setting forth of arguments *for* and *against* is preliminary to a work of concordance, for the prologue contains an appeal to dialectics in order to arrive at a harmony of the opposed texts: the same word, he says, has in different authors and at different times, different senses. If we bear this in mind, the oppositions disappear, and the mind rediscovers unity. In his *Apologia*, Abélard argues that the same word may exchange its sense according to the syntax of the phrase, and he infers that he himself has not taught the heresy concerning the *potentia* of the three Divine persons which St. Bernard had imputed to him, and he insinuates that his opponent is not at home in these dialectical subtleties.² The dialectic method which consists in setting forth successively the arguments *for* and *against* and the *solution*, was already in use in the canonists of the eleventh century, as, for instance, in Bernold of Constance (died 1100) and Yves of Chartres (died 1116). It was to be carried on and perfected by the summists of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

It is again from dialectics that Abélard as a theologian

¹ *Theologia*, Migne, *P.L.*, vol. 178, c. 981 C.

² Grabmann, *op. cit.* (120), pp. 15 and 25.

borrowed the practice of the *quæstio* and the *interrogatio*, that is, "methodic doubt," as well as the Aristotelian method of "apories" as taught in the *Logica nova*. "Dubitando enim ad inquisitionem venimus, inquirendo veritatem percipimus" (p. 223). In view of this fact, Robert ascribes to the *Sic et Non* a preponderating influence on the theological method of teaching and exposition after Abelard. Grabmann, while not denying this influence, makes a twofold reservation: the *disputatio* was not fully introduced as a scholastic exercise until the end of the thirteenth century, and secondly, we must attribute to the *Logica nova*, and especially to the *Topics*, an influence at least as powerful as that of Abelard himself.¹

Lastly and above all, Abélard puts arguments from reason at the service of the doctrines of the faith. For dialectics, which enables us to discern between the true and the false, is also acquainted with the Catholic faith.² It is of course true that the human mind cannot demonstrate (*comprehendere*) a mystery, or have of it the experimental knowledge arising from things present to consciousness (*cognoscere seu manifestare*), but at any rate it can arrive at an approximate notion of it by means of analogies and similitudes (*intelligere vel credere*).³ Geyer remarks (pp. 600-2) that the solution given by Abelard to the problem of universals does not help in the elaboration of the theory of the Trinity, but on the other hand that we find in the *De unitate* and the *Theologia christiana* texts on the *idem* and the *diversum* which are borrowed from the dialectics of the *Nostrorum petitioni*.

The principles of Abelard are thus far removed from rationalism. Does he remain faithful to them when he passes on to their applications? It has often been said that in his anxiety to combat the tritheism of Roscelin he himself destroys the mystery of the Trinity, inasmuch as he declares it accessible to the human reason. The Greeks, he says, had intuitions of it, for we discover the three persons in the triad of the One, the *voûs* and the World-Soul. It is added that, in order the better to establish the unity of God, Abélard subscribes

¹ Robert, *Les écoles et l'enseignement de la théologie*, pp. 170-8; Grabmann, *Geschichte der scol. Methode*, II, pp. 217-221.

² *Haec autem est dialectica, cui quidem omnis veritatis vel falsis discretio . . . subjecta est . . . Quæ fidei quoque catholicæ ita necessaria monstratur*, ed. Cousin, p. 435.

³ Terminology established by Kaiser, *Pierre Abélard critique*; cf. Heitz, *op. cit.* (20, VII), pp. 16, sqq., and Grabmann, *Gesch. d. Scol. Meth.*, II, 18.

to a kind of Sabellianism: the three persons, it would seem, do not constitute each one the whole divine essence, but represent modalities of one unique essence, corresponding respectively to the divine power, wisdom, and goodness, just as in dialectics the same discourse (*oratio*) is at one and the same time *propositio*, *assumptio* and *conclusio* (*Theol.*, II, 12). Otto of Freising, who points out the comparison, says of Abelard: "sententiam ergo vocum seu nominum in naturali tenens facultate non caute theologiæ admiscuit."¹ Finally, Abelard is accused of teaching *quod Christus secundum quod homo non sit aliquid*, which de Ghellinck calls a Christological nihilism.²

It is not necessary for us here to discuss these matters in detail. We will confine ourselves to remarking that in theology, as in philosophy, the present tendency of historians is rather to rehabilitate Abelard. J. Cottiaux, in a recent study, concludes, "contrary to the current opinion," that in general there is no contradiction between Abelard's principles and his method.³ On the other hand, Grabmann writes that if Abelard's principles are beyond criticism, the use which he makes of them does not always keep within just limits.⁴ Ottaviano arrives at a similar conclusion (120).

St. Bernard did all he could in order to oppose the explanation offered by Abelard of the doctrine of the Trinity. He declared this explanation to be heretical, because "cum Ario gradus et scalas ponit in Trinitate."⁵ In the *Apologia* which Abelard drew up in order to reply, in the Synod of Sens, to eighteen accusations of heresy, and fragments of which have been rediscovered and published by Grabmann (*proemium*, reply to the first accusation, and the beginning of the reply to the second), he defends himself with the utmost energy, and denies that he had taught the doctrines attributed to him. The two condemnations passed upon him, to which he duly submitted, helped to inspire many with an excessive mistrust of philosophy.

Abelard founded a school of thought in theology, as we shall see later on.

¹ *De gestis Freder.*, I, 47; *Monum. Germ. histori.*, SS. XX, 377.

² *Op. cit.* (120), p. 153.

³ *Op. cit.* (120), p. 822.

⁴ *Gesch. der katholischen Theologie*, p. 37.

⁵ Ep. 330, Migne, *P.L.*, Vol. 182, c. 536.

119. Conclusion. Expansion of Moderate Realism.—The texts of Abelard on universals are decisive. It is to him that the merit belongs of having considered the problem under all its aspects, and of having co-ordinated the theories implied in a complete solution. Starting out from the dialectical point of view, and the verbal analyses to which his predecessors and contemporaries had confined themselves, Abelard went on to study the problem from the criteriological point of view, and by this critical study he was led on to the metaphysical and psychological aspects of the question.

In other words, he was the first to solve the Porphyrian enigma which had puzzled men's minds for two centuries. The great doctors of the thirteenth century will have nothing to add to his formulæ. This is no small merit. His analyses led him on to the psychology of abstraction, and the way in which he describes the collaboration of the senses and the intellect is altogether in the spirit of the *Treatise on the Soul*, with which, nevertheless, he was unacquainted. The theories of the active intellect and the passive understanding, which appear in the thirteenth century, are but the logical extension of his doctrine.

Abelard marks a turning point in the history of the twelfth century. After him, exaggerated realism declines and disappears. Master Alberic was one of its last representatives.

Gilbert de la Porrée was influenced by the ascendancy of Abelard, and adopted his moderate realism. Geyer finds Abelardian formulæ in the glosses on the *Isagoge* and the *Treatise on Interpretation* which Cousin attributed to Rhaban Maur, Prantl to a pseudo-Rhaban, and Reiners to an author of the beginning of the tenth century.¹ Reiners had already pointed out that these contain the doctrines of Boethius on the real value of the individual substance to which our predicates belong, and that they mention the verbalistic interpretation (*sententia vocum*) of a group of logicians of the eleventh century. These glosses accordingly belong to the beginning of the twelfth century. Lastly, the Abelardian realism is clearly set forth in an anonymous treatise *De Intellectibus* printed by Cousin among the works of Abelard,

¹ Ueberweg-Geyer, *Grundriss* . . . p. 180; Cousin, *op. cit.*, p. lxxviii; Reiners, *Beiträge*, VIII, 5, p. 21, note. "Quorum tamen sententia est Porphyrii intentionem fuisse in hoc opere non de quinque rebus, sed de quinque vocibus tractare."—Cousin, *ibid.*

and which is probably the work of a disciple. We therein find set forth with a hitherto unknown precision the sensible origin of ideas (*totam humanam notitiam a sensibus adeo urgere*, p. 747), the immateriality of the concept, and the function of abstraction. The intelligence conceives the real *absque suorum scilicet individuorum discretione* (p. 745); the universal is the product of a mental "precision," *ab individuis universale abstrahitur*, but the content of the universal idea belongs to real or possible beings.

120. Bibliography.—Editions: V. Cousin, *Ouvrages inédits d'Abélard* Paris, 1836 (contains amongst others the fragment *De generibus et speciebus*, wrongly attributed to Abélard); *Petri Abaelardi opera*, 2 vols., Paris, 1849-59; R. Stolzle, *Abaelards 1121 zu Soissons verurtheilter Tractatus de unitate et trinitate divina*, Freiburg-im-Breisgau., 1891; B. Geyer, *Peter Abaelards philosophische Schriften*, four sections, Beiträge, XXI, 1-4, Munster (W.), 1919-33; P. Ruf and M. Grabmann, *Ein neuaufgefundenes Bruchstück der Apologia Abaelards*, Sitz, M., 1930, fasc. V.

Studies: Ch. de Remusat, *Abélard*, 2 vols., Paris, 1845; P. Lasserre, *Un conflit religieux au XIIe s. Abélard contre S. Bernard*, Paris, 1930 (lacks historical precision); C. Ottaviano, *Pietro Abelardo, La vita, le opere, il pensiero*, Rome, 1931; G. de Giuli, *Abelardo e la morale*, in *Giornale critico della filos. ital.*, 1931, pp. 33-44; G. Delagneau, *Le concile de Sens de 1140, Abélard et S. Bernard*, in *Revue apologétique*, 1931, pp. 385-408; J. G. Sikes, *Peter Abaelard*, Cambridge, 1932 (adopts our view of Abélard's nominalism); J. Cottiaux, *La conception de la théologie chez Abélard*, in *Revue Hist. Ecclés.*, 1932, pp. 247-95, 533-51, 788-828; H. Waddell *Peter Abélard*, London, 1933; J. Rivière, *Les 'capitula' d'Abélard condamnés au concile de Sens*, in *Rech. T.A.M.*, 1933, pp. 5-22.

§ 13.—Gilbert de la Porrée

121. Life and Writings.—Gilbert de la Porrée was one of the prominent personages of the thirteenth century, by reason of his relations with all the best known masters, the high offices he occupied, and by his own philosophical and theological teaching, which had great repercussions. Born at Poitiers (1076), he was united in bonds of friendship to Bernard of Chartres, and became his disciple. He himself taught at Chartres for more than a dozen years, and was Chancellor of the school. Later on we find him as a master at Paris (1141), and John of Salisbury, who attended his lectures,

assures us of the great reputation which he enjoyed in the metropolis of letters. In 1142 he became Bishop of Poitiers, and continued to hold this office until his death in 1154, retaining the while his professional functions. His most important philosophical works are the *Liber sex principiorum*, and commentaries on Boethius' *De Trinitate* and *De duabus naturis in Christo*. The work *De causis* has been erroneously attributed to him.

122. Philosophy.—Gilbert was greatly influenced by Boethius and his deductive method; he also worked on the new books commented on by Theodoric of Chartres; but especially he undertook, in the *Liber sex principiorum*, to complete the *Categories* of Aristotle. To the four predicaments studied by Aristotle (substance, quantity, quality and relation), and which Gilbert calls *formæ inhærentes*, he adds the *formæ adjacentes*, or accidents which characterize the substance in relation to other substances (*actio, passio, ubi, quando, situs, habere*; a preliminary chapter studies the *forma*). It is easy to see that the proposed classification will not do, for it is difficult to place relation among the absolute accidents. But it is the endeavour to complete Aristotle which is a novelty, and it assured the fame of the author. Included in the list of classical manuals (p. 79), the *Liber sex principiorum* was commented on by Albert the Great and Robert Kilwardby, was quoted by St. Thomas, and studied right up to the end of the Middle Ages.

Gilbert was a resolute opponent of excessive realism: essences exist only in individuals, and are really multiplied in each one of them. "Unus enim homo una singulari humanitate. . . . ut pluribus humanitatibus plures homines et substantiæ."¹ The "native forms" or *subsistentiæ* inherent in sensible things are copies of the Divine ideas, or pure forms, from which they differ essentially: Gilbert adopts the thesis of his master Bernard and thus succeeds in harmonizing his solution of universals with the theory of exemplarism.² But what then is the origin and value of universals? Gilbert replies: the mind compares (*colligit*) the essential determinations (*diversæ subsistentiæ*) realized in various beings, and

¹ In *Boeth. de duab. nat.*, Migne, P. L., Vol. 64, 1378.

² In *Boeth. de Trinit.*, *ibid.*, 1734.

brings about a mental union of their similar realities : it is this similar or conformable element (*cum-forma*, with the same form) which is called the genus or species. "Universalia quæ intellectus ex particularibus colligit." Or again : the genus and species are the collection of beings in which are found these similar realities, although the latter belong properly to each one of them,¹ *quamvis conformes, tamen diversas* (col. 1262). The *ratio* abstracts them, *quodammodo abstrahit, ut earum naturam perspicere et proprietatem comprehendere possit* (col. 1374).

In considering sensible things, abstraction disengages certain primary judgments or principles, some of which are *rationes communes*, common to a generic element of the object studied, whilst others are *rationes propriæ*, which apply exclusively to the specific elements. From this Aristotelian theory, connected with the *Posterior Analytics*, Gilbert infers that each object of knowledge has its principles, which are not to be transferred to the study of any other object. It follows from this that one cannot apply to God judgments which are valid only for the sensible world.²

If now we consider the internal structure of some one actual and individual being, Gilbert here introduces a distinction between the essential realities which it possesses and which are found similarly in other things (*subsistentia, id quo est*), and the individual determination which places it in the realm of real existence (*substantia, id quod est*). "Genera et species, i.e., generales et speciales subsistentiæ, subsistunt tantum, non substant vere" (*ibid.*, 1318). In other words, when he establishes the relation in an individual being between the common and the individualized essence, he seems to regard the latter as a part really distinct from the former. The same

¹ Genus vero nihil aliud putandum est, nisi subsistentiarum secundum totam earum proprietatem ex rebus secundum species suas differentibus similitudine comparata collectio, etc.—*ibid.*, 1389.

² C. 1255 and 1283. Prantl calls Gilbert an ontologicist realist (?) (*op. cit.*, II, 221); Stöckl a conceptualist (*op. cit.*, I, 227); Clerval an exaggerated realist (*op. cit.*, 262). The following is the laconic judgment of John of Salisbury on Gilbert : Universalitatem formis nativis attribuit . . . Est autem forma nativa, originalis exemplum, et quæ non in mente Dei consistit, sed rebus creatis inhæret. Hæc græco eloquio dicitur εἶδος habens se ad ideam ut exemplum ad exemplar ; sensibilis quidem in re sensibili, sed mente concipitur insensibilis, singularis quoque in singularibus, sed in omnibus universalis.—*Metal.*, II, 17. The "in omnibus universalis" must evidently be harmonized with "singularis quoque in singularibus" which leaves no doubt as to Gilbert's anti-realism.

tendency leads him to look upon certain transcendental attributes of individuals—such as unity—as proper *subsistentia*, whereas of course they are not really distinct from the being itself.¹ But none of these doctrines contradict Moderate Realism, for these metaphysical elements of a being are endowed not with a universal existence, but with one which is proper to each individual.

When he opposes *form* to *matter*, Gilbert makes the former a property of the being, thus perpetuating an erroneous conception peculiar to this period. It is not surprising, in consequence, that he admits a plurality of forms.

From the standpoint of the continuity of ideas, the most remarkable feature in Gilbert's philosophy is the way in which he breaks away from realist tendencies; these were at that time becoming more and more accentuated, and were leading the Chartrain realism into a metaphysical impasse. Gilbert gave a powerful thrust in the direction of pluralism, and took his stand at the side of Abélard in the growing group of moderate realists. The same is true of John of Salisbury, who likewise separated from the Chartres masters on fundamental questions of metaphysics. The defection of these two men broke the influence of the Chartrain schools.

123. Theology.—Gilbert de la Porrée was also a theologian of note, and his metaphysical doctrines had their repercussions in his interpretations of the Holy Trinity. We may say of him as of Abelard that, after establishing between faith and reason theoretical relations which safeguarded the superiority of the former and the instrumental function of the latter, he ended up in heretical conclusions upon certain points of doctrine. He extends to God the distinction between the universal and the singular, and "regards God (*Deus*) and the Divinity (*Divinitas*), the Father and Paternity, and even Nature and Person, as different things." This is a denial of the Divine unity. These propositions gave rise to violent controversies. Clarendon of Arras devotes a great part of his commentary *De Trinitate* to the *error episcopi Pictaviensis*, and tells us that at the Council of Rheims in 1148 his

¹ *Ibid.*, 1148. Quod est unum, res est unitati subjecta, cui scilicet vel ipsa unitas inest, ut albo, vel adest ut albedini . . . Ideoque non unitas ipsa sed quod ei subjectum est, unum est. Cf. Prantl, p. 221.

book was condemned, and forbidden in lectures to students and to monks: "damnatusque tam scholarium lectionibus quam claustralium" (ed. Jansen, p. 78). The opinions of the Bishop of Poitiers also made him the object of attacks by St. Bernard and his secretary Geoffrey, who wrote a *Libellus contra capitula Gilleberti Porretani* (Migne, *P.L.*, Vol. 185). Walter of St. Victor included him among the four masters who had led French theological science astray.

After the synod of Rheims, Gilbert withdrew the condemned propositions. In spite of this, a whole group of theologians followed in his footsteps, as we shall see later on.

124. Otto of Freising.—Among the contemporaries of Gilbert who were influenced by his metaphysics we must mention, besides the anonymous author of the *Liber de Vera Philosophia*, the historian Otto of Freising (1114/15-1158), educated at Paris and afterwards Bishop of Freising. His two great works, in which one is pleased to find a philosophy of history, the *Chronicon sive historia de duabus civitatibus* and the *Gesta Frederici imperatoris*, contain in connection with some historical episodes digressions dealing with the Greek philosophers, universals, logic, and the Divine nature.¹ Gilbert's theories concerning native forms, the similitude of the specific essence, and other metaphysical notions are faithfully adhered to.² We have already mentioned the rôle of Otto as a propagator of the *Logica nova* in Germany (p. 59). The *Gesta* give places of honour to the prominent personalities in the intellectual movement of the twelfth century.

125. The Sophists.—The middle of the twelfth century witnessed a recrudescence of the sophistic logic which had not ceased to develop in the schools as a sort of parasitical movement. The putting into circulation of the *Logica nova* furnished a new field for subtleties. John of Salisbury wrote in scathing language about these *nugiloquos ventilatores*, word-tricksters,

¹ *Chron.*, II; *Gesta*, I, 5 and 60.

² The texts are collected by Schmidlin, *Die Philos. Otto's v. F.*, p. 321 *et seq.*, and given side by side with corresponding texts of Gilbert. Universalem dico non ex eo quod una in pluribus sit, quod est impossibile, sed ex hoc, quod plura in similitudine uniendo ab assimilandi unione universalis, quasi in unum versalis dicitur.—*Gesta*, I, 53. Quamvis Socrates et Plato ratione partiendi in numerum veniant, ut duo dicantur homines, tamen ratione assimilandi unus possunt dici homo.—I, 5.

who argue for the sake of arguing, and who imagine that dialectics consists of verbosity, *qui sapientiam verba putant*.¹ His *Cornificius* is one of their number. In their school they discuss whether a pig led to market is held by a rope or by the one leading it (*Metalog.*, I, 3). Alexander Neckam, who was at Paris about 1180, mentions other discussions of the same kind,² and his *De Naturis Rerum* contains a thorough-going attack on these abuses of Logic. The best known of these dialecticians was a certain Adam. Born at Balsham near Cambridge, and called "du Petit Pont" (Parvipontanus) because he taught the *trivium* in a school situated near the little bridge over the Seine. His *Ars Dialectica* (1132) was a triumph of sophistry. These sterile discussions, which undiscerning historians have identified with scholasticism, are simply its counterfeit.

126. Bibliography.—Gilbert.—Editions: Migne, *P. L.*, Vol. 64, col. 1255-1412 (Comment. on Boethius); Vol. 188, col. 1257-70 (*De sex principiis*). B. Geyer, *Die Sententiæ divinitatis, ein Sentenzenbuch des Gilbertschen Schule*, Beiträge, VII, 2-3, Munster, 1909; A. Heyse, *Liber de sex principiis Gilberto Porretano ascriptus*, Munster, 1929 (Opusc. et textes, 7).—Studies: A. Berthaud, *Gilbert de la Porrée et sa philosophie*, Poitiers, 1892; A. Landgraf, *Untersuchungen zu den Eigenlehren Gilberts de la Porrée*, in *Zeitschrift für kath. Theol.*, 1930, pp. 180-213; A. Forest, *Le réalisme de Gilbert de la Porrée dans le commentaire du 'De hebdomadibus'*, in *Revue Néo-Scolast.*, 1934, Vol. 36, pp. 101-10; J. de Ghellinck, *L'histoire de 'persona' et d' 'hypostasis' dans un écrit anonyme porrétaïn du XIIe s.*, *ibid.*, pp. 111-27.

Otto of Freising.—Edition: R. Wilmans, in *Monum. Germ. histor.*, SS., XX, pp. 83-301, 338-493.—Studies: J. Schmidlin, *Die Philosophie Ottos von Freising*, in *Philos. Jahrb.*, 1905, pp. 156-75, 312-23, 407-23. A. Hofmeister, *Studien über Otto von Freising*, in *Neues Archiv.*, 1911-12, pp. 99-161, 633-768; X, *Otto von Freising in seiner Schriften*, Cisterzienser Chronik, 1933.

¹ *Polycrat.*, VII, 12. Again: *Fiunt itaque in puerilibus Academici senes, omnem dictorum aut scriptorum excutiunt syllabam, imo et litteram; dubitantes ad omnia, quærentes semper, sed nunquam ad scientiam pervenientes.*—*Metalog.*, II, 7. Debuerat Aristoteles hanc compescuisse intemperiem eorum, qui indiscretam loquacitatem dialecticæ exercitium putant.—*ibid.*, II, 8.

² *De naturis rerum*, in the chapter *De septem artibus* (Wright's edition in *Rolls Series*, 1863, p. 303): *Docuere idem enuntiabile omni tempore fuisse verum et omni tempore fuisse falsum . . . Docuere infinitam esse lineam, et nullam lineam esse infinitam, salve pace Aristotelis.*

§ 14.—*The School of St. Victor*

127.—Hugh of St. Victor, born at Hartingam in Saxony (1106), was educated at Paris, where he went at the age of 19 years. He entered the Monastery of St. Victor at Paris (1115), and taught there from 1125 onwards. In 1133 he took over the direction of the teaching, and continued to supervise it until his death in 1141.

From the philosophical point of view, his chief work was the *Didascalion* or *Eruditionis didascalicæ libri VII*. This work, of which three books are devoted to the liberal arts and three to theology, is an epitome of the sacred and profane knowledge of the twelfth century. A seventh book forms a separate treatise, on meditation. The *Epitome in philosophiam* is a developed form of the first books of the *Didascalion*.

In theology, we may mention the *De sacramentis legis naturalis et scriptæ*, and especially the *De sacramentis christianæ fidei* (1136-41), which is a first-class work. The *Summa sententiarum*, the authorship of which is much discussed (see later on) would seem not to be his work. Besides works on Holy Scripture, Hugh wrote a commentary on the *Celestial Hierarchy* of pseudo-Dionysius, making use of the translation by John Scotus, an opusculum *De unione corporis et spiritus*, and numerous mystical works (*De arca Noe morali*, *De arca Noe mystica*, *De vanitate mundi*, *De arrha animæ*, *De amore sponsi ad sponsam*, etc.). An *Epitome in philosophiam* and the *De contemplatione et ejus speciebus* are as yet unpublished.

Hugh was a complex personality—a philosopher and a humanist, a dogmatic theologian and a mystic—qualities which fitted together in him in a very harmonious way, and made him one of the most cultivated men of his time.

128. Philosophy.—It is not true that he looked upon philosophy with the same proud disdain as some of his successors at St. Victor. The contrary is the case. While Peter Damian considered profane knowledge as a *superfluum*, Hugh wrote these striking words: *Omnia disce, videbis postea nihil esse superfluum* (*Didasc.*, VI, 3). He not only wished to know all things, but he also co-ordinated what he knew, and from this standpoint he well represents the synthetic tendencies

which manifested themselves more or less everywhere, and prepared the way for the great thirteenth century. The following points in his philosophy are worthy of note :

(i) The classification of the sciences found in his *Didascalion*, which with other similar efforts inspired the classifications of the thirteenth century. Hugh writes at length on the three conditions for the acquisition of knowledge : natural talent (*natura*), scholarly practice (*exercitium*, including *lectio* and *meditatio*), and zeal (*disciplina*).

Substituting the Aristotelian divisions for the Platonist scheme, he introduced into profane knowledge the following division : 1. Theorica (theology, mathematics, physics ; mathematics including the sciences of the *quadrivium*). 2. Practica (ethics, economics, politics). 3. Mechanica (*scientiæ adulterinæ*). Logic is given a place apart ; it is the preamble to and condition of all knowledge (Boethius). It has as its object, not things but the *intellectus* (*Didasc.*, II, 18), and it includes *grammatica*, and the *ratio disserendi*.

(ii) The proofs for the existence of God open a new phase in the history of natural theology. For Hugh abandons *a priori* arguments, and bases himself exclusively on experience. On internal experience above all : from the existence of an ego which is not always known, he concludes that it has begun to be, and thence he infers the existence of a Being to whom all else owes its existence. He argues also from external experience, which bears witness to the mutability of things, and leads us to infer the fact that they have begun to be, and thence to the existence of the Creator.¹

(iii) The affirmation of pluralism. In his exegesis of pseudo-Dionysius, Hugh clearly manifests his antipathy for pantheism, and corrects in an individualistic sense the suspected formulæ of John Scotus Erigena.² He adopts Abélard's solution of the problem of universals. In connection with the composition of bodies, pluralism leads him to a rather confused atomist theory : bodies are constituted of atoms the motion of which explains the change of corporeal forms, but these simple elements

¹ See the texts in Grunwald, *op. cit.* (99), p. 69 *et seq.*

² Ostler, *Die Psychol. des H. v. St. Victor*, p. 9, n. 3, gives many examples. Speaking of the unity of beings in God, he says : " *ut unum sint in illo, qui unam trahunt similitudinem ex illo.*"

instead of being fixed and unchangeable are capable of multiplication and growth.¹

(iv) Psychology was his favourite study, as we should expect in a mystic. His system was inspired by Augustine and pseudo-Augustinian theories in all that concerns the nature of the substantial ego and the soul. The soul is not other than the ego ; it is one, spiritual, and immortal ; it alone constitutes the human person, and the body shares in personality only because it is united to the soul.² The faculties of the soul are developments of its being.

The theory of knowledge is Aristotelian in inspiration, and harmonises very well with the solution of the problem of universals. Hugh distinguishes clearly between sensation and imagination on the one hand, and abstract and general thought on the other, and he represents the latter after the manner of Abélard, as the disengaging or isolating of some element (*actus*) belonging to the essence of the things considered, so that reason regards apart (*inconfuse*) that which is mingled in the reality (*confuse*, "Actus confusos inconfuse per rationem attendere"). He applies this psychological analysis to mathematics and to physics. Thus, the mathematician can consider a line as such (*pure, per se*), although in bodies there is no line which does not form part of a surface. In the same way, sensible bodies result from a combination (*permistos*) of the four elements, while the physicist directs his abstractive attention to one of them, as for example to pure fire, the nature of which he scrutinizes.³ Abelard spoke in the same sense of *divisim non divisa considerare*, but perhaps his language was more precise than that of Hugh. For the example which the latter borrows from physics is fallacious,

¹ Qualia sunt corpora simplicia, quæ atomos dicunt, quæ quidem ex materia non sunt quia simplicia sunt, sed tamen materia fiunt, qua in semetipsis multiplicantur et in augmentum excrescunt.—*Sacram.*, I, vi, 37 (Migne, P. L., Vol. 176, col. 286).

² In quantum ergo corpus cum anima unitum est, una persona cum anima est ; sed tamen personam esse anima ex se habet, in quantum est rationalis spiritus ; corpus vero ex anima habet, in quantum unitum est rationali spiritui.—*Ibid.* (col. 408).

³ Mathematicæ autem proprium est actus confusos inconfuse per rationem attendere, verbi gratia in actu rerum non invenitur linea sine superficie et soliditate . . . ratio tamen attendit sine superficie et crassitudine lineam pure per se. . . . Physicæ autem est proprium actus rerum permistos impermiste attendere. Actus enim corporum mundi non sunt puri, sed compositi ab actibus purorum quos physica . . . pure tamen et per se considerat purum scilicet actum ignis, etc. (*Didasc.*, II, 18.)

and seems to imply that to the various contents of abstract notions there correspond really distinct exterior objects, as is the case for water and fire. Abelard, on the other hand, more penetrating, applies his theory of abstraction to genera and species, which are the same real being. Later on Thomas Aquinas will make all this clear.

No less noteworthy is Hugh's outline of an explanation of the origin of abstraction: the content of the sensible image (from which the mind is going to derive the abstract notion) is placed in a sphere of light, inasmuch as though it is obscure in itself, the image is clarified by a rational light which "circumscribes" its content.

Hugh speaks of the *ratio in imaginationem agens*. "Postquam imaginatio usque ad rationem ascendit, quas umbra in lucem veniens et luci superveniens, in quantum ad eam venit, manifestatur et circumscribitur" (*De unione corp. et animæ*, Migne, *P.L.*, Vol. 177, col. 288).

Such a theory of sense knowledge fits in very well with the general economy of knowledge. For the soul has a threefold object, or a threefold vision. In addition to the *oculus carnis*, by which it knows the sensible world, and in which sensation, imagination and abstraction have their place, the soul penetrates itself by means of introspection (*oculus rationis*), and by the *oculus contemplationis* it attains to God. The consciousness of self bears witness not only to the existence of the soul, but the wise man also discovers in the inmost self the substantiality of the soul, its spirituality, and its presence in the whole body and in each of its parts. These theories lead us back to Plato and to St. Augustine. As for the knowledge of God, to which introspection leads us, this is completed in mystical illumination. Just as the triple eye of the soul is related to a threefold knowable object,¹ so also a triple mode of vision denotes the more or less penetrating way in which we grasp one and the same object: the *cogitatio* is a superficial and extensive regard, the *meditatio* a sustained and deliberate reflection on a given point, *contemplatio* a profound intuition, leisurely and comprehensive.² Like St. Augustine, Hugh seeks in the will the profound being of the soul.

¹ Tria sunt animæ rationalis visiones: cogitatio, meditatio, contemplatio.—*Hom. I* (Migne, *P. L.*, Vol. 175, c. 116).

² Contemplatio est perspicax et liber animi contuitus in res perspicandas usque quaque diffusus. Cf. Ostler, *op. cit.* (133), p. 145.

129. Theology and mysticism.—According to the *Didascalion*, philosophy is the vestibule which leads to a higher science. In spite of the very clear distinction between sacred and profane sciences, and although the latter are cultivated by Hugh according to their own proper methods, they serve in the end for theological purposes. *Ex quo constat quod omnes artes naturales divinæ scientiæ famulantur et inferior sapientia recte ordinata ad superiorem conducit* " (*De Sacram., Prol.*).

The historians of dogmatic theology consider that the *De sacramentis* is a more perfect dogmatic synthesis than the *Introductio ad theologiam* of Abelard, which preceded it in time. It marked a stage in the progress of theology. The subject matter is therein distributed according to a different plan (creation or *conditio*; reparation or *restauratio*). Hugh has left a celebrated definition of faith: "*fides est certitudo quædam animi de rebus absentibus supra opinionem et infra scientiam constituta.*" The *scientes* possess a more perfect knowledge. "*Perfectius enim agnoscunt, qui ipsam rem ut est in sua præsentia comprehendunt.*"¹ We see that a keen psychological analysis diversifies believing and knowing.

Finally, Hugh was the founder and the most celebrated representative of mysticism at St. Victor. His writings on mystical theology deal with the faith in its objective data (*fides quæ creditur, materia fidei*) and especially in the affective sentiment to which it gives rise (*affectus, fides qua creditur*). Following St. Augustine, Hugh describes the stages in the ascent toward God. It is by the eye of contemplation that the soul reaches God.² Inasmuch as all knowledge is brought about by a resemblance, the soul finds in this possession of God a completion of its being, and the love of God to which contemplation leads, gives to the soul its most perfect form. Although this union with God does not call for the intervention of a faculty distinct from the intelligence, Hugh requires a supernatural help of grace to lead the soul to these heights.

¹ *De Sacram. chr. fidei*, I, Migne, P. L., Vol. 176, c. 330. Cf. Ostler, *op. cit.* (183), p. 148; Grabmann, *Gesch. der schol. Meth.*, II, p. 279.

² Qui autem Spiritum Dei in se habent, et Deum habent; hi Deum vident, quia oculum illuminatum habent, quo Deus videri potest, et sentiunt non in alio vel secundum aliud, quid ipse non est, sed ipsum et in ipso, quod est, quod præsens est.—*Hier.*, III (P. L., Vol. 175, c. 967). Cf. Ostler, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

By *contemplatio*, the soul gazes with a free, penetrating, and effortless regard upon the infinite being of its Creator.¹

130. Richard of St. Victor.—Scotch by birth, Richard entered the Victorine Monastery at Paris when quite young. He was Prior there from 1162 until his death in 1173. A disciple and successor of Hugh, he possessed the same complex mentality of philosopher, theologian and mystic. The *Liber Exceptionum* (taken from the *Didascalion*) and his important works *De Præparatione Animi ad Contemplationem*, and *De Contemplatione* are the most interesting from the philosophical point of view. They are full of repetitions, and display an abundance of terminology and comparisons which often makes him obscure.

The *De Trinitate* is the chief theological work of Richard. In addition, he wrote several treatises on mysticism.

Richard bases his proofs for the existence of God on observation and on the principle of causality ; he also makes use of the grades of being, but he will have nothing to do with the *a priori* method of St. Anselm. It has been said that for the period between St. Anselm and Thomas Aquinas, the proofs of Richard are the most philosophical.²

His metaphysics is pluralistic ; his solution of the problem of universals is that of Moderate Realism ; but like his master, and for the same reasons, Richard applies himself principally to psychological questions,³ and in particular he develops an excellent ideology.

Sense experience is the necessary starting point of knowledge. It has for its domain the corporeal. From this lower stage the soul ascends by degrees to the higher stages of intellectual knowledge. Reason (*ratio*) knows the essence of the corporeal by the intermediary of sensation, and without the aid of the latter it attains to the incorporeal (*intelligentia pura*). Richard speaks of an interior Divine light which assists the *ratio* in all its operations, but does not explain its nature. The abstract concepts which we have of corporeal reality are the fruit of a spontaneous activity (Augustine). Just as a metal which receives

¹ Heitz connects this system with neo-Platonist (Augustinian) influences : " Rational knowledge is conditioned by illumination in such a way that a modern theologian would find it difficult to say whether it is the rational knowledge which is supernatural, or whether revelation is lowered to the level of reason." (*Op. cit.*, p. 83.)

² Grunwald, *op. cit.* (20, V.), p. 78. Cf. Baeumker, *Witelo*, p. 312.

³ Cf. J. Ebner, *op. cit.* (133).

an impression becomes representative by its internal power, so the soul clothes itself with resemblances of the external world. "Cum vero impressor metallo figuram imprimit, ipsum quidem non extrinsecus, sed ex propria virtute et naturali habilitate aliud jam aliquid repræsentare incipit."—*Didasc.*, I, 2.

The knowledge of the incorporeal includes the first principles of speculative thought (principles of contradiction and of causality) and also the practical ones; the nature of the soul itself (*nihil recte aestimat quæ seipsum ignorat*); and the essence of God, to which the knowledge of the soul leads us.

Richard recognizes the autonomy of philosophy, but does not ascribe to it the same value as Hugh of St. Victor. He stresses rather its theological function. The *De Trinitate* establishes a system of relations between faith and reason in the Anselmian way. Faith precedes reason; it confers a certitude *supra opinionem et infra rationem*, but reason must illumine it. In his exegesis of the *fides quærens intellectum*, Richard, in order to justify the content of faith, admits not only *rationes probabiles*, but also *rationes necessariae*. This might appear exaggerated, but the formula is not to be taken literally, for the Victorine master stops in presence of a mystery, which he declares to be impossible fully to comprehend (*plene comprehendere*—*De gratia contempl.*, I, 6). At the same time, he has a marked tendency to stress the rational aspect of dogma, and to give to argumentation a place equal to that of authority, and he speaks as follows of the methods practiced by others: "abundant in his omnibus auctoritates, sed non æque et argumentationes" (*De Trinit.*, I, 5).

In the annals of mysticism Richard is almost as well known as his master. Describing the "degrees of contemplation," he contrasts the knowledge of God which philosophers obtain by the discursive play of their reason and the study of the sensible world, with the states of knowledge and love which are superior to the powers of the reason.¹ The "philosophical arks," i.e., systems, collapse; the ark of Moses, or the free contemplation of God when the latter visits the soul by grace, remains unshakeable.

¹ Constat itaque supra hominem esse et humanæ rationis modum vel capacitatem excedere quæ ad hæc novissima contemplationum genera videntur pertinere.—Migne, *P. L.*, vol. 196, col. 79A and 135A.

131. Godfrey of St. Victor (died 1194) was the author of a *Fons philosophiæ*, in which we find a classification of the sciences and a review of the ancient sources of philosophy: Plato, Aristotle, Boethius, M. Capella, and Macrobius. A chapter entitled *De modernis philosophis et primum de nominalibus et realibus* gives an account of the solutions of the problem of universals. Godfrey left another work, *De microcosmo*, in which Grabmann sees a close fusion of the Platonist mentality of Chartres, the Victorine mysticism, and the dialectical spirit of Aristotle.

132. The classifications of the Sciences.—The classifications of Hugh and Richard of St. Victor were not the only ones: similar endeavours were numerous in the twelfth century. Grabmann has made known several of these classifications from unpublished documents. They are not homogeneous and constitute progressive steps towards the *Wissenschaftlehren* of the thirteenth century. We notice neo-Platonist influences in the classification adopted by Radulfus de Longo Campo (Commentary on the *Anticlaudianus*), and others perpetuate the Platonist division. One of the most remarkable classifications, contained in a Bamberg manuscript, distinguishes very clearly between philosophy and theology, and divides theoretical philosophy according to Aristotelian principles.¹ Another establishes the preparatory character of the liberal arts, and the hierarchical order of the arts, philosophy, and theology.²

133. Bibliography.—Hugh of St. Victor.—Editions: Migne, P.L., Vols. 175-7.—Studies: A. Mignon, *Les origines de la scolastique et H. de S. V.*, 2 vols., Paris, 1895; J. Kilgenstein, *Die Gotteslehre*

¹ Cod. Q., VI, 30. Philosophia, Sapientia: (1) Theoretica (theologia, phisica, mathematica). (2) Practica (ethica, echnomica, politica). (3) Mekanica.—Sacred science is distinct from philosophy.—Certain subjects are proper either to philosophy or to theology, others are common to both: "Tribus autem modis anime occulta dei innotesunt, vel ratione tantum, vel divina tantum revelatione, vel utroque modo."—Grabmann, *Gesch. der schol. Meth.*, II, p. 39.

² Codex Paris, lat. 6570: "Ad istas tres scientias (phisica, theologia, scientia legum) parate sunt tanquam vie septem liberales artes, qui in trivio et quadrvio continentur" (p. 46, n.). The same clear distinction between philosophy and theology, and the same treatment of the liberal arts, is found in the following text of Cod. 14401 of Ratisbon (twelfth century): "Non solum enim *philosophi* humane videlicet sapientie amatores rite discendo docendoque hos prædictos (i.e., the liberal arts) sequebantur gradus, sed et s. *divine scripture doctores*. . . ."—*Ibid.*, I, 191.

des Hugo von S. V. nebst einer einleitende Untersuchung über Hugos Leben und seine hervorragendsten Werken, Würzburg, 1897); H. Ostler, *Die Psychologie des Hugo von S. V.*, Beiträge, VI, 1, Munster, 1906 (good, but rather diffuse); J. de Ghellinck, *La table des matières de la première ed. des œuvres de H. de S. V.*, in *Rech. de sc. relig.*, 1910, pp. 270-89, 385-96; *Un catalogue des œuvres de H. de S. V.*, in *Revue Néo-Scholast.*, 1913, pp. 220-39 (important article); A. Wilmart, *Opusculs choisis de H. de S. V.*, in *Revue Bénédictine*, 1933, pp. 242-8.

Richard of St. Victor.—Edition: Migne, *P.L.*, Vol. 196; Vol. 197, fol. 193 *et seq.* (*Liber excerptionum*). Studies: J. Ebner *Die Erkenntnislehre Richards v. S.V.*, Beiträge, XIX, 4, Munster, 1917; C. Ottaviano, *Riccardo di S. Vittore, La vita le opere, il pensiero*, Memorie della R. Accad. naz. dei Lincei. Cl. di sc. morale, 1933, Vol. IV, pp. 411-541.

Godfrey of St. Victor.—Edition, Migne, *P.L.*, Vol. 196, 1417-22.

§ 15.—Isaac of Stella, Alcher of Clairvaux, and Alan of Lille

134. Isaac of Stella and Alcher of Clairvaux.—To the middle of the twelfth century belong two psychological *opuscula* which may be regarded as the product and summing up of Augustinian psychology: a letter from Isaac of Stella to Alcher of Clairvaux, *Epistola ad quendam familiarem suum de anima*, and the *Liber de spiritu et anima*, which is probably Alcher's reply.

English by birth, Isaac, like so many of his fellow countrymen, studied and lived in France. He was in turn a monk at Clairvaux, where he knew St. Bernard, and abbot of the Cistercian monastery of l'Etoile in Poitou (1147-1169). We know that he discussed philosophy with his compatriot John Beaumains, Bishop of Poitiers. His *De anima* is a series of considerations on the nature of the soul, its union with the body, and its activities. It was apparently written at the request of Alcher. Of the three kinds of beings, God, the soul, and the body, God is the best known, and the body is the furthest removed from our knowledge. The soul is made to the image of wisdom, and can be defined as *omnium similitudo*; and as it is placed between God and bodies, it has a *summum* which raises it up towards God, and an *imum* which lowers it

in the direction of the corporeal. Isaac endeavours to show that the soul tends towards that which is highest amongst bodies. The two factors are joined *in suis extremitatibus*, and from the union of these two irreducible natures results the unity of person.

Interesting developments deal with the activities of knowing (*rationalis*), which, together with the emotions (*concupiscibilis* and *irascibilis*), form a dynamic triad. These activities of knowledge take a quintuple form, in which we see a combination of Aristotelianism and Augustinianism: while the *sensus corporeus* and the *imaginatio* are confined to the particular and the corporeal, the *ratio* considers in multiple bodies the constituent elements which are fixed and endowed with unity. The process of abstraction, the objective nature of its information, and the harmonizing of the individuality of bodies with the general character of the abstract notion, are expounded in concise and Abelardian terms. Isaac thus takes up his position in the ever growing ranks of the Aristotelians.¹ The *intellectus* has as its object beings which are incorporeal by nature, while the higher activity (*vis*), or *intelligentia*, contemplates God in the sense that after seeing the light which God sheds upon everything knowable, *ipsam coruscationem lucis* (Isaac calls it a divine theophany), the soul perceives in a certain manner the very source of all intelligibility.²

The *Sermons* of Isaac are theological dissertations full of philosophy. We there find proofs of the existence of God, based on the gradation of beings and on the necessity of positing a *supersubstantia* at the summit of being. In speaking of the ineffable, we are obliged to have recourse to improper terms, for otherwise we should be reduced to silence. For God is necessarily of a nature other than that of the works of his hands. The influence of Anselm of Canterbury and of pseudo-Dionysius is manifest here.³

The *Liber de spiritu et anima*, which is generally attributed to

¹ Abstrahit enim ratio a corpore, quæ fundantur in corpore, non actione, sed consideratione. . . . Percipit itaque ratio, quod nec sensus, nec imaginatio, rerum videlicet corporearum naturas . . . omnia incorporea, sed non extra corpora nisi ratione subsistentia.—Migne, *P. L.*, vol. 194, col. 1884, A.B.

² Ita manens in Deo, lux, quæ exit ab eo, mentem irradiat, ut primum ipsam coruscationem lucis sine quo nihil videtur, videat, hincque ad ipsum lucis fontem intelligentia ascendens, ipsam per ipsius lumen inveniat et cernat. 1888 A.

³ Bliemetzrieder, *op. cit.* (136), p. 159, also compares Isaac with his compatriot Robert Pullus.

Alcher,¹ is a complete treatise, with well arranged divisions. We there find incorporated the letter of Alcuin *ad Eulaliā virginem*, and fragments of Augustine, Boethius, Macrobius, Isidore, Cassiodorus, Hugh of St. Victor, and others. Alcher compares the soul of a city of God: his definitions are of Augustinian inspiration; some indeed reproduce Aristotelian formulæ, but these are misunderstood. The soul governs the body; it is bound to it by bonds of friendship, although the body interferes with the exercise of its activities; it cherishes its prison. "Sociata namque illi, licet ejus societate prægravetur, ineffabili tamen conditione diligit illud; amat carcerem suam."² The powers of the soul are manifold, but none is really distinct from the substance. In various threefold divisions which do not harmonize very well with each other, the author discovers vestiges of the Holy Trinity (cap. 6). Alcher describes our faculties at length, from the *vis vitalis et animalis* up to intelligence. Sensation is an activity of the soul, *anima per corpus videt* (cap. 2); intelligence is an abstractive faculty. The soul knows itself, and by a Divine *illustratio* it knows God. Alcher sums up the solution of universals in this concise and significant formula: *Abstrahit a corporibus quæ fundantur in corporibus*" (col. 787). He is in full agreement with Isaac of Stella.

135. Alan of Lille.—Little is known of his life. He was born about 1128, taught at Paris, passed some time at Montpellier, and was present at the third Council of Lateran. He became a Cistercian, took part in the propaganda of the Order against the Albigenses, and died at the Abbey of Cîteaux (1202). Later generations awarded him the title of *Doctor Universalis*.

His chief works, which are both theological and philosophical in character, are the following: *De fide catholica contra hæreticos*³ (an apologetic work); the *Regulæ* or *Maximæ*

¹ The attribution to Alcher has been proposed by Stöckl, *Gesch. d. Phil. d. Mittel.*, I, 384 *et seq.*, and Hauréau, *op. cit.*, V. 113. Albert the Great (*In Lib. Sent.*, I, d. 8, art. 25) rejects the attribution to St. Augustine, and puts forward the name of William, a Cistercian. Thomas Aquinas in many places (e.g., *In Lib. Sent.*, IV, d. 44, q. 4, a. 3) ascribes the work to "quidam Cisterciensis qui eum ex dictis Augustini compilavit et quædam de suo addidit" (*ibid.*). See note by G. Théry, *op. cit.* (136).

² *De Spiritu et Anima*, in Migne, *P.L.* 40, col. 780.

³ Attributed to Nicholas of Amiens by Hauréau, Von Hertling, and Grabmann (*Gesch. der schol. Meth.*, II, 459 *et seq.*). Bæumker thinks that it belongs to Alan (*Handschriftliches zu den Werken des Alanus* (Philos. Jahrb., 1894).

theologicæ (modelled upon the *Liber de hebdomadibus* of Boethius, and presenting the same appearance; a *Liber de Trinitate* (wrongly attributed to him); *Anticlaudianus* (a poem which became famous; an encyclopædia of sacred and profane knowledge, the plan of which recalls the *De nuptiis* of Martianus Capella, the *De mundi universitate* of Bernard Sylvestris and the works of Claudianus Rufinus, whence its name of *Anticlaudianus*, and also that of *Antirufinus*, which appears in some manuscripts¹; and lastly, a moral allegory entitled *De planctu naturæ*, rich in classical reminiscences, and in which we recognise the influence of the *De consolazione philosophiæ* of Boethius and of the treatise of M. Capella.

Alan does not attach himself exclusively to any philosophical tendency. He does not attempt to co-ordinate his doctrines, and he is aware of the imperfection which his eclecticism causes in his thought, for he compares himself to a blind man, who ought not to undertake to lead other blind men.² His philosophical doctrines manifest the influence of Chartres, and through this we recognize Pythagorean, Platonist, and Aristotelian ideas. If we except a few Arabian treatises on Astronomy, which Alan knew in translations, we may say that he did not come into contact with Arabian literature. But he seems to have known the *De unitate* of Gundissalinus, and we find in him one of the first quotations from the *Liber de causis*, which he calls *Aphorismi de essentia summæ bonitatis*.

Logic is no longer the despotic goddess of thought. It appears in the form of a pale young girl, exhausted by excessive vigils. Of the logical theories of Alan, the most interesting is his conception of philosophic method: following Boethius, he proclaims the absolute rights of the mathematical and deductive method. He emphasizes the genetic function of the first principles, which, in each science, dominate the series of doctrines contained in it: "Omnis scientia suis nititur regulis velut propriis fundamentis" (*Regulæ*, Prol.). The argument based on reason ought to be preferred to that based on authority, which is too easily invoked on behalf of contradictory opinions. "Quia auctoritas cereum habet nasum, i.e., in

¹ Adam de la Bassée published a work under the same title—Hauréau, *Not. et extr.*, V, 548, 549, 559.

² Simpliciter cæcus prohibetur ducere cæcum.—Ne cæcus cæcum ducat in antra sua.—Quoted by Huizinga, *op. cit.* (136), p. 5.

diversum potest flecti sensum, rationibus, roborandum est.”¹

The metaphysics of the doctor of Lille are inspired by Boethius. Through the latter, Alan knows the Aristotelian doctrines on the categories, personality, and the four causes of being. Prime matter is not indeterminate or potential, but a kind of *chaos antiquum*, a mass which exists and is therefore already informed : a theory which has nothing in common with that of Aristotle. As for the form, instead of being the constitutive principle of things, it is a property, or the sum of the properties of a being. In the question of universals, Alan is an anti-Realist after the manner of John of Salisbury.

As in the Chartres school, dissertations on unity, *unitas*, *monas*, occupy a prominent place in the study of God, and Alan appeals to the Hermetic work *Asclepius*, which he knew through the pseudo-Augustinian work *Contra quinque hæreses*. Some of these hermetic formulæ, such as the following, “*Monas gignat monadem et in se suum reflectit ardorem*” ; “*Deus est sphaera intelligibilis, cujus centrum ubique, circumferentia nusquam*”—were repeated throughout the Middle Ages down to Nicholas of Cusa. Similarly, the Pythagorean idea of number is put forward as the principle of unity of the cosmic elements. His proofs for the existence of God, although they make use of the principle of causality, reflect the ultra-deductive method. Between the Creator and individual beings there is an intermediary, Nature, the Servant of God, *Dei auctoris vicaria*, a sort of world-soul governing the universe.² Is this a distinct reality, a real being, or rather a poetical personification of the forces of nature? It is difficult to decide.

In Psychology, Alan passes over the problem of the genesis of our knowledge. His attention is concentrated on the nature of the soul, for his work is controversial, defending its immateriality, simplicity and immortality against the Cathari. In consequence of his erroneous conception of form, he will not allow that the soul is the form or “property” of the body ; it is an independent substance, united to the body after the manner of a *connubium*, or *copula maritalis*. A *spiritus physicus* unites them, and their mutual relations are regulated

¹ *Contra Hæreticos*, I, 30. Cf. Baumgartner, *Die Philos. d. Alanus*, pp. 27-38.

² Baumgartner, *op. cit.*, pp. 77 *et seq.*

by number and harmony. The Augustinian conception, mingled with Pythagoreanism, dominates Alan's doctrine on the nature of the soul; Aristotelian has no place in it.

Alan's theology is greatly influenced by his philosophy, and we may say that it is apologetic throughout. He had a ready mind, and was a skilled dialectician, excelling in controversy. In order to establish Catholic doctrines against the Waldenses, Jews and Mahommedans, Alan bases himself as much on arguments from reason as on texts from Scripture and the Fathers. The *Regulæ* endeavour to apply to dogma deductive methods and the play of logical concepts. The theory of numbers furnishes an explanation of the Trinity, and Alan thinks with Abelard that the pagans had knowledge of this doctrine. Even the mysteries are subject to syllogistic reasoning by the philosopher, in the sense that though the mind cannot demonstrate them, it is capable of establishing their motives of credibility. Thus the speculative method is given a definite place side by side with the Scriptural method. Alan thus continues the traditions of Abelard, and will hand them on to the thirteenth century.¹

Whether he treats of philosophy or of theology, the master of Lille delights to clothe his ideas in poetic language, which renders his work a noteworthy monument of the humanism of the twelfth century, written in elegant language. From this standpoint he has attracted the attention of those who aim at reconstituting the golden chain of Christian writers of the Middle Ages. His images, personifications of virtues and vices, and of philosophical or theological notions, present a characteristic combination of imaginative data with the philosophical and religious element, in which the former serves to interpret the latter.² But it is not easy to determine the exact part which belongs to each.

The half poetical, half philosophical and theological literary form, was destined to become very popular. Alan's successors, however, robbed his allegorical personages of all Christian significance. Such was John of Auville, author of *Architrenius* (1184). The two poets who wrote the *Roman de la Rose* similarly were largely inspired by the *De planctu naturæ*.

¹ William of Auxerre, in his *Summa aurea*, puts the *Regula logicalis* together with the *Regula theologica*.—Grabmann, *Gesch. der schol. Meth.*, II, 470.

² Huizinga, *op. cit.*, pp. 88 et seq.

Alan enjoyed a fair reputation among his immediate successors. Radulfus de Longo Campo commented on his *Anticlaudianus* (1216) and utilized his *Regulæ*. He presents a well-developed classification of the sciences. In it we find the triad, "God, Spirit, World-Soul," so dear to the Chartres school, but it is modified by Aristotelian elements, for already Ralph is under the new influences of the time: he knows the *De anima* of Aristotle, and various treatises by Averrhoes and Avicenna. A little later (before 1231), William of Auxerre wrote another commentary on the *Anticlaudianus*.

Allegory is also prominent in another work of the middle of the twelfth century, the *De Consolatione Rationis* of Petrus Compostellanus. This treatise in prose and verse is a discussion between *mundus*, *caro*, *ratio*, the seven liberal arts, etc., and Petrus Compostellanus who sees them in a dream in the form of young girls. The work is devoted to philosophical and moral questions. Blanco, who has studied the treatise after a manuscript in the Escorial, thinks it was composed after 1120 and sees in it a possible work by Peter Micha. The treatise is dedicated to the Archbishop of Compostella, Berengarius of Santiago. It still breathes the spirit of Western Gothic culture, and manifests the influence of Boethius, Isidore of Seville, and St. Augustine, although appearing at the dawn of the Renaissance which began in Spain with Dominic Gundisalvi.

136. Bibliography.—Isaac.—Edition: Migne, *P. L.*, Vol. 194, 1689-1890.—Studies: F. Bliemetzrieder, *Isaac de Stella*, in *Rech. T.A.M.*, 1932, pp. 134-60. See also the previous studies by the same author.

Alcher.—Edition: Migne, *P. L.*, Vol. 40, pp. 779-832 (*De spiritu et anima*). Study: G. Théry, *L'authenticité du De spiritu et anima dans S. Thomas et Albert le Grand*, in *Revue Sc. Phil. Theol.*, 1921, pp. 373-77.

Alan.—Editions: Migne, *P. L.*, Vol. 210. Th. Wright, *The Anglo-Latin satirical Poets and Epigrammatists of the Twelfth Century*, Vol. II, pp. 268-522, London, 1872 (in *Rerum Britann. Script. Medii Ævi*).—Studies: M. Baumgartner, *Die Philosophie des Alanus de Insulis*, Beiträge, II, 4, Munster, 1896 (excellent). J. Huizinga, *Ueber die Verknüpfung des Poetischen mit dem Theologischen bei Alanus de Insulis*, Amsterdam, 1932 (Mededeelingen der k. Akad., afd. Letteren, publishes the *De virtutibus et vitiis* in an appendix).

§ 16.—*John of Salisbury*

137. John of Salisbury (Johannes Parvus) was born between 1115 and 1120. He went to Paris when quite young (1136), and the autobiography which he has given us in his *Metalogicus* (II, 10, 17) tells us that he followed the lectures of all the best-known professors in dialectics and in theology at Chartres as well as at Paris: Abelard (called *Peripateticus Palatinus*), Alberic, William of Conches, Gilbert de la Porrée, Adam of Petit Pont, Robert Pulleyn, and others. From 1148 onward he led an active public life: he was in turn secretary to Theobald, Archbishop of Canterbury, to whom he was introduced by St. Bernard at the Council of Rheims; secretary to St. Thomas à Becket (1162), whom he supported in his quarrel with the King, whose exile he shared, and whose assassination he witnessed in Canterbury Cathedral; then finally he was elected Bishop of Chartres (1176), and remained there until his death (1180).

Besides the *Letters*, which are of great interest, and a *Historia Pontificalis*, he has left a philosophical poem, *Entheticus de Dogmate Philosophorum*, the first part of which is devoted to a history of Greek and Roman philosophy; and, most important of all, two works written in 1159, when he was in disgrace with the King of England, the *Polycraticus* and the *Metalogicus* (or *Metalogicon*), both dedicated to Thomas à Becket, and which constitute a unique monument of the history of ideas in the twelfth century. The *Polycraticus* has as its second title: *De nugis Curialium et vestigiis Philosophorum*, "On the vanities of Courtiers, and Philosophical Remains," and contains a criticism of court manners, a theory of the State, and a picture of humanist culture as seen by the author. The second work develops a complete programme of logic, and concludes with considerations on the nature of truth.

With John of Salisbury begins the long series of English intellectuals who were at once statesmen, churchmen, humanists, philosophers, and writers. In his *Letters* and in his works, he shows himself to be a typical knightly clerk, devoted to the Christian ideal, optimistic and humble, faithful to his superiors, seeking a just measure in all things. He sets forth his sentiments and opinions in a free and haphazard way, without any

attempt at a plan of systematic exposition, and with a touch of romanticism which makes him a very attractive personage.

138. John the humanist, the logician, and the historian.—John of Salisbury energetically defended the cultivation of the liberal arts: the *trivium* and the *quadrivium* are the seven ways which conduct the mind into the sanctuary of science. He did not despise grammar, but he protested against those who would shut themselves up in the dry-as-dust analyses of Priscian. John was, in fact, a typical representative of the literary humanism, which made the name of the Schools of Chartres, and which arose from a wise and discerning extension of rhetorical studies. Familiarity with the great Latin classics, and especially with Cicero, made him the most refined and concise Latin writer of the twelfth century; his prose and verse are saturated with classical reminiscences. It was doubtless his love of literary form which led him to join in the vigorous campaign of the masters of Chartres against a party of know-nothings, the "Cornificians," who systematically vilified all study, as being in their eyes simply the means of attaining rapidity to lucrative posts. The *Metalogicus* opens with a sweeping attack against a strange being, Cornificius, of whom he gives a by no means flattering portrait,¹ and in whom he personifies the movement. After showing the importance of dialectics, *cum itaque logicæ tanta sit vis*, he again turns angrily upon this *logicæ criminator, philosophantium scurra* (*Metal.*, IV, 25).

As a dialectician, he defends dialectic against its own excesses, and chastises the wordy disputants who confuse it with a pretentious phraseology (II, 8-9).² Dialectics is the queen of the *trivium*; it is a science which forms the mind, and by its means beginners learn the art of thinking and speaking, without which philosophy is impossible. "Inchoantibus enim philosophiam, prælegenda est, eo quod vocum et intellectuum interpres est sine quibus nullus philosophiæ articulus recte procedit in lucem." And so John of Salisbury dwells with pleasure on the notion of logic, its divisions, and the way in

¹ According to Clerval, *op. cit.*, 227, the Cornifician party rose under the direction of a monk named Reginald about 1130. Mandonnet identifies him with a certain Gualon—Siger de Brabant, *Etude critique*, 1911, p. 122, note 4.

² *Ibid.*, II, 3. We quote from Webb's edition.

which Aristotle and Porphyry should be read.¹ He shows that the other sciences are debtors to logic for their methods of demonstration, division, and definition. Hence it is not surprising that there flow from his pen magnificent eulogies of Aristotle, whose treatises incorporated in the old and new logic he minutely analyses. The *Topics* and the *Posterior Analytics* especially attract his attention. He says of the *Topics* that they are worth more than all the dialectical works utilized by the modern teachers. "Plus confert ad scientiam disserendi . . . quam omnes fere libri dialecticæ, quos moderni patres nostri in scholis legere consueverant" (*Metal.*, III, 10). Speaking of the *Posterior Analytics*, he stresses their difficulty and deep meaning. They hold the secret of scientific systematization; they teach us that every science rests on indemonstrable first principles and directive axioms, such as the principle of contradiction.

After thus magnifying the study of dialectics, the philosopher nevertheless insists upon its insufficiency if it is cultivated to the exclusion of the other philosophical sciences: abandoned to itself it is bloodless and sterile. "Sicut dialectica alias expedit disciplinas, sic, si sola fuerit, jacet exsanguis et sterilis, nec ad fructum philosophiæ fecundat animam, si aliunde non concipit" (II, 10). Alan of Lille speaks in the same sense: the despotism of logic is at an end.

As a historian of philosophy he is extremely reserved. He would examine everything before accepting anything as true. He goes back to the great sceptics of antiquity (*Polycrat*, VII, 1-6), and praises the "academic temperament" (VII, 2), not in order to take refuge in doubt, but in order the more surely to arrive at the truth. Many have pointed out his long list of *dubitabilia*, but forget that he is enumerating questions which are difficult, but not insoluble. Some have been surprised to see that he includes among them the questions of substance, universals, Providence, and many others, in view of the fact that he gives his own answers to these questions. But his sole aim is to insist on the limits of our knowledge, and its insufficiency. The wise man ought to be satisfied with it, and be modest. And in this no thirteenth century scholastic will oppose him.

Again, he made a point of hearing those of his contemporaries

¹ *Ibid.*, II, 11; III and IV, 1-7.

who were well known, and discusses their opinions. The *curriculum* of his student life constitutes a very complete picture of the schools of the twelfth century.¹ His inquiries concerning the opinions of others make him the chief historian of philosophy for this period. In particular, he is a very useful source for the study of the progressive solutions of the problem of universals.

139. John the Philosopher.—The English writer does not allow himself to be limited by didactic divisions. His works treat of the most varied questions without much sequence, and many of his doctrines are found in incidental digressions.

The *Metalogicus* adopts the Platonist division of philosophy (II, 2 and 5), but the doctrinal influence of Aristotle is preponderant. The question of universals occupies a prominent place. This is natural, since in discussing it "the world had grown old, and it had taken up more time than the Cæsars had occupied in conquering and governing the world."² John of Salisbury is an opponent of Exaggerated Realism: "*qui autem ea esse statuit, Aristoteli adversatur*" (*Metal.*, II, 20, p. 92). Again: "he who seeks for the object of genera and species outside the things of sense is wasting his time." His solution is that of Moderate Realism, which he presents in a formula very similar to that of the treatise *De Intellectibus*: the mind operates upon the data of sense and brings about a segregation of the elements which are common to various beings, and those which differentiate them, in order to gather up in one concept of genus and species that in which many individuals resemble each other.³ Moreover, he adds, there is no sense in letting one's hair turn white in the schools over this eternal question. Many other subjects demand the attention of the thinker.

These subjects are found in psychology, to which the question of universals itself belongs, and comprise especially the study of our faculties, and our mental acts. Sensation is an organic

¹ Webb (*Polycrat.*, Vol. I, p. xxi and *Metalogicus* p. xiii) gives the list of authors quoted.

² *Polycrat.*, VII, 12.

³ Diffinit ergo ratio quod concipit intellectus . . . Dum itaque rerum similitudines colligit, etc.—*Polycrat.*, II, 18. Per abstrahantem intellectum genera concipiuntur et species quæ tamen, si quis in rerum natura, diligentius a sensibilibus remota, quærat, nihil aget et frustra laborabit . . . Ratio autem ea deprehendit, substantialem similitudinem rerum differentium pertractans.—*Metal.*, II, 20, ed. Webb, p. 99.

excitation which affects the soul (*anima pulsata sensibus*, IV, 15), and so to speak invades it, provided it is sufficiently intense. "Nisi enim eadem aliquid violentiæ habeat, nec ad animam pervenit, nec cadit in sensus formam" (IV, 9). It is followed by sense judgments and acts of imagination, which all lead to opinion, and do not exclude error. Truth belongs to a higher faculty, the exercise of which follows on that of the senses. But here a new subdivision comes in between the *ratio* and the *intellectus*.

By the *ratio*, which deals with the data of the senses (*Ars, sive scientia originem trahit a sensu*, IV, 20), we subject corporeal reality to a threefold abstraction, physical, mathematical, and metaphysical. Aided by memory and experience (*experimentum*) the *ratio* derives from sensation even the primordial judgments which are the laws of universal intelligibility and the validity of which transcends experience, so that the sensible origin of knowledge extends to the most elevated principles. Further, by the *ratio* we penetrate into the domain of the spiritual (IV, 16); and we attain to the *rationes æternæ*, the foundation of all certitude (IV, 32). By the *intellectus*, we accomplish the work of abstraction. It provides the *ratio* with its abstract concepts, and being thus at the service of the *ratio*, it is inferior to it. From another point of view the *intellectus* is superior to the *ratio*, for in addition it has the function of co-ordinating the data of knowledge into a synthesis having God as its basis, and thus attains to *wisdom*. With the exception of the fundamental distinction between sensation and thought, these classifications are rather confusing. The English philosopher is careful to attribute the characteristic activities of the soul to distinct faculties or powers, but his applications of this correct principle are not very happy. He tempers the psychology of St. Augustine by that of Aristotle, without obtaining a coherent result. The soul is simple and immortal (IV, 20). Volumes would be required, he says, for a complete study of its activities and its nature.

In moral philosophy, John of Salisbury discusses and condemns Epicurus and gives a detailed description of the vices (*Polycrat.*, VII). He studies Providence and the Divine foreknowledge, which he endeavours to harmonize with human liberty (II, 20-21).

140. The Polycraticus and the development of political Philosophy.—During the twelfth century, a new factor intensified the development of the philosophy of the State. This was the appearance upon the scene of prominent masters in civil and canon law, and feudal jurists, who all took up the study of political questions both from the practical and the theoretical points of view (§ 20). And thus to the sources at the disposal of the scholastics of the eleventh century (90) some important material was added.

The *Polycraticus*, written in *usum civitates regentium*,¹ is the most complete philosophy of the State produced in the first period of the Middle Ages. The *De Officiis* of St. Ambrose, the *De civitate Dei*, and the doctrines of the Stoics and the Roman lawyers, are made good use of, not to mention a great number of ancient writers with whom the author was familiar. The fourth book opens with a distinction between a prince and a tyrant. The prince is subject to *æquitas*, which John defines with the lawyers as *rerum convenientia, tribuens unicuique quod suum est* (cap. 2). The law is but the interpreter of this equity or justice (*lex vero ejus interpres est*), and the prince is the servant of the law. There follows a picture of the qualities which the prince ought to manifest, and which make him a sort of moral superman (cap. 4). Here the Augustinian influence is manifest. The authority of the prince comes from God, but there is no suggestion of a *pactum* with the people. Still, the people's rights come out in the case of an abuse of power: a tyrant is opposed to the common good, and may be killed or suppressed by any possible means save poison. Tyrannicide is not only lawful and praiseworthy, but even obligatory (VIII, 20). Passing on to the organization of the State, the English writer has recourse to a comparison with the human organism, which he takes from the *Institutio Trajani* of pseudo-Plutarch, and which was in great favour in the Middle Ages. But this is only an *illustratio*, for John has too much good sense to see in the State a reality independent of its citizens, which would indeed be irreconcilable with the principles of his moderate realism. He adds that kings are subject to the Church, and that the latter is the dispenser of the power which they possess. *Hunc ergo gladium de manu Ecclesiæ accipit princeps* (IV, 3). The supra-national

¹ Cf. Webb, Prologue.

unity of the Catholic Church, the spiritual jurisdiction of the Pope, and the supremacy and universality of Roman Law are regarded by him as the primordial factors in the civilization of his time.

These materials for the philosophy of the State will be taken up and used in great measure by the philosophers of the thirteenth century, who will bind them together by meta-physical conceptions.

141. Bibliography.—Editions: Migne, *P. L.*, Vol. 199. *Entheticus*, by Chr. Petersen, 1843. Critical edition of the *Policraticus*, by C. C. J. Webb, 2 vols., Oxford, 1909; and of the *Metalogicon*, Oxford, 1929. Critical edition of the *Historia pontificalis*, by R. L. Poole, Oxford, 1927. Poole has also edited the *Letters*.

Studies: L. Denis, *La question des universaux d'après J. de S.* in *Revue des Sc. Phil. Théol.*, 1927, pp. 425-34; R. Lloyd, *John of Salisbury*, in *Ch. Quarterly Review*, 1929, pp. 19-38 (biographical notes); C. C. J. Webb, *John of Salisbury*, London, 1932 (biography); H. Daniels, *Die Wissenschaftslehre des Johannes von Salisbury*, Kaldenkirchen (Germany), 1932 (Dissertation); J. Huizinga, *Een praegothicke geest, Johannes van Salisbury*, in *Tijdschrift voor geschiedenis*, 1933, pp. 224-44; C. Scharschmidt, *J. S. nach Leben und Studien*, *Schriften u. Philosophie*, 1862.

§ 17.—*Materialists, Dualists, and Pantheists*

The materialism and dualism of the Cathari and Albigenses, as also the pantheism of Amalric of Benes and David of Dinant, which appeared towards the end of the twelfth century, were closely connected with religious, mystical, and social movements.

142. The Materialists.—There were materialistic tendencies in the middle of the twelfth century, for Alan of Lille protests against certain contemporaries who taught the disappearance of the human *spiritus* at the moment of death and the impossibility of the resurrection. "Hi autem volunt dicere ideo resurrectionem non futuram, quia anima perit cum corpore, sicut nostri temporis multi falsi christiani, imo hæretici" (*Contra hæreticos*, I, 27).

In the works in which he attacks them directly, he sets forth some of their arguments. Thus, they invoke in favour

of their thesis the opinion of certain scholastics (Adelard and William of Conches for example), who taught the incorporeal character of every vital principle, and then they proceed to reason as follows: "Si incorporalis est (spiritus animalis) sicut spiritus humanus, qua ratione perit cum corpore et non spiritus hominis? Qua enim ratione aut vi conservabitur potius anima humana in corpore quam anima bruti?" (*Ibid.*).

But above all they appeal to Epicurus and Lucretius, whose atomism and utilitarian ethics was bound to attract anyone who did not believe in the rewards and punishments of the future life. All there is to do is to seek the maximum of enjoyment out of the present life, and the chroniclers tell us that people holding these easy-going ideas were to be found in both the towns and the countryside.¹

143. The Dualism of the Cathari and the Albigenses.—The Cathari and Albigenses, two sister sects exceedingly widespread in the twelfth century in France and Italy, founded their strange religious and social doctrines on a metaphysical and moral dualism. Through Byzantium they received a group of oriental ideas, and borrowed from Manichæism the dualistic thesis of the co-existence of God, the Principle of Good, and of a Principle of Evil. Both of these have formed man: the soul is the work of the former, and the body that of the latter. Since the body is evil and corrupt, it is our duty to destroy sensibility; hence purifications and austerities are commanded and the propagation of the race is condemned. Alan of Lille mentions that according to Albigensian theory the souls of some privileged and superior men are really fallen angels, condemned to be united to human bodies a certain number of times (*Anticlaudianus*, I, 1, 12). The "perfect" aimed at leading an ascetical life and at suppressing their evil nature. Their followers praised their efforts at reform, together with their criticisms of the religious life of the twelfth century. Since only a few "perfect" were necessary

¹ Marbodius thus describes this materialism: "Inter quos habitus non ultimus est Epicurus—Ex atomis perhibens mundi consistere molem.—Iste voluptatem summum determinat esse—Perfectumque bonum, quo quisque fruendo beatus—Congaudensque sibi sine sollicitudine vivat;—Scilicet aut animas cum corporibus perituras—Aut nullum credens meritum post fata manere—. . . Quis numerare queat regiones, oppida, vicos—Urbes atque domos Epicuri dogma sequentes?"—*Liber decem capitulorum*, c. 7. Quoted by Philippe, *Lucrece dans la théol. chrétienne*, etc., p. 67.

in a society and others were allowed to lead an ordinary life provided they received the blessing of a "perfect" one before death (*consolamentum*), the sect rapidly grew in numbers.

The metaphysics of the Cathari compromised the infinity and unicity of God ; while their psychology and moral system went astray on the question of the nature of the union between soul and body. If we add that the Cathari forbade not only marriage but also oaths and war, even a just war, we shall realize that they were undermining the foundations of the existing social order. This helps to explain the intervention of the Church, the guardian of mediæval civilization, and the Inquisition which she organized in concert with the civil power.

144. Amalric of Benes and the Amauritians.—Amalric of Benes, born in the neighbourhood of Chartres, was teaching theology at Paris just before his death in 1206-7. . To reconstitute his doctrine we have at our disposal some references in chroniclers concerning the sect which issued from him (William the Breton, Cæsar of Heisterbach, Martin the Pole) ; texts in philosophers and moralists (John the Teuton ; Henry of Suso, Cardinal of Ostia, 1210-1271) ; texts of St. Thomas, of great value ; texts of the *Contra Amaurianos* ; and accounts of the condemnation of the sect.

All these documents¹ agree in presenting Amalric's philosophy as an absolute pantheism, based upon the univocal character of being : God is identical to all that is. *Omnia unum, quia quicquid est, est Deus*. We recognize here, transposed in a monist sense, the celebrated Pythagorean formula, *Omne quod est, ideo est quia unum est*. There is no being which is not God. According to the laconic judgment of Thomas Aquinas,² Amalric maintains that God is the formal principle of everything, which means that God penetrates the substance of everything and gives its *His* existence. The chronicler Martin of Poland condenses the spirit of this metaphysic in another no less expressive text : *Dixit enim Deum esse essentiam omnium creaturarum et esse omnium*.³ Henry of Suso adds

¹ Classified by Mlle. Capelle, *op. cit.* (146), Introduction.

² S. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 3, a. 8, in corpore.—*Alii enim dixerunt deum esse principium formale omnium rerum, et hæc dicitur fuisse opinio amalricianorum.*

³ Martini Poloni Chronic. M. G. SS. XXII, 438, 28. Note the distinction between *essentia* and *esse*.

that the one unique Being exteriorises certain aspects of himself, and that is what we must understand by creation. The divine ideas are creatures, and in their turn they create the multiple and the changing: *creant et creantur*.¹ Humanity is a stage in this becoming. Accordingly, it is not strange that the passing and multiple forms which the divinity takes in limited beings ultimately return to him. In the case of man this constitutes deification.

The Amalricians inferred from these principles several heretical consequences, both dogmatic and moral. The divine persons are creatures, all three of whom become incarnate. Every man is a divine member just as Christ was.² To each one of us may be applied literally the texts of the Bible concerning the divinity.

From 1200 onwards, these ideas made progress, and various sects put Amalric's theories on deification into practice. They preached to the people that at the end of five years (after 1210) every man would be the Holy Ghost, and that man, being a Divine member, is above sin, that, as every human act is the act of God, there is no distinction between good and evil, and hence Nature should not be refused anything—*qui cognoscit Deum esse in se, lugere non debet, sed ridere*. An act is devoid of moral value in itself, it is the intention alone that counts. A certain GODINUS, and a goldsmith named WILLIAM spread abroad these ideas in the first years of the thirteenth century. They had some points in common with the Catharist doctrines and again with the extravagant theories put forth independently about the same time by JOACHIM OF FLORIS, who justified moral disorders in the name of the Divinity immanent in our being.

Philosophers and theologians rose up against the Amauritian doctrines. An anonymous treatise *Contra Amaurianos*, written between 1207 and 1220, and which Baeumker³ attributed to

¹ Mlle. Capelle publishes the complete text, p. 94.

² Baeumker, *op. cit.* (146), p. 24.

³ *Op. cit.* (146). The Cistercian Garnerius of Rochefort, who was first Abbot of Clairvaux (1186), then Bishop of Langres (1192) and died at Clairvaux (about 1216), also wrote sermons and various theological treatises in which Baeumker recognises similarities of style, technique and texts, with the treatise in question (p. lvi). As the author is a monk, the treatise cannot be the work of Rudolph of Namur (hypothesis advanced by Mandonnet, in *Revue Thomiste*, 1893, p. 261). Neither can it be the work of Peter of Poitiers, for chronological reasons (p. xxvii), but the latter was one of the sources of the treatise.

Garnerius of Rochefort, opposes the principal theses of the Amalricians : is it not absurd to say that God becomes stone in a stone, and Godin in Godin ?

Amalric was accused of heresy, but he retracted before his death. His doctrines were condemned in 1210 by the Synod of Paris, at the same time as those of John Scotus Erigena. The prohibition was renewed five years later, by Robert of Courçon at Paris and by the Council of the Lateran (1215).

To what sources must we attach the pantheism of Amalric ? His contemporaries associated his name with that of John Scotus, and one and the same condemnation struck them both. Also the texts of Henry Suso on the stages of the divine becoming, and the theory of the return of all things into God, including its terminology, seems to show that Amalric was inspired by the palatine philosopher.¹ But in this case he twisted the latter's formulæ and gave them a meaning they were not intended to have. John Scotus, by reason of his lack of precision and imprudent language, may have given a wrong impression of his real thought. Amalric gave a monistic sense to the philosophy of Scotus, because this enabled him to appeal to it in favour of his own ideas. This is the verdict of a contemporary chronicler.² We must add that he may have abused the philosophers of Chartres in the same way. As he was brought up at Chartres, he cannot have been ignorant of the ideas of a Theodoric or of a Clarembald on the divine unity ; and through these he must have known the theory of Boethius on the divine *esse*, and transposed purely static doctrines in the sense of a universal becoming of God in the world. As the mind of Amalric did not move in the serene spheres of speculation as practised at Chartres, but was mixed up with religious agitations, he would not hesitate to misuse the doctrines of his masters.

145. David of Dinant, in Belgium,³ was in communication

¹ Henry of Ostia certifies this, *Super quinque lib. decret.*, I. Cf. J. Huber, *Johannes Scotus Eriugena*, Munich, 1861, p. 436.

² Alberic of Trois Fontaines writes in his chronicle for 1225 : " Hoc anno damnationem incurrit (i.e., John Scotus) propter novos Albigenses et falsos theologos qui verba bene forsitan suo tempore prolata et antiquis simpliciter intellecta male intelligendo pervertebant, et ex eis suam heresim confirmabant."—*Monum. Germ. hist.*, SS. XXIII, 914 sqq.

³ A. Boghaert-Vache, *David de Dinant liégeois ou breton ?* Wallonia, 1904, pp. 266-72.

with Innocent III in 1210.¹ That is practically all we know about his life. To him have been ascribed two works, the *De tomis, id est de divisionibus*, and the *Quaternuli*, which are possibly two titles of one and the same treatise. David's work had its hours of fame, and made a great sensation, but the condemnations directed against it led to its disappearance from circulation. At the same time it is possible to reconstitute the system it contained, thanks to the numerous quotations and references to it found in Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and Nicholas of Cusa.² Also, recently discovered documents, which are soon to be published, will doubtless clear up some uncertainties (146).

David's system is a monistic one, and a materialistic pantheism of a very particular kind, in which there is room for a distinction between doctrinal tendencies, and method.

The diverse, which our senses seize in the world of bodies, and our mind in the world of spiritual beings, is connected with *forms*, which are the principles of multiplicity. But the diverse is only an appearance: it presupposes the real, or substance, which is unique, immutable, and indivisible. This substance—which is real being—is a trinity of indivisibles identical with each other. “*Divisit res in partes tres, in corpora, animas et substantias æternas; et primum indivisibile, ex quo constituuntur corpora, dixit yle; primum autem indivisibile ex quo constituuntur animæ dixit noym vel mentem; primum autem indivisibile in substantiis æternis dixit Deum; et hæc tria esse unum et idem; ex quo iterum consequitur esse omnia per essentiam unum.*”³

This text of Thomas Aquinas is very important, and makes David's thesis plain. The transformable element in the realm of bodies is prime matter, taken here in Aristotle's sense, but endowed with unicity and indivisibility. In the same way the *voûs* is the unique impersonal substance, transformable in the realm of spirits (by the determination of the forms) into multiple incorporeal substances. Matter and *voûs* are identical, but not only by reason of this similar-

¹ A chronicler mentions in 1210, together with Amalric and David, another robber of souls (*animarum latista*), Walter of Muissi, *Chronicon universale anonymi Laudunensis von 1154 bis zum Schluss 1219*, hrsg. von A. Cartellieri, bearbeitet von Wolf Stechele, Leipzig, Paris, 1906, pp. 69-70.

² The texts are collected and classified by G. Théry, *op. cit.* (146), pp. 120 et seq.

³ Thomas Aquinas, *II Sent.* dist. 17, q. 1, art. 1.

ity of function, but also because no common genus governs them and hence there is nothing which can diversify them. David thus ends in an indeterminate identity which embraces both bodies and minds. Moreover, matter and *νοῦς* are identical with God, for here again there is no common genus which could serve as a foundation for a diversification: God, the basis of all things, is identified with the transformable—an identification which Albert the Great calls *omnino asininum*,¹ and of which Thomas Aquinas writes: *stultissime posuit*.²

The method which David utilizes to establish these strange assertions is that of a pure logician, preoccupied solely with combining concepts. It is by dialectical sophisms, specimens of which have been conserved for us by Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, that the Walloon writer endeavours to establish his thesis of the identity of being: "In order that two things should differ, we should have to find in them a common element, and a differential element. Now, if spirit were different from matter, there would be a matter in prime matter, and we should have to go on to infinity."³ In other words: the three principles of all things are simple realities, therefore without composition, therefore without difference, therefore identical.

Théry justly points out that David's identities are realized in a sphere higher than that of appearances and the diverse, and we must not say of God that He penetrates incorporeal and corporeal things,⁴ and this constitutes a difference between his philosophy of the Divine Being and that of the Amalricians. And inasmuch as the system of Amalric differs profoundly from that of David, the former being spiritualistic and the latter materialistic, it is unlikely that David really derived his doctrines from Amalric, as stated by the chronicler of Laon.

Where did David of Dinant find the inspiration for his monism? The terminology *matter* and *form* indicate an acquaintance with Aristotle, especially with the *Physics* and the *Metaphysics*. It is in the commencement of the latter treatise that David would seem to have found both the

¹ *Summa theol.*, II, tr. XII, q. 72, m. 4, a. 2.

² *Summa theol.*, I, q. iii, art. 8.

³ Albertus Magnus, *Summa theol.*, I, tr. IV, q. 20, m. 2; *In Metaph.*, tr. 4,

c. 7.

⁴ *Op. cit.* (146), p. 49.

underlying conception of his system (the distinction between being and appearance), and an exposition of the monistic materialism of the early Greeks. David seems to have been subject only to Aristotelian influences, and in particular there seems to be no trace of Neo-Platonism in his doctrine.¹ Neither does there seem to be any influence of the *De divisione naturæ* of John Scotus, according to Théry. That the title *De tomis*² is not a conclusive argument for connecting David with the palatine philosopher may be granted. But the excessive realism of John Scotus, and his obscure descriptions of the theophanies may have put David on his way. Would he have passed over those equivocal texts to which others had given a monistic sense, and which could serve his purpose? The question of the relation between David and John Scotus is still an open one, and there is no decisive reason for or against the action of the latter on the former. David may also have known the *Fons Vitæ* of Avencebrol, but his pantheism has nothing in common with the *De unitate* of Gundissalinus (commencement of the thirteenth century), as was long suggested, for this last work was conceived in the spirit of scholastic individualism. Nor is there any doctrinal filiation between his materialism and the platonism of Chartres. David had nothing to do with Chartres, and cannot be attached to that school.³

The *Quaternuli* were condemned in 1210, at the Council held at Paris by Peter de Corbeil, Archbishop of Sens. Five years later, Cardinal Robert forbade the reading of David's works in the Faculties of Theology and Arts at Paris. The same condemnation was directed against Amalric and Maurice of Spain.⁴ The Decree of 1215 must have been directed against Arabian philosophy. According to some, Mauritius Hispanus would be none other than Averrhoes.⁵ Others regard him as Avicenna.⁶ Others again think that one cannot decide de-

¹ Conclusion of G. Théry, *op. cit.*, p. 50. R. Arnou says that David was influenced by Neo-Platonism through Avencebrol, and that he derives from this source his conception of matter, and the method of "resolutions" which gives to the work of dialectical decomposition the power of attaining to the unique reality.—*Op. cit.* (146).

² It is also called *De atomis*.—Théry, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

³ Thesis of B. Geyer, *Ueberwegs Grundriss* . . . p. 251 *et seq.*

⁴ Deniflé-Chatelain, *Chartul. Univ. Paris*, I, 70.

⁵ P. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant*, 2nd edn., Vol. I, p. 17.

⁶ A. Masnovo, *Da Guglielmo d'Auvergne a San Tomaso*, I, p. 109. Milan, 1930.

finitely between these two, or again that other identifications are possible, and that the question remains open.¹

Why did Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas devote so much attention to this gross Monism, to the service of which David devoted all the resources of his sophistry, and which the Council of Paris in 1210 banned from the schools, together with the philosophy of Aristotle? Thérý thinks that this may have been in order to dissociate the two names which the Council had linked together, and to let people see that the cause of Aristotle was not compromised by the sophisms of David of Dinant.

146. Bibliography.—P. Alphandéry, *Les idées morales chez les hétérodoxes latins au début du XIIIe s.*, Paris, 1903. E. Broekx, *Le catharisme*, Louvain, 1916.

Amalric of Benes.—Cl. Baeumker, *Contra Amaurianos. Ein anonym. wahrscheinlich dem Garnerius von Rochefort zugehöriger Traktat gegen die Amalrikaner aus dem Anfang des XIII. Jahrh.*, Beiträge, XXIV, 5-6, Munster, 1926; G. C. Capelle, *Autour du décret de 1210: III. Amaury de Bène, Etude sur son panthéisme formel*, Paris, 1932 (Bibliothèque thomiste, XVI); M. Bouyges, *Connaissions-nous le Mauricius Hyspanus interdit par Robert de Courçon en 1215?* in *Revue Hist. Ecclés.*, 1933, pp. 637-58.

David of Dinant.—G. Thérý, *Autour du décret de 1210: I. David de Dinant, Etude sur son panthéisme matérialiste*, Paris, 1925 (Bibliothèque thomiste., VI). R. Arnou, *Quelques idées néoplatoniciennes de David de Dinant*, in *Philosophia perennis* (Festgabe J. Geyser), Ratisbonne, 1930, Vol. I, pp. 115-27; A. Birkenmajer, *Découverte de fragments manuscrits de David de Dinant*, in *Revue Néo-Scolast.*, 1933, pp. 220-9 (they will be published in *Les Philosophes Belges*. Cf. a note by R. de Vaux in *Revue Sc. Phil. Théol.*, 1933, p. 243).

§ 18.—Writers of Summas and Sentences

The twelfth century was rich in speculative and mystical theologians. The former set forth a systematic exposition of Christian doctrine in *Summas* and collections of *Sentences*; the latter described the phenomena of the mystical union of the soul with God. All were primarily theologians, and philosophers only secondarily. We will deal with them briefly in this work, in view of the philosophical interest they possess for us. Later on we shall indicate the tendencies they manifest.

¹ R. de Vaux, *Mauritius Hispanus, le Mahométan d'Espagne*, in *R. Sc. P.T.*, 1932, p. 236; M. Bouyges, *op. cit.* (146).

147. Honorius of Autun.—BRUNO OF SEGNI, Abbot of Monte Cassino (1049-1123), and HONORIUS OF AUTUN were influenced by Anselm of Canterbury. Honorius was a complex and enigmatic personality of the first half of the twelfth century who, after having been *scholasticus* at Autun, led the life of a hermit near Ratisbon. He was a popular writer rather than a *savant*, and at times a poet. He wrote numerous works, the most important being the *Elucidarium sive Dialogus de Summa Totius Christianæ Theologiæ*, which had a great success.

At the commencement of the thirteenth century, this work was translated into many languages, and the German encyclopædia under the title of *Lucidarius* (1190-95) was based on it. In this utilization of theological material we discern the dialectic method of St. Anselm, and the style of the collections of Sentences which begin to appear everywhere. The dogmatic material is presented in the form of syllogisms, with arguments for and against. Similarly, we notice the influence of St. Anselm and St. Augustine very clearly in the *Inevitable*, a dialogue dealing with the reconciliation of freedom and grace. This work exists in two forms, the one stressing the doctrine of absolute predestination, the other adding the thesis that the decisions of free will, known by the Divine foreknowledge, are one of the factors which decide the character of predestination. The *Clavis Physicæ* of Honorius is taken bodily from the *De divisione naturæ* of Scotus Erigena, while the *De cognitione vitæ* closely follows the *Monologium* of St. Anselm.

Every creature can be considered in a triple state of existence: in God, plurality is reduced to the unity of a point ("totus hic mundus instar brevissimi puncti intra Deum colligitur"),¹ and the divine essence, which is the *archetypus mundus*,² alone deserves the name of veritable being; in itself, plurality is but the shadow of the divine idea ("omnis ista creatura est umbra vitæ et veritatis")³; in us it is in the state of an object known. Here we have the Augustinian Platonism according to the purest principles of Anselm, together with frank statements of pluralism and of the distinction between God and created things.⁴

¹ *De cognit. vitæ*, c. 25, Migne, P. L., Vol. 40, col. 1020. Cf. 1008.

² *De imag. mundi*, I, 2.

³ *Liber XII quæst.*, c. 1.

⁴ The *Speculum Ecclesiæ* of Honorius, a collection of sermons, was one of the main sources of the inspiration of the symbolic iconography of the cathedrals.

148. Anselm of Laon, *magister Anselmus*, the *magister divinitatis* of the beginning of this century, was for a time famous. His *Sententiæ*, and another collection, *Sententiæ divinæ paginæ*, attributed to him by Bliemetzrieder, display the first systematic arrangement of theological questions (God in Himself ; the Trinity ; God as Creator ; God as Redeemer). The questions are clearly enunciated, but the solutions are brief, often incomplete, and occasionally omitted. These two works are full of philosophical theories. Anselm starts from the idea of God, Ineffable because of His perfection. The Divine Essence is *essentialiter tota in singulis creaturis* (Scotus Erigena) in the sense that everything pre-exists in the wisdom of God, and that everything comes from Him (*ex ipso omnia*).¹ An analogical knowledge of the Trinity seems to be implanted in human reason. It was fitting (*deceuit*) that God should create beings outside of Himself (pp. 7-10). The human soul comprises *rationalitas* and *sensualitas*, but Anselm hesitates when discussing the question whether these *vires* or *proprietas* are really other than the soul itself. Then come dissertations on freedom of the will, in which he adopts the definition of St. Augustine instead of that of St. Anselm of Canterbury, on Providence and free will, on the *lex naturalis omnibus communis* (p. 79), and on Predestination. In one of the appendices to the *Sententiæ*, devoted to the return of all things to God, Anselm writes some high-flown pages in which the influence of Scotus Erigena is evident. So long as we are on this earth, the body is an obstacle which prevents us from understanding the Divinity. Our *senses* grasp corporeal properties, *ratio* rises above the individual and grasps the essence in the abstract state, but intuition or *intellectio* is lacking to us. After the resurrection, the blessed will experience a change in knowledge: the senses will take the place of the reason, and the reason will have an intuitive power. We shall see God in His works, and the presence of creatures will not affect the vision of the Divinity, "just as in the case of white-hot iron in a fire we behold the splendour of the state of heat and do not avert to the iron itself."²

¹ Bliemetzrieder's edition, pp. 4-5.

² Similiter de ferro candente in igne licet dicere in quo nimia exustione caloris fulgorem et formam ignis discernamus, ut ferrum non attendamus—p. 153. Pages 150-155 are worth reading.

149. The Schools of Abelard, Gilbert de la Porrée, and Hugh of St. Victor.—We have already mentioned the theological activity of these three personalities, who all had disciples.

The *Introductio ad theologiam* of Abelard, with its characteristic division of theology (*fides, caritas, sacramentum*), found its imitators. Deniflé has published four *Summas* which follow it closely in the division of the subject-matter, the method of exposition, and doctrine: *Epitome theologiæ* by Master Hermanus, a work which gives a faithful summary of the master's doctrine; *Sententiæ Rodlandi Bononiensis magistri auctoritatibus rationibus fortes* by Roland Bandinelli (Pope Alexander III), subsequent to 1141; *Summa* by Omnibene, a contemporary of Roland; and another *Summa* in the library of St. Florian, by an anonymous writer.

The School of St. Victor, represented by the two great Victorines, was more reserved, and confined itself within the limits of the strictest orthodoxy. The *Fons philosophiæ* of Godfrey of St. Victor, and an anonymous treatise *De sancta Trinitate* belong to this school, and Hugh of Rouen and Robert of Melun also are to be attached to it.¹

The existence of a school of Gilbert de la Porrée is proved by the *Sententiæ divinitatis* (written between 1141 and 1148) which reproduces the characteristic errors of Gilbert condemned by the Synod of Rheims in 1148, and at the same time was greatly influenced by the *Summa Sententiarum*. Among the disciples of Gilbert de la Porrée (*Porrectani*) we come across RADULFUS ARDENS, writer of homilies, a *Liber epistolarum*, and especially of a *Speculum universale*. This great work, written between 1179 and 1215, opens with a classification of the sciences, makes an endeavour to systemize the data of theology, deals with the transposition of philosophical terminology into theological matters (*qua necessitate quæ intentione nomina sunt translata a naturali facultate ad theologiam*,² and at the same time is a noteworthy exposition of moral teaching.

Haskins has published the preface of a *Liber de diversitate naturæ et personæ proprietatumque personalium*, in which we at once recognize the doctrine of Gilbert. Its author visited Constantinople in 1179 as an envoy of Frederick Barbarossa,

¹ Grabmann, *Gesch. der schol. Meth.*, II, pp. 318-28.

² Grabmann, *op. cit.*, I, 255.

and set himself to look for texts in the Orthodox theologians which could confirm his own opinions and those of Gilbert on the Trinity. He tells us that Gilbert was very familiar with Latin translations of the *Scripta beati Theodoriti et Sophronii*, and that he appealed to these at the Council of Rheims.¹

As for the *Summa Sententiarum*, in which the tendencies of Abelard and the Victorines converge, this was a work manifesting still further development in the clearness of its exposition. In its turn it influenced several collections of *Sentences* in the period immediately following. The origin of this work is still a subject of discussion, and has not yet been established.

150. Robert of Melun.—The Englishman ROBERT OF MELUN deserves a place apart. He was born in the closing years of the eleventh century, and succeeded Abelard in the teaching of dialectics in the *Schola Artium* at St. Geneviève. John of Salisbury, who followed his lectures, described him as *in responsionibus perspicax, brevis et commodus*. He tells us that Robert explained the *Topics* of Aristotle. Afterwards Robert went on to Melun (1142), where dialectics was being taught, and numbered among his pupils there John of Cornouailles. He soon occupied a chair of theology at Melun, and sat at the Council of Rheims (1148) as an equal of Peter Lombard, the master of Paris. It is possible that he taught at St. Victor² before returning to England. Thither he was recalled by Thomas à Becket, the Chancellor of Henry II. He became Archdeacon at Oxford, and then Bishop of Hereford (1163), which see he held till his death in 1167. We know of three theological works written by him, the *Questiones de divina pagina*, *Questiones de epistolis Pauli*, and *Sententiæ*. The last work exists in a summary which seems to be the work of one of Robert's disciples.³ The *Questiones de divina pagina* (1143-7), recently published by R. Martin, belong to the first stage of this kind of literary work which was destined to pass through so many evolutions. The problem is stated, the arguments for and against are set forth, and then the

¹ Haskins, *Studies in Mediæval Science*, pp. 210-12. The author concludes on p. 211: "Quod quidem (i.e., non idem esse personales proprietates et essentiam) supranominatus Pictaviensis episcopus . . . evidenter asseruit."

² R. Martin, *Œuvres de Robert de Melun*, I, p. ix.

³ Martin, *op. cit.*, p. xiv.

solution and answers to objections. This admits of a certain amount of variation, but the technique manifests the influence of the dialectics of Aristotle.¹ The two books of the *Sententiæ*, which were subsequently abridged, show the influence of the *Sic et non* of Abelard, and of Hugh of St. Victor. We find therein a noteworthy systematization, in which the two theological methods (authority and reason) are well balanced. The Prologue affirms the intellectual character of faith; it gives us valuable information on the superficial dialectical methods employed by certain contemporary commentators, which the author would replace by a more critical technique.

Robert left no disciples, but the numerous transcriptions, summaries, and annotations of the *Sententiæ* bear witness to the wide diffusion of the work. We find numerous citations in the *Summa* of Master Hubert, composed during the latter part of the twelfth century, and in a *Summa* associated with Prevostin (Landgraf).

151. Peter Lombard.—The best-known composer of *Sentences* was PETER LOMBARD, author of *Libri quattuor sententiarum*.² Born about 1100 at Lumello, near Novarra, in Lombardy, he received his theological education at St. Victor in Paris. He taught at the Cathedral School in 1140, and after a stay in Rome (1148-50) he returned to Paris as Bishop (1159). He died the following year. His work is the natural culmination of the arranging of materials which began at the commencement of the century. He is a moderate man, for he places the arguments of authority first, and has recourse to philosophical notions only in so far as they may be of service to dogma. According to the formula of Damiani, he put the liberal arts to the service of theology: "eam quippe solam artes liberales habent dominam, ei subjectionis debito famulantur, ejus lege astringuntur."³ This utilitarian pre-occupation explains why Peter Lombard is not a philosopher, except in appearance, and why his philosophical considerations are incidental, and devoid of originality. We may describe him as "an eclectic, who adopts ideas from almost

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. xl and xliii.

² Completed in 1150 according to Deniflé; 1152 according to F. Pelster (*Wann hat Petrus Lombardus die Libri IV Sententiarum vollendet?* in *Gregorianum*, 1921, pp. 387-392).

³ Grabmann, *op. cit.*, II, p. 353.

every source, sometimes in a very superficial way, sometimes with profound reflection, in order to explain the Church's doctrine."¹ In theology Peter Lombard is equally devoid of originality. He imitates and often copies Abelard, Hugh of St. Victor, the *Sententiæ divinitatis*, Alcher of Liège, and many others; he takes his patristic and conciliar texts from Gratian; he makes use of the classifications and certain of the ideas of the *De Fide Orthodoxa* of St. John Damascene, a Latin translation of which, from the pen of Burgundius of Pisa, he had found at Rome; he is greatly influenced by St. Augustine. In spite of these borrowed elements, his work forms an excellent systematization inspired by a division of the material into *res* and *signa*; it provides schemes and subjects for lectures, excludes all imprudent curiosity and deals with all the questions at issue without succeeding in harmonizing completely the divergent authorities. All this explains the astonishing celebrity of the work, which according to one of his disciples its author did not expect to be used in teaching. He was very soon called the "Master of the Sentences."²

In spite of opposition on the part of Walter of St. Victor, John of Cornouailles, Gerhoch of Reichersberg, and others to Lombard's method and the "Christological nihilism," which he adopted from Abelard, and the attacks in the *Liber de Vera et Falsa Philosophia* and Joachim of Floris, the fame of Peter Lombard lasted for four centuries.

Among the first imitators of Peter Lombard must be mentioned Master BANDINUS, GANDULPHUS OF BOLOGNA, who wrote about 1150 and in several chapters summarized him (*Abbre-
viatio magistri Bandini*), PETER THE EATER (Petrus Comestor), chancellor of Paris in 1164 (died 1178), and especially PETER OF POITIERS (died 1205), Professor of Theology, afterwards

¹ Espenberger, *Die Philosophie des Petrus Lombardus und ihre Stellung im zwölften Jahrh.*, Beiträge, III, 5, Munster, 1901, p. 11. Dehove shows that in spite of his hesitations Peter Lombard must be included amongst the partisans of moderate realism: "Qui præcipui fuerint labente XII s. ante introductam arabum philosophiam temperati realismi antecessores." — Lille, 1908, p. 119.

² Contents of the work:

- A. *Res*, or things which are not the symbol of anything else.
 - (a) The object of our beatitude, namely, God (Lib. I).
 - (b) The means of attaining thereto, i.e., creatures (Lib. II).
 - (c) The virtues which are at once objects of happiness, and means of attaining to beatitude; men and angels, or the beings called to enjoy beatitude (Lib. III).
- B. The *signa* or symbols, i.e., the sacraments (Lib. IV).

Chancellor of Notre Dame at Paris, his most faithful disciple, whose *Sententiarum libri quinque* and important commentaries (*Glossæ super sententias*, written before 1175) greatly helped to spread the work of the master. His commentaries contain one of the first references to the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle; but the author did not utilize the work, and is still rather vague: "Asserunt quidam hoc Aristotelem dixisse in *Metaphysica*, sed qui diligenter inspexerunt, hoc negant."¹ In the division of the subject matter, Peter of Poitiers is more orderly than the Lombard; like the latter, he starts with the absolute certitude of faith, the argument from reason having only an exegetical value. "Licet tanta sit certitudo, tamen licet nobis dubitare de articulis fidei et inquirere et disputare."² His proofs for the existence of God are superior in precision to those of the Lombard, and are not lacking in originality. In particular, one argument is based on the division of beings into substance and accidents, and on the insufficiency of either to exist by itself (*a se*). Another argument is based on the incapability of any being composed of parts, of existing *per se*.

Abridgments and Commentaries on the Master of the Sentences appeared as early as the second half of the twelfth century. The Lateran Council (1215) confirmed his magistral authority, and in the thirteenth century the commentaries on his work were numbered by hundreds. Up to the middle of the sixteenth century his plan of treatment remained classic, and the *Sentences* were explained side by side with the Bible in the theological faculties of the European universities.

152. Simon of Tournai and Prevostin.—To Peter of Poitiers we may attach Martin de Fugeriis and Peter of Capua. They were influenced by him, and the same is true of Simon of Tournai and Prevostin of Cremona.

Simon of Tournai, born about 1130, master of arts at Paris about 1150, and professor of theology (1165), who died at Tournai about 1201, was the author of *Institutiones in sacram paginam* or *Sententiæ*, also of *Disputationes*, and an *Exposition of the Creed of St. Athanasius*. This last work begins thus: "Apud Aristotelem, argumentum est ratio faciens fidem.

¹ Grabmann, *op. cit.*, II, 508

² *Sentent.*, III, 21, 1092 D.

Sed apud Christum argumentum est fides, faciens rationem. Unde Aristoteles, Intellige et crede. Sed Christus, Crede et intelliges.”¹ The master’s point of view is the same as that of Peter of Poitiers: as a theologian, he is concerned with philosophy only in order to interpret dogma. Boethius is freely quoted. Mention is made of John Scotus Erigena, and of the *Physics* of Aristotle, and attention has been called to the unusual fact that Simon mentions his own name. The *Disputationes*, recently published by Warichez, make great use of the method of the *quæstio*; they manifest a certain doctrinal relation to the Porreccion school, and also with the theology of the Lombard.

Prevostin (Præpostinus) of Cremona was successively master at Paris (about 1193), a scholar at Mainz (1194-1203), chancellor at Paris (1206) until his death (about 1210). He displayed great intellectual activity as an exegete, a liturgist, and a speculative theologian. His *Summa theologica* is divided into questions, and each of these adopts the triadic process of the for, against, and solution.² Another work, the *Summa contra hereticos*, depending on Peter of Poitiers, is directed against the doctrine of the Passagians, and its composition (between 1184 and 1210) must be connected with the fact that Prevostin spent some time among the heretics with a view to converting them.

Peter the Singer, or of Rheims (Petrus Cantor), who taught at Notre Dame from 1169-70 and died in 1197, gave a practical and positive direction to theology. Though not interested in philosophy as such, he utilizes the *disputatio*. We find the same tendencies in Liebhard of Prufening; Guido of Orchelles; and a group of English writers: Richard of Leicester; William de Montibus; Peter of London; Robert de Courçon (*Summa*),³ one of the first organizers of the Univer-

¹ *Biblioth. Cassin.*, Florileg., IV, p. 322.

² Grabmann, *op. cit.*, II, 558.

³ Studies questions of moral theology and canon law. One of the most interesting parts, dealing with usury, has been published by G. Le Fèvre, *Le traité de usura de R. de Courçon*, Lille, 1902. It is to be noted that the author does not invoke the texts of the *Ethics* and the *Politics* in order to condemn gain from usury, as was done later on. From this Le Fèvre infers that until the thirteenth century the attacks upon loans with interest were conducted independently of the authority of Aristotle.—From the number of summists and philosophers we may exclude Hildebert of Lavardin (1057-about 1133), Bishop of Tours, for the *Tractatus theologicus* attributed to him is really by Hugh of St. Victor (Hauréau, *Not. et extr.*, etc., V., 251); and the *Philosophia moralis* under his name is by William of Conches.

sity of Paris; Stephen Langton, Archbishop of Canterbury (died 1228); and Cardinal Laborantis.¹

153. Nicholas of Amiens.—We have mentioned previously the apologetic work of Alan of Lille. The *De arte catholicae fidei*, which its author Nicholas of Amiens² dedicated to Clement III (1187-91), displays the same characteristics, and is composed according to the same methods. Starting from definitions (*descriptiones*), postulates (*petitiones*) and axioms (*communes conceptiones*), the author deduces therefrom the theological "theoremata" concerning God, the creation, the sacraments, and the future life, so that the work of Nicholas can be regarded as the most perfect example of the type of deductive theology. The same methods are found in *Liber de Trinitate* wrongly attributed to Alan of Lille.

We may say, after this rapid enumeration, that many *Summas* and twelfth century treatises remain unpublished.

154. Bibliography.—Cf. 20 (II and VII) and 32.—M. Grabmann, *Geschichte der katholischen Theologie*, Freiburg in B., 1933 (recent bibliography on the theology of the twelfth century, pp. 286-91; Supplements the last edition of Ueberweg; Contains references to the editions and numerous works of Bliemetzrieder, de Ghellinck, Lacombe, Landgraf, Lottin, Martin, Pelster, etc.). The general works of de Ghellinck (32) and Robert (29). G. Englhardt, *Die Entwicklung der dogmatischen Glaubenspsychologie vom Abaelardstreit bis Philipp den Kanzler*, Beiträge, XXX, 4-6, Munster, 1933.

J. A. Endres, *Honorius Augustodunensis, Ein Beitrag z. Gesch. des geistigen Lebens im 12 Jahrh.*, 1906; Fr. Baeumker, *Das Inevitable des H. A.*, etc., Beiträge, XIII, 6, 1914; F. Bliemetzrieder, *L'œuvre d'Anselme de Laon et la littérature théologique contemporaine*, I. Honorius d'Autun, in Rech. T.A.M., 1933, pp. 275-91; R. Martin, *Œuvres de R. de Melun. I. Questiones de divina pagina*, Louvain, 1932; *L'immortalité de l'âme d'après Robert de Melun*, in Revue Néo-Scolast, Vol. 36, pp. 128-45.

§ 19.—The mystical theologians

155. St. Bernard.—The mystics are theologians who describe the interior life of the soul, and base the stages in its

¹ These two last writers have been the subject of several works by Landgraf, Lacombe and others.

² Grabmann, *op. cit.*, II, 459, *et seq.*, has shown that the attribution to Nicholas is no longer uncertain. The work is printed by Migne under the name of Alan of Lille.

ascent towards God on supernatural grace. In the twelfth century we find many who apply themselves to a methodic study of the exalted spheres of contemplation.

The first great name is that of St. Bernard (1091-1163), who may be called the founder of mediæval mysticism. This extraordinary man, whose ascendancy over his age is everywhere manifest, was not only the founder of a religious order, the promoter of a crusade, and an administrator of justice, but also a contemplative, who lived an intense interior life, described it, and expounded its theory. It is this theory which interests us in the *Epistolæ* (numbering a hundred and ninety), the *Sermones in Cantica Canticorum*, and the *De gradibus humilitatis et superbiæ* (about 1121), of the one who has been called *Doctor mellifluus*.

All knowledge is in a plane illuminated by the mystical life, and is legitimate in the measure in which it favours its progress. But if one seeks knowledge for its own sake, after the manner of Abelard (*ventosa loquacitas philosophorum*), it is but base curiosity (*turpis curiositas*). The plan of mystical studies, which Bernard derives from a profound study of Augustinian texts, and which the later mystics have only to develop, is summed up above all in the conditions of the mystical union, and in the forms which this union takes. The conditions of union with God are humility (in twelve degrees), and the love which humility engenders. Then appear the contacts of the soul with God ("in culmine humilitatis, constituitur cognitio veritatis"),¹ the *consideratio*, *contemplatio*, and at the summit, the ecstasy *excessus*, *raptus*. This *excessus puræ mentis in Deum*, also called *Dei pius descensus in animam*, is characterized negatively by the silence of all sensitive life ("seceditur etiam a corporis sensibus"), positively by an ineffable enjoyment of the Divine Word, which may go so far as a kind of assimilation of the soul to God (*deificatio*). Bernard gives us celebrated comparisons, such as the drop of water lost in a great amount of wine; incandescent coal which can no longer be distinguished from the central fire, air which becomes transparent when the sun's rays pass through it. Bernard has recourse to these to explain that this state of intimate union leaves nothing human in man save his substance as a finite being. The latter, indeed,

¹ *De gradu humil.*, c. 2, n. 3.

remains distinct from God and inalienable. This reservation is of fundamental importance, and separates Bernard's theory from any suspicion of monism. "Quomodo omnia in omnibus erit Deus, si in homine de homine quidquam supererit? Manebit quidem substantia, sed in alia forma, alia gloria, alia potentia."¹

Attentive to all that touches the life of the soul, Bernard dwells upon the freedom of the will, which is illuminated by the reason but is never subject to its determining action.² Liberty, *arbitrii libertas*, is the impress of the divine upon the soul.

156. William of St. Theodoric, born at Liège, and abbot of St. Theodoric (1119-35, died in 1148), presents numerous points of contact with St. Bernard. It was the latter who directed his attention to the theological errors of Abelard in a letter often quoted, and he himself published a *Disputatio adversus Abelardum* (1138 and 1139). Besides mystical and dogmatic treatises (*Speculum fidei*, *Ænigma fidei*) he composed *Libri duo de natura corporis et animæ*. In this compilation, the body is studied according to the data of Arabian physiology, which the author takes from Constantine the African, and the soul after the Platonico-Augustinian manner. This psychology enables him to explain the ascent of the soul towards God, in seven steps.

157. St. Hildegard of Bingen (1098-1179), whose life, at once contemplative and active, was passed in various convents in the Rhine country, and who founded the monastery of Bingen, presents one of the most curious manifestations of the mystical life.

The treatises which she wrote (principally *Scivias*, *Liber Divinorum Operum simplicis hominis*) are noteworthy in many respects: fascinated by the fallacious imagery of the *De Mundi Universitate* of Bernard Sylvestris, she describes the evolution of the Divine Spirit which permeates the universe, gives rise to the beings of the *macrocosmos*, and absorbs the human soul. This description of the world is intimately combined with her own affective experiences and mystical

¹ *De diligendo Deo*, c. 10, n. 28. Migne, P. L., Vol. 182, col. 991 AB.

² "Est vero ratio data voluntati ut instruat illam, non destruat. Destrueret autem, si necessitatem ei ullam imponeret.—*De gratia et libero arbitrio*, c. 2, n. 4. Migne, P. L., Vol. 182, col. 1003 C.

transports towards God. Furthermore, she herself commented on her mystic visions, to which she seems to ascribe a real value, and had them depicted in wonderful miniatures in which she is represented as seated in contemplation. She enlists in the service of these visions all the cosmological and astronomical data found in the writings of Galen, Ptolomy, and other men of science known in the School of Chartres.

158. The Victorines.—The convent of St. Victor in Paris was the sanctuary of mysticism. Hugh and Richard of St. Victor were its most illustrious representatives.

When these two masters disappeared, mysticism became exaggerated in its exuberance. The act of faith came to be looked upon more and more as a purely affective sentiment, independent of the motives of credibility. Philosophy was rejected as needless. Contempt for all speculation is expressed in a pamphlet by Walter, the successor of Richard, and he regards dialectics as the art of the devil. His work *In quatuor labyrinthos Franciæ* (about 1179) includes in a common condemnation the author of the *Sententiæ divinitatis*, Abelard, Gilbert de la Porrée, Peter Lombard, and Peter of Poitiers. If such great errors spring up in the schools, says he, we must look for the cause in the *aristotelicus spiritus* and in the *scolastica levitas* to which it gives rise.¹

Godfrey of St. Victor (died 1194) is more moderate. As for Thomas Gallus, who taught at St. Victor at the commencement of the thirteenth century, and then went to the monastery of Verceil, he attributes a great importance to the treatises of pseudo-Dionysius, from which he gives *Extractiones*. He presents a fusion of the dionysian mysticism with that of the Victorines, and his work marks the transition from the school of St. Victor to that of St. Bonaventure (see p. 69). His *Excerptiones* were still in use in the fifteenth century.²

Amongst the mystics with practical tendencies we may mention Aelred of Rievaulx (1166), author of a *Liber de spirituali amicitia*, in which we see the influence of the *De amicitia* of Cicero, and which Peter of Blois, in his *De amicitia christiana*, merely plagiarizes.

¹ "Uno aristotelico spiritu efflatus, dum ineffabilia sancte Trinitatis et incarnationis scolastica levitate tractarent."—Deniflé, *Archiv. für Litter. u. Kirchengesch. des Mittelalters*, I, 406.

² Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben*, 460-1.

159. Joachim of Floris.—To the mystics we may attach Joachim of Floris (1145-1202), who was in turn Abbot of the Cistercian monastery of Corazzo, then Abbot of San Giovanni in Fiore in Calabria. We possess numerous exegetical and dogmatical treatises written by him, but the majority are unpublished. He was a contemplative who was chiefly known for his historic conception of humanity and the Church, the development of which he undertakes to explain in function of the Trinity. The three periods marked by the creation, the redemption, and the middle of the twelfth century, are identified with the *status* of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and their succession with the processions of the divine persons. The third age, which according to Joachim began with his own coming into this world, was to be the age of the *Evangelium æternum*, in which, thanks to a revelation of the Holy Spirit, humanity would attain to the profound meaning of the Gospel. A radical reform of the Church, in which its institutions would lose all connection with the temporal, was to confer upon it a purely spiritual glory.¹ This would be a time of perfection, of the Christian ideal, of the Spirit.

How was Joachim led to these prophetic dreams? One of his recent historians says that it was by his taste for Scripture, and a certain way of interpreting its texts, and of judging the future by the past. It should be added that these reveries of perfection for the Church were found in many religious movements, and this explains why Joachim's interpretations made a great impression upon all the *illuminati* of the time, such as the Amalricians, and also in the thirteenth century, on the Spirituals and the Fraticelli of the Franciscan Order, who thought they saw the realization of Joachim's prophecies in the institution of the mendicant orders.

160. Bibliography.—J. Pacheu, *Introduction à la psychologie des mystiques*, Paris, 1901; *Psychologie des mystiques chrétiens*, Paris, 1909; A. Sharp, *Mysticism, its nature and value*, London, 1910 (clear explanations and classifications); P. Pourrat, *La spiritualité chrétienne*, Vol. II., *Le moyen âge*, Paris, 1924; J. Maréchal, *Sur quelques traits distinctifs de la mystique chrétienne*,

¹ In 1188, Pope Clement III requested Joachim to terminate his *Explanation of the Apocalypse*, and his *Concordia*.—*Dict. théol. cath.*, art. Joachim de Flore, col. 1427. An unpublished treatise by Joachim, *De unitate trinitatis*, dogmatic in character, and directed against Peter Lombard, develops a tritheistic thesis reducing the divine unity to a collective unity. The treatise was condemned in 1215 by the Lateran Council.—*Ibid.*, col. 1432.

in *Revue de Philos.*, 1912; M. Seitz, *Gott und Mensch in der Mystik d. Mittelalters*, in *Philos. Jahrb.*, 1930, pp. 207-21, 357-72.

M. Grabmann, *Geschichte der katholischen Theologie*, Freiburg in B., 1933 (recent bibliography on the mysticism of the twelfth century, pp. 315-16); E. Vacandard, *Vie de S. Bernard, abbé de Clairvaux*, Paris, 1910, 2 vols.; P. Mitterre, *La doctrine de S. Bernard*, Brussels, 1932; A. Adam, *G. de St. Thierry, sa vie et ses œuvres*, Bourg, 1923; Ch. Singer, *The Scientific Views and Visions of St. Hildegard*, in *Studies in the History and Method of Science*, I, Oxford, 1917; H. Fischer, *Die hl. H. die erste deutsche Naturforscherin und Aerztin*, Munich, 1927; H. Liebeschutz, *Das allegorische Weltbild der hl. Hildegard von Bingen*, Leipzig, 1930 (Studien d. Bibliothek Warburg); R. Egenter, *Die Lehre von der Gottesfreundschaft in d. Scholastik u. Mystik des XII u. XIII. Jahrh.*, Augsburg, 1928; M. Davy, *Un traité de l'amour du XIIe s., Pierre de Blois*, Paris, 1932; E. Vansteenbergh, *Deux théoriciens de l'amitié au XIIe s., Pierre de Blois et Aelred de Rievall*, in *Revue des sc. relig.*, 1932, pp. 572-89; A. Wilmart, *Magister Adam Cartusiensis*, in *Mélanges Mandonnet*, Paris, 1930, Vol. II, pp. 145-61. E. Bonajuti has edited the *Tractatus super IV Evangelia*, by Joachim of Floris, Rome, 1931. H. Bett, *Joachim of Flora*, London, 1931 (contains nothing new); E. Benz, *Joachim-Studien, II. Die Exzerptsätze der Pariser Professoren aus dem Evangelium æternum*, in *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, 1932, pp. 415-55.

§ 20.—Jurists and Canonists

161. Roman Jurists.—Until the eleventh century, Roman civil laws had been studied in a very narrow spirit, and students confined themselves to the compilations of the *Breviarium* of Alaric, or of some epitome of it. The twelfth century, however, witnessed a juridical renaissance, intimately connected with the rise of commerce on a great scale, and the prosperity of the Italian cities. It began with a revival of Roman Law, and then extended to Canon Law and civil feudal law.

The school of Bologna was the most active centre for Roman Law. There we find Pepo, who was connected with the the decision of court of Tuscany in 1076 in which there appeared for the first time a quotation from the *Digest*, this being the most interesting part of the *Corpus juris civilis* for the reason that it gives in extracts the texts and methods of the great Roman lawyers.¹

¹ Haskins, *op. cit.* (28), p. 199.

We also find there Irnerius (born about 1060, and still alive in 1125), who left voluminous commentaries; a group of commentators known as the "four doctors," who were counsellors of Frederick Barbarossa; then, in the following generation, Placentinus (died 1192). All comment on the whole of the *Corpus juris civilis*. It was this mass of commentaries, the abundance of which ended in stifling the text, which was codified about 1250 in the *Glossa ordinaria* of Accursius.¹ Under the influence of Bologna, Roman Law was cultivated at Montpellier, where Placentinus taught for some time, and we find other centres of juridical culture at Orleans, and even in England. From that time scholasticism has a rival, a lay rival, namely, the doctrine of Roman Law. (Cf. Ch. III, § 4.)

162. Canonists.—The methods practised in the study of the texts of the *Digests* were applied to the laws of the Church, and so, side by side with the Roman jurists, there appear in the twelfth century a numerous group of canonists.

The most noted of them was Gratian, a monk of San Felice of Bologna (about 1140). He undertook in his *Decretum* or *Concordance of Discordant Canons*, what Peter Lombard accomplished in the case of theology, so that their works have been called "two eggs from the same nest." The *Decretum* is an ordered arrangement and supplement of the collections of the eleventh century, which the successors of Gratian in their turn developed and commented upon. Amongst these we may mention Roland Bandinelli, the future Pope Alexander III (about 1149), and especially Rufinus (1157-9), who was the head of a group comprising Stephen of Tournai and a number of decretists.²

The work of Gratian constituted the first part of the *Corpus Juris Canonici*. The second part was to be formed later on by the great book of *Decretals* published by Gregory IX (1234). We shall see later that canon law occupied a place in university teaching equal in importance to that of civil law.

¹ In the decisions of the tribunals, the gloss had ended by having greater weight than the text. Hence the saying: "Quidquid non agnoscit glossa non agnoscit curia."—*Ibid.*, p. 202. Very soon people began to comment on the commentaries—in itself a condemnation of the method. The scholasticism of the fifteenth century presented the spectacle of a similar phenomenon, when it produced commentaries on commentaries.

² O. Lottin, *Le droit naturel* . . . (20, V), pp. 13 *et seq.*

Gratian adopts from Isidore of Seville the notion of *jus naturale*, but he gives it a Christian significance: "*jus naturale est quod in lege et Evangelio continetur quo quisque jubetur alii facere quod sibi vult fieri, et prohibetur alii facere quod sibi nolit fieri*" (*Pr. Dist.*, I). He then reproduces the three-fold division of law into *jus naturale*, *jus gentium*, and *jus civile*. The first alone is immutable, and this makes it superior to the other two. In virtue of natural law, everything is common (Plato, *Acts of the Apostles*). Private property has arisen from custom (*jus gentium*) and positive legislation. Rufinus is more precise: "*est naturale jus vis quedam humane creature a natura insita ad faciendum bonum cavendumque contrarium*," so that the *jus naturale* is linked up with the rational instinct in man, and not with the merely animal instinct. Rufinus for the first time divides natural law into *mandata*, *prohibitiones*, and *demonstrationes*, a division adopted by Stephen of Tournai and others.¹ Slavery and property, which the law of nature neither imposes nor forbids, are allowable and even recommendable.

The labours of the decretalists on natural law culminated in the precisions which we find in John the Teuton, author of the *Glossa ordinaria* (after 1215), who gives to the *jus naturale* a fourfold sense: the tendency of every being to reproduce its kind; the tendency common to men and to animals; the rational tendency proper to man; and the collection of the natural precepts of the Decalogue.²

163. Feudal jurists.—These were not grouped into a school, but appeared in various countries of Europe, notably in France (Beaumanoir, *Les coutumes du Beauvoisis*), England (Bracton, author of a treatise *De legibus et consuetudinibus regni Angliæ*), Italy (Rathere of Verona), Germany (the author of *Sachsenspiegel*). The prestige of Roman law, or of the *lex scripta*, is not altogether unconnected with this codification of customs.

164. Bibliography.—For general works on the history of Law, see above, 20, V (Natural Law) and VI (Civil and Canon Law).—On the juridical literature of the Middle Ages, see also M. Grabmann,

¹ Rufinus, *Summa Decretorum*, D. I, Dict. Grat. ad cap., 1. Carlyle, *op. cit.* (20, V), II, 103.

² Lottin, *op. cit.* (20, V), p. 23.

Geschichte der kathol. Theologie, Freiburg in B., 1933, pp. 321-22 ; K. F. von Savigny, *Gesch. d. römischen Rechtes im Mittelalter*, 2nd edn., 1834-51 ; P. Vinogradoff, *Roman Law in Mediæval Europe*, 1909 ; Haskins, op. cit., 23, contains general views in chap. vii, *The Revival of Jurisprudence* ; G. Le Bras, Alger de Liège et Gratien, in *R. Sc. P. T.*, 1931, pp. 5-26 ; P. Fournier and G. Le Bras, *Histoire des collections canoniques en Occident depuis les Fausses décrétales jusqu'au Décret de Gratien*, 2 vols., Paris, 1932

CHAPTER III

Synthetic Studies

If we cast a general glance upon the movements of ideas which we have studied in their development from the ninth to the twelfth centuries, we cannot help noticing the progress which they manifest. Philosophy affirms its autonomy; it constitutes its general framework; it enunciates its problems, but does not ascend to vast systematizations (§ 1). In the midst of the doctrines which succeed one another, we notice currents forming, and uniformities begin to reveal themselves (§ 2). In addition, all are functions of certain spiritual factors which affect the whole civilization (§ 3). Distinct from other disciplines, philosophy cultivates close relations with speculative and mystical theology, and with civil, feudal and canon law (§ 4).

§ 1.—*The progress of scholasticism*

165. Autonomy of philosophy.—At the beginning of the Middle Ages, philosophy was not very clearly defined. The first thinkers passively gathered together the debris of the ancient knowledge, and from the fourth to the eighth century we see appearing a number of encyclopædic works. The *florilegia*, or collections of sentences taken from numerous authors, and dealing with theological or philosophical matters, arose from this same desire to gather up everything.

Not only did the knowledge of the early ages present an encyclopædic appearance, but the name of *philosophy* was given to this collection of disparate items of knowledge. Isidore of Seville writes: "Philosophia est rerum humanarum divinarumque cognitio cum studio bene vivendi conjuncta" (*Etymol.* II, 24). And Alcuin describes philosophy as: "naturarum inquisitio, rerum humanarum divinarumque

cognitio quantum homini possibile est æstimare" (Migne, *P.L.*, Vol. 101, col. 952)—thus somewhat resembling Ulpian, who says at the beginning of his *Digest* that jurisprudence is "divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia." Thus there is no line of demarcation, either between philosophy and theology, or between philosophy and the liberal arts.

Towards the ninth century, philosophy begins to detach itself from the liberal arts, and in the measure in which it attains its constitution, it raises itself above the *trivium*. The demarcation is clearly realised in the twelfth century.

Philosophy also detaches itself, but more slowly and painfully, from theology. At what moment was the confusion between philosophy and theology dissipated? It seems to us that there is room for distinguishing two stages in the autonomous constitution of philosophy: at a first moment, the distinction exists *de facto*, but it is not noticed, and there is no attempt to base the distinction on technical data and definitions; at a second moment, the autonomy is scientifically established upon methodological bases, and exists *de jure*.

The distinction *de facto* appears very early. If we leave out Boethius, who was not strictly speaking a mediæval, and who, on this question as on so many others, set forth astonishingly precise statements, which, however, were either not utilized or not understood, we may say that philosophy was cultivated apart from theology from the ninth century onwards. It was certainly so cultivated by John Scotus Erigena, although he stresses the community which exists between the field of exploration of philosophy and that of religion: the powerful Scotist synthesis is a rational conception of reality. It is equally impossible not to recognise the philosophical point of view in the first discussions on universals.

The autonomy of philosophy existed, then, *de facto* from the ninth century. It existed *de jure* from the eleventh. We may say that the *conscious* dissociation of the two disciplines was brought about by Anselm of Canterbury, who sought its principle in the distinction between *intelligere* and *credere*. From this moment the two sciences had each its own constructive methods, and its proper principles. Scholastic philosophy is an explanation of the universal order by the mind, while theology tends more and more to become a systematization of revealed data, contained in the Bible or in

Apostolic tradition. Henceforth philosophy and theology follow a parallel evolution. It is neither scientific nor in conformity with history to confound them, as has so long been done, in a sort of mixed department which would belong to the history of religions.

Distinct from theology, philosophy was not, however, at once independent. We shall return to this aspect of the question later on.

166. Internal constitution and enunciation of problems.—

At the same time when philosophy detached itself from other disciplines, it began to develop its internal constitution; it built its framework piece by piece, by attacking one after the other the problems which ought normally to be studied by it.

The first schools professed an exaggerated cult for dialectics, and the treatises in use helped to accentuate its despotism. We may infer from this that dialectics alone was *taught* as such, but not that it alone constituted the *whole of philosophy* in the eighth and ninth centuries, for, quite early, there appeared preoccupations of another kind. Questions of metaphysics arise out of theological discussions. From the *Timæus* was borrowed its statement of the principle of causality, and from Aristotle his scheme of the four causes, but we do not find a complete study of causality. There is a whole metaphysic in germ in Boethius, but it is incomplete. The new problem of universals led to problems concerning nature, God, and being in general. In the eleventh century, there was a multiplication of psychological studies, by a kind of contagion, and this itself is an unequivocal sign of progress; political theories were presented in a purely rational form, and the following century developed these.

Then, in the twelfth century, we find another indication of maturity: a sudden outburst of classifications of the sciences. Alan of Lille, Ralph de Longo Campo, and the two Victorines make it the subject of their studies of predilection. In addition there were numerous anonymous writers who felt a need to trace out the frontiers and delimit the provinces of the various departments of knowledge.

Of all the branches of philosophy, ethics was the slowest to grow. Previous to the thirteenth century it did not appear

as a rational science. It was for a long time stifled by scriptural and patristic theology. On the other hand, theories of natural right arose fairly early. Sketched out by Isidore of Seville, they were filled in by the jurists and canonists of the twelfth century, but it was only in the thirteenth century that the study of the *lex æterna* of Augustine harmonized with the metaphysical and moral theories of Aristotle, gave to natural law all its fulness.

In spite of this progressive development of the philosophical framework, we may say that no thinker of this period succeeded in filling in the whole. All the philosophies, including that of John Scotus Erigena, the great isolated thinker, presented thus a more or less fragmentary character. The philosophies of Anselm of Canterbury, Abelard, or of Hugh of St. Victor, while comprehensive so far as certain departments are concerned, failed to deal with important problems.

167. Doctrinal antinomies.—The philosophical framework having thus been constituted, and the problems enunciated, we may go on to ask in what measure the philosophers of the first period succeeded in producing that internal cohesion and doctrinal solidarity, which are the criteria of the value of a system.

Before we reply to this question, we must note the chief antinomies in presence. They appear in the division of the branches of philosophy, in dialectics, in metaphysics, in psychology, and to a less degree, in ethics.

The majority of the *philosophical classifications* were related to the Platonist division (logic, ethics, physics), and many merely reproduced it. At the same time, Boethius made known the Aristotelian classification (physics, mathematics, metaphysics). But it remained without influence, and was sometimes added on to the former, without any attempt to harmonize them.

In *dialectics*, Aristotle reigned without a rival, and the neo-Platonist commentators known to the scholastics unanimously acknowledged this sovereignty, which extrinsic circumstances helped to accentuate. St. Augustine himself recommended the study of dialectics, and this contributed to the fame of Aristotle. But until the eleventh century there was an antinomy between the letter of Aristotle and the

spirit. Dialectics, preponderant as it was in the *trivium*, too often confined itself to the study of words and logical forms, and did not find in metaphysics a sufficient counterpoise. In addition, the deductive or synthetic method, which was Platonist in spirit, was dominant until the end of the twelfth century. This predominance is explained by the small place allotted to psychology and the sciences of observation. John Scotus and St. Anselm were deductive minds. But in the measure in which thought ripened, this synthetic method was freed from its excessive elements, but it was reserved for the thirteenth century to build philosophy upon the double analytico-synthetic method.

Until the thirteenth century, *metaphysics* manifested a strange combination of Aristotelian and Platonist ideas. The incoherences appeared above all in the theory of individuality, and in that of matter and form.

That the individual alone is the true substance, and that each human person is an independent substance, was from the time of Abelard the unanimous doctrine of the scholastics. Already in the ninth century the Aristotelian notions of substance, nature, and person were interpreted in this sense. But on the other hand, people were still fascinated by the Platonist theory of separated ideas, the mother of exaggerated realism, and it was difficult to harmonize such a conception with the theory of individuality.

The theory of matter and form was known by St. Ambrose, Boethius, and the somewhat hesitating declarations of St. Augustine. But this theory, which was an essential feature in the peripatetic system, and which was to be equally essential in the scholasticism of the thirteenth century, was rather effaced, and played a badly understood part in this first period. According to some, matter is the primitive chaos of elements (Alcuin, Rhaban Maur, Remigius of Auxerre, Anselm, Honorius of Autun, Richard of St. Victor, Peter Lombard, etc.). According to others, it is the material atom, which is the ultimate residuum of division (the atomists, William of Conches). According to others, again, it is a qualitatively constituted mass (School of Chartres). While some (Isidore of Seville, Rhaban Maur, Clarembald of Arras, Gilbert de la Porrée) seem to be aware of the character of indetermination and passivity which Aristotle attributes to matter, they do not

give it the value of a constituent principle of a substantial nature. The same is true of the form, which is represented, not as a constituent of substance, but as the sum of properties of the being. Theodoric of Chartres and Clarembald of Arras say indeed that matter and form are related as potency to act, but they identify the potency with simple possibility. They are hardly interested in the problem of the becoming of things, and do not succeed in rising to the dynamic signification of the doctrine. We are inclined to say that in a certain number of scholastics of this period, the insufficient or erroneous interpretations which they give of the doctrine are due to the transposition of a logical theory into the metaphysical domain. Just as a judgment is composed of a subject and a predicate so also beings are composed of matter (subject) and form (property).

Cosmological doctrines manifest the same opposition. Thus, under the influence of the neo-Platonist theory of the world-soul, or of the *fatum* of the Stoics, some freely attribute to nature as such a being of its own and an autonomous life, and, according to the *Commentary* of Macrobius on the *Dream of Scipio*, the soul of the world is unique both for the heavenly bodies and for men. But this does not prevent the majority of the philosophers, and these the best (Abelard, John of Salisbury, for instance), from proclaiming with Aristotle the individuality of every natural substance contained in this universe—two theses which are difficult to reconcile. The *Timæus* provided a mixture of philosophical and poetic material on the formation of matter and of the elements, on the function of the demiurge, and that of ideas.

We may say that until the twelfth century, the *psychology* of the scholastics was in the main Augustinian and Platonist, but with Aristotelian elements introduced. Thus we get a new series of antinomies.

They appear in ideology. According to the Augustinian doctrine, the soul derives its ideas from its own inmost being, upon the occasion of sensation. This doctrine is combined with the Aristotelian theory of abstraction.

They appear also in the doctrine concerning faculties. From Augustine was taken his division of the faculties of the soul, and his theory of the absence of any real distinction between the soul and its faculties. At the same time, the

Metaphysicus of John of Salisbury (IV, 9) speaks of the theory of the real multiplicity of the powers of the soul, which he says certain writers oppose to the Augustinian conception.

The scholastics of this period declare unanimously that the soul is of a nature superior to that of the body. On the other hand, following Constantine the African (107), some cultivate physiological observations inspired by Arabian science, and which tend to confuse the psychic phenomenon and the physiological phenomenon, a confusion which leads logically to the rejection of the spirituality of the soul.

The study of the origin and destiny of the soul manifested other incoherences. Until the twelfth century, several writers allowed themselves to be influenced by Augustine's hesitation between creationism and traducianism, and leaned towards the latter solution; they did not notice that their doctrine was destructive of the spirituality of the soul.

It was again in the spirit of the Platonist psychology, and under the guidance of Chalcidius, that the nature of man was studied. His component parts are independent substances, united with each other according to numerical relations (Pythagoras), or in an extrinsic manner, as a pilot is united to a ship. But in spite of the *independence* of its component substances, they affirmed the *unity* of man. Although they knew, through Chalcidius, the Aristotelian definition of the soul (the soul is the entelechy of the body), they refused to regard the soul as the substantial form of the body, for this would, according to certain conceptions of the time, mean regarding the soul as a *property* of matter. For the same reason they refused to explain the composition of other living beings by the theory of matter and form. Some denied that animals have a soul, others regarded it as a corporeal *spiritus*.

Ethics was mainly theological. Among those who dealt with it as philosophers, several contented themselves with a description of particular virtues, after the manner of the Stoics. The most noteworthy moral theories relate to liberty. They adopted from Augustine the notion that the will is free inasmuch as, by nature, it excludes compulsion.

There remains *natural theology*, which was always regarded by the scholastics as one of the most important chapters of philosophy. Cicero, Augustine, pseudo-Dionysius, Boethius, left copious dissertations on God, exemplarism, creation, and

Providence. We also notice the influence of Pythagorean theories on harmony and number. To prove the existence of God, two methods were used : the first, realistic in inspiration, rested on the postulate that our concepts are guarantees of the extramental reality of the thing conceived, and that the idea of a perfect Being proves the existence of this being (St. Anselm). The second method was based on the principle of causality, and took various forms. The order and government of the world provide an easy and rudimentary proof (Cicero, Seneca). But others also argued from the changes of things (Augustine, R. Pulleyn, P. Lombard) ; and the Victorines (Hugh and Richard of St. Victor) in this connection made a wide appeal to external and internal experience. The Aristotelian argument for a first mover from motion was utilized (Boethius, Adelard of Bath), but it was not given its metaphysical amplitude. Alan of Lille was the first to point out that there must be a starting point in the order of efficient causes.

The Stagirite was blamed for denying Providence, and a greater regard was had for Plato, the *symmystes veri*, because, as John of Salisbury says, he teaches the existence of God or of the supreme Good, the distinction between time and eternity, and between ideas and matter. All these Platonist doctrines were interpreted in an Augustinian sense. From Augustine was taken in addition the doctrines on transcendence, and the Ideas (*formæ*) as exemplary causes of the world ; creation, and the eternal laws as the basis of the moral law.

168. Augustine and Boethius.—The doctrinal oppositions which we have just indicated were all in direct or indirect connection with the opposition between two points of view in the treatment of problems, the one being Platonist, and the other Aristotelian. The former is represented by St. Augustine, the second by Boethius—two men who appear more and more as the great philosophical educators of the early Middle Ages. By his theories on God, and the deductive views which connected with them ; by his teaching concerning the independence of the soul, the inferiority of sensation, and of the knowledge of the corporeal, Augustine laid down the tradition of a modified Platonism. By him were inspired above all those who practised the synthetic method, and who explained the real by

relating it to God. Boethius, on the contrary, represents the genius of Aristotelianism, the analytic method, which starts from the observation of the created, gives a place to sensation, lodges the real in the sensible, and rehabilitates the science of the corporeal. The whole of Aristotelianism was in Boethius in potency, but a great deal of time was necessary to actualize it.

The reputation of St. Augustine remained unshaken from the ninth to the twelfth centuries ; that of Boethius, or rather of Aristotelianism, increased during that period. The stages which mark the popularization of Aristotle's writings display the increasing spread of his philosophy.

169. Lack of systematization.—The scholastics of the first period were powerless to harmonize the opposed doctrines which attracted them, to lay them aside, or to correct them. The lack of cohesion affected to a greater or less extent the various philosophical productions from the ninth to the end of the twelfth century, and the best were not exempt. John of Salisbury might have applied to all the men of this period what he writes in his *Metalogicus* (II, 17) concerning the Chartrains who endeavoured to harmonize Plato and Aristotle : " They have laboured in vain to reconcile when dead those who opposed each other throughout their lives."

Even John Scotus Erigena, who is an exception from so many points of view, and whose philosophy presents synthetic features, had his weaknesses. He was embarrassed when trying to reconcile pluralism with the unity of God, and he was not able to rise to a doctrine of the analogy of being. Anselm of Canterbury did not succeed in harmonizing his exaggerated realism with this other doctrine, that the individual is the true reality. William of Champeaux, an unsettled mind, agreed first with Plato, and then with Aristotle. The psychology of Clarembald of Arras was an illogical compromise between Platonism and Aristotelianism. Gilbert de la Porrée introduced incoherences into his metaphysic of the individual. Hugh of St. Victor combined excellent analyses of the process of abstraction, Aristotelian in spirit, with Augustinian theories on the soul and on the knowledge we have of its spirituality. Isaac of Stella started from the Platonico-Augustinian psychology, but this was somewhat shaken by an Aristotelian theory of abstraction. The same incoherences were manifested

in the psychology of John of Salisbury. Considered as a whole, we may say that the philosophy of this period resembles a crucible, in which disparate materials are being melted down.

At the same time, as time went on, and as philosophical thought ripened, the need of unity became more pressing. The philosophers of the twelfth century, such as Abelard, the Chartrains, and the Victorines, were less incoherent than the realist or antirealist doctrines of the eleventh century.

It is perhaps the absence of a strict systematization which explains the freedom with which a great number of scholastics in this period openly reveal their own personal sentiments. Even when he is developing his own doctrines, John Scotus delights to speak of himself and the part he plays. Abelard and John of Salisbury are romantics, influenced by the spirit of chivalry; St. Anselm and St. Bernard reveal to us what is passing in their souls; Alan of Lille and others have recourse to allegory, letting us perceive their personality behind their didactic methods. Nothing like this will be found in the philosophers of the thirteenth century. Everything is objective and impersonal in their doctrine, and systematization pushed to an extreme suppresses personality.

170. Partial syntheses.—But though there were no integral systems comparable to the vast doctrinal co-ordinations which we find in the thirteenth century, we cannot fail to recognize that partial syntheses appeared, and that important departments of philosophic knowledge were the subject of general views which are worthy of attention.

To begin with, we must mention the grouping of numerous metaphysical problems in the *De divisione naturæ* of John Scotus. The noteworthy natural theology of Anselm of Canterbury represents another effort at a synthesis. We may say the same of the realism of Abelard. The widening of the problem of universals, and the gradual formation of "moderate realism" from Roscelin to Abelard, enables us to follow the progress of Scholasticism in an important group of questions. Not only does Abelard clarify the sybilline terms in which Porphyry and Boethius had set forth the question, but he also gives coherence to an important collection of metaphysical, ideological, and epistemological doctrines. In the same way, the Chartrain realism, which is the most perfect form of

exaggerated realism, forms a unified chapter of metaphysics. Finally, political theories take consistency in John of Salisbury. We have here collective groupings capable of being incorporated into wider philosophical syntheses, and several will be retained by later generations.

The genius for systematization, the satisfaction of the need which the mind feels for order, the internal arrangement of materials according to logical schemas, the clearness of expression which results therefrom, and the precision of the terminology in which this clearness is manifested—all these precious gifts, which the scholastics of the thirteenth century possessed in an eminent degree, were shared by the intellectuals of the ninth to the twelfth centuries, in an ever increasing measure as time went on.

When the twelfth century came to an end, decisive events hastened the full development of Scholasticism. We might ask what would have happened to Scholasticism without the aid of these favorable external circumstances; but it would be unjust not to recognize the work accomplished during the period which we have just been studying. The appearance and expansion of the syntheses of the thirteenth century would not have been so rapid, if the intellectual ground had not already been prepared to receive them.

Whether we study the widening of the framework and the problems, or the internal coherence and breadth of the systematizations, everywhere progress was made during this period, and it has well been called from this point of view the Youthful Period of Scholasticism.

§ 2.—*Doctrinal uniformities*

171. The factors.—In the course of the ebb and flow which mark the general rhythm of the scholastic philosophies, certain doctrinal uniformities gradually manifested themselves. The very close relations between the various centres of studies; the adoption of the same programmes, and the same text books; the scientific monopoly in the clergy, who alone in actual fact devoted themselves to the cultivation of the things of the spirit; the office of professional teachers, who travelled from one school to another; the constitution of a learned cosmopolitan language, which kept its position above the

vulgar tongues, and the technical vocabulary of which was everywhere understood : all these are so many factors which favoured the formation of a common philosophical mentality transcending local boundaries.

Two other factors, whose influence reached the inmost constitution of philosophy, contributed to the formation of doctrinal uniformities in the period from the ninth to the twelfth centuries.

The first was the unanimous and very pronounced tendency in all the scholastics of this period to place their speculations in the light of theology. By keeping discussions and solutions within the limits of orthodoxy, this care for theology rendered materialistic or monistic philosophies impossible, and gave a privileged position to certain doctrines which respected the Church's dogmas, and which accordingly could be developed from the rational point of view without in any way offending the religious sentiment.

The second was the assimilating influence of peripateticism. It made itself known quite early in logic and metaphysic, under the influence of Boethius ; and from the middle of the twelfth century it also penetrated into ideology.

The majority of these doctrinal uniformities were acquired at the price of great efforts, and they appeared mainly in the twelfth century. We find them unaffected by the more or less fragmentary character of the philosophy which accepted them, so that they tended to establish a dominant manner of solving important problems. It goes without saying that they were not the product of an entente between the masters. The picture which we draw here is a result of the application to this period of the comparative method, the nature and interest of which have already been established (14).

172. Chief uniformities.—I. First and foremost, *the pluralistic conception of reality*. Everything which exists (or can exist) is an individual substance. This great doctrine heads an important procession of metaphysical theories : the real distinction between individual substances, and consequently, the substantial distinction between God and creatures, and between corporeal and spiritual beings ; the substantial independence of individual bodies among themselves ; human personality.

It was in the course of the controversy on universals that, little by little, scholastics arrived at a full consciousness of the principle, *nihil est præter individuum*. It was natural that this formation should be above all due to the antirealists, that is, to those who combated the Platonist thesis of the substantial unicity of the species. Emanating from Boethius, the *nihil est præter individuum* inspired Roscelin, and received from Abelard its full metaphysical justification. In the twelfth century the formula became the password of Gilbert de la Porrée, the Victorines, Alan of Lille, Alcher of Clairvaux, Isaac of Stella, and John of Salisbury marvelled that it could have been doubted.

Even in the camp of the exaggerated realists, the pluralistic conception of the real retained its rights. The very enunciation of the problem implied the plurality and diversity of substantial species and genera. Thus, John Scotus Erigena admits as many specific types as there are exemplary ideas in God, for he bases his theory of the world upon a correspondence between these. Anselm of Canterbury, who likewise attributes a reality of its own to the generic and specific entity, regards the individual as the substance in the primordial sense of the word. The *Dialogus de Grammatico* comes out definitely in this sense, so that the universal reality is a layer beneath that of the individual.

The Chartrains, who gave a new impetus to exaggerated realism, were nearer to Platonism than was St. Augustine. Men and corporeal beings are but accidental modifications of a type, and their multiplicity has as its foundation the dispersion of this type in space. But their realism did not extend beyond the *formæ*, or specific types, the stability of which throughout their individuations they tried to explain: the type "man" is *distinct* from the type "lion." They did not want to betray pluralism at any price, when there was question of establishing the relations between finite beings and God. The horror of monism and pantheism, which would be the opposite to the *nihil est præter individuum*, helps to determine its significance.

2. *The transcendence and infinity of God*, as well as *the aptitude of the reason to prove His existence*, were not questioned by anybody. God is not only distinct from His creatures, but elevated above genera and species: a theory which

nevertheless remained somewhat vague, inasmuch as the doctrine of analogy had not yet been formulated. The divine knowledge was universally understood in the Augustinian sense, and the *formæ*, the foundation of essences, are also the foundation of the accuracy of knowledge. Creation and providence complete the precise enunciation of the relations between God and the finite.

3. *The study of the finite world in function of the Infinite.* If we compare the metaphysics of John Scotus, St. Anselm, and the Chartrains, we cannot help being struck by the similarity in the points of view, and we recognize the same inadequacies. Following Boethius, pseudo-Dionysius, and Augustine, all stress this same fundamental idea, that compared to the Infinite, the finite is as if it were not. The finite world is related to God by means of the theory of exemplarism and of Providence. The result of this way of regarding reality is a metaphysics of tranquillity and stability. The problems which arise from the interpretation of becoming in limited beings will not be fully realized until there is contact with the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle.

4. In psychology, one great ideological doctrine comes to the forefront: *the irreducibility of the two ways of knowing, sensation and thought.* This doctrine interprets the double way in which we seize the real, the one grasping the concrete, the other, by means of abstraction, freeing the known object from the bonds which imprison it in the extramental world in which everything is individualized. This first doctrine is completed by a second: the superiority of thought over sensation, or the supremacy of man, based upon his privilege of knowledge by abstraction. The few philosophers who, like Clarembald of Arras, speak of an intuitive intellectual knowledge superior to sensation, do not question its subordination to the abstract knowledge to which it leads. By these two ideological theories, the scholastics of the first period continue the line of the great Greek intellectualists, Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, followed likewise by Augustine.

Agreement was unanimous on the real objectivity of this twofold mode of knowledge. Exaggerated Realists and Moderate Realists (we have seen that the Nominalists were the forerunners of the Moderate Realists) put the human mind in contact with a non-ego, and proclaimed the absolute value

of its affirmations. Before the thirteenth century there was no trace of subjectivism.

We have seen that the explanations differed as soon as there was question of the *genesis* of our knowledge, although the thesis of the sensible origin of our ideas of the corporeal world was favoured by the Augustinians themselves. Agreement is found, again, in everything concerning the simplicity, spirituality, and immortality of the soul.

5. From Abelard onwards, *Moderate Realism* became the definitive solution, and unified a whole group of metaphysical, psychological and criteriological problems.

6. The *rudiments of speculative ethics*, relating to liberty and virtue.

7. *Theories on the State*; all who treated these applied to the group life the principles of pluralism. The mission of the prince, popular delegation, and the right to dismiss an unworthy sovereign, were established in virtue of the value of the citizen.

8. The *threefold division of law* (*naturale, gentium, civile*), and the *rudiments of natural law*: the existence of a natural and primitive law, innate and immutable, anterior to the Mosaic revelation, and summed up in this principle: "Do not do to another what you would not wish him to do to you." But a detailed study of natural morality and law is not found previous to the thirteenth century.

Transmitted by Roman Law, which had created juridical uniformities in the Italian cities above the local customs, the theories of natural law benefited by this unquestioned prestige, and the cordial reception given to them by Canon Law strengthened their universal authority.

We may add that, on other points, doctrinal uniformity, though not established, was on the point of being realized. Thus the classification of philosophical sciences inspired by Aristotle tended progressively to replace the Platonist classifications. Similarly, the purely deductive method which John Scotus and St. Anselm utilized in their philosophical constructions was gradually modified by a combination with the analytical method starting from observation, and advocated by Abelard, the Victorines, and John of Salisbury.

173. Horror of monism and of materialism.—In the series

of uniformities which we have just enumerated, the most important are *pluralism* on the one hand, and *intellectualism* on the other, for these two theories are the keystones for a metaphysics and a psychology.

To make quite plain how deeply these have impressed and fashioned what we may call the philosophic conscience of the West, we must consider the attitude taken up towards suggestions of monism and materialism.

The first fact to stress is that the monistic philosophies were very few in number. The most marked thinkers who have been thought to be infected with monism—John Scotus and the Chartrains—were really free from it, and this fact in itself is no slight support to our thesis that a collective and more or less homogeneous mentality was constituted in the course of the Middle Ages. John Scotus would have nothing to do with any compenetration of God and the finite. Neither for Theodoric of Chartres nor for Clarembald of Arras can the divinity contract the stain which would be involved by its fall into corporeal matter. Neither of them introduced into their realism—which notwithstanding was very complete—any conception in which plurality disappears.

There were no monists other than the Amalricians, the followers of David of Dinant, and a few exalted mystics.

Now—and this is the second important fact—monism did not appear as a pure speculation, but was mixed up with religious and social movements which it endeavoured to justify. What interested Amalric was, not a philosophical conception of the world, but a way of showing that the human act was the act of God, and therefore could not have the character of a moral fault. Similarly, the monistic materialism of David of Dinant had repercussions of a religious nature, as we see from the condemnations directed against it. The same may be said of the monistic mysticism of Joachim of Floris, who was not a philosopher but an agitator. The monism of the twelfth century was set forth not as a serene philosophy, but as a pretext for religious troubles. Its success was not in the intellectual order.

Lastly—and this is another important fact—wherever monism was thought to be found, it was vigorously attacked. The history of the texts of John Scotus provides a typical example of this. The successors of the Palatine philosopher,

who interpreted in a monistic sense the vague formulæ which he employed, vied with one another in refuting his pseudo-monism, and in suppressing the subsequent forms of monism to which the misunderstanding of his texts had given rise. We find again in the majority of the mystics an anxious care to avoid everything which might resemble a confusion of God with the beatified soul.

No philosopher of the twelfth century, as far as we know, opposed the so-called morism of the Chartrains, which confirms the pluralistic interpretation which we have suggested of their philosophy.

As for materialism, this had little currency, and concerns the history of morals rather than that of philosophy.

The most ardent discussions in this first period of mediæval philosophy were aroused by the question of universals. In other words, they were circumscribed in their scope. It was not until the thirteenth century that we find controversies and quarrels which affected the directing principles and spirit of a whole system.

We shall also see that the doctrinal uniformities realized by the scholastics of the twelfth century will be adopted by their successors, and introduced into more comprehensive philosophies.

§ 3.—*Civilization and Philosophy*

174. Extrinsic harmonies.—There existed a certain parallelism between the development of philosophy and that of the great social forces which engendered the new civilization of the Middle Ages. Like the civilization, the philosophy was first of all receptive, and began to organize itself at the moment when the new society asserted itself. That moment was the twelfth century, for it was then that the new religious, social and artistic features of the West, and the ethnic characteristics of the peoples called to play a preponderant part, became fixed.

Among the main extrinsic harmonies and interdependences (by this we mean those based on the external circumstances of philosophy, and not on its doctrine), we may mention the reflections of feudal life upon the organization of the schools,

and the religious character of philosophy and everything connected with its teaching.

175. The organization of the schools a reflection of the civilization.—I. The particularist spirit which in the eleventh and twelfth centuries cut up the West into lay or ecclesiastical principalities, and penetrated all the domain of social life, was reflected in the *regional character of the schools*. These intellectual centres, upheld as they were by rival abbots or bishops, vied with each other in attracting professors and pupils. This scholastic particularism, which disappeared with the twelfth century, was a beneficial feature, for it produced a legion of humanists, dialecticians, jurists, philosophers and theologians.

2. Just as the particularist forces of the feudal system were broken down by the unitive policy of the Capets and the Plantagenets, so also there appeared, in spite of the regionalism of the schools, *a certain uniformity in the programmes and methods*, and the intellectual history of the twelfth century closes with the preponderant position of the schools of Paris.

3. The eleventh and twelfth centuries, in which civilization was predominantly French, were also the *centuries of French science*. If we except Monte Cassino, which had a long tradition behind it, and a few Spanish centres with a very particular function, it was France which was at the head of the scientific movement, and French schools—le Bec, Laon, Chartres and Paris—exercised a decisive attraction upon other countries. They reached a high degree of prosperity, although the nobles upon whom they depended were involved in feudal wars: war then absorbed only those who were soldiers by profession, and called for only those contributions laid down by the feudal contract.

In the time of Abélard, the influx of strangers into the French schools reached its climax. English students were especially numerous; this is explained both by the close relations between the two countries, and also by the poverty of the scholastic centres in the British Isles. Adélar of Bath, Adam du Petit Pont remained in the episcopal schools of France, Richard of St. Victor and Isaac of Stella in the abbatial schools. Others, like Alexander Neckam and Walter Map, returned to England. John of Salisbury, the most famous

of all, stayed some time at Canterbury and then returned to Chartres. Contrariwise, William of Conches, Peter of Blois, and perhaps Alan of Lille, migrated to England, as preceptor to the king, secretary to an archbishop and monk of a Cistercian abbey respectively.

There was a similar influx of students from Germany. It suffices to mention Otloh of St. Emmeran, Otto of Freising, Manegold of Lautenbach, and Hugh of St. Victor. An equally numerous contingent came from Italy: Lanfranc in the eleventh century, and a little later Peter Lombard, Peter of Capua, and Prevostin of Cremona taught at Paris. Roland Bandinelli, before he became Pope Alexander III, was a pupil of Abelard, and the future Innocent III studied grammar and theology at Paris.

In view of this we shall not be surprised to find intellectuals of the twelfth century writing magnificent eulogies of the French schools. Adelard of Bath speaks of the *Gallicarum sententiarum constantia*¹; an anonymous writer boasts of the *Francie magistri*²; Cæsar of Heisterbach adds that Paris is the source of all knowledge; Otto of Freising says that the men of science have emigrated to Gaul, and both are only commenting on the saying of the time: Italy has the Papacy, Germany the Empire, and France has Knowledge.³

4. *The demarcation of the frontiers separating the various sciences*, and the advent of psychology, took place at a moment when a similar work of growth was taking place in the departments of civilization. It was in the twelfth century that feudal society found its equilibrium, the programme of intellectual work was outlined, and the various sciences vindicated their claims to autonomy.

We may also point out that the regionalism of the scholastic centres was no obstacle to this work of delimitation, for it favoured the specialization of schools and masters. Orleans became a school of grammarians; Paris a centre of philosophy and theology. Chartres was known for its cultivation of the humanism of the *trivium*; Bologna, Lyons and Angers specialized in law, Montpellier in medicine, Laon in theology,

¹ *De quibusdam naturalibus quæstionibus*. Cf. De Wulf, *Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages*, p. 41.

² Cf. Haskins, *Mediæval Versions of the Posterior Analytics* (Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, Vol. XXV), 1914, p. 94.

³ Steinhausen, *op. cit.* (18, IX), p. 355.

while the school of St. Victor at Paris became noted for mystical theology.

176. Religious character of philosophy.—All the factors of mediæval civilization were impregnated with the religious spirit, including its family, social, political, artistic, and scientific life. The same holds good of philosophy. In the intellectual circles impregnated with Catholicism, and where science was cultivated almost exclusively by clerics, the "Christian wisdom" of St. Augustine remained for a long time the model of all knowledge, and the zeal for theological studies was superior to the desire to develop profane knowledge. This mental attitude enables us to understand certain peculiar features.

From the pedagogical and scholastic point of view, theology was the highest science. Studies and teaching were organized with a view to ensuring its full development. An indication of this is to be found in the programmes laid down in the monastic and abbatial schools. The ambition of each individual was to become a theologian, after being, and remaining, a philosopher. Again, we find philosophical theories in the same works in which theological problems are discussed; the two points of view are mingled together. This juxtaposition does not in any way imply a confusion of the two disciplines, any more than the juxtaposition of a picture and a statue in the same museum is an obstacle to the distinction between painting and sculpture.

This same religious character was manifested in the subjective preoccupations of the philosophers, who, like the artists, knights and kings, saw in their professional functions a means of arriving at eternal salvation.

This religious character of the scientific life appeared, lastly, in the elaboration of a theory on the doctrinal relations between philosophy and theology, and between reason and faith. The study of these relations will be the subject of a last section (§ 4).

177. Doctrinal harmonies.—I. Pluralism is a vigorous affirmation of the value of personality. The philosophy of the twelfth century, which almost unanimously rallies to Pluralism, establishes on a speculative basis the sentiment of personal dignity which had become the soul of the feudal

civilization, and was in due course reformed by the development of communal institutions.¹

2. The influence of the language of philosophy on national idioms is not far removed from a doctrinal action. This learned and supra-national language, Latin, imposed upon the vulgar tongues something of its own precision and richness. In its turn, Latin came to incorporate in its vocabulary expressions born upon the lips of the people.

3. The argument which we have borrowed from iconography in order to show the distinction between philosophy and the liberal arts (25) is an instance of the influence which philosophical and humanistic ideas exercised upon plastic art. The liberal arts and philosophy are painted and carved according to the ideas of Martianus Capella and Boethius. The *Psychomachia* of Prudentius furnishes the theme of the struggles between vice and virtue.² Hugh of St. Victor represents virtue and vice in the form of two trees (the old Adam and the new), the branches of which symbolize the particular virtues and vices. The mediæval mind delighted to translate its doctrines into sculptural forms.

In another order of ideas, the philosophic and theological data was given by many an allegorical and literary expression. Only exceptionally did they take their philosophical and theological visions seriously, and believe in the creations of their fantasy. This would seem to be the case with Hildegard of Bingen. On the other hand, there were a good number of philosopher-poets who, while stressing their doctrine, had recourse to literary artifices in order to explain it. Examples would be the dialogue method practised by John Scotus and Adelard of Bath. Allegory was favoured by Martianus Capella, Boethius and Bernard of Compostella, who utilized it with varying degrees of discretion. There were also poet-philosophers for whom the doctrinal theme was merely a literary subject. These helped to create a genus of literary composition, destined to have a great success in the immediate successors of Alan of Lille and in the romancers and dramatists of the thirteenth century.

The interaction of the cultural factors constantly increased,

¹ De Wulf, *Philosophy and Civilization*, p. 55.

² E. Male, *L'art religieux du XIII^e siècle*, p. 100. H. Liebeschutz, *Kosmologische Motive in der Bildungswelt der Frühscholastik*, Leipzig, 1926, in *Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg*, 3, pp. 83-148.

and helped to form the remarkable unity of civilization in the thirteenth century.

§ 4.—*Philosophy, theology, and law*

178. Dependence of philosophy upon theology.—Distinct from theology inasmuch as it is an ordered and rational explanation of reality, philosophy was none the less viewed in the light of theology during the whole of the first period of the Middle Ages.

1. *Certain philosophical problems originated* in the theological discussions of the time (87). All through the period, the theological controversies brought to the front the philosophical problems to which they gave rise, and obliged philosophers to treat them more fully. Examples are the notions of substance, person, and hypostasis, which provided a constant subject of discussion.¹ Or again, the problem of free will, which became specially important from the time of St. Anselm. Freedom was studied as found in the creative act of God and in angelical activity, as well as in man, and thanks to this theological elaboration, freedom was seen to be a fundamental attribute of spiritual being, a perfection which has a modified sense in man, but which appears in God in its pure state. Another example would be that other subject ardently discussed in the twelfth century, namely, the question whether man is responsible for the "first" movement of sensibility (*primus motus*), a discussion which involved theories of psychology and ethics.²

From this point of view we may say that theology impressed a religious character upon philosophy. But philosophy treated these various problems, from a rational point of view, and was not on this account put under any doctrinal dependence whatsoever. It was indeed dependent upon theology from another point of view, as we shall see later on.

2. If we analyse the content of the philosophies of the ninth to the twelfth centuries, it becomes evident that *several*

¹ De Ghellinck, *op. cit.* (126), and M. Bergeron, *La structure du concept latin de personne*. (Etudes hist. littér. et doct. du XIIIe s. Publications of the Institute of Mediæval Studies at Ottawa, II, 1932, pp. 121-61.)

² Lottin, *La théorie du libre arbitre depuis S. Anselme jusqu'à S. Thomas d'Aquin*, Louvain, 1929; *La doctrine morale des mouvements premiers de l'appétit sensitif aux XIIe et XIIIe s.*, in Arch. H.D.L.M.A., Vol. VI, p. 49.

of their theories coincided with Christian doctrines : the existence of a creating and provident God, the spirituality and immortality of the soul, and freedom are among the most important of these.

3. The fact that the two disciplines were cultivated by the same men, who combined in their person the double quality of theologians and philosophers, led to the acceptance by all of this tacit and implicit principle, that *in no case may reason contradict faith*. But we do not find that the Scholastics of this period formulated in a special chapter of methodology the reasons which justify this principle. That will be the object of prefaces which are found in many of the theological *Summas* of the thirteenth century. Moreover, this prohibition to pass beyond the barrier, forbidding the contradiction of revealed truth, did not carry with it an obligation to establish or to justify the latter, for philosophical speculation was distinct from theological speculation by its principles and its purely rational methods.

We must add that great groups of philosophical questions, discussed throughout these three centuries of the Middle Ages, had no religious or theological repercussions, and accordingly, the qualification of *religious* would not be pertinent to these, and could not in any way characterize them. Examples would be the discussions on universals, on matter, and on the origin of knowledge.

To sum up, when it is said that the scholastic philosophy of this period was a *religious* philosophy, the qualification is correct if by it is meant that on the one hand revealed doctrine governed the choice of certain special problems, and that on the other hand, dogma served as a regulating principle and as an indirect control of philosophical research. But it ought to be understood that, speaking formally and in strict terms, a philosophy in the degree in which it is distinct from theology, is not susceptible of the adjective "Christian," and hence, the expression "Christian philosophy" is an unsuitable one.¹

¹ Thirty years ago, in our *Introduction to Neo-Scholastic Philosophy*, 1904, (§23), we set forth these precisions, which have their bearing to-day, in view of recent discussions on the expression "Christian philosophy." Gilson calls "Christian philosophy" any philosophy which, while formally distinguishing between the two orders, regards the Christian revelation as an indispensable auxiliary of the reason.—*L'esprit de la philos. médiévale*, Paris, 1932, 1e série, p. 39.

179. Dependence of theology upon philosophy.—Inversely, theology sought aid and help from philosophy. This utilization of philosophy for theological purposes began with the first speculations, and the works of St. Augustine were full of it. It became more ample at the end of the eleventh and in the twelfth century, at the time when theology, in its twofold speculative and mystical form, underwent a considerable development, and was cultivated in great schools. At this moment speculative—or scholastic—theology, which is most closely related to philosophy, received valuable help from the latter. On the one hand, the practice of logic taught theologians to make progress in matters of methodology. On the other hand, and above all, the introduction of rational arguments into religious matters taught them to construct a metaphysics of dogma.

The progress in matters of methodology consisted in :

1. *The systematic codification of materials.* This work went through progressive stages, beginning with simple quotations (*flores, excerpta*) or collections of texts and expositions borrowed from the Fathers (for instance, Isidore of Seville, or Prosper of Aquitaine), and the *Libri Sententiarum* or *Sententiæ*, which gradually grouped these texts, and accompanied them by dialectical considerations ; down to the *Summas*, which comprised an elaboration and an ordering of these materials.¹ The codification, already apparent in the *Sententiæ* of Anselm of Laon and of William of Champeaux, was perfected in the work of Peter Lombard.

It is interesting to note, with De Ghellinck, that the theological codification was elaborated mainly in the French scholastic centres, by the French themselves, or by foreigners formed by them, in France, north of the Loire.²

2. *The classifications of sources.* On the one hand the texts and doctrines of the Fathers, *auctoritates* or *dicta authentica* ; on the other hand, the writings and texts of the scholas-

¹ *Sententiæ* : " Aussprüche, Thesen, Quæstionen, Abhandlungen welche man aus den hl. Vätern, den kirchlichen Lehrern u. Canonensammlungen nahm." Sometimes the works of those who made these extracts had the name of *Sentences*. Denifle, in *Arch. f. Litt. u. Kirchengesch. d. Mitt.*, I, 588.—In a collection of *Sentences* written between 1121 and 1141, and pointed out by De Ghellinck (*Revue hist. ecclés.*, 1909, p. 290), we read : " ut ex diversis præceptis et doctrinis Patrum exciperem et in unum colligerem eos flores quos solemus, quasi singulari nomine, sententias appellare."

² *Le mouvement théologique, etc.*, p. 87-93.

tics or authors of the Middle Ages, *dicta magistralia*. The theologians were very respectful towards the former, and departed from them only with oratorical precautions (*reverenter exponere*), but they freely discussed the latter, and adopted or rejected them after a reasoned examination.

3. The "triadic" method of exposition. This became general after Abelard, and was practiced equally by the philosophers: the exposition of *for* and *against*, and the *solution*.

4. The use of the syllogistic form; the classifying of arguments into probable and necessary ones; the application of the logical categories to the dogmatic concepts and formulæ; the practice of the *questio* and the *disputatio*.¹ We find phrases like the following introducing these technical methods: "Quæ omnia Deo annuente loco suo secundum doctrinam Aristotelis explicabimus."²

The penetration of rational arguments into the study of dogma ended in the constitution of the method called *speculative* or *scholastic*.³ As an autonomous science, theology has its own proper constituent methods, the chief of which, practised by all, is *the literal interpretation of the Scriptures and the Fathers*. The speculative method, the beginnings of which we have noticed in Boethius, John Scotus, Lanfranc, and St. Anselm, is a subsidiary method, which consisted in proving a previously determined doctrine by reason or at any rate of elaborating its rational aspect. It is a rational and metaphysical systematization of the data of the faith. Thus the authority of the Scriptures, *auctoritates*, is confirmed by a veritable philosophy, *rationes*: the distinction of the two terms is found in Peter of Poitiers,⁴ as later on in Thomas Aquinas, and it is significant.

From this it follows that the speculative method, or the utilization of philosophy in theology, is a theological method the use or abuse of which is not to be imputed to philosophy itself. Its application gave rise to lively controversies among

¹ De Ghellinck, *Dialectique et dogme aux X-XII siècles*, Beiträge, Supplementband II (Baeumker Festgabe), 1913.

² Anonymous treatise of the middle of the twelfth century quoted by Grabmann, *op. cit.*, II, p. 20.

³ Such is the conclusion which follows from the work of M. Grabmann, *Geschichte der scholastischen Methode* (Vol. I, p. 36). The reference is to theological, not philosophical methods.

⁴ Unpublished commentary, *ibid.*, I, 33.

theologians, and may serve as a basis for a grouping into various parties. We may thus distinguish between the *reactionaries*, opponents of the introduction of dialectics into theology, *rationalists*, who made the dialectical method the chief one, and placed reason above dogma, and the *moderates*.

180. Rationalists and Reactionaries.—The first controversies of the ninth century led to the destruction of dogma in those who, with Berengarius of Tours, made reason the arbiter of Christian beliefs, “rationibus omnia velle comprehendere.” Such a principle suppresses the faith. The twelfth century, which witnessed many religious agitations, saw the rise of the Cathari, the Albigenes, the followers of Amalric of Benes, David of Dinant, and of Joachim of Floris. These took practically no account of the literal sense of the Scriptures and the interpretation which its texts had been given by the Fathers; in the name of reason they presented their own explanation of Catholic doctrine, which ended in destroying it.

It was only natural that these exaggerations provoked a reaction on the part of certain theologians. And if we find timorous people, or rigid and narrow minds, who forbid theology to get into touch with philosophy or to have recourse to its services, this attitude is to be explained by the abuses. This will explain the position taken up by some exalted mystics in the twelfth century, at St. Victor, Citeaux, and Fontevel-lana, or again the attitude of an influential group of seculars who, with Peter of Blois or Stephen of Tournai (died 1203), opposed the writers of the new *Summas*, and complained to the Pope of the dialectical malady which had infected the scholastic body.

At the same time, it is to be remarked that these excessive spirits, who condemned the usage of philosophical methods, remained the exception. The majority followed the example of Peter Damian, and wished to regard philosophy as a servant, *ancilla*, who could when occasion required facilitate the work of her mistress.

181. The moderate theologians formed the most important group.—If we bear in mind the principles which inspired their attitude, we may include among them John Scotus Erigena, St. Anselm, Honorius of Autun and Anselm of Laon, and then above all the three great leaders, Abelard, Gilbert

de la Porrée, Hugh of St. Victor, and their disciples. The author of the *Summa Sententiarum*, Robert of Melun, Peter Lombard and his imitators, Alan of Lille, and Nicholas of Amiens, belong to the same category. All follow in the path opened up by Boethius, and which will lead the scholastics of the thirteenth century to the summits of speculative theology. Abelard could rightly say of the Ostrogoth philosopher, "fidem . . . nostram et suam . . . inexpugnabiliter astruxit."¹

Passing over here the differences which separated them, we may say that these theologians, who were moderate in their speculations, reached an *entente* as to the principles governing the utilization of dialectics and philosophy in theology: the two sciences remain distinct; theology confirms its scientific character by calling reason to its aid; the method of Scriptures comes first, Revelation is sovereign, so that at no moment may reason contradict faith.

In the application, some betrayed these principles, and on particular questions ended in teaching doctrines incompatible with dogma. They probably erred in good faith: such is the opinion of the majority of historians, and if we bear in mind their submission to the decrees which condemned them, their intention can hardly be questioned.

It must be added that these moderate theologians, or speculative theologians—with whom we are mainly concerned in this history—also recognise the autonomous character of philosophy, and cultivate this for their own sake. Personalities like Abelard, Gilbert de la Porrée, Hugh of St. Victor, to mention only the leaders, were at once philosophers and theologians. As philosophers, they devoted their endeavours to the constitution of a doctrine explanatory of reality, by the light of reason. As theologians, they gave a systematic exposition of Catholic beliefs. This confirms the view that philosophy appeared in a double rôle in the Middle Ages: it had an autonomous value, and it inspired the speculative method in theology. For a long time the Church has been accused of condemning *philosophy* in the person of Roscelin, Abelard, and Gilbert de la Porrée. Nothing could be further from the truth. What the Church condemned was neither philosophy in general, nor the method of reasoning in theology, but certain *applications* of this method. It was with theolo-

¹ *Theol. Christ.*, Migne, P. L., Vol. 178, col. 1165-6.

gical doctrines alone that she was concerned. In the thirteenth century, a host of doctors will take up the philosophical theories of Roscelin and Abelard, and councils will not be called in order to condemn them. We may add that the heresies, by exaggerating some point of doctrine, helped to fix the latter, for their condemnation necessitated an exact statement of the doctrine in question.

182. Practical and Speculative Mysticism.—It is not easy to define Mysticism. The word is connected with the root *μν* (which has the general meaning of *to shut* or *to close*) and signifies in general a tendency which leads man to unite himself to God *in an intimate and hidden manner*. Understood in this sense, Mysticism is closely connected with religion, and it will flourish in the degree in which the religious sentiment is universal, while inversely, religious scepticism will exclude it.

The early Middle Ages, which lived with an ardent Catholic faith, knew all the forms of Mysticism: there were *practical mystics*, who passed their lives in this state of union with God, but never dreamed of writing books. The monastic rules favoured the life of prayer and silence, and the despising of earthly things. It was amongst the exalted mystics that the enemies of human science were to be found, and those who would banish art from the churches.

There were also *mystical writers*, who, under the influence of the mystical life, expressed their outbursts of love in ardent prayers (for instance, certain hymns in the Benedictine breviary, or prayers of St. Bernard).

Others, lastly, fewer in number, worked out the theory of Mysticism. These were the *speculative mystics*, who alone concern us here. Practising the method of introspection, they *described the states which realize in varying degrees the direct communication of the soul with God, and explained nature and reality in terms of this union*.

Speculative Mysticism implies some fundamental themes. First, the communication with God is the fruit of love. Certainly, it requires a *contemplation*, which reveals to the soul the majesty and grandeur of the Infinite, but it culminates in an *affective movement* of ones being, and in the sweet possession of God, and these may take various forms. Moreover, this communication is *direct*. That is to say, it is not based on a

mediate and analogical knowledge of God through the intermediary of creatures, but upon an *immediate intuition*. That is why, in addition to the senses and the reason, the mystics allow of *internal visions*, or other modes of knowing. They also allow of corresponding affective movements. God seeks for the soul, and takes possession of it, in such a way that the soul is drawn out of itself, forgets itself, and in future loves none but God.

Lastly, union with God becomes the *culminating point in psychic activity*, just as it is the end of earthly life. Other efforts, and particularly philosophical researches, are directed towards it.

The nature of speculative mysticism explains certain other characteristics which are found in the works or the temperament of those who give themselves to it. The elevated spheres of mysticism, being hidden, lend themselves easily to poetry, allegory, and personification, and the very titles of the works reflect this tendency. Then, the mystics delight to interpret the visible world as a sign of the supernatural world, and they apply this symbolic method not only to the exegesis of the Scriptures, but also to the study of nature, which they interpret in detail. Lastly, those of them who also deal with philosophy, devote themselves by preference to problems of psychology and ethics. They concentrate their attention upon the *interior man*, stress the duality of the soul and body, and teach that the soul must be freed from the bonds of sensibility.

183. Division of speculative mysticism.—There are two fundamental types of speculative mysticism, based on the *nature* of the union between the soul and God: the *pluralistic* or individualistic mysticism bases this union upon a transcendent activity of the knowing and loving soul, but maintain the distinction between its substantial being and the divine substance; while the *monastic* mysticism would make the Divine union more intimate, and identifies the soul with God Himself.

From this classification there follows another, which was superposed to the former in the Middle Ages and completed it: mysticism is either *natural* or *supernatural*. Those who establish a substantial distinction between the soul and God, do not ascribe to the soul left to its natural forces the power of attaining to God in a sufficiently intimate and direct manner,

but require on the part of God Himself an indispensable *supernatural* assistance, a grace, which is not due to the soul, and which God may give to whom He pleases. On the other hand, those who divinize the soul and identify it with the Infinite have no need to have recourse to this increase of power, and treat mystical intuitions as the highest, but still a natural, manifestation of psychic life.

Under pain of being illogical, *those who subscribed to metaphysical pluralism in philosophy* could not, when dealing with mysticism, allow a *natural or philosophical mysticism*. For according to their ideology, the human reason can know, and the will love God, only in starting from creatures. Now such knowledge attains to God only as the result of a process. The *direct communication*, the object of the mystical life, which Hugh of St. Victor or a Bonaventure describe with such enthusiastic ardour, is essentially distinct from the philosophic knowledge of God.

The mystical ways accordingly form the steps in a higher ladder, which man cannot climb without grace. That is why the scholastics treat Mysticism as a department of Theology.

In the Middle Ages we find Mysticism in its theological or pluralistic form, and in its philosophical or pantheistic form. Their representatives make use of the same sources: the *Confessions* of St. Augustine, the *Stromateis* and *Pædagogus* of Clement of Alexandria, the *De institutione cænobitorum* of Cassian, the *De vita contemplativa* attributed to Prosper of Aquitaine, and above all, pseudo-Dionysius. At the end of the twelfth century we also find the influence of Arabian mysticism.

Taken as a whole, the speculative mysticism of the first period is a supernatural and orthodox mysticism, and accordingly implies as a basis the fundamental positions of the pluralistic philosophy. In this group are ranged the mystics of the eleventh century, and the phalanx of great writers of the twelfth century: St. Bernard, William of St. Theodoric, and the Victorines.

It is very difficult not to see monistic and pantheistic principles in the descriptions of the contemplative life left by Hildegard of Bingen. She seems to attribute an objective reality to her reveries, her seductive images, and her personifications of cosmological and philosophical data; but perhaps

she was not aware of the implications of her principles. As for the mysticism of Joachim of Floris, his trumpet sounds of monism in no uncertain way, and moreover, it is incorporated into a collection of heretical doctrines. In the phalanx of mystics of the twelfth century, Hildegard and Joachim remain exceptions.

184. Scholastic philosophy and law.—The increasing reputation of Scholasticism explains the penetration into juridical studies of many a method practised by the philosophers of the twelfth century. Like Abelard, Irnerius endeavours to solve the apparent contradictions of the "authorities"; he proceeds by way of discussion and question. In all these commentators the material studied is subjected to a logical dissection; the principles are followed out to their extreme consequences; definitions and classifications abound; and as in philosophy, distinctions and discussions develop a critical and meticulous mentality.

On their side, the Roman jurists helped to reinforce scholastic doctrines. In particular, they constructed a remarkable theory of *æquitas* ("rerum convenientia quæ in paribus causis paria jura desiderat"), which has its foundation in God, becomes *justitia* when it is the object of the human will, *jus* when expressed in terms of law. On this notion was based the idea of the *natural law*, or body of inviolable moral principles dictated by reason, and of which the law of nations ("jus gentium quasi quo jure omnes gentes utantur") and civil law are but the extension. Starting from this, the mediæval jurists tended to mitigate slavery. They also joined to the works of the Justinian epoch a group of theories which have their echo in the philosophy of the State (140). Thus, a law is not the expression of the sovereign, but the echo of justice. The source of authority is to be found in the people: according to some, the people surrender it into the hands of the emperor, while others, and these the most important, regard the people as the permanent subject of governmental power. They also admit the coexistence of two equally sacred legislations, that of the State and that of the Church.

Just as in the preceding age, canon law provided theology with numerous subjects for discussion, and an abundant *dossier* of patristic quotations. It received in return some

influence from theology, and adopted from it some important subjects, such as the study of the sacraments. Often, moreover, the same person combined the offices of a theologian and a canonist.

The interaction of canon law and philosophy was equally efficacious. It was to dialectics and to Abelard that Gratian owed his method of exposition: we must distinguish the various senses which the same word takes in different authors, and then they cease to be *adversi* and are simply *diversi*. Peter of Blois and the other successors of Gratian make use of this principle, and sometimes even apply it to an abusive extent.

Again, canon law was one of the sources which inspired the political philosophies of the twelfth century. It stressed the links between politics and the Christian moral law; found a place for charity no less than for justice; linked up the *jus gentium* with custom; affirmed that, though authority is of divine origin, it is nevertheless only a remedy made necessary by sin; proclaimed the superiority of the Church over the State; claimed for the Pope the right to exercise a control over temporal sovereigns, and eventually to depose them.

In feudal law, as in canon law, we find doctrines which harmonize very well with the political and social philosophy of the time. Authority is instituted for the maintenance of justice, and not to serve the caprices of the prince; law is above all the product of custom, and through custom, it rests on the natural and the divine law; the relations between the king, the supreme suzerain, and his vassals or subjects, are governed by a pact. All these are mediæval ideas which are derived from the feudal system, and which rejoin the conceptions of the Roman jurists.

CHAPTER IV

Appendix : Byzantine, Arabian and Jewish Philosophy

185. Byzantine Philosophy.—Banished from Athens by a decree of Justinian (529), and driven out of Alexandria by the invasion of the Arabs (640), Greek philosophy took refuge at Byzantium, the rallying point of the last upholders of neo-Platonism, Themistius and Proclus. There it maintained itself throughout the Middle Ages. The intellectual relations between Byzantium and the West were sporadic in character during the first period of this history. At the time when the revival of studies began to make itself felt in France, and the neighbouring countries, the Greek Schism (858) gave rise to agelong misunderstandings which separated the West from the Byzantine world. It was not until the Crusades and the capture of Constantinople in 1204 that there was any great intellectual exchange of ideas between the two civilizations.

Already in the sixth century the *Isagoge* of PORPHYRY and the works of PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS enjoyed a great reputation in Byzantine circles, and it was through Byzantium that these apocryphal writings were introduced into France.

Another writer to whom we have already referred is JOHN DAMASCENE (died 750), who lived in the midst of the troubles created by the rulers of the Isaurian dynasty. His chief work, *Πηγή γνώσεως* was one of the first systematic collections of theological and philosophical material. The work opens with a sort of philosophical introduction (*κεφάλαια φιλοσοφικά*) founded on Aristotelian logic and metaphysics, with elements borrowed from Porphyry and Ammonius. The apologetic tendency of the work is clearly set forth, and explains why philosophy and profane science are represented therein as servants of theology. After a second part, devoted to a catalogue of heresies, the author proceeds to give in a systematic treatise an ordered arrangement of patristic texts and an exposition of Christian doctrine. This last part, known later

on under the title *De Fide Orthodoxa*, and used as a source by Peter Lombard and others, was divided into four books. It was translated in 1151 by Burgundius of Pisa and it profited by the unexampled success of Peter Lombard, so much so that it had, not only in the twelfth but also in the thirteenth century, an ever-increasing attraction for theologians and philosophers. Alexander of Hales made use of the second book of the *De Fide Orthodoxa*, and Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas mention it frequently.

MICHAEL PSELLUS THE ELDER and the Patriarch PHOTIUS are the striking figures of the ninth century. The account of the life of Photius (about 820-97) has been greatly changed by recent historians. In addition to his part in celebrated religious disputes, he was a prominent professor and writer. Amongst other works he wrote a *Bibliotheca*; he pointed out contradictions in Plato, to whom he prefers Aristotle, and commented on the logical works of the Stagirite. On the other hand, his disciple ARETHAS sided with Plato. In the eleventh century MICHAEL PSELLUS THE YOUNGER (1018—after 1096), Prime Minister of Michael Parapinakes and Professor at the Academy of Constantinople was the initiator of an Eclectic Platonism which culminated, without any break of continuity, in the Platonism of the Italian Renaissance. But he was not known in the West, and we may say the same, with some exceptions, of a group of Aristotelian commentators of the end of the eleventh century, such as Johannus Italus and Michael of Ephesus. In the twelfth century, Eustratus of Nicæa also commented on the logic and ethics of Aristotle, while Nicholas of Methon composed a treatise against the *θεολογική στοιχείωσις* of Proclus.

186. Philosophy among the Syrians.—It was through the intermediary of the Syrian Christians that the Arabs came into contact with Greek thought, and the Syrians had themselves received it at first hand thanks to the Greek traditions in their country resulting from the expeditions of Alexander the Great.

Certain works of Aristotle, chiefly the *Organon*, Porphyry's *Isagoge*, and the works of pseudo-Dionysius, were translated from Greek into Syriac and commented on by savants of the Nestorian School in the fifth century (Theodore of Mopsuesta,

Theodoret of Cyr and others), in the sixth by the Monophysites of Resaina (Sergius) and Chalcis ; in the seventh by James of Edessa, and in the eighth by other Nestorians. When the Arabs conquered Persia and Syria, they in their turn received the philosophic deposit from those they had vanquished, and this gave rise to a great development of Arabian philosophy, which the cultivation of the sciences of observation and religious discussions had already endowed with a tendency towards autonomy. The Abassides, who in 750 replaced the Ommaiades, invited to the Court of Bagdad certain Syrians who translated from Syriac into Arabic the great works of Greek philosophy. This work of translation began under the Khalifate of El-Mansour (753-774), and was vigorously promoted by El-Mamoun. The latter established at Bagdad, about the year 832, a school of translators under the direction of HUNAIN BEN ISAAC, the *Johannitius* of the Scholastics (died 873), a contemporary of Scotus Erigena and of Photius. COSTA BEN LUCA, of Baalbek (864-923), another Christian translator, was at the same time the author of a treatise *De differentia spiritus et animæ*, which was translated in the twelfth century (see p. 71) and utilized by the first scholastics of the thirteenth century. The Arabians thus possessed a number of Greek treatises on medicine and mathematics, the works of Aristotle, the Commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Porphyry, Themistius and Ammonius. Plato was not so well known, but on the other hand the Arabian world was soon introduced to neo-Platonism, for one of the first works translated (A.D. 840 at the latest) was the famous *Theology*, wrongly attributed to the Stagirite, being in reality a compilation from the *Enneades* of Plotinus (iv-vi) made in the third or fourth century. As for Arabian commentaries on the *Isagoge*, more than five hundred of these have been counted.

187. Arabian philosophy flourished for three and a half centuries, and developed successively in Eastern centres and in the kingdoms of Spain. It was the complex product of a civilization with a religious and mystical basis, and in which very varied factors played a part. Besides the influence of Islamism, and of the conceptions universally held in the East as to the function of a Light God, the principle of all things, we must also take into account Persian theories,

and, from 850 onwards, the Indian doctrine of Nirvana. It was about this time that the Hellenic factor began to operate: Greek philosophy came in to join together all this material of such diverse origin and spirit into its own systematic framework.

The Greek philosophy which thus by its contact gave rise to typical conceptions which so profoundly impressed the Western mediæval mind, was principally neo-Platonist, with, however, Aristotelian elements.

From Aristotle, who was regarded universally with respect, the Arabs took their conception of science, the value of the observation of facts, and a number of particular doctrines which the Scholastics afterwards adopted in their turn. But they did not merely adopt a slavish imitation of the Peripatetic system. They interpreted Aristotle chiefly through the Greek commentators, and above all, they fitted their Aristotelianism with a neo-Platonist framework, so that when later Scholasticism began to study Arabian philosophy, it received fresh neo-Platonist infiltrations from this source.

The neo-Platonist doctrines which we find in the most important thinkers are chiefly the emanation of Intelligences graduated in perfection, the impersonality of the active intellect, the eternity of matter, and the mystical union by ecstasy.

The *emanative procession* of a certain number of Intelligences, which are interposed between the Supreme Being and the material world, introduces a static hierarchy into reality, and determines both the origin and perfection of beings. The emanative process is clearly set forth in the *Theology of Aristotle*. For Avicenna, the Intelligences are produced one by another in a series. For Averrhoes they are all at once directly produced by God. But all hold that these Intelligences are extrinsically united to the heavenly spheres (stellar or planetary), and are the source of their local motion. An artificial but close connection exists between the metaphysics of the Intelligences and astronomical data. At the same time, the procession of the spheres is combined with the theory of light. The *human intellect* is the last and least perfect of pure intelligences. This theory is based on an obscure text in Aristotle where he says that the active intellect is a divine principle coming from outside (*θύραθεν*), and that it alone

is immortal, while the passive understanding begins with the body and disappears with it. The Arabians forced the texts of Aristotle in the sense of an emanative neo-Platonism. They concluded that the human intellect is impersonal, separated from human individuals, and unique for the whole race, and they linked it up with the system of intelligences, in which it occupies the lowest rank. The Aristotelian doctrine was thus mixed up with a mass of neo-Platonist ideas.

Matter is eternal, as all the Greeks teach, and it is distinct from the supreme being (Avicenna, Averrhoes). Integral monism, which makes matter the extension of the Supreme Being, does not appear until the Jew Avencebrol.

The *mystical union* of the soul with God is regarded as the end of life. Platonism here rejoins and reinforces the Indian theories of Nirvana, and Mohammedan mysticism.

Lastly, we must not forget that the harmonizing of philosophical thought with the Koran was one of the preoccupations of the Arabians. Philosophers distinguished between a popular religion, based on the letter of the Koran, and the religious of the learned, founded upon its rational interpretation. From 800 onwards there were reactions on the part of the theologians, and powerful religious groups reproached the philosophers for betraying Mahommedan orthodoxy.

We shall deal here mainly with those Arabian philosophers whose works were utilized by the scholastics of the thirteenth century, and who thus exercised an influence upon them.

188. Eastern Group. Alfarabi, Avicenna.—The first great name is that of ALKINDI (died about 873), a man of science, a logician, a translator, and an encyclopædist. He wrote a treatise *De Intellectu*, and his philosophical works were translated into Latin (see p. 71). He probably revised a primitive Arabian translation of the *Theology of Aristotle*.

The Scholastics were better acquainted with ALFARABI (died 949–50),¹ another savant of the Bagdad School, an interpreter of Aristotle. His works include Commentaries on the *Posterior Analytics*, a treatise *De Ortu Scientiarum*, and another *De intellectu et intelligibili*. The *Tehafot*, or “unreflecting precipitation,” is directed against the peripatetics who, despising revelation,

¹ See article by H. Bédoret in *RNS*, 1938, pp. 80–97.

turn towards reason, and burn themselves like a butterfly in a flame.

Alfarabi proves the existence of God by the Aristotelian argument for an immovable mover. God creates all things by the intermediary of the acting intellect. The system is completed by mystical tendencies. There is nothing in Avicenna and Averrhoes, according to O'Leary, which is not found in germ in Alfarabi.¹

Already in the second century of the Hegira opposition was manifested to philosophy. The religious groups of the "Brothers of Purity" and the conservative theologians of the *Mutakallimun* (upholders of the *calam*, speech) constituted themselves fierce defenders of orthodoxy. Age-long quarrels broke out between the philosophers and the theologians. One of the most extreme sects was that of the disciples of Ach'ari (880-940), against which Maimonides wrote as well as St. Thomas. In order to safeguard the Omnipotence of Allah, they taught that everything comes about in the world by the unique and arbitrary will of God. The atoms, which God creates from time to time, are the subject of accidents which last only for an instant and which constantly vanish. They are incapable of acting upon each other, so that there remains no real causality other than the divine causality.²

Alfarabi's successor, IBN-SINA (AVICENNA, 980-1037), at once a philosopher, theologian, and a physician, enjoyed the highest reputation among the Scholastics.³ In spite of the vicissitudes of an eventful life, he managed to write a great many works—indeed, they are said to have numbered over a hundred. His chief work, *Kitâb assifâ*, or Book of Healing, is a philosophic encyclopædia dealing with Logic, Physics, Mathematics, and Metaphysics. The first book of the *Physics* was known to the Scholastics under the title *Sufficientiæ*; the sixth book, *liber sextus naturalium*, deals with Psychology. The *Metaphysica Avicennæ, sive ejus Prima Philosophia*, published at Venice in 1499, is another part of the *Kitâb*; while the *Nadjât* is an abridgement of the whole work. The *Book of Theorems and Warnings*; the *Guide to Wisdom*; the *Philosophy of Aroudi*; the *Philosophy of Alâ*, and other special

De Lacy O'Leary, *op. cit.* (192), p. 155, and Carra de Vaux, *Avicenna*, Paris, 1900, pp. 112-16.

² Gilson, *op. cit.* (192), I, *et seq.*

³ See article by H. Bédoret in *RNS*, 1938, pp. 374-400.

treatises deal with a number of important questions. In addition, Avicenna also wrote many mystical works and treatises on medicine and astronomy.

Avicenna was the greatest exponent of Greek philosophy. As an interpreter of Aristotle he understood very well the spirit of his logic, and corrected the conceptions of Alfarabi in the sense of peripatetic pluralism. At the same time, a neo-Platonist emanation theory inspires the series of Intelligences which Avicenna interposes between God and the material world, and his ideas on knowledge are neo-Platonist on more than one point.

A general view of the philosophy of Avicenna must begin with a description of the neo-Platonist setting in which in a hierarchical manner he arranges real beings. At the summit we have God, the one necessary Being, perfect Intelligence, absolute Good, and distinct from all that He produces. His only mode of production is of an intellectual order. God engenders a First Intelligence, for the one can only produce the one. This first caused being knows its generator ; it also knows itself, and it knows itself both as *necessary*, since it comes from God, and as *possible*, for nothing determines this first Divine generation. Now the aspects of the divine production provide us with a method of explaining the multiplicity of the world : the act by which the caused Intelligence knows its producer makes a second caused Intelligence to flow from the first. At the same time, the consciousness in the second Intelligence that it is necessary engenders the *soul*, and its consciousness of being possible engenders the *body* of the last sphere. The mode of procession goes on, in a descending derivation, each Intelligence being united to an astronomical sphere, until we arrive at the active Intellect, produced by the Intelligence of the moon. The generation of Intelligences stops here, for it is not necessary that it should continue indefinitely.¹ The theory of the procession of the spheres is completed by that of their astronomical motion : the circular motion of the spheres finds its ultimate reason in the finality exercised by God, for the intelligent soul of each sphere tends towards the Supreme Good.

The active intellect, instead of producing a new sphere, directly accounts for the production of human souls, terrestrial

¹ Carra de Vaux, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

bodies, and also for the genesis of our intellectual acts. It thus fulfils a double rôle, the one physical, the other psychological.

Avicenna's Physics or Cosmology explains in Aristotelian terms the composition of the four elements, which have a common matter and a proper substantial form; they are transformed into each other under the influence of the active Intellect. Over against the active Intellect we have matter, or the universal plascity of the world of bodies, which is eternal, and apparently outside the series of emanation. Absolutely indifferent in itself, it receives from the active intellect a form, and therefore a determined substantial state. But such a union of form and matter requires a *præparatio* of the matter to receive such a form. The *præparatio* is a theory peculiar to Avicenna. We have here an efficient causality distinct from that of the active intellect, and concurring with it in bringing about substantial becoming. The "preparer" is the sum total of the movements of the heavenly spheres, which thus fix and direct the intervention of the active intellect.¹

The human soul is a spiritual substance. It is free from matter, especially because it is a receptacle of intelligible forms, and because these cannot exist in a corporeal substance. There is no pre-existence of the soul, but on the other hand it is immortal and survives death. It is united to the body, not after the manner of a substantial form, but according to relations of friendship and collaboration; it is a unique principle, from which flow multiple faculties.

Among these faculties Avicenna gives the most prominent place to knowledge, of which he gives a minute analysis as to its nature, genesis, and value. Starting from the great principle of spiritualist ideology, he introduces into the functioning of the human intellect (the "passive understanding" of Aristotle) a complicated machinery which we already find in Alfarabi, and on the other hand he attaches the phenomena of abstraction to the general principles of efficiency established in physics. There are four kinds of intellects, corresponding to the diverse dispositions in which our mind finds itself with

¹ Principium autem motus est præparans, aut est perficiens. Sed præparans est id quod præparat materiam. . . . *Sufficiëntia*, I, 10. Cf. Gilson, *op. cit.*, I, 40 et seq.

regard to the intelligibles which it receives from the separated active intellect : the bare aptitude, pure and simple (*intellectus materialis, in potentia absoluta*) ; the intellect as endowed with the first notions, which will enable to acquire science (*intellectus in effectu*) ; the aptitude perfectly prepared, and capable of turning towards the intelligibles (*intellectus in habitu*), and lastly, the intellect actually contemplating the intelligible (*intellectus adeptus*).

How does this final actuation of contemplation come about ? Chiefly under the action of the active intellect. But as in the case of corporeal efficiencies, this action requires in the soul a *præparatio*. The preparation comes from the soul itself, and consists in the consideration to which it subjects the sensations and images by means of which it has previously perceived the corporeal and the singular. This preparation is individual and variable, and this explains the diversity of the effect produced in different men by the stable force of the active intellect. The latter then impresses upon the "prepared" understanding the forms of objects, purified from all their individual characteristics. Abstraction is merely that. It is not our work, for we receive a ready-made intelligible form as soon as the soul is suitably prepared and turns towards the active Intellect. We may add that the theory of knowledge culminates, as in Alfarabi, in mystical visions, which find a place for ecstasy and prophecy.

Avicenna is thus able to harmonise the fundamental thesis of his metaphysics, that the individual alone exists, with this other, which must be taken literally, that the universal or abstract is a product of the understanding. "*Intellectus in formis agit universalitatem.*" His theory of the three states (*respectus*) of the essence which we may regard as clothed with individual notes in the extramental reality, or as affected by universality in our minds, or again in itself, without respect to number, is a solution in brief of the problem of universals, to which all the great scholastics of the thirteenth century will turn their attention,¹ and it is completely in the spirit of Aristotelianism.

¹ *Essentiæ vero rerum aut sunt in ipsis rebus, aut sunt in intellectu. Unde habent tres respectus. Unus respectus essentiæ est secundum quod ipsa est . . . alius respectus est secundum quod est in his singularibus ; et alius secundum quod est in intellectu.*—*Logic*, 1508 edn., fol. 12 V.A. See De Wulf, on Henry of Ghent, in *Histoire de la Philos. scolast. dans les Pays Bas*, 1895, pp. 205 *et. seq.*

We may say the same of a number of metaphysical doctrines : pluralism, the theory of causes, the composition of created being, in which there is room for a distinction between the nature of things, and their existence,¹ and also the definition itself of metaphysics, to which Avicenna gives as subject the study of being.

His Logic, concise and clear, and a free commentary on Aristotle, gives a central place to definition and to reasoning. It is the instrument which enables one to acquire philosophy, not philosophy itself. The classification of philosophical sciences given by Avicenna became classical in the West : physics, mathematics, and theology, each with a pure and an applied part, together form speculative philosophy ; ethics, economics and politics constitute practical philosophy.

It will belong to monographic labours to establish the precise influence of this great Arabian philosopher upon the scholasticism of the thirteenth century, by showing the reactions produced by various theories, the utilizations made of them, and the criticisms and refutations to which they gave rise.

189. Algazel or Algazzali (1058-1111) summed up the philosophical teaching of Alfarabi and Avicenna in a work which Dominicus Gundissalinus translated under the title *Philosophia*, and which gave to the Middle Ages a clear presentation of the Avicennian theories. He proceeded to criticize these philosophical views, in the name of Mohammedan orthodoxy, and occupies a prominent place in the group of theologians who declared war against the philosophers properly so called. In his most important works, *The Destruction of the Philosophers* and *The Renewal of Religious Sciences*, he condemns as heretical a number of solutions defended by the philosophers. To the eternity of the world he opposes creation in time by a personal God. To the theory of the procession of the spheres he substitutes that of the divine Omnipotence, and claims for God alone the efficient causality of all that takes place in this world (cf. the Mutakallimun). To rational science he would substitute orthodox theology ; he does not reject the services of speculation, provided this is humble and submissive, and that in no case it considers itself sufficient as a foundation for the

¹ See the analysis of A. Forest, *La structure métaphysique du concret selon S. Thomas d'Aquin*, 1931, p. 139.

truths of faith. His ethics, based on the Koran, manifests infiltrations of Greek and Christian ideas. It is indissolubly linked up with mysticism.

Sufism, or the orthodox mysticism of the Mohammedans, was not the fruit of the Koran, but resulted from three great influences, Indian, neo-Platonist, and Christian, the last-mentioned giving to Sufism its characteristic features. Algazel was endowed with a profoundly mystical temperament, and studied all the degrees of intuitive knowledge. This is the work of asceticism and faith, while ordinary knowledge is the work of the senses and the reason.¹ But the mysticism of Algazel and the Sufists is not pantheistic, any more than in Christian mysticism. This is all the more significant because, in contrast with Christian mysticism, ecstasy seems to be represented as within the natural reach of man.

In addition to orthodox mysticism, there was already in the time of Avicenna a neo-Platonist form of mysticism, under the name of the "illuminative philosophy."

After Avicenna, the Arabian philosophy declined in the East, but its fame was perpetuated in Spain.

190. Western group. Averrhoes.—The Spain of the tenth century was the meeting-place of the most diverse races. In the Mohammedan kingdoms Jews and Christians lived side by side with the Arabs, and for the most part enjoyed the same liberty of thought which later on the Christians of Toledo conceded to the Jewish and Arab populations occupying the cities at the time of the *reconquista*. This helped to make Spain the centre of an intense philosophic movement up to the thirteenth century.

The origins of the Arabo-Spanish philosophy date back to the ninth century with ABENMASARRA, who reproduced the theories of pseudo-Empedocles. In the eleventh century we find the names of ABEN-HAZAM of Cordova, and AVEMPACE of Saragossa (end of eleventh century to 1138). The latter was the author of logical works, a treatise on the soul, numerous Aristotelian commentaries, and a *Guide for the Solitary*, which studies the stages of the mystical union. We find the same mystical tendencies in ABU-BACER (Ibn Thofail, 1100-1185).

¹ Cf. M. Asin, *La mystique d'Al-Gazzali* (Mélanges de la Faculté Orientale, 1914, pp. 67-104).

But none of these philosophers was equal in celebrity to Averrhoes. Born at Cordova in 1126, Averrhoes (Ibn Roschd) was in turn held in honour in the courts of the great, and then suffered their disgrace. He died in 1198. He was a physician, a man of science, and a noteworthy commentator on the Aristotelian encyclopædia, to the exegesis of which he devoted his life. His admiration for Aristotle was boundless. He says of him: "Credo enim quod iste homo (Aristoteles) fuerit regula in natura et exemplar, quod natura invenit ad demonstrandam ultimam perfectionem humanam."¹ He himself was known in the Middle Ages as the *Commentator*. But this does not imply that his own philosophy is a mere reproduction of Aristotelianism.

We can distinguish the Aristotelian commentaries left by Averrhoes into three groups, the greater commentaries, the lesser commentaries, and the abridgements or paraphrases. The first group follow the text very closely, and explain it at length; the others are more condensed, treat the subject matter with more order, and above all introduce discussions and personal developments, in which it is not easy to separate out the doctrines attributed to Aristotle. It is in Logic that Averrhoes follows the Stagirite with the greatest fidelity. The three types of commentary exist in Latin translations for the *Posterior Analytics*, the *Physics*, the *De Cælo*, the *Psychology*, and the *Metaphysics*. We possess the whole of the *Organon* in the lesser commentary and in paraphrase, and other commentaries besides were known to the Latins.

The Latins were also acquainted with original treatises by Averrhoes: the *Destruction of the Destruction*, a reply to Gazali; *Quæsitæ in libros logicæ Aristotelis*; an epitome of the *Organon*; Problems in Physics; *Epistola de connectione intellectus abstracti cum homine*, *De animæ beatitudine*, discussions on points of Avicennian metaphysics, *De substantia orbis*, and various treatises on the agreement between the religious law and philosophy.

1. The *Supreme Being*, the object of metaphysics, and whose existence is proved by rational arguments, brings forth from all eternity all the *Intelligences*. Only a creative act can explain the presence of reality outside God. The *Intelligences* accordingly do not emanate one from the other in cascade fashion

¹ Lib. 3, *De Anima*, c. 2 (Venice edn., 1550, f. 169, l. 59.)

(Avicenna), but are created directly by God. Their plurality results from the fact that they are unequal in perfection and simplicity. They are extrinsically united to spheres. The heavens are composed of several spheres, each with an Intelligence as its form. The first mover puts in motion the first sphere, and this passes on the motion to the planetary spheres, as far as the moon, which is moved by the human intellect (*intelligentia vel motor lunæ*). This intellect, which intervenes in our acts of understanding, has a metaphysical function as in Avicenna's system.

2. *Eternity and potentiality of matter.* Matter is eternal together with God, for non-being cannot be the term of a creative act. It is pure indetermination, but nevertheless is not an empty receptacle in which forms are projected (neo-Platonism), but a universal potency, containing all forms in germ. In presence of this eternal matter, the first mover (*extractor*) draws forth (*extractio*) the active forces of matter: the material world results from the uninterrupted sequence of these developments. The series of generations is necessary, and is eternal *a parte ante* and *a parte post*.

3. *The monism of the human intellect and the denial of personal immortality.* The human intelligence, the last of the planetary series, is an immaterial, eternal form, separated from individuals, and endowed with numerical unity. This intelligence is both the *active intellect* and the *material or possible intellect*. The whole human mind is impersonal and objective; it is the torch which illumines individual souls, and thus secures for humanity an unchangeable participation in the eternal truths.¹

In the individual man, the act of intelligence takes place in the following manner: by its action on the sense images which are proper to each man, the separated intelligence contracts an accidental union with the individual according to the dispositions of each one, and without suffering any detriment to its numerical unity from these manifold unions.²

¹ Cum ex hoc dicto nos possumus opinari intellectum materialem esse unicum in cunctis individuís, possumusque adhuc ex hoc existimare humanam speciem esse æternam . . . ideo oportebit intellectum materialem non posse denudari a principiis universalibus natura notis universæ humanæ speciei.—*De anima*, III, ed. Juntas, Venice, 1550, p. 165, R.B.

² Et, cum declaratum est . . . quod impossibile est ut intellectus copuletur cum unoquoque hominum, et numeretur per numerationem eorum per partem, quæ est eo quasi materia, secundum intellectum materialem, remanet

This first degree of possession engenders in the individual the *acquired intellect* which one may call "the impersonal reason participated by the personal being."¹ But there are still more intimate unions of man with the universal intellect—that which results from the actual possession of the abstract essences; and, at the highest point in the scale, that which is brought about by the mystical knowledge and prophetic illumination.

From the doctrine follows the impersonality of life after death. Everything dies in man, except his Intelligence, which is not an individual substance, but the Intelligence of the race, common to all.

4. *Philosophy and the allegorical interpretation of the Koran.* Many of Averrhoes' doctrines ran counter to the Mohammedan religion. It was indeed because the Caliphs suspected his philosophy that he was banished. Nevertheless, Averrhoes was not irreligious. According to him, religion presents philosophical truth in a symbolic manner. He distinguished between the literal interpretation of the *Koran*, suitable for the illiterate, and the allegorical interpretation to which philosophers have access and which alone leads one to the higher truths. It belongs to philosophy to decide what is traditional in religion, what doctrines need to be interpreted, and in what way. These principles enable Averrhoes to reconcile the thesis of the temporal origin of the world defended by Gazali, with the Peripatetic thesis of its eternity. He devotes a special treatise to this attempt at reconciliation.² Here we find the first suggestion of the doctrine of the two truths so extensively used by the latin Averrhoists.

The line of Arabian philosophers came to an end with Averrhoes, but their influence survived in the person of the Jewish philosophers.

191. Philosophy among the Jews : Avencebrol, Maimonides.

ut continuatio intellectorum cum nobis hominibus sit per continuationem intentionis intellectæ cum nobis et sunt intentiones imaginatæ, etc.—*ibid.*, p. 164, V. A. Cf. the whole commentary on Book III of *De Anima*, and the *opuscula* on the separated intellect.

¹ Renan, *Averroès et l'Averroïsme*, 5th edn., p. 140.

² Published by Worms, Beiträge, III, 4. In connection with the temporal creation of the world, Averrhoes writes for instance: Omnia ista sunt existimationes vulgares, valde sufficientes secundum cursum quem nutriuntur homines in eis, non secundum sermonem sufficientes.—*Comment. Physics* of Aristotle, Vol. IV, in Venice edition of the *Opera* (1560), Book VIII, c. 1, p. 271 v.

—If we exclude mysticism which centred round the Cabala, we may say that Jewish philosophy is an adaptation of the doctrine of Judaism to Greek philosophy. This feature is already noticeable in PHILO (30 B.C.—A.D. 50) and is more prominent still in the Middle Ages. Among the philosophic writers prior to the eleventh century we may mention the physician and logician ISAAC ISRAELI (died 940), DAVID BEN MERWAN the caraïte, and especially his contemporary and opponent, SAADJA (892-942), who has been called the first Jewish philosopher. His chief work, “*Amānāt*,” or *Book of Faith and Science*, written in 933 at Sura in Babylonia, is at once exegetical and apologetical, inasmuch as it endeavours to show the harmony existing between Judaism and reason. Saadja was an eclectic: he took his philosophic arguments from the Greeks and the Arabian rationalists as well as from the Orthodox Arabs. The work was written in Arabic, but was twice translated into Hebrew, one version being made in 1186 by Jehuda ben Saul ibn Tibbon.

Jewish philosophy developed principally in Spain, where also their science and literature flourished, thanks to the freedom they enjoyed under the Arab domination.

The two most important representatives from the standpoint of the history of Western thought, were Avencebrol and Moses Maimonides. The former is closely attached to the neo-Platonist system, and the latter to Aristotelianism.

SALOMON IBN GEBIROL (AVENCEBROL, about 1020-1050/70), of Saragossa, was the most celebrated of the Jewish philosophers in Spain, and with him began a period of brilliant thought. His chief work, *Fons Vitæ*, the only one known to the West in the thirteenth century, develops a powerful and original system in which the Aristotelian and neo-Platonist influences of Arabian philosophy are closely combined.

The first fundamental idea is that of *emanative and degenerate monism*. God, the supreme Being, One and Unknowable (Plotinus) is the only reality, whence is derived the series of limited beings as from an inexhaustible source. God produces the Cosmic Spirit, inferior to Himself, and composed of matter and form (Aristotle), two universal principles which permeate all finite reality, and which God brings together in an indissoluble union by His Will. The potentiality and finite nature of all the stages of the Cosmos are explained by the presence

in all things of *materia universalis*, just as their root of all the determinations connected therewith is derived from the *forma universalis*. When the Cosmic Spirit spreads itself out by the process of degenerating emanation, its development at once divides into two lines, in which it recognizes its own being, namely, the line of pure spirits, and that of corporeal things. This division is explained by a new state of potentiality (matter) and actuality (form). In pure spirits, there is a *spiritual matter* and *form* existing in the cosmic matter and form. In the same way, in corporeal things, to the various perfections of intellectual life in man and to those of sensitive and vegetable life and corporeal extension, there correspond new forms, according to the degrees of the hierarchical scale, united to matter or corporeal potentiality. Thus each individual substance possesses within itself a plurality of matters and forms determining its place in the system of emanations ; and all things derive their being from the Divine source in the Cosmic Spirit.

Man is a *microcosmos* since he is an image of the universe or *macrocosmos*. His body, a *résumé* of the corporeal world, results from cosmic matter and corporeal matter, which are actualized by the inferior forms of corporeity (extension), figure, colour, etc. At the same time it is the seat of vegetative, sensible and rational souls, which are so many derivatives of the universal Soul or cosmic form. He also possesses intelligence which can rise to the intuition of the Infinite. The Cosmic Spirit, together with everything which comes forth from it, tends towards God, the Absolute and Unique Good.

That which is peculiar to Avencebrol is not his emanative monism, but his theory of the plurality of matters and forms in one and the same individual, and the cognate thesis that the composition of matter and form is found also in spiritual substances. The discussion of these two doctrines played a great part in the scholastic metaphysics of the thirteenth century.

To the name of Avencebrol we may join that of JOSEPH BEN ZADDIK (died 1149). His *Microcosmos* marks the transition from the religious science with which the Motakallimîn opposed philosophy, to the Jewish Aristotelianism represented by Moses Maimonides.

MOSES MAIMONIDES, the great admirer of Aristotle, was born

at Cordova in 1135, and died in Egypt in 1204. In his *Book of Precepts*, and *Guide for the Doubting* (which the Scholastics called *Dux neutrorum sive dubiorum*), he builds up on an Aristotelian foundation a philosophic justification of the doctrines of Judaism. The perplexed ones whose doubts he wishes to remove are the Jews who do not question the existence of God, but represent Him in anthropomorphic ways.

The highest object of metaphysics is God. Maimonides proves his existence after the manner of the "philosophers" of Alfarabi and Avicenna, by the argument for the first mover, and the distinction between the possible and the necessary, two proofs which he derives from his predecessors, and which he supports by "twenty-six propositions of philosophers" drawn from Aristotle's *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. A third proof deduces the existence of a necessary and infinite Being from that of contingent and limited beings, and this is peculiar to Maimonides. A last argument, very similar to the first, leads to the existence of a first and unique cause. The similarity between these arguments and the "five ways" of Thomas Aquinas has often been pointed out.

Maimonides stresses the unity and spirituality of God. We attain to God only by negative ideas, by excluding all potentiality and resemblance with limited being. We are able to say what He is not, not what He is. God created the world in time, and above man there are pure spirits constituting a hierarchy of perfection. Of all corporeal beings, man alone is the object of a Providence extending to each single individual. The knowledge of God is the end towards which tend both philosophy and religion, by convergent efforts. In order to harmonize belief and reason, Maimonides admits side by side with the literal exegesis of the Bible, a philosophic and allegorical interpretation by means of which the texts take a sense which does not contradict certain scientific truths. This method is tinged with rationalism, and led to controversy and opposition in the Jewish schools of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

Maimonides was the last great representative of Jewish Philosophy in Spain. He exercised a considerable influence on the Jews of Provence and on the Scholastics.

192. Bibliography.—Abundant bibliography in B. Geyer, *F. Ueberwegs Grundriss* . . . § 27-29.

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ABBREVIATIONS

USED IN THE COURSE OF THE WORK

- Arch. F.H. (*Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*).
 Arch. H.D.L.M.A. (*Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age*).
 Beiträge (B. zur Geschichte der Philosophie und der Theologie des Mittelalters).
 Beitr. K.M.R. (Beiträge zur Kulturgeschichte des Mittelalters und der Renaissance).
 Bibl. th. (*Bibliothèque thomiste*).
 Bull. th. (*Bulletin thomiste*).
 Dict. H.G.E. (*Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastiques*).
 Dict. théol. cath. (*Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*).
 Forsch. G.P.P. (*Forschungen zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Pädagogik*).
 Flor. Pat. (*Florilegium Patristicum*).
 Hist. Jahrb. (*Historisches Jahrbuch*).
 Phil. Belges. (*Les Philosophes Belges*).
 P.G., P.L. (*Patrologia Græca, Patrologia Latina*).
 Op. et text. (*Opusculua et textus, Series scholastica*).
 Riv. F.N.S. (*Rivista di filosofia neo-scholastica*).
 R. Hist. éccles. (*Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique*).
 Revue Néo-Scholast. (*Revue Néo-scholastique de philosophie*).
 R. Sc. P.T. (*Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*).
 R. Th. (*Revue thomiste*).
 Rech. T.A.M. (*Récherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*).
 Schol. (*Scholastik*).
 Sitz. B. (*Sitzungsberichte of the Academy of Berlin, Class of Philosophy*).
 Sitz. M. (*Sitzungsberichte of the Academy of Munich, Class of Philosophy*).
 Sitz. V. (*Sitzungsberichte of the Academy of Vienna, Class of Philosophy*).
 Xenia th. (*Xenia thomistica*).

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